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The present work has examined the thesis that the current framework for the regulation 
of SMP under EU law on electronic communications does not address the oligopoly 
problem in full. Under the SMP framework for electronic communications, joint 
dominance is considered a very rare occasion that may arise in symmetrical duopolies; 
there are strong doubts on whether the existing framework is capable in practice of 
addressing more complex issues associated with oligopolies in electronic 
communication markets. Wholesale international roaming is presented as a case study 
in support of this submission. Under the SMP framework for electronic 
communications, the Commission thinking has been too much dominated by the 
concept of single dominance. In view of the increasing number of oligopolistic markets 
in the post-liberalisation era, the framework needs to be revised to encompass wider 
market definitions, which will be able to catch oligopolistic situations also. The 
application of the collective dominance test of Annex II of the Framework Directive 
and the Guidelines on the assessment of market power will have to be updated in 
accordance with the Impala judgment. Also, the Guidelines should be revised to 
address also particulars of the application of remedies in oligopolistic markets and  
remedies of a quasi-contract type, like the imposition of penalties that may be used for 
the finance of the roll-out of new networks should be examined as an alternative to 
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Chapter 1: Concerns around the 
Oligopoly Problem in the European 
Telecommunications Markets.  
 
The present work addresses the approach adopted by NRAs and the Commission for 
the eventual regulation of oligopolies under the current framework on the regulation of 
significant market power in electronic communications. This is done through the 
detailed review of Commission notifications under Article 7 of the Framework 
Directive, literature, Commission documents, studies and case-law summarised in the 
Bibliography section. Material is updated until 30.09.2013. The position taken in this 
thesis is that, under the SMP framework for electronic communications, joint 
dominance is considered a very rare occasion that may arise in symmetrical duopolies; 
there are doubts on whether the existing framework is capable of addressing more 
complex issues associated with oligopolies in electronic communication markets. It is 
submitted that the case of wholesale international roaming, which is presented as a 
case study in this work, makes this point, i.e. it is a more complex case of collective 
dominance that failed to be addressed under the existing framework, hence,  was dealt 
with under the Roaming Regulations. The work also suggests improvements to the 
guidelines given by the Commission on the application of SMP framework in 
oligopolistic markets.   
 
The first chapter identifies concerns around the existing regulation of oligopolies in the 
European telecommunication markets. The first section describes the so-called 
oligopoly problem in markets with few players and sets out the approach of 
competition law to this problem through the development of the concept of collective 
dominance. The second section starts with a description of the likely emergence of 
oligopolies in European telecommunication markets in order to show that the 
oligopoly problem merits attention in the context of electronic communications in 
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Europe, albeit the focus of regulation to date has been on single dominance as a result 
of the need to deal with impediments created by the former incumbents.   
 
1.1. Oligopolies and competition law 
1.1.1. Identification of the oligopoly problem 
 
The literal definition of an ‘oligopoly’ is as simple as the two constituents of the word, 
which has a Greek origin: ‘oligon’, which means few in Greek and ‘polion’, which was 
a term applied to define markets in Ancient Greek; hence, an oligopoly is a market 
with few market players or, more precisely, a market structure with few firms and 
many buyers1. 
 
In an oligopoly, the ability to exploit market power derives directly from the peculiar 
characteristic of the market itself, namely the presence of only few players, each of 
which enjoys a strong position on the market without being dominant, and a high level 
of transparency on the market that allows each player to be aware of the conduct of the 
others. These features create interdependence among all players, which confers on 
them a position of dominance on the market that is collectively held2. In light of their 
interdependence, undertakings usually try to find an equilibrium that allows them to 
cohabit on the market3. There are, however, oligopolistic markets where competition is 
intense as a result of market conditions. The indispensable characteristic of an 
oligopoly is the existence of a sustainable mechanism for the coordination of 
behaviour that may lead to parallelism of prices and capacity4, which results from the 
structure of the market (limited number of players of a considerable size). The firm’s 
rational choice to either collude or compete is thus driven by a trade-off between the 
short-term profits of competition and the expected loss from retaliation5. 
 
                                            
1 Alese, F., The Economic Theory of Non-Collusive Oligopoly and the Concert of Concerted Practice 
Under Article 81, [1999] ECLR, 379. 
2 Vecchi, T., Unilateral Conduct in an Oligopoly accoding to the Discussion Paper on Art. 82: 
Conscious Parallelism or Abuse of Collective Dominance?, [2008] World Competition, 386. 
3 Ibid., 387. 
4 Kokkoris, I., Assessment of Mergers Inducing Coordinated Effects in the Presence of Explicit 
Collusion, [2008] World Competition, 498. 
5 Mezzanote, F., Can the Commission use Article 82EC to combat Tacit Collusion? CCP Working Paper 
09-5, February 2009, 16. 
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As a result of their interdependence relationships, it is very difficult to distinguish 
collusive forms of conduct from parallel forms attributed to the nature and structure of 
an oligopolistic market6. This is the so-called ‘oligopoly problem’, notably the lack of 
a “yes or no” answer to the question: is competition in the specific oligopolistic market 
effective. 
 
Economists have developed various models to approach the ‘oligopoly problem’. The 
Cournot model is what economists regard as the classic oligopoly model. It was 
presented by the French mathematician Augustin Cournot in 1838, who tried to 
establish a precise relationship –in terms of prices, profit and supplied quantity- 
between (a) concentration of supply, production costs and price elasticity of market 
demand and (b) market outcome7. The Cournot model focuses on restriction of 
capacity and shows under what circumstances it is rational for firms to restrict their 
capacity or output individually, thus causing prices to rise above the competitive level 
(profit maximising output level). This model tries to accommodate a chain of reactions 
of the oligopolists, whereto each player makes a choice without knowing what the 
competitors will do, but taking into account what choice can rationally be expected 
from them. It is a static model in the sense that there is only one period in which 
oligopolists make their decisions and it also operates under the assumptions that rivals 
keep their output fixed and that they all anticipate equal marginal costs. The outcome 
of the model is that for any particular number of firms, there exists stable price-
quantity equilibrium8.  
 
The Bertrand theory was developed in 18889. The theory tries to calculate the price 
that would be expected in a market structure and establishes the starting point of the 
                                            
6 Whish, R., Competition Law, Butterworths LexisNexis, 2003, 466. 
7 Cournot, A., Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth, 1938 (1897, 
translation into English by N.T. Bacon). In Chapter 7, Cournot presents his famous duopoly model, 
whereby he shows that if each producer chooses a quantity that maximizes his profits subject to the 
quantity reactions of his rival, the quantities chosen by the rival producers are in accordance with each 
other's anticipated reactions. He notes that under duopoly, the price is lower and the total quantity 
produced greater than under monopoly and shows further that as the number of producers increases, the 
quantity becomes greater and the price lower and able to reach a level where the price is equal to 
marginal cost. 
8 Niels, G., Collective Dominance: More than just Oligopolistic Interdependence [2001] ECLR, 169. 
9 Bertrand, J.L.F., Calcul des Probabilites, 1888, Paris: Gauthier-Villars. In this text book he stated what 
was later referred to as the Bertrand paradox. 
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effectiveness of competition where companies are tempted to lower such price. In this 
model, firms chose their price level as opposed to the profit maximising output level of 
the Cournot model. The model’ s main deficiency lies in the fact that in the case of 
homogeneous goods, it leads to the same outcome as perfect competition, even in 
duopolies, because firms keep undercutting each other’ s prices until the level of 
marginal cost10. This deficiency is the reason for the Bertrand model not being 
systematically used for the assessment of oligopolistic structures. 
 
The welfare costs in the static Cournot model or Bertrand model with capacity 
constraints or differentiated products illustrate well the costs of vigorous competition. 
These models predict an equilibrium price in oligopoly which is lower than the 
monopoly price, but higher than the price in perfect competition. Although the welfare 
costs of vigorous competition can be higher than those of perfect competition, they are 
still lower than those of collusion11. 
 
Modern economic theory has criticised the foregoing models for heavy reliance on 
static equilibrium concepts. Namely, they take into account only one period in which 
oligopolists make their decisions, thus omitting dynamic considerations with the effect 
of being unrealistic and non-corresponding to business reality12.  
 
Starting from Chamberlin in 192913, who found that the interaction of two completely 
independent sellers may give rise to a complete absence of price competition, without 
however any sort of agreement, the economists of the 20th century developed the 
theories of “interdependence” or “game theory” or the theory of “tacit collusion”, as a 
response to the foregoing criticisms14.  
 
The Harvard school, represented by Bain, Kaysen and Turner, gathered a huge amount 
of empirical data and found a link between oligopolistic market concentration and 
                                            
10 Niels, G., ibid., 170. 
11 Mezzanote, F., ibid., 15. 
12 Etter, B., The Assessment of Mergers in the EC under the Concept of Collective Dominance [2000] 
Journal of World Competition, 114. 
13 E. H. Chamberlin, “Duopoly: Value Where Sellers Are Few”, (1929) 44 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 63. 
14 Aumann, R.J., Game Theory in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online, 2008, 2nd edition, 
Durlauf, S., Blume, L. (eds), www.dictionaryofeconomics.com 
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supra-competitive profits (the “SCP paradigm”)15. In their view, if oligopolies achieve 
supra-competitive profits it is because, like monopolies, they enjoy an “unreasonable” 
degree of market power. On the other hand, Chicago School experts argued that 
oligopolistic market structures often yielded efficiencies. In their view, Harvard 
scholars had succumbed to a daft economic error, that of conflating correlation and 
causation by failing to envision the alternative explanation that oligopolists achieve 
profits thanks to superior efficiency16. Stigler demonstrated that collusion can only 
arise in the presence of demanding conditions – i.e. oligopolists must be able to 
monitor and police adherence to a pre-defined collusive agreement17.  
 
The advances in game theory in the 1970s based on a classic prisoner’s dilemma, 
where the long-term profits achieved with collusion exceed the short-term profits 
achieved with competition, build on the traditional models but analyse the conditions 
under which it is rational for individual firms to stick to anti-competitive market 
equilibrium both in the short and in the long run, namely to co-ordinate future price 
increases through the use of a self-enforcing mechanism. Firms take decisions 
individually, unilaterally, independently and rationally, but, as a result of the 
characteristics of the market, they end up co-ordinating their market behaviour in an 
entirely non-cooperative fashion18. Game theory principles explain that collusion is a 
conduct, and that the incentive for firms to behave this way lies in the fact that 
collusion pays more than vigorous competition. Moreover, they illustrate that the 
collusive conduct of firms has to be self-enforceable, which occurs through a 
mechanism of retaliation by which firms are able to defeat the short-term incentive to 
undercut prices19. 
 
                                            
15 J. S. Bain, Industrial Organization, 2nd ed., John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1968; C. Kaysen C. and 
D.F.Turner, Antitrust Policy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1959. 
16 Petit, N., The ‘Oligopoly Problem’ in EU Competition Law, in Research Handbook in European 
Competition Law, I. Liannos and D. Geradin eds., Edward Elgar, September 2013, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1999829, p. 5. 
17 Stigler, G., A Theory of Oligopoly, [1964] Journal of Political Economy, 44. 
18 Christensen, P., Rabassa, V., The Airtours decision: Is there a new Commission approach to collective 
dominance?, [2001] ECLR, 228. 
19 Mezzanote, F., ibid., 18. 
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It is noted that no oligopoly theory can predict the effect on competition, but it can 
identify general criteria of market structure and conduct for the assessment of 
collective dominance20. 
 
The EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines21 summarise the conditions that must exist 
cumulatively, for the non-cooperative equilibrium of game theory to arise and endure, 
in paragraph 41:  
‘Coordination is more likely to emerge in markets where it is relatively simple 
to reach a common understanding on the terms of coordination. In addition, 
three conditions are necessary for coordination to be sustainable. First, the 
coordinating firms must be able to monitor to a sufficient degree whether the 
terms of coordination are being adhered to. Second, discipline requires that 
there is some form of credible deterrent mechanism that can be activated if 
deviation is detected. Third, the reactions of outsiders, such as current and 
future competitors not participating in the coordination, as well as customers, 
should not be able to jeopardise the results expected from the coordination’. 
 
Notably, first, oligopolists must share a common understanding of the price at which 
collusion should unveil, otherwise they will keep raising price at different levels, and 
there will be competition in the market. Second, there must be a “credible threat of 
retaliation” against rival cheaters, to discourage any temptation to deviate. Third, 
oligopolists must be able to monitor each other’s prices so as to “detect” any 
competitive deviation. Fourth, the sustainability of tacitly collusive prices is 
conditioned on the oligopolists’ ability to “discourage production by external firms”, 
in other words, entry22. 
 
1.1.2. The treatment of the oligopoly problem in the development of competition 
law 
 
                                            
20 Niels, G., ibid., 172. 
21 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, [2004] OJ C31/5.  
22 Petit, N., ibid., 7.  
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In competition law, the joint exercise of market power through the co-ordinated 
behaviour of an oligopoly has been associated with joint or collective dominance23. 
The precise number of firms operating in the market at issue is not essential and varies 
between markets24. What is essential is that there should be sufficiently few firms in 
the market, so that each firm recognises that its best choice of action depends on the 
choices of its rivals25.  
 
As explained by Kook and Kerse26:  
“The concept of collective dominance rests on the economic proposition that 
in highly concentrated markets it is highly likely, if not inevitable, that if only 
a small number of firms survive, they will recognise their inter-dependence 
and the futility of aggressive competitive behaviour. They will adapt their 
behaviour, not necessarily collusively, to that which a profit-maximising 
dominant single firm would choose. For this to occur, market conditions must 
be such that, in the medium to long term, competitive activity (i.e. action 
which pays no heed to competitors’ likely reactions) by a firm will not bring it 
any sustainable economic benefit”.  
 
The  Court of Justice had not been always keen on applying the general principles of 
competition law of article 102 of the EC Treaty to cases of dominance involving more 
than one undertakings. In Hoffmann La Roche27 and in Zuchner28 the CJEU held that a 
condition precedent for the application of article 102 was the unilateral nature of the 
abusive conduct of the undertaking, which could not be the case where more than one 
undertakings are involved. It was not until some years later in Italian Flat Glass29, 
where the Court of First Instance took a different view: 
                                            
23 Christensen, P., Rabassa, V., ibid., 227. If express collusion between market players is experienced in 
oligopolistic markets, this may be caught by Article 101 of the Treaty, like any other form of anti-
competitive behavior, refer also to Jones, A., Suffrin, B., EC Competition Law, 2nd edition, 2004, 772-
785. 
24 Views have been expresssed on the quantitative understanding of a tight oligopoly as a group of two 
to five undertakings. Refer to Haupt, H., Collective Dominance under Article 82 EC and the EC Merger 
Control in the light of the Airtours Judgement [2002] ECLR, 435. 
25 Niels, G., ibid., 169. 
26 Cook & Kerse, EC Merger Control, Oxford University Press, 2000, 171. 
27 Case 85/76 Hoffmann La Roche v. Commission [1979] ECR 461, para. 39. 
28 Case 172/80 Gerhard Zuchner v. Bayerische Vereinsbank AG [1981] ECR 2021, para. 10. 
29 Case T-68/89 Societa Italiano Vetro v. Commission [1992] ECR II 1403, para. 358. 
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“… There is nothing, in principle, to prevent two or more independent 
economic entities from being, on a specific market, united by such economic 
links that, by virtue of that fact, together they hold a dominant position vis-à-
vis the other operators on the same market”. 
 
Since the first attempt to identify the elements of a collective dominant position in 
Italian Flat Glass, the GC emphasised the necessity of “economic links” between the 
parties involved. The Court appeared to suggest that economic links might be 
established where there are structural links between the undertakings in question30, 
since reference was made to the existence of agreements between the parties or 
licenses providing them technological advantages31. The same position was taken by 
the Commission in its Notice on Access Agreements in the telecommunications 
sector32, where the agreements for cooperation or interconnection agreements between 
operators were considered to establish significant economic links for the establishment 
of collective dominance, if other factors so permit. 
 
Albeit the principles laid by Italian Flat Glass are quoted as authority in the cases that 
are mentioned in this section, the concept of collective dominance has evolved around 
the examination of merger cases in the years that followed. 
 
The judgements in Almelo and Kali & Salz33 required the existence of links 
establishing “the same conduct on the market” by the undertakings involved34. 
Gencor35 took things a step further in recognising that evidence of economic 
interdependence was sufficient to establish collective dominance. The General Court in 
Gencor clarified that structural links are not a prerequisite for the establishment of 
collective dominance: 
“[Anti-competitive] structures may result from the existence of economic 
links in the strict sense … or from market structures of an oligopolistic kind 
where each undertaking may become aware of common interests and, in 
                                            
30 Withers, Ch., Jephcott, M., Where to now for EC oligopoly control? [2001] ECLR, 297. 
31 Para. 358 of Italian Flat Glass. 
32 [1998] OJ C 265/2, par. 91(a). 
33 Joint Cases C-68/94, France v. Commission and C-30/95 Societe Commerciale des Potasses et de l’ 
Azotte and Entreprise Miniere et Chimique v. Commission [1998] 4 CMLR 829,  para. 221. 
34 Case C-393/92, Municipality of Almelo and others v NV Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij, par. 42. 
35 Case T-102/96, Gencor v. Commission [1999] 4 CMLR 971, para. 186. 
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particular, cause prices to increase without having to enter into an agreement 
or resort to a concerted practice”36. 
 
The position was confirmed in Compagnie Maritime Belge37:  
“[T]he existence of an agreement or of other links in law is not indispensable 
to a finding of a collective dominant position; such a finding may be based 
on other connecting factors and would depend on an economic assessment 
and, in particular, on an assessment of the structure of the market in 
question”. 
 
The Court shifted the focus of attention from the existence of economic links to their 
effect by requiring the undertakings involved to act as a single entity against market 
conditions. This shift of attention has been criticised as implying that there can be no 
price competition between the constituents of a collective dominant position38, which is 
contrary to the Court’ s earlier judgements, such as Gencor, which required for the 
establishment of economic links a mere 
“relationship of interdependence existing between the parties to a tight 
oligopoly within which, in a market with the appropriate characteristics, in 
particular in terms of market concentration, transparency and product 
homogeneity, those parties are in a position to anticipate one another’s 
behaviour and are therefore strongly encouraged to align their conduct in the 
market in such a way as to maximise their joint profits by restricting production 
with a view to increasing prices”39. 
 
In Airtours40, a leading case for collective dominance, which involved the merger of 
two out of the four major vertically integrated travel groups in the UK, the 
Commission contended that tacit collusion is not a necessary condition for collective 
dominance: 
                                            
36 Para. 277 of the judgment. 
37 Case C-395/96P, Compagnie Maritime Belge v. Commission [2000]3 CMLR 1076, para. 45. 
38 Preece, S., Compagnie Maritime Belge: Missing the boat? [2000] ECLR, 390. 
39 Para. 276. Conversely, the Gencor judgement has been criticised as failing to consider the capability 
of the group’ s independent undertakings to act not only in an independent, but also in an identical 
manner on the relevant market, refer to Haupt., H. ibid., 441-442. 
40 Case IV/M. 1524 Airtours/First Choice [2000] OJ L 93/01. 
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‘it is sufficient that the merger makes it rational for the oligopolists, in 
adopting themselves to market conditions to act, individually, in ways which 
will substantially reduce competition’41. 
 
The Airtours judgement has been considered to identify a gap in the coverage of 
merger regulation, in that mergers can have adverse effects on competition, yet lead to 
a position of neither single firm dominance nor collective dominance42. Although the 
decision was overruled by the GC on appeal43 on the standard of evidence accepted by 
the Commission, the principles set out by the Commission in the original decision 
were not challenged.  
 
The GC’s judgement on Airtours provides a clearer description on the requisite links 
between the oligopolists for tacit co-ordination to be established. The decision refines 
earlier judgements in explaining the links that place oligopolists in a position towards 
the other members of the group favouring collusive behaviour. Such links, 
“may arise as the result of a concentration where, in view of the actual 
characteristics of the relevant market and of the alteration in its structure that 
the transaction would entail, the latter would make each member of the 
dominant oligopoly, as it becomes aware of common interests, consider it 
possible, economically rational, and hence, preferable, to adopt on a lasting 
basis a common policy on the market with the aim of selling at above 
competitive prices, without having to enter into an agreement or resort to a 
concerted practice within the meaning of Article [101] EC and without any 
actual or potential competitors, let alone customers or consumers, being able 
to react effectively”44. 
 
In Airtours, the GC laid down a strict standard regarding the finding of joint 
dominance. According to the GC, the Commission is required not simply to reflect the 
normal economic conditions of the market, but must convincingly indicate not only the 
anticompetitive impact of commercial links but the likelihood and sustainability of the 
                                            
41 Par. 54 of the decision. 
42 Kokkoris, I., The Reform of the European Control Merger Regulation in the Aftermath of the Airtours 
Case – the Eagerly Expected Debate: SLC v Dominance Test, [2005] ECLR, 41.  
43 Case T-342/99 Airtours v. European Commission, Decision of 6.6.2002. 
44 Para. 61 of the judgement. 
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common policy as well. Hence, the GC contended that the fact that there were the 
same institutional shareholders common to Airtours, First Choice and Thomson could 
not be regarded as evidence of collective dominance in the absence of evidence 
demonstrating that the common shareholders were capable of exercising influence on 
the management of these undertakings or that there was a mechanism for exchanging 
information between them45. Also, the Commission’s arguments with regard to the 
“tendency towards collective dominance” alleged to exist on the affected market 
already prior to the concentration were rejected46.  
 
The GC judgment on Airtours has been criticized for having drawn too close an 
analogy between tacit collusion and explicit anticompetitive agreements47. Thus, a 
couple of years later, in IMPALA, the GC accepted that the conditions defined by the 
Court in Airtours as necessary for the existence of tacit collusion, may 
‘in the appropriate circumstances, be established indirectly on the basis of 
what may be a very mixed series of indicia and items of evidence relating 
to the signs, manifestations and phenomena inherent in the presence of a 
collective dominant position’48. 
 
A couple of years later the CJEU seems to have confirmed the judgment in holding at 
paragraphs125 and 12849 that  
“objection cannot be taken to paragraph 251 of itself” 
 and that  
“In applying those criteria, it is necessary to avoid a mechanical approach 
involving the separate verification of each of those criteria taken in isolation, 
while taking no account of the overall economic mechanism of a hypothetical 
tacit coordination”. 
 
                                            
45 Par. 90f of the judgement. 
46 Para. 63 of the GC judgement. 
47 Kokkoris, I., ibid. at footnote 60, 439. 
48 Case T-464/04, Independent Music Publishers and Labels Association (Impala) v. Commission, 13 
July 2006, [2006] ECR I-2, par. 251. 
49 C-413/06 P, Bertelsmann AG v. Impala, 10 July 2008, [2008] ECR II-4951.The Court of Justice also 
confirmed the application of the Airtours criteria as a condition precedent for the establishment of 
collective dominance,  Mezzanotte, F., Interpreting the Boundaries of Collective Dominance in Article 
102 TFEU, [2010]4 European Business Law Review, 519-537. 
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Before the issue of the Impala judgment, the GC had also considered in Laurent Piau 
v. Commission50, that the regulations for members of the FIFA clubs lay down the 
conditions for the provision of services in the football players market are capable of 
establishing collective dominance, but disentangled the establishment of such position 
from its abuse, which was not proven51. 
 
In the recent EFIM v. Commission case52, the GC citing Piau v. Commission  reiterated 
that collective dominance under Article 102 TFEU covers situations of tacit 
coordination and dismissed the claims of the applicant alleging abuse of collective 
dominance from the part of Hewlett Packard in the ink cartridge market, because it 
failed to establish the three necessary conditions precedent to tacit coordination, i.e. (i) 
detection opportunities; (ii) retaliation mechanisms; and (iii) absence of countervailing 
power of actual and potential rivals53. 
 
The 2005 Discussion Paper recognised the possibility for unilateral conduct to be 
considered an abuse of collective dominance, when a single-firm’s conduct that occurs 
in an oligopoly market has anti-competitive consequences and is a manifestation of the 
collective dominance54. However, since the Guidance Paper only dealt with collective 
dominance, similar references were omitted. Yet, not all single-firm forms of conduct 
in a tight oligopoly should be considered abusive, because these may represent merely 
an expression of conscious parallel behaviour and intelligent reaction to the conduct of 
the other members of the group55. Thanks to the favourable structure of the market, 
oligopolists have means that allow them to signal to the other undertakings their 
intentions and to monitor their reaction on their adherence to an anti-competitive 
practice, thus increasing transparency on the market and consequently reducing 
uncertainty as to the other undertakings’ conduct56. The expression of the 
interdependence between the members of an oligopoly may take the form of absence 
of competition as a natural result of each company behaving rationally in its own 
                                            
50 Case T-193/02, Laurent Piau v. Commission, judgment of 26 January 2005. 
51 Par. 114f. of the judgment. 
52 Case T-296/09, EFIM v. Commission, judgment of 24 November 2011.  
53 Par. 71f of the judgement, which was also upheld by the Court of Justice, in C-56/12, judgement of 19 
September 2013, not yet reported. 
54 DG Competition Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary 
abuses, December 2005 (the ‘Discussion Paper’), par. 74-75. 
55 Vecchi, T., ibid., 393-394. 
56 Ibid., 388. 
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interest in a concentrated market with price transparency and homogeneous products 
without any communications with its competitors57. 
 
The existence of an anti-competitive market outcome does not necessarily imply that 
firms co-operate or otherwise behave with a definite intention to restrict competition58 
and no party may be held to induce anti-competitive conduct, simply because it reacts 
intelligently to the strategic moves of its competitors59. For a unilateral conduct to fall 
within the definition of abuse of a dominant position, such conduct should benefit the 
collective dominant position jointly held by the members of the oligopoly. Such would 
be the case of a conduct increasing transparency on the market or reducing the 
uncertainty as to the other members’ behaviour, like advance price-announcements 
indicating the intention not to lower prices by way of adopting a most favoured 
customer clause in contracts with buyers60. 
 
In fact, there has been wide discussion after Airtours, given the stringent constraints 
placed on the Commission by the GC in this case, that an SLC test would give the 
Commission scope to plead co-ordinated or unilateral effect arguments in the 
alternative and, thereby, to reach cases in oligopolistic markets where it had a real 
concern that competition would be reduced by a concentration, but where it could not 
make a collective dominance case. The economic justification behind the suggested 
change in the test was found on static economic models of Cournot competition, 
according to which any increase in supply concentration may lead to higher 
equilibrium prices, even if the merged entity is not necessarily the market leader61. 
 
                                            
57 Ibid., 386-387, Temple Lang, J., Oligopolies and Joint Dominance in Community Antitrust Law, 
[2001] Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corp. L. Inst., 274.  
58 Kloosterhuis, E., Joint Dominance and the Interaction between Firms [2001] ECLR., 79. 
59 In Woodpulp (Case C-89/85 Alstrom v. Commission [1993] ECR I-1307, para. 71), the CJEU held that 
intelligent reactions to the market by oligopolists is an alternative plausible explanation to a concerted 
practice, which does not infringe Article 101. 
60 Vecchi, ibid., 396-397, derives the argument on the advantage of the other members of the oligopoly 
from the Irish Sugar judgement and Article 101 case-law establishing that all members of a complex 
agreement prohibited under Article 101 may be held liable if such behaviour was intended to pursue the 
common purpose of the agreement (e.g. joined cases T-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95 to T-32/95, T-34/95 to 
T-39/95, T-42/95 to T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95 to T-65/95, T-68/95 to T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-
103/95 and T-104/95, Cementeries CRB v. Commission). 




In its Green Paper for the Review of Merger Regulation62, the Commission launched a 
comparative discussion of the relative merits of the dominance test and of the SLC test 
used in other jurisdictions, notably the USA and the UK, thereby prohibiting 
acquisitions of shareholdings with possible effects of substantially lessening 
competition or tending to create a monopoly63. One of the main reasons for the 
suggested change was that, leading academics and practitioners were casting doubt on 
the ability of the dominance test to deal with the so-called “non-collusive” oligopolies, 
namely situations where the oligopolists would not be acting in pursuit of a common 
policy, but would rather each individually exercise market power64. The dominance 
test might not capture mergers that substantially lessen competition, unless they make 
tacit co-ordination likely65. 
 
In its response to the Green Paper, the United Kingdom mentioned that the SLC test, 
especially in oligopolistic markets, is fundamentally better adapted to merger control, 
primarily because it is directly grounded on economic analysis and on the impact of 
the merger on competition, whereas Sweden argued that the SLC test may be assumed 
to deal more effectively with cases where one cannot state there is a risk of concerted 
practices, but concentration enables the company to act to the disadvantage of the 
consumer, the so-called ‘unilateral effects’66. Proponents of the dominance test argued 
in favour of the certainty created by European precedents on the concept of 
dominance67, as opposed to the vagueness inherent in the SLC test, particularly in 
                                            
62 European Commission, Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/1989, 
COM(2001) 745/6. 
63 Section 7 of the Clayton Act and sections 22, 33, 35 and 36 of the Enterprise Act. 
64 Fountoukakos, K., Ryan, S., A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control, [2005] ECLR,, 282. The 
dominance test has been also criticised as incapable of catching certain other types of mergers, including 
mergers between firms producing differentiated products that give rise to unilateral effects, unless 
markets are narrowly defined. See further Bishop, S., Walker, M., ibid., 310. 
65 Vickers, J., Competition Economics and Policy, [2003] ECLR, 102. Goddard, G., Curry, E., New 
Zealand’s New Mergers Test: A Comparison of Dominance and Substantial Lessening of Competition in 
the Supermarket Industry, [2003] ECLR, 310, who gave the example that under the dominance test, a 
proposed merger between the second and third largest players in an oligopolistic market would be 
cleared predominantly on the basis of the constraining influence of the first largest competitor. 
66 Kokkoris, I., ibid, 43. 
67 See further Boege, U., Mueller, E., From the Market Dominance Test to the SLC Test: Are There Any 
Reasons for a Change?, [2002] ECLR, 495-498: the authors examine the outcome of the European 
Airtours case and the US Heinz/Beech-Nut case, which were both overturned on the second degree by 
the Courts to support that both tests themselves may lead to different results, depending on the person 
who applies them. 
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relation to the adjective ‘substantial’, whereas others pleaded directly against the 
lowering of the intervention threshold to capture non-collusive oligopolies68.  
 
Finally, a compromise was reached and the Commission decided to retain an altered 
version of the dominance test in the 2004 Merger Regulation, where the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position is only one example, although the principal 
example of a significant impediment to effective competition (hence the SIEC test). 
The SIEC test aims at clarifying the notion of collective dominance, contained in the 
substantive test, as well as ensuring that the new regulation applies to mergers leading 
to unilateral effects in situations of oligopoly69. 
 
Scholars have suggested, though, that the outcome of merger cases would not have 
been much different under the traditional dominance test70, the reason being that the 
two tests generally apply the same substantive criteria, such as market structure and 
barriers to entry71. Nonetheless, even those who challenge the effects of the change in 
the test recognize that the burden to substantiate coordinated effects may be higher 
than in the case of unilateral effects analysis72. 
 
In any event, it should be clarified that this thesis only touches on the regulation of 
collusive behavior in oligopolistic electronic communications markets and will not 
examine unilateral conduct73.  
 
1.2. Oligopolies in the regulation of electronic communications  
 
                                            
68 However, the concept of dominance is an abstract term in itself as demonstrated in section 3.1. 
69 Kokkoris, I., ibid., 44. 
70 Briones, J., ibid., 28f. 
71 Litzell, M., The Appraisal of Collective Dominance under the Clarified Substantive Test of the New 
EC Merger Regulation – A Step towards greater global convergence of merger control?, [2005] 1 
ELSA SPEL, 41. 
72 Ibid., 30. 
73 However, it is noted that although the first draft of the Framework Directive was released after the 
Green Paper for the Review of Merger Regulation was published and in the course of discussions which 
lead to the adoption of the SIEC test two years after the 2002 regulatory framework, the prospective of 
establishing a test for SMP regulation on the basis of an SLC-type of test was not examined. 
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1.2.1. The likely emergence of oligopolies in telecommunications markets  
 
In network industries (telecommunications, electricity, gas, postal services, etc.), as a 
result of market opening reforms, oligopolies have replaced monopolies, and risks of 
tacit collusion are conceivable74. In electronic communications markets, as new 
entrants appear in traditionally monopolistic markets, the focus of attention with 
respect to potentially abusive behaviour is gradually shifted from one to more than one 
incumbents, who may be found to hold SMP collectively.  
 
The Commission declares the emphasis placed by the current regulatory framework on 
the role of network infrastructure competition75. Inevitably, concentration in such 
markets will be high. Despite the growing loss of market share by incumbents in 
network markets, the high investment costs entailed in most network industries, 
coupled with the rapid advances of technology in technology-driven sectors and the 
low returns of a limited customer base because of network externality features76, 
render the probability of a large number of players being active in network (wholesale) 
markets very small. The deployment of both fixed and mobile networks require 
continuous investment since future sustainable growth in maturing markets like voice 
telephony requires new service innovation and business models77. As pointed out by 
the Commission in its Implementation Report on electronic communications markets 
for the years 2012-2013, the average European may choose between 3-4 alternative 
providers. According to the Commission, in the years of 2012-2013, the dynamics of 
the mobile market have remained fairly stable, with the average shares of the three 
main operators ranging between 25% and 35%78.  
 
                                            
74 Petit, N., ibid., 50. 
75 E.g. par. 7 of Commission Recommendation of 20.09.2010 on regulated access to Next Generation 
Access Networks (NGA), [2010]OJ L 251/35. 
76 The Commission states in its Staff Working Document accompanying its Recommendation on NGA 
(p. 15) that it is unclear if commercial investment will suffice to serve all of today’s broadband 
subscribers with upgraded NGA services in the near future.  
77 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Progress Report on the Single 
European Electronic Communications Market 2009 (the 15th Implementation Report), COM 2010, 
253final, p. 1. 
78 European Commission, Staff Working Document - Implementation of the EU regulatory framework 
for electronic communications – 2014, at p. 9. 
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High concentration in wholesale markets is caused primarily by the high barriers to 
entry at wholesale level, due to high sunk costs and spectrum limitations. The 
Commission has recognised the oligopolistic structure of the market of the mobile 
market, which is due to spectrum limitations that have not been eliminated, and that in 
Member States with small number of licenses79 and no prospect of entry in the medium 
term, there may exist incentives and possibilities for mobile operators to tacitly 
collude80. The Commission calls for coordinated action by member states and market 
players to open up the digital dividend spectrum for different services, as this will 
create an opportunity particularly for wireless broadband network operators to gain 
valuable radio spectrum, which in turn is expected to reinforce competition in the 
provision of broadband services81. However, despite technology developments, which 
continually improve the exploitation of the spectrum, spectrum limitations also limit 





In addition, the few competitors in network markets may have similar cost structures, 
and constant interactions between market players based on agreements of access and 
interconnection, or infrastructure share of telephony markets that possess the 
characteristics – and the incentive – necessary to engage in collective dominant actions 
that could harm consumers83. Such constant interactions and requirements imposed by 
legislation regarding publication of interconnection and wholesale access rates may be 
reasonably found to also increase transparency of rates in the relevant wholesale 
markets.    
 
Further, in the voice markets, it is reasonable to expect that SMP operators (both fixed 
and mobile) shall seek to respond to the loss of revenue caused by VoIP probably 
                                            
79 In 2012 all member states have 3 mobile network operators, with the exception of Cyprus with 2 
operators active (Telecommunications Horizontal Assessment Report, p. 23). 
80 Explanatory Note to the Commission Recommendation on relevant product and service markets 
within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation [2007] OJ L344/65, 45. 
81 2009 Implementation Report, 9. 
82 Walden, I., Telecommunications Law and Regulation: An Introduction in Walden I., Angel, J., 
Telecommunications Law, Blackstone, 2002, 9 
83 Ryan, P., European Competition Law, Joint Dominance, and the Wireless Oligopoly Problem, [2005] 
Columbia Journal of European Law, vol. 11, pp 353-371. 
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through joint anti-competitive practices (whether expressly or tacitly) against VoIP 
operators, like blocking services84. In fact, there is evidence pointing to the same 
direction, since mobile operators all over the world decided to block on their networks 
VoIP providers like Skype that make the receipt of calls on a portable device in a WiFi 
or 3G network feasible, with the exception of 3 in the UK and Verizon in the US85. 
 
Convergence also increases oligopoly concerns. This is because convergence allows 
operators of a similar size and financial strength (e.g. incumbents and broadcasters or 
IT multinationals86) to compete on the same markets. Symmetry of sizes and financial 
strength is a crucial factor for the establishment of collective dominance, as discussed 
in detail in chapter 3. The current market trend towards bundled products is 
significantly affecting the competitive dynamics, as operators of different platforms are 
in a position to make multiple offerings (TV, voice and internet)87. Bundled offers are 
gaining popularity throughout the EU, though at very different paces. In several 
Member States, a majority of households take triple or quad-play subscriptions. In 
terms of market dynamics, triple and quad-play are said to reduce churn. They also 
drive alliances across the fixed and mobile segments of the market, as operators are 
under pressure to become quad-play providers88.  
 
Moreover, the number of alliances and mergers between operators throughout the EU 
particularly in the course of the previous decade indicated a trend towards 
consolidation in the sector, including a number of fixed-mobile transactions, in order 
to respond to higher levels of competition, decreasing revenues from traditional 
sources and to the increasing need to invest in data capacity89. Most of the major 
European operators followed the strategy of acquiring presence in several member-
states through various corporate structures, with the purpose of expanding their 
presence in various member states. This strategy is endorsed by the Commission, who 
                                            
84 Muys, S., New Whines and Old Whineskins: Addressing the Challenge of Regulating IP-based 
Networks and Services, [2006] CTLR, 59-66. Technology neutrality issues are discussed in chapter 2. 
85 Skype Blocked by Mobile Phone Operators at www.prlog.org/10537471-skype-blocked-by-mobile-
phone-operators.html. 
86 In May 2011, Microsoft announced the take-over of Skype. The transaction was approved by the EU, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/1164.  
87 The trend towards multiple or bundled offerings is discussed in under section 2.2.2.3. 
88 European Commission, Staff Working Document - Implementation of the EU regulatory framework 
for electronic communications – 2014, at p. 9. 
89 European Commission, Staff Working Document - Implementation of the EU regulatory framework 
for electronic communications in 2012 and 2013, at p. 9. 
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considers pan-European consolidation in the sector a primary target and a necessary 
condition for the establishment of a single European market. Section 1.2 of the 
Proposal for a Regulation laying down measures concerning the European single 
market for electronic communications and to achieve a Connected Continent, and 
amending Directives 2002/20/EC, 2002/21/EC and 2002/22/EC and Regulations (EC) 
No 1211/2009 and (EU) No 531/2012 reads:   
“Today, Europe is fragmented into 28 separate national communications 
markets, each with a limited number of players. As a consequence, while no 
operator is present in more than half of the Member States, most in far fewer, 
overall more than 200 operators serve a market of 510 million of customers. 
EU rules on, for example, authorisations, regulatory conditions, spectrum 
assignment and consumer protection are implemented in diverging ways. This 
patchy scenario raises barriers to entry and increases the costs for operators 
wanting to provide cross-border services thereby impeding their expansion. 
This stands in stark contrast with the US or China who have one single market 
of 330 and 1400 million customers respectively, served by four to five large 
operators, with one legislation, one licensing system, and one spectrum policy. 
Economies of scale and new growth opportunities can improve the returns on 
investment in high-speed networks and can at the same time drive competition 
and global competitiveness. Yet within the EU, operators cannot benefit 
sufficiently from them. The Spring European Council of 2013 called on the 
Commission to report by October 2013 on the remaining obstacles to the 
completion of a fully functioning Digital Single Market, and present concrete 
measures to establish the single market in information and telecommunications 
technology as early as possible”90.  
 
It is, thus, evident, that the European strategy endorses the creation of operators for the 
provision electronic communication services with a pan-European footprint, both in 
fixed and mobile markets, providing bundles of communication and possibly media 
services. In pursuit of this strategy, the national markets of the various Member-states 
will be comprised of the same players, or next to the former national incumbent the 
same players will be active in most telecommunication markets at wholesale level 
throughout the EU (who may have been incumbents themselves in the member State of 
                                            
90 COM (2013) 627 final, 11.09.2013. 
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their registered office)91. The exit of smaller national players from the market may 
enhance conditions capable of creating collusive behaviour particularly as a result of 
the multi-market contact of the same operators, which may be considered capable of 
sustaining retaliatory action. In MCI/WorldCom/Sprint, the Commission 
acknowledged that a collective dominant position may have been created prior to the 
notified merger following the exit of a number of players from the market, i.e. that the 
top-level Internet connectivity market experienced a significant level of oligopolistic 
concentration through internal growth. When the market eventually reaches a state of 
maturity with the appearance of a cluster of large, entrenched firms, those oligopolists 
subsequently find themselves in a position where they can cease competing, and adopt 
profitable, passive commercial strategies. 
 
Finally, the drastic toughening of anti-cartel policies across the world may incidentally 
spur tacit collusion on oligopolistic markets, in particular when market players are not 
risk averse. In this context, market players engage in avoidance strategies, and find 
creative ways to achieve anticompetitive outcomes short of a conventional competition 
law infringement92. 
 
In short, wholesale network markets in electronic communications may exhibit 
oligopoly characteristics and there may be concern that these markets are conducive to 
tacit collusion. However, the focus of ex ante SMP regulation in electronic 
communications has been on the monopolies of the former incumbents and builds on 
traditional single dominance principles, that may be difficult to adapt to the more 
complex assessment of oligopolistic behavior. These concerns are described in the 
following sub-sections.  
                                            
91 For example, in 2008, when DT acquired participation interests in the Greek incumbent OTE, it 
already provided fixed telecommunications services in Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Romania and 
Slovakia and operated public mobile networks in Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and the UK (par. 3 of Case COMP/M.5148-DT/OTE). In 2007, when FT 
acquired control of the mobile operator One in Austria, FT was already providing fixed communication 
services in France, Poland, Spain and Belgium and operated mobile communication services through its 
subsidiary Orange in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain 
and the UK (par. 2 of Case COMP/M.4809-FT/MidEuropaPartners/One). 
92 Petit, N., ibid., 54. This hypothesis, which according to Petit, remains untested, is said to draw on the 
work of Prof. Schinkel in Market Oversight Games, Working Paper No. 2010-11, Amsterdam Center for 
Law & Economics, 15 October 2010, who argues that market players try to avoid the competitive 
pressure imposed on them that the regulators are working to keep up. 
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1.2.2. From state-owned monopolies to liberalisation 
 
The history of European telecommunications legislation shows that addressing market 
failures caused by the presence of former monopolies was at the centre of SMP 
legislation in the EU. The liberalisation process of the ex-monopolistic 
telecommunications sector has evolved around the debate of enacting sector specific 
regulation against reliance on pure competition law principles93.  
 
Harmonisation and liberalisation of telecoms at European level began in 1987 with the 
publication of the Green Paper on Telecommunications94. The Green Paper described 
the poor state of telecommunications in the EC compared with the United States and 
Japan and called for competition in all aspects of telecommunications services and 
equipment, except basic voice telephone service. At the time, basic voice services 
represented 80 to 90 percent of telecom revenues in Europe and allowed public 
operators to receive protected revenues to maintain their universal service obligation 
and allowed them an interim period to adjust and modernise to meet the challenges of 
the emerging market place95. The adoption of regulatory measures was sine qua non 
both for terminating the incumbent’s exclusive rights, which had been established 
through domestic legislative measures and for the setting of common standards and 
opening up existing networks to competitors as a condition precedent for the viability 
of any private investment initiative. In addition, the principles of the internal market 
required that a harmonised legal environment is created throughout the community, to 
ensure a level playing field for investors in the sector. 
 
The liberalisation process began with early EC measures focused on introducing 
competition in the presence of incumbent monopolies through various directives which 
required the gradual abolition of the incumbent’s exclusive and special rights. The first 
step in this direction was introduced through the withdrawal of exclusive and special 
                                            
93 Grewlich, K., “Cyberspace”: Sector-Specific Regulation and Competition Rules in European 
Telecommunications [1999] C.M.L.Rev, 947. 
94 European Commission, Towards a Dynamic European Economy: Green Paper on the Development of 
the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM(87) 290 final. 
95 Naftel, M., The Natural Death of a Natural Monopoly: Competition in  EC Telecommunications after 
the Telecommunications Terminals Judgement, [1993]3 ECLR, 106. 
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rights in the supply of telecommunications equipment96. The core of the old legislative 
framework was found in the Services Directive97 and the ONP Directive98.  
 
The central aim of the Services Directive was to open the telecommunications 
infrastructure to service providers, who would compete with the TOs in providing 
services over that network, save as for basic voice telephone service, mobile, telex, 
paging and satellite services, to become open to competition99 and required the 
structural separation of all regulatory functions from the commercial activities of the 
incumbents100. With the exception of these services from the ambit of the Directive, 
public telecommunications operators were given an interim ‘grace period’ to prepare 
themselves from a financial perspective to operate in a competitive environment101.  
 
The ONP Directive, with ONP standing for Open Network Provision, dealt with open 
networks and harmonisation of diverse technical and commercial environments102. The 
use of the network, owned by the incumbents, was opened for providers of competitive 
services under harmonised conditions and subject to general requirements imposed by 
telecommunications administrations. The ONP Directive established the basic tariff 
principles for network services on objectivity, transparency and publication, non-
discrimination and guarantee of equality of access and treatment of users103. 
 
Under the Interconnection Directive104, the Directive amending the Directive on 
Leased Lines105 and Directive 98/10/EC amending the ONP Directive with respect to 
voice telephony and universal service, the Commission decided to regulate market 
power in the sector. Telecommunications organisations holding 25% market share 
were regarded as having significant market power in the markets designated in the 
                                            
96 With the Terminal Equipment Directive Commission Directive 88/301/EEC of 16 May 1988 on 
competition in the markets in telecommunications terminal equipment, [1988] OJ L 131/73, the 
Commission requested the separation of regulatory functions regarding approval of terminal equipment 
from the business functions of incumbents. 
97 Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for 
telecommunications services, [1991] OJ L 192/10. 
98 Commission Directive 90/387/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the establishment of the internal market for 
telecommunications services through the implementation of open network provision, [1991] OJ L 192/1. 
99 Articles 1 and 2 of the Services Directive. 
100 Article 7. 
101 Recital 18 of the Services Directive. 
102 Article 1 par. 1 of the ONP Directive. 
103 Article 3. 
104 Directive 97/33/EC. 
105 Directive 97/51/EC. 
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respective Directives (fixed public telephone network, leased lines service, public 
mobile telephone networks)106. The Directives of this old framework allowed NRAs to 
designate organisations holding less or more than 25% of the respective market share, 
taking into account the organisation’s ability to influence market conditions, its 
turnover relative to the size of the market, its control of the means of access to end-
users, its access to financial resources and its experience in providing products and 
services in the market107.   
 
These organisations with significant market power (SMPs) were subject to additional 
obligations (compared with non-SMPs), which comprised the following: 
- non-discrimination with regard to interconnection offered to other operators108; 
- provision of necessary information and specifications on request, to facilitate 
conclusion of the interconnection agreement109; 
- transparency, cost orientation and unbundling of interconnection charges110; 
- publication of reference interconnection offer111; 
- obligation to apply cost-accounting systems and accounting separation in relation to 
interconnection and unbundling of charges related to the sharing of the cost of 
universal service obligations112; 
- any obligation related to the provision of leased lines113 (no discrimination, 
publication of relevant information, provision of minimum set of leased lines, cost 
orientation and transparency for tariffs); 
- quality targets and keeping up-to-date information concerning their performance114; 
- provision of calling-line identification, direct dialling-in and call forwarding115; 
- provision of reasonable access to the fixed public telephone network at network 
termination points other that the commonly provided network termination points116; 
                                            
106 Article 4 par. 3 of Directive 97/33/EC, Article 2 par. 3 of Directive 97/51/EC, Article 2 par. 2(i) of 
Directive 98/10/EC. 
107 Ibid.. 
108 Article 6(a) of Directive 97/33/EC. 
109 Article 6(b) of Directive 97/33/EC. 
110 Article 7 par. 2 and Article 7 par. 4 of Directive 97/33/EC. 
111 Article 7 par. 3 of Directive 97/33/EC. 
112 Article 7 par. 4 and Article 7 par. 6 of Directive 97/33/EC. 
113 Directive 92/44/EEC, as amended by Directive 97/51/EC (Article 2). 
114 Article 12 par. 1 and 2 of Directive 98/10/EC. 
115 Article 15 par. 1 of Directive 98/10/EC. 
116 Article 16 of Directive 98/10/EC. 
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- no discrimination in making use of the fixed public telephone network, including any 
form of special network access117; 
- cost orientation and unbundling of tariffs for the use of public telephone network, 
independently of the type of application implemented by the users118 and associated 
cost-accounting obligations119. 
 
Under the aforementioned provisions, the Commission opted in favour of asymmetric 
regulation in relation to undertakings that could be found to enjoy dominance in pre-
defined telecommunication markets. The threshold was set at 25% of market shares, 
which is the lowest indication of single dominance, according to competition law 
theory120. The selection of this threshold indicates that the Commission was primarily 
targeting single dominance when setting the definition of market power, since joint 
dominance has been accepted as possible to occur between players holding 
individually lower market shares121. The introduction of the ‘25% rule’ departed from 
the general meaning of dominance in competition law, which is not strictly linked to 
specific percentages of market shares and was debated on this ground.  
 
After the liberalisation date, the Commission decided to review its position with 
respect to its overall approach to regulation. At the same date, having regard to 
technological developments, which allowed the coming together of telecoms with the 
media and IT sectors, the Commission launched its Convergence Green Paper122, 
which was put to public consultation and the aggregated responses were evaluated in a 
follow-up communication (‘the Results of Public Consultation on Convergence’)123.  
 
In the Results of Public Consultation on Convergence, it appeared that setting up a 
single horizontal, i.e. platform independent framework for all three sectors found 
considerable support, in particular for networks and infrastructure. Access to networks 
and digital gateways was widely identified as the key commercial and regulatory 
                                            
117 Article 16 par. 7 of Directive 98/10/EC. 
118 Article 17 of Directive 98/10/EC. 
119 Article 17 of Directive 98/10/EC. 
120 Whish, R., ibid, 153. 
121 The details are given in the context of chapter 3. 
122 European Commission, Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information 
Technology Sectors and the Implications for Regulation, COM(97) 623. 
123 Summary of the Results of the Public Consultation on the Green Paper on the Convergence of the 




concern together with the perceived need for a framework for investment in 
infrastructure124.  
 
In the 1999 Communications Review the Commission took the view that regulation for 
general interest objectives will remain in place, whereas regulation for managing 
transition to competition will be progressively reduced125. Services provided over 
networks would, in turn, be governed by other rules at EU and national levels (content 
regulation, e-commerce etc.). Internet transmission services would be treated in the 
same way as other transmission services. 
 
Indications of the need to have oligopolistic markets regulated ex ante made their first 
appearance, as commentators considered that areas such as international roaming and 
call termination rates (i.e. sensitive areas of the oligopolistic mobile marketplace) 
called for strong regulatory or competition-based intervention as there was significant 
evidence that operators were taking advantage of an imperfectly competitive 
marketplace to charge excessively high rates126. In the direction of increased reliance 
on competition law principles, it was suggested that the 25% threshold for the 
designation of SMP is abolished and a new definition adopted in line with the 
traditional competition law approach to dominance127. 
 
Following an assessment of responses, the Commission, in its communication of April 
26, 2000128, elaborated five key considerations, which were later developed into the 
five Directives, which formulated the current regulatory framework for 
telecommunications. In this context, it was decided that a single regulatory framework 
for communications infrastructure and associated services would be established 
                                            
124 Nonetheless, the document was criticised for failing to present a clear view as to how regulation 
should be structured and why. Refer to Sauter, W., The Consultation on EU Regulation for Convergence 
[1999]1 Util. Law Rev., 5. 
125 European Commission, Towards a new framework for Electronic Communications and Associated 
Services – The 1999 Communications Review, COM 539 (final). 
126 Durie, R., Romer, J., The impact of regulation on the mobile marketplace – Past, present and future, 
[2002] CTLR, 96. The issue of excessive roaming charges is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.2.1. 
127 The introduction of such definition has received criticism on the grounds that the imposition of 
measures on dominant undertakings without prior review of potential abuses of dominance is not in 
compliance with competition law and, in fact, results in more regulation. Refer to the Opinion of the 
Economic and Social Committee on the 1999 Communications Review, [2000] OJ C204/3.  
128 European Commission, Communication from the Commission: The results of the Public Consultation 
on the Communications Review 1999 and Orientations for the new Regulatory Framework, COM 
(2000) 239 26 April 2000. 
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(horizontal approach to regulation). However, the new framework would distinguish 
between two types of regulation, depending on the level of competition. The first type 
would be designed for undertakings enjoying significant market power in markets 
where competition would be found not to be effective and the second type would be 
designed for all players. 
 
The 2002 regime that followed the 1999 Communications Review and the results of 
the public consultation indicates a move towards competition law principles. The basic 
thrust of the Directives is that citizens’ interests are best served by market forces and 
that regulation should be kept to a minimum129. Under such premise, it was decided to 
continue with asymmetric regulation through the establishment of rules governing the 
behaviour of undertakings enjoying significant market power, though with more 
reliance on competition law principles.  
 
In March 2002 the European Parliament and the Council adopted four Directives on 
electronic communications, the Framework Directive130, the Universal Service 
Directive131, the Access Directive132 and the Authorisation Directive133. These 
Directives together with the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications134, 
which was passed in the summer of the same year, formed the current regulatory 
package for electronic communications with effect from 25 July 2003. The Universal 
                                            
129 De Streel, A., The new concept of “Significant Market Power” in Electronic Communications: the 
hybridisation of the sectoral regulation by competition law, [2003] ECLR, 535-536. 
130 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, [2002] OJ L 108/33. 
131 Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal 
service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, [2002] OJ 
L108/51. 
132 Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to 
and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, [2002] OJ L108/7. 
133 Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the 
authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, [2002] OJ L108/51. 
134 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector, 
[2002] OJ L201/37. 
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Service Directive was revised by Directive 136/2009/EC135 and the remaining 
Directives by Directive 140/2009/EC136.  
 
The Framework Directive intended to establish a harmonised framework for the 
regulation of electronic communications networks and services, by setting out the 
policy objectives and the regulatory principles governing electronic communications 
operations in the Member States, by laying down tasks of national regulatory 
authorities and by establishing a set of procedures to ensure the harmonised application 
of the regulatory framework throughout the Community137. 
 
On 11.9.2013, the Commission launched a Proposal for a Regulation laying down 
measures concerning the European single market for electronic communications and to 
achieve a Connected Continent, and amending Directives 2002/20/EC, 2002/21/EC 
and 2002/22/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1211/2009 and (EU) No 531/2012138. The 
Proposal intends to purport amendments to various important sections of the current 
framework, like the authorization regime, but not on the framework for the ex ante 
regulation of SMP. 
 
As far as the Commission’s intent to catch oligopolistic market structures, over and 
above monopoly situations, in the ambit of ex ante regulation in electronic 
communications is concerned, this is spelled out in the definition of SMP in electronic 
communications of Article 14 par. 2 of the Framework Directive: 
“An undertaking shall be deemed to have significant market power if, either 
individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a position equivalent to dominance, 
that is to say a position of economic strength affording it the power to behave 
                                            
135 Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 
amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic 
communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal 
data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 
2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer 
protection laws. 
136 Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 
amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications 
networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications 
networks and services 
137 Article 1 of the Framework Directive. 
138 COM(2013) 627 final. 
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to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and 
ultimately consumers” [emphasis added]. 
 
In other words, SMP regulation is designed to embrace single company dominance, 
joint dominance and the leverage of a dominant position on to an associated market. 
The definition of significant market power in Article 14 par. 2 of the Framework 
Directive clearly reflected the Commission’ s idea that sector-specific regulation 
should be reduced in favour of a stronger application of general competition law 
principles. The threshold for the imposition of ex ante rules is in the form of 
‘significant market power’, which, compared with the previous regime, was redefined 
on the basis of the competition law concept of dominance139. Hence, ex ante 
obligations may only be imposed where undertakings are found to have a dominant 
position under competition law, coupled with incumbency or vertical integration, with 
the result that the ex post remedies of competition law would not be adequate to cure 
perceived market problems. 
 
The following section discusses concerns that are associated with the setting of 
dominance as the threshold for ex ante intervention particularly in the context of 
oligopolistic environments. 
 
1.2.3. Difficulties associated with the setting of dominance as the threshold for ex 
ante regulation 
 
Skepticism has grown on whether Article 102 of the Treaty provides an adequate basis 
for ex ante market regulation140. Doubt has been expressed on whether the findings of 
competition authorities in the context of alleged committed abuses of Article 102 may 
apply in ex ante approaches of dominance, on the grounds that NRAs rely on different 
sets of assumptions and expectations. The requirement that dominance be established 
implies a focus on the market structure that would pertain in the market under 
                                            
139 Brodey, M., Telecommunications: Towards a new EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications, [2000] CTLR, 182. 
140 The Commission’ s policy to align its reasoning in merger cases in the findings of Article 102 cases 
has been cast in doubt because of the increased certainty and clarity inherent in assessing ex post 
behaviour in an oligopolistic market. Refer to Richardson, R., Gordon, C., Collective Dominance: The 
Third Way? [2001] ECLR, 420. 
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investigation, perhaps at the expense of other dynamic non-structural features of the 
scenario on the development of the market141. 
 
The Commission acknowledges the differences between the assessment of power by an 
undertaking to affect competition for SMP regulatory purposes, and an ex post (Article 
102) analysis of an effected market structure, in par. 73 of the Guidelines: 
“In an ex post analysis, a competition authority may be faced with a number of 
different examples of market behaviour each indicative of market power within 
the meaning of Article [102]. However, in an ex ante environment, market 
power is essentially measured by reference to the power of the undertaking 
concerned to raise prices by restricting output without incurring a significant 
loss of sales or revenues”142. 
 
Yet, dominance is a legal concept without any direct equivalent in economic theory143. 
Traditional economic theory supports that the structure of the market determines the 
firm’s conduct and that conduct determines market performance144.  
 
European competition law has defined dominance as: 
“a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to 
prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by 
                                            
141 Similar criticism was expressed for the application of the dominance test under the former ECMR, 
Fountoukakos, K., Ryan, S., ibid., 289. Doubts have been also expressed in the context of the efficient 
competitor test launched with the Commission Guidance on the former Article 82 (now Article 102 
TFEU). The Guidance establishes the premise that, in general, only conduct which would exclude an “as 
efficient competitor” is abusive; the efficiency both of the firm under investigation and of its competitor 
may be measured with the use of cost pricing methods. This test, albeit suitable to apply in abuse of 
dominance cases, may be impractical when applied for ex ante sector-specific regulation in the 
electronic communications sector, because the focus should not be on the incumbent firm rather than the 
market itself. To take the efficiency of the incumbent as a criterion might lead to distortion in the market 
because of the inability of competitors to correctly observe the incumbent’s efficiency. Also, depending 
on the cost-control methodology imposed on the incumbent by sector-specific regulation, the level of 
regulatory costs might be fixed at a lower or higher level than actual costs. Stoyanova, M., The Dangers 
of Over-Regulation in the Electronic Communications Sector, [2007] World Competition, 112. 
142 Para. 73 of the Guidelines. 
143 Christensen, P., Rabassa, P., The Airtours decision: Is there a new Commission approach to 
collective dominance?, [2001] ECLR, 228. 
144 This is the famous “Structure – Conduct – Performance” or SCP paradigm of Bain, S., Exonomies of 
Scale, Concentration and the Conditions of Entry in Twenty Manufacturing Industries, [1954] 44 




affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, its customers and ultimately of the consumers”145. 
 
Hence, under European competition law, dominance has been defined by reference to 
the effect on competition and the exercise of market power independently of 
competitors, customers and consumers146. The definition has received criticism from 
economic scholars, who consider that the legal definition of dominance suffers from 
the weakness of not having a well-defined economic meaning or a well-defined 
standard of measurement, because no firm would set a price independently of its 
customers and a test of independence of competitors’ pricing is not possible147. 
 
The ability to behave independently, namely the absence of competitive market 
pressure faced by an undertaking, has attracted a lot of attention in EC cases148; the 
reason for the emphasis may be that this feature corresponds most closely to the 
economic textbook definition of market power149. Bishop and Walker have defined 
dominance as 
‘the ability of a firm or a group of firms to raise prices, through the 
restriction of output, and maintain them for a significant period of time above 
the level that would prevail under the competitive conditions and thereby to 
enjoy increased profits from the action’150. 
 
This is the same statement repeated in par. 73 of the Guidelines, which was set out 
earlier. Nonetheless, the ability to affect competition is not in itself sufficient to 
establish anti-competitive behaviour, since Article 102 of the Treaty does not prohibit 
dominance but the abuse of it151. 
                                            
145 Case 27/76 United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207. 
146Discussion Paper, par. 21. 
147 Pearce de Azevedo, J., Walker, M., Dominance: Meaning and Measurement, [2002] ECLR 363-367. 
The opposite view has been expressed by la Cour, L., Mollgaard, H.P., Meaningful and Measurable 
Market Domination, [2003] ECLR, 132-135. 
148 Case 85/76 Hoffmann La Roche v. Commission [1979] ECR 461, par. 42-46. . In Case T-210/01, 
General Electric v. Commission, the GC ruled that the existence of lively competition on a market does 
not rule out the possibility that there is dominant position on that market, since the predominant feature 
of such market is the ability of the undertaking to behave independently of such competitors (par. 117). 
149, Newton, Ch., Do Predators Need to be Dominant? [1999] ECLR, 129.  
150 Bishop, S., Walker, M., Economics of EC Competition law, Sweer & Maxwell, London, 2006, 87. 
151 Wheatherill, S., Beaumont, P., EC Law, 2nd edition, Penguin, 1995, 721f.  However, in Wanadoo, the 




Under Article 14 par. 2 of the Framework Directive, dominance is set as the 
threshold for SMP also in oligopolistic environments. We have seen in the first 
sections of this chapter that competition law has relied on the theory of tacit 
collusion, as opposed to the strict application of economic models of Cournot or 
Bertrand type for its approach to oligopolistic markets and on this theory has SMP 
regulation built its approach to oligopolistic markets.152. Scholars have argued that 
the sole application of a static model such as the Cournot model may prove 
inefficient for the assessment of dynamic telecommunication markets which may 
lend themselves more easily to dynamic oligopoly theories, such as the theory of 
tacit collusion. In the model of Cournot competition, which leads to price 
equilibriums situated between marginal costs-pricing and monopoly pricing, 
oligopolists may achieve supra-competitive profits absent tacit collusion153. 
 
Yet, the decision to regulate joint dominance in electronic communications ex ante, 
through the application of the dominance test, rests on the paradox that there is not a 
single Article 102 case precedent, where collective dominance was found to exist154. 
The analysis of the section 1.1.2 has shown that the concept of collective dominance 
was developed mainly in the context of merger cases, which suggests a lower evidence 
threshold due to ex ante speculation as opposed to the ex post proof, which seems more 
robust than ex ante speculation. The application of the stronger dominance test of 
Article 102 may not tally with the relaxation of the evidentiary burden after the Impala 
judgment. 
 
                                                                                                                              
scheme, Case T-340/03, France Telecom v. Commission of the European Communities, judgement of 30 
January 2007. 
152 Some commentators suggest that the Cournot model may present a more appropriate tool for the 
calculation of joint dominance in ex-ante assessments on market power, compared with the theory of 
tacit collusion, on the grounds that that the Cournot type of analysis differs from the analysis of tacit 
collusion in that, at least theoretically, it specifies the market outcome that is to be expected in a given 
situation instead of offering a more open prediction that the market outcome will be anti-competitive, 
Camesasca, P., ibid., 65. However, as in the case of every theoretical model, economic theory sets out 
specific factors for the application of the Cournot model, including product homogeneity, increased 
transparency with respect to prices and market demand, symmetry of market positions, as well as the 
stability and maturity of the market, Kloosterhuis, E., ibid, 85-86. 
153 Petit., N., ibid., at foonote 332. Conversely, scholars have argued that the application of the Cournot 
model still leaves room for application of the theory of tacit collusion, because the Cournot price lies 
below that of a perfect cartel or a monopolist and the difference between these levels indicates the scope 
for profitable collusion (Kloosterhuis, E., ibid., 86). 
154 In none of the three Article 102 cases mentioned in section 1.1.2, i.e. Italian Flat Glass, Laurent Piau 
and  Efim v. Commission, was there a finding of collective dominance. 
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Given the inevitable complexities inherent in the assessment of joint dominance, the 
high level of proof required for the establishment of joint dominance cases, creates 
doubts on whether there may be findings by NRAs on collective dominance in the long 
run under the SMP framework for electronic communications or there may be pleas on 
the absence of one condition discrediting in their entirety tacit collusion theories of 
harm. In a dynamic and forward-looking market analysis as in the case of the analysis 
requested by the Commission in the Guidelines, it is doubted whether any economic 
analysis would be able to provide the degree of certainty requested under Article 102. 
In principle, all future predictions entail a certain degree of uncertainty related to 
unforeseen events, which is enhanced by the fact that the factors establishing all 
economic theories may collapse. Support for this concern is lent by the following 
observations, which will be dealt with in detail in the chapters that follow. 
 
First, the decision of the European Commission to regulate termination rates under 
single dominance principles, as a result of the delineation of termination markets on 
the separate networks of mobile and fixed operators. Such approach indicates the 
Commission’s decision to have termination rates regulated ex ante as opposed to 
leaving such decision open to NRAs. Given that termination services could have been 
examined also from an oligopolistic perspective, had wider market definitions been 
adopted, such approach may also imply that the Commission was wary that NRAs 
could find ways out of regulation under tacit collusion principles. Notably, the 
Commission may have wanted to ensure that termination would be regulated anyway; 
conversely, it is possible that the Commission did not want to leave NRAs with the 
option of pleading that one or more factors necessary for the establishment of 
collective dominance did not apply, hence allowing SMP not being established and the 
market escaping regulation.  The relevant discussion is found in chapter 2. 
 
Second, the application of factors capable of establishing joint dominance by NRAs 
and the Commission, which shows that, in the course of implementation of the SMP 
framework, joint dominance is considered only on very rare occasions. In the period 
from 29.08.2003 to 30.09.2013 there have been four (4) decisions establishing 
collective dominance concerns in three wholesale markets: IE/2004/121, ES/2005/330, 
IT/2006/424 and MT/2006/443. The first was taken in 2005 and the other three in 
2006. All of them were subsequently deregulated through subsequent market 
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assessments and since then no electronic communication market has been regulated as 
an oligopoly in the 28 member states. Back in 2008, in an analysis of collective 
dominance under the first round of market review, Hou assumed that the analysis of 
collective SMP in the second round market review would continue to appear in more 
competitive markets155. However, this did not prove to be the case. The assessment of 
market notifications effected under Article 7 of the Framework Directive reveals a 
significant reduction in the number of cases involving collective dominance from 21 
notifications in 2006 to 2 in 2010, none in 2011, 2 in 2012 and none in 2013. Of 
course, a complete analysis of the relevant national markets would be required in order 
to support the existence of collective SMP in any electronic communications market in 
any of the 28 member states and such analysis has not been undertaken in the context 
of this thesis. However, the observation remains that not only are there no findings on 
collective SMP, but also lack of notifications involving the assessment of prospective 
collective SMP, which shows the lack of concerns in the presence of a second 
wholesale operator. The relevant analysis is made in chapter 3.   
 
It is noted that BEREC shares the analysis of different economic papers on the 
potential insufficiency of two competing networks to achieve effective competition 
and recognizes the necessity to review the criteria to assess joint SMP, in particular via 
an update of the Guidelines to cover the latest competition law developments and to 
assess clearly complexities associated with duopolies in electronic communication 
markets156.   
 
Third, the careful reading of the history behind roaming regulation may support the 
assumption that the SMP regulation has possibly failed to address issues of collective 
dominance in wholesale roaming markets, hence the decision of the European 
Commission to regulate roaming through a separate regulation. The NRAs of the 12 
member states that carried out their assessments of the respective wholesale roaming 
markets declared themselves unable to prove the existence of collective SMP, albeit 
they all recognised the existence of high rates and the majority accepted the existence 
of factors indicating collective dominance in the market, whereas some of them 
                                            
155 Hou, L., The assessment of collective SMP: Lessons learned from the first market review, December 
1st, 2008, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1309684  
156 BEREC’s response to the European Commission’s questionnaire for the public consultation on the 
revision of the Recommendation on Relevant Markets BoR (13) 22, at p. 3. 
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accepted the potential existence of joint SMP in the short term. This observation is 
particularly interesting if one considers the risk of future collusion between the few 
operators active in the different Member-States for the provision the same bundled 
products, should the plan of the Commission for the development of a single European 
concentrated market with one legislation, one licensing system and one spectrum 
policy materialize. This subject is presented in chapter 4. 
 
The same chapters, as well as the last two chapters on remedies attempt also to give 





Chapter 2: Market delineation under 
the SMP regime: is there any room left 
for oligopoly regulation? 
 
2.1. Defining product markets in electronic communications 
 
Market delineation is fundamental to the establishment of any market power in 
electronic communications and to the proper application of the relevant regulatory 
framework. If the definition of the product and/or geographic market is too broad, the 
establishment of dominance of any kind may be rendered remote. If the product and/or 
geographic market is too narrow, then a finding of dominance where such case does 
not exist may lead to the imposition of unnecessary regulatory burdens and restrictions 
in the conduct of the firms with the utmost result against the development of the 
market. In both cases, the efficiency of the regulatory approach in relation to market 
power in electronic communications is prejudiced, because it fails to meet the 
objective of its existence, i.e. the regulation of market power only where such power 
risks to affect artificially the competition forces of the market and/or to prejudice 
consumer interests. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the Commission’s choices on market 
delineation in electronic communications in relation to the application of ex ante 
measures aiming at the constraint of anti-competitive practices through SMP 
regulation. The chapter will show that the Commission mainly directs NRAs towards 
narrow market definitions, which renders the inclusion of oligopolistic situations in 
SMP regulation considerably difficult. The review of the Commission’s choices on 
markets susceptible to ex ante regulation will show that the Commission has placed 
little emphasis on oligopolies. Rather, through the delineation of markets susceptible to 
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ex ante regulation, the Commission’s main concern is the setting of limitations to anti-
competitive behaviour of monopolists.  
 
The review commences with the description of general principles of competition law 
on market definition with indications on issues affecting oligopolistic markets and on 
technology issues affecting market definition in electronic communications and turns 
into the examination of the specific markets defined for the purposes of SMP 
regulation. The chapter makes suggestions for the revision of these pre-defined 
markets, which allow the covering of situations of joint dominance in electronic 
communications and gives guidelines that assist the proper market delineation in 
concentrated markets with few players. 
 
2.1.1. The significance of market delineation for competition law purposes 
 
Market delineation is a condition precedent to the calculation of market power, as anti-
competitive effects, whether caused by abuse of dominance, concentration or 
agreements between undertakings are assessed by reference to a particular market157. 
The main purpose of market definition is to identify in a systematic way the 
competitive constraints that the undertakings involved face. The relevance for 
dominance cases is that the broader the market, the less likely the finding of 
dominance158. 
 
Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law159 (the “Notice”) defines the “relevant product market” 
and the “relevant geographic market” as follows: 
‘A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services 
which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by 
reason of the product’ s characteristics, their prices and their intended use’. 
‘The relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the 
undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and demand of relevant 
                                            
157 Jones, A., Suffrin, B., EC Competition Law, OUP, 2004, 299. 
158 Ibid. 
159 OJ 1997 C 372/5. 
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products or services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently 
homogeneous and which can be distinguished from the neighbouring 
geographic areas because, in particular, conditions of competition are 
appreciably different in those areas’160. 
The Notice also summarises the suggested test, as follows:  
‘Basically, the exercise of market definition consists in identifying the effective 
alternative sources of supply for the customers of the undertakings involved, in 
terms both of products/services and of geographic location of suppliers’161. 
 
Firms are subject to three main sources of competitive constraints: demand side 
substitutability, supply side substitutability and potential competition. This test of 
‘substitutability’ measures the extent that a product can be substituted by another 
product both on the demand and on the supply side (demand substitution and supply 
substitution), also by reference to short- to medium-future predictions of market 
structure (potential competition). Geographic markets are identified by reference to 
their homogeneity and their ability to be discerned from neighbouring areas162. 
 
Supply substitution is defined in economic literature as 
“the possibility of an undertaking that does not sell a given product being able 
to start producing and selling that product in the short term without having to 
invest significant amounts in order to adapt its production facilities”163. 
 
The Commission has identified product markets on the basis of supply substitution, 
where demand substitution was found not to exist. For example, in Torras/Sarrio164, 
despite the lack of substitutability between writing papers of different quality from a 
consumer point of view, the Commission has identified a single writing paper market, 
                                            
160 Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Notice respectively. 
161 Ibid., par. 13. 
162 Case 27/76, United Brands Co and United Brands Continental BV v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, 
par. 11 and 44. 
163 Navarro, E., Font, A., Folguera, J., Βriones, J., Merger Control in the EU, Law, Economics and 
Practice, OUP, 2002, 91. 
164 [1992] Case IV/M 166. 
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on the grounds that paper manufacturers can switch from producing one quality of 
paper to another almost immediately165. 
 
As for the third source of competitive constraint, potential competition, the 
Commission cites in the Notice that this 
‘is not taken into account when defining markets, since the conditions under 
which potential competition will actually represent an effective competitive 
constraint depend on the analysis of specific factors and circumstances 
related to the conditions of entry. If required, this analysis is only carried out 
at a subsequent stage, in general once the position of the companies involved 
in the relevant market has already been ascertained, and when such position 
gives rise to concerns from a competition point of view’166. 
 
In practice, supply substitution plays a minor role in market definition process, 
whereas potential competition is not measured at all, i.e. the bulk of the analysis is 
related to demand substitutability167. Demand side substitution constitutes the most 
immediate and effective disciplinary force on the suppliers of a given product, in 
particular in relation to their pricing decisions, but supply side substitution is also 
required in order to establish relevant market. The weakest competitive constraint, 
potential competition, will usually be assessed at the later stage of the competitive 
assessment168. 
 
The Notice indicates that demand substitution will be effected by recourse to the 
hypothetical monopolist test, which measures the effects that a small (5% - 10%) but 
significant lasting increase in the price of a given product has, assuming that the prices 
of all other products remain constant169. The hypothetical monopolist test of the Notice 
                                            
165 For the significance of customers’ switching costs as an element of product market definition refer to 
Willis, P., When is a Market not a Market? Secondary Markets in the IT and Telecommunications 
Sectors, [2002] CTLR, 170-173. 
166 The Notice, par. 24. 
167 Hildebrand, D., Using Conjoint Analysis for Market Definition: Application of Modern Market 
Research Tools to Implement the Hypothetical Monopolist Test, [2006] World Competition, 316. 
Potential competition has been taken into account for product market definition purposes in Case 
IV/M.1225, which involved the merger between Enso and Stora, [1999] OJ L254, par. 40.  
168 Competition Committee, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Roundtable on market 
definition, DAF/COMP/WD(2012)28, at p. 3. 
169 The Notice, par. 17. 
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indicates a move closer to the SSNIP test170 adopted by the US Merger Guidelines171, 
although a number of scholars considers the two tests equivalent172 and a move away 
from the traditional test of “functionable interchangeability” defined by the ECJ in 
Hoffman-La Roche173, determining which products are sufficiently similar in function, 
price and attributes to be regarded by consumers as reasonable substitutes for each 
other174. 
 
Economists support that own-price and cross-price elasticities are decisive in 
evaluating whether a price increase of a hypothetical monopolist would be profitable 
or not and hence how to define the relevant market, as the eventual change in the profit 
of a hypothetical monopolist after a price increase can only be answered empirically175. 
However, a problem with the hypothetical monopolist test is that it cannot identify 
whether the current price is already a monopoly price resulting from the exercise of 
market power176. This is generally known as the “cellophane fallacy”, named after a 
US antitrust case, where the Supreme Court failed to recognise that the consumers’ 
willingness to substitute cellophane with other flexible wrapping materials was due to 
the consumers’ inability to afford an increase in cellophane, because prices were 
already set well above the competitive level177.  
 
The Cellophane Fallacy has been claimed to be only part of a general problem for the 
application of the hypothetical monopolist test, which arises whenever the prices the 
                                            
170 SSNIP stands for a small but significant non-transitory increase in price. 
171 Issued by the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in 1992 and revised in 
1997. Available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm  
172 Refer, e.g. to Kokkoris, I., The Concept of Market Definition and the SSNIP Test in the Merger 
Appraisal, [2005] ECLR 209f. The main differences between the two tests lie in the time-frame of the 
increase (“non-transitory”, as opposed to “lasting”) and in the definition of “small” increases (only 5% 
in the SSNIP). The SSNIP test judges the profitability of a small but significant and non-transitory 
increase in price. The relevant product is the smallest set of products for which a hypothetical 
monopolist would find it profitable to increase prices by 5%, Camesasca, P., European Merger Control: 
Getting the Efficiencies Right, Intersentia Hart, London 2000, 86. 
173 Hoffman-La Roche vs. Commission, Case 85/76, [1979] ECR, 461. 
174 The concept of functionable interchangeability had been discarded by antitrust practice for not 
projecting a very reliable vision of reality and does not allow one to define the boundaries of the 
relevant market, because it gives no information about the profitability of a particular price increase, 
Camesasca, P., ibid., 91. 
175 Hildebrand, D., ibid., 315-336. 
176 Jones, A., Suffrin, B., ibid., 57. 
177 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co, 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del 1953). 
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test is applied to do not reflect competitive conditions, including ‘too low’ prices178. 
That would be the case, for example, of markets suffering from over capacity, where 
prices may be set below short or long-run incremental average costs, or of monopolists 
engaging themselves in predatory pricing. In this case, the result would most likely be 
that the test delineates relevant markets too large either in the product or in the 
geographic dimension179. BEREC has identified possible cellophane fallacy effects on 
deeply discounted bundles of multiple offerings (fixed telephony, internet, mobile and 
broadcasting), since consumers may be unlikely to unpick the bundle as a result of the 
price increase180. 
 
Conversely, where market power appears to be absent but an entity has very high 
market share, it places an additional burden on the parties to define correctly the 
relevant product market. Where concentration is very high and prices are not 
statistically different to those in other areas where concentration is low, this can 
suggest that either the market has been drawn too narrowly, or that the market is 
subject to ‘hit and run’ entry or firms in nearby markets are able to switch capacity 
fairly easily181.  
 
The issue of the correct starting price and thus of the possible cellophane fallacy is 
claimed to be more relevant in abuse of dominance cases than in merger cases where 
the prevailing price of the product produced by the merging entities is taken as the 
starting point182. In oligopolistic markets, the problem may be even more acute, 
because the existence of tacit collusion may act as a deterrent in the detection of anti-
competitive prices and the involvement of more market players in the anti-competitive 
behaviour provides faulty indications as to the competitiveness of prices for the same 
product. Failure to capture the oligopolistic nature (and interactions) of many markets 
might lead the SSNIP test to define markets too narrowly, and often dominant groups 
as monopolists rather than oligopolists. This may have been the case in the designation 
of separate termination markets on the individual networks of each operator, which is 
                                            
178 Croscioni, P., The Hypothetical Monopolist Test: What it can and cannot tell you, [2002] ECLR, 
354f. 
179 Olesen, H., Sundahl, L., The Power Fallacy: Energizing the Cellophane Fallacy, [2006] ECLR 704. 
180 BEREC Report on impact of bundled offers in retail and wholesale market definition, BoR (10) 64, 
13. 
181 Hildebrand, D., ibid., 321. Benchmarking, i.e. comparison with the prices charged for the same 
product in other geographic markets, has been suggested as a solution to this problem. 
182 Kokkoris, I., ibid., 212. 
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discussed in section 2.2.2.2 below. Harbord and von Graevenitz take the view that the 
‘oligopoly problem’ is related to the ‘Cellophane fallacy’, save that the fallacy is in the 
opposite direction. Put simply, a monopolist of product A could well be found to have 
profitably increased the price of A by a SSNIP. However, in an oligopolistic market 
such price increase would lead also competitors to respond by raising price: assuming 
“the terms of sale of all other products” constant, we would infer that the producer of 
A is a monopolist183. 
 
Although the Commission has identified the cellophane fallacy problem in its 
Guidelines on market definition and the assessment of market power (the 
“Guidelines”)184, the existence of deterrents in the detection of anti-competitive prices 
created under oligopolistic conditions is not addressed in their text. 
 
Within the context of the hypothetical monopolist or the SSNIP test economists 
support that own-price and cross-price elasticities are decisive in evaluating whether a 
price increase of a hypothetical monopolist would be profitable or not and hence how 
to define the relevant market, as the eventual change in the profit of a hypothetical 
monopolist after a price increase can only be answered empirically185. Several 
econometric methods have been developed to provide such empirical analysis186, with 
the most common being Critical Loss Analysis, which intends to provide answers 
quantitatively on how elastic demand must not be, for the candidate market to be an 
antitrust market187. 
                                            
183 Harbord D., von Graeventiz, G., Market Definition in Oligopolistic and Vertically-Related Markets: 
Some Anomalies, [2000] ECLRev, 21:3. 
184 Commission Guidelines on Market Analysis and the Assessment of Significant Market Power under 
the Community Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, [2002] 
C 165/02, par. 42. 
185 Hildebrand, D., Using Conjoint Analysis for Market Definition: Application of Modern Market 
Research Tools to Implement the Hypothetical Monopolist Test, [2006] World Competition, 315-336. 
186 Econometric techniques that are based on historical data, like price correlation over time, have not 
been considered credible options because they are backward-looking, and thus define markets as they 
were in the past. Price-concentration studies examine how the price of a product in a distinct area varies 
according to the number of other products sold in the same area. Hildebrand (ibid.) has suggested 
conjoint analysis as well suited to estimate the effects of a hypothetical price increase on demand and 
hence on profits of a firm for the implementation of the hypothetical monopolist test. It is an empirical 
method that examines the benefit a product represents for the customer and values it. It is based on the 
premise that relative utilities of certain product features might not be measurable if considered 
separately but that a joint consideration of the different product features will reveal the relative utilities 
of the distinctive features. 
187 Critical Loss Analysis has been used also by NRAs in their market assessments under Article 7 of the 
Framework Directive, e.g. in PT/2008/0850 on Wholesale (physical) network infrastructure access 




As an alternative to the hypothetical monopolist test, economic literature has put 
forward the concept of Upright Pricing Pressure (UPP), especially in merger cases, 
which focuses on the value of the diverted sales as a result of the number of units 
diverted multiplied by the margin between price and incremental cost on that 
product188. A higher UPP as the result of higher diversion ratios and/or higher margins 
can indicate a significant change in the pricing incentives. The UPP method is very 
close in spirit to other methods focusing on the elasticity of demand and closeness of 
substitution as it heavily relies on the concept of diversion ratios. However, it 
reinterprets the difference in pricing incentives between the single firm and the 
independent firms from the cost side, in particular, from the angle of opportunity 
costs189. 
 
Whereas the Commission's Guidelines on Horizontal Mergers do not explicitly refer to 
the UPP concept, they do refer expressly to the use of diversion ratios and mention that 
high pre-merger margins may make significant price increases more likely190. 
Nonetheless, it is generally acknowledged even in the US, which pioneered the 
application of UPP in antitrust analysis, that albeit UPP may be a useful tool, it cannot 
replace the need for traditional product market definition191. Not only is the concept of 
market definition inherent in the EU Merger Control Regime, it is in practice in most 
cases significant less time and data intensive to define the relevant market and 
calculate the market shares than perform an UPP analysis. Additionally, UPP is only 
one additional element of evidence for the analysis of substitution and merger effects 
with strength and weaknesses between other qualitative and quantitative evidence. It 
can therefore only be one "additional piece in the puzzle"192. 
 
                                                                                                                              
elasticity of the demand at the retail level is high, and that the barriers to switching are low; and that 
there was a tendency for increased retail competition between DSL and cable-based broadband offers 
following the spinoff of the main cable operator, ZON Multimedia, from the PT Group. Therefore, the 
NRA considered that a price increase at the wholesale level for DSL would turn out to be unprofitable, 
hence offers supported on ADSL and cable can be included in the same market. 
188 The UPP test has been applied also in recent merger cases also in the telecommunications sector, like 
Case M. 6497/Hutchinson 3GAustria/Orange Austria. 
189 Competition Committee, ibid., at footnote 36. 
190 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentration between undertakings, [2004] OJ C 31/5, par. 28-29. 
191 Refer to the relevant analysis in par. 344f. of Case M. 6497/Hutchinson 3GAustria/Orange Austria.  
192 Competition Committee, ibid., at p. 9. 
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With the foregoing background in mind, we shall now discuss the extent to which 
technology affects product market definition in electronic communications in so far as 
it may be of relevance in the context of oligopolistic markets. 
 
2.1.2. The influence of technology on product market definition in electronic 
communications 
 
The methodology for defining technology markets follows generally the same 
principles as the definition of product markets. However, it can be more difficult to 
compare technologies, to assess their substitutability or to take into account 
technologies that are currently only used in-house and/or are not or only to a very 
limited extent being licensed. Similarly, it may be more difficult to calculate market 
shares on a technology market193.Telecommunications is a technology-driven sector 
and the advances of technology have enabled operators to provide a variety of services. 
The Commission has recognised the significance of technological features in product 
market delineation since the 1991 Guidelines on the application of ICC competition 
rules in the telecommunication sector194. 
 
In the early days of telecommunications law, the Commission was considered to have 
defined relevant product markets somewhat broadly, relying to a great extent on 
customer substitutability as a guide, without attaching too much importance to 
technological issues195. Hence, in Inmarsat196 and in Iridium197, the Commission found 
that satellite personal communication systems  
“are expected to act as a complement to both GSM and digital cordless 
telephony within fixed radius (DECT) wireless terrestrial mobile 
technologies. This will be particularly the case in areas where the cellular 
network has failed to penetrate (namely rural parts of the developed world 
                                            
193 Competition Committee, ibid., at p. 8. 
194 [1991] OJ C233/2, pars 26-30. 
195 Larouche, P., EC Competition Law and the Convergence of the Telecommunications and 
Boradcasting Sectors, (1998)22 Telecommunications Policy, 230. 
196 [1995] OJ C304/6, section IV.1 of the decision. 
197 Commission Decision of 18.12.1996, Iridium [1997] OJ L16/87. 
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and both urban and rural parts of lower income countries) or where terrestrial 
roaming is not available, because of incompatible technologies”. 
 
The Commission also examined the differences in satellite systems resulting from 
varieties in orbital positions (LEO, MEO and GEO systems) in order to assess the 
existence of sub-markets within the satellite personal communications market. 
Although a negative conclusion was reached, the Commission did not preclude such 
approach in the long term, depending on the specificities of the system to be 
developed198.  
  
In MSG199 and NSD200, two landmark decisions in the broadcasting sector, although 
decided at approximately the same period as Inmarsat and Iridium, distribution of 
signals via satellite was distinguished from distribution through terrestrial links on the 
premise of considerable differences that were found to exist between the two modes of 
distribution both technically and financially201.  
 
In British Interactive Broadcasting/Open202, the Commission noted that for the 
provision of basic voice services to consumers, the relevant infrastructure market 
included not only the traditional copper network of BT but also the cable networks of 
the cable operators, which were capable of providing basic telephony services, and 
possibly wireless fixed networks. In Nortel/Norweb203, the Commission recognised 
that electricity networks using Digital Power Line technology could provide an 
alternative to existing traditional local telecommunications access loop. In both cases, 
the responses collected from industry players accorded with this approach.  
 
                                            
198 Ibid., par. 28. 
199 Commission Decision of 9.11.94, Case IV/M.469, MSG Media Service (1996) OJ L364/1.  
200 Commission Decision of19.7.1995, Case IV/M.490, Nordic Satellite Distribution (1996) OJ L 53/20, 
par. 57. 
201 As far as traditional broadcasting services are concerned, merger authorities continue to define 
different television broadcasting markets by reference to the platform applied for the transmission of the 
signal, refer to Macquarie UK Broadcast Ventures Limited/ National Grid Wireless Group, Clearance of 
11.3.2008 at www.competition-commission .org.uk.  
202 Case No IV/36.359, [1999] OJ L 312, par. 33-38. 
203 Case No IV/M.1113, par. 28-29. 
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Since the late nineties, product market delineation on the basis of technology was 
regarded as inflexible204 and unstable because of the rapid advances of the same, 
especially with a view to the advent of digital era 205. The disassociation of the services 
from the type of network over which they are supplied has developed the principle of 
platform independence or the principle of technological neutrality and resulted from 
the phenomenon of convergence of networks and services. In fact, platform 
independence has contributed to the establishment of the current single regulatory 
framework for electronic communications206. According to the definition of the 
principle in recital 18 of the Framework Directive, the principle contains a prohibition 
of discrimination and the associated consequence that regulation should not pre-empt 
market outcomes on the basis of (evolutionary) technologies207.  
 
In the Guidelines, the Commission does not preclude market definition of products 
destined for end users on the basis of the physical characteristics of networks over 
which the services are rendered, but it recognises that the purpose of the services is the 
most decisive element208.The Guidelines also set out the principle that access markets 
should be platform independent, in that they should comprise all types of infrastructure 
that can be used for the provision of a given service209. The broadening of market 
definition pursuant to the principle of platform independence reveals that alternative 
technologies can have the ability to lower market entry barriers, which are one of the 
                                            
204 Larouche, P., Competition Law and Regulation in European Telecommunications, Hart Publishing, 
London, 2000. 
205 Grewlich, K., “Cyberspace”: Sector-specific Regulation and Competition rules in European 
Telecommunications, [1999]36 CMLRev., 942. 
206 As stated in recital 5 of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 
March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 
[2002] OJ L 108/3 (the Framework Directive), the convergence of the telecommunications, media and 
information technology sectors means all transmission networks and services should be covered by a 
single regulatory framework. Refer also to the definition of "electronic communications network" in 
Article 2a of the Framework Directive, i.e. transmission systems and, where applicable, switching or 
routing equipment and other resources which permit the conveyance of signals by wire, by radio, by 
optical or by other electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, fixed (circuit- and packet-
switched, including Internet) and mobile terrestrial networks, electricity cable systems, to the extent that 
they are used for the purpose of transmitting signals, networks used for radio and television 
broadcasting, and cable television networks, irrespective of the type of information conveyed.  
207 Rec. 18 quotes: ‘The requirement for Member States to ensure that national regulatory authorities 
take the utmost account of the desirability of making regulation technologically neutral, that is to say 
that it neither imposes nor discriminates in favour of the use of a particular type of technology, does not 
preclude the taking of proportionate steps to promote certain specific services where this is justified, for 
example digital television as a means for increasing spectrum efficiency’. 
208 Paragraph 45 of the Guidelines.  
209 Paragraph 67 of the Guidelines. 
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three factors necessary for the pre-definition of any market susceptible of ex ante 
regulation, as set out in the following section. Hence, this means that the broadening of 
market definition pursuant to the principle of platform independence may imply that 
regulation will not be necessary210. 
 
On the other hand, platform independence is particularly significant for the definition 
of oligopolistic markets, because it precludes the narrowing of the market per type of 
network and allows the prospective inclusion in the same service market of operators 
providing similar services over different types of network, thus allowing a wider view 
on possibly emerging technologies also211. The opening up of the digital dividend 
spectrum for different services is further demonstration of the principle of platform 
independence, since it creates an opportunity particularly for wireless broadband 
network operators to gain valuable radio spectrum, and in turn reinforces competition 
in the provision of broadband services. For market definition purposes this means that 
broadband services offered via any of the abovementioned technology will form part 
of the same market. In April 2011, the Commission set out the technical parameters 
allowing for the co-existence of GSM and 3G with either LTE or WiMXA based 4G 
technology212.  
 
In its response to the European Commission’s questionnaire for the public consultation 
on the revision of the Recommendation on Relevant Markets213, BEREC identified the 
roll-out of LTE, the upgrade of cable infrastructure and the deployment of fibre as 
major technological developments affecting market definition in electronic 
communications markets, i.e. the substantial increase in inter-platform competition, 
with the upgrade of cable technologies and local fibre deployment. Furthermore, 
BEREC noted the increasingly substantial use of broadband, which has resulted in an 
                                            
210 Kamecke, U., Korber, T., Technological Neutrality in the EC RegulatoryFramework for Electronic 
Communications: A Good Principle Widely Misunderstood, [2008] ECLR, 333. 
211 Ibid. It is important to understand that the term convergence does not refer to the networks 
themselves, but to the services provided over the different networks. 
212 Commission implementing decision of 18 April 2011 amending decision 2009/766/EC on the 
harmonisation of 900 Mhz and 1800 Mhz frequency bands for terrestrial systems capable of providing 
pan-European electronic communications services in the Community, [2011] OJ L 106/9. National 
administrations were obliged until 31st December 2011 to implement the Decision into their national 
rules so that GSM bands are effectively made available for LTE and WiMAX systems. 
213 BoR(13) 22. 
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increase in the supply and demand of services and applications via the internet, 
including Over-The-Top (OTT) services, whereas IP technology is taking over circuit 
switched networks with particular implications for fixed telephony services.   
 
In relation to wholesale broadcasting transmission services, despite their removal from 
the list of markets susceptible to ex ante regulation, as a result of the transition from 
analogue to digital platforms214, studies have shown that in case of failure on the 
market for managed transmission services (e.g. transmission operators charge abusive 
prices to broadcasters), depending on the existence of a prospect for intra-platform 
competition for the provision of broadband services, remedies should be imposed 
either on the market for access to network elements (if there is prospect for intra-
platform competition) or on the market for managed transmission services (if market 
analysis shows that such prospect does not exist)215. If there is a prospect for intra-
platform competition, there may also be a prospect of collusive behaviour between 
undertakings operating on different platforms216. 
 
2.2. Defining product markets for SMP regulatory purposes  
2.2.1. The method of pre-definition 
 
On examining competition law cases, particularly in the context of mergers, the 
Commission and the ECJ have defined a significant number of markets in the 
telecommunications sector, including separate markets for network access and 
services, voice and data/ Internet markets, mobile services, terminal equipment etc.217.  
                                            
214 Nonetheless, there have been notifications assessing the relevant market, like e.g. FR/2012/1354. 
215 Cullen International, Study on the Regulation of Broadcasting Issues under the New Regulatory 
Framework, prepared for the European Commission, 22.12.2006, 121-123. 
216 However, at the time of the study (ibid., 123), only France had succeeded in introducing intra-
platform competition and spectrum assignment which was authorised through the 2009 reform package 
is expected to facilitate such form of competition in broadcasting services. 
217 E.g. only in Telia/Telenor (Commission decision of 13 December 1999, 
Case IV/M.1439) the Commission defined fourteen separate markets, for local 
calls with the use of switch fixed telephony segment, long distance calls with 




The 2002 regulatory framework does not direct National Regulators (NRAs) towards 
complete market analysis in electronic communications. On the contrary, for 
homogeneity purposes in the regulation of SMP throughout the EU, the Commission 
has opted in favour of the pre-definition of the relevant electronic communication 
markets at Community level. Article 15 par. 1 of the Framework Directive, provides 
that the electronic communication markets, which may justify the imposition of 
regulatory measures, are set out by the Commission in a Recommendation. The 
Commission also reserves veto rights as to the decision by NRAs to define different 
product markets or to impose sector-specific regulatory obligations on markets other 
than those identified in the Recommendation.  
 
The accurate product and geographic dimension of a market identified in electronic 
communications for SMP regulation depends on the proper gathering of all necessary 
information, findings and studies commissioned or relied upon by NRAs in exercising 
their regulatory tasks. The Guidelines point out that in preparing to carry out a market 
analysis, NRAs will collect all the necessary information from the widest possible 
range of sources. Article 5.1 of the Framework Directive provides that member states 
shall ensure that undertakings providing electronic communications networks and 
services provide all the information necessary for NRAs to ensure conformity with 
                                                                                                                              
switch fixed telephony segment, calls from fixed to mobile, mobile telephony, 
operator access to local loop networks, operator access to long distance or 
international networks, business data communications, ISP services, 
wholesale ISP services, Internet advertising, sale of advertising space in local 
telephone directories, sale of advertising space in business-to-business 
directories and PABX distribution. The Commission has also defined separate 
markets for optical network products, broadband access solutions, S/R 
equipment, narrowband switches (Case No COMP/M.4214, Alcatel/Lucent 
Technologies, 24.7.2006), for cable CPEs and digital set-top boxes (Case No. 
COMP/M.4063, Cisco/Scientific Atlanta, 22.2.2006), mobile network 
equipment, network access network equipment, core-network access 
equipment, transport and IP network equipment (Case No COMP/M.4297, 
Nokia/Siemens, 13.11.2006), etc.  
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Community law. Furthermore, Article 11 of the Authorisation Directive provides that 
undertakings can be required by the terms of their general authorisation to supply the 
information necessary for NRAs to conduct a market analysis within the meaning of 
Article 15.2 of the Framework Directive.  
 
Hence, accurate market identification for regulation for SMP purposes depends to a 
great extent on the education, resources, skills and competence of the staff employed 
by the NRAs. Market definition is not a mechanical or abstract process but requires an 
analysis of any available evidence of market behaviour and an overall understanding of 
the mechanics of a given sector. It has been pointed out correctly that the effectiveness 
of a competition law regime depends at least as much on administrative skills (the 
training and skills of the staff involved) as on the strength of the underlying 
legislation218. One assumes that the list was needed to fill gaps in NRAs’ competences 
and accelerate convergence of regulatory approaches, at the same time ensuring a 
degree of control in the hands of the Commission219. 
 
The first Recommendation, issued on 13.5.2003 described 18 product markets and was 
revised in December 2007 to reduce the number of markets susceptible to ex ante 
regulation to seven wholesale and one retail market220. According to the Draft Revised 
Recommendation issued on September 30, 2013, the number of markets susceptible to 
ex ante regulation is reduced further into four wholesale markets221. Any other market 
analysis for the purpose of imposing additional measures to SMPs should be justified 
by exceptional circumstances that apply in that particular member state and be subject 
to the Commission’ s approval as per Article 7 par. 4 and 5 of the Framework 
Directive. 
 
                                            
218 Pitt, E., Telecommunications Regulation: Is it realistic to rely on competition law?, [1999] E.C.L.R. 
247-248. 
219 Ecorys, Final Report commissioned for DG Connect: Future electronic communications markets 
subject to ex ante regulation, Rotterdam, 18.09.2013, (the “Final Market Report for DG Connect’) 383. 
220 Recommendation on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications 
sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communication 
networks and services, [2007] OJ L344/65. In October 2012 the Commission launched consultation 
procedures for the review of the Recommendation, http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/public-
consultation-revision-recommendation-relevant-markets.  




In the early days of telecommunication regulation, the Commission has adopted in its 
Guidelines on the application of EEC Competition rules in the Telecommunications 
sector, the view that, as a result of rapid advances of technology and changes in market 
conditions,  
“any current market definition runs the risk of becoming inaccurate or 
irrelevant in the near future”222.  
 
However, subsequent regulatory approaches favoured the pre-definition of relevant 
markets in establishing obligations for organisations with significant market power. 
E.g. in relation to interconnection, the relevant markets for the purposes of assessing 
significant market power were specified in the Interconnection Directive as fixed 
public telephone networks and services, leased line services and public mobile 
networks223. The rapid advances of technology and market conditions in the telecom 
sector was the reason for such predefinition of relevant markets in legislation, which 
were, nonetheless, criticised as unable to form the basis of any reliable and enduring 
assessment of market power in compliance with economic theory and competition law 
practice 224. 
 
The Commission decided to remain with such regulatory practice, to ensure 
harmonisation and legal certainty throughout European markets225. Although such 
decision may seem justified in the light of control of over-regulation, it is in potential 
conflict with the Commission’s decision to approach regulation of SMPs in accordance 
with general competition law principles and the flexibility inherent in such 
approach226. Although there should not be significant deviations from state to state in 
the list of most commonly used product markets, product market definition may be 
found to depend on specific conditions, which differ from state to state, such as 
primarily legal, statutory or other regulatory requirements, but also on specific 
customer preferences and habits and the structure of the market itself. Article 15 par. 1 
of the Framework Directive does not preclude market delineation on the basis of such 
specific characteristics, but regards it as a more remote possibility.  
                                            
222 Par. 54. 
223 Annex I to Directive 97/33/EC. 
224 Taylor, M., European Commission’ s Draft Guidelines on Market Analysis, [2001]6 CTLR 130. 
225 European Commission, Explanatory Note, SEC [2007] 1483 final. 
226 Articles 14 f of the Framework Directive provide explicit instructions to the Commission to define 




Three months after publishing the 2002 Directives in the Official Journal and, in 
particular, on 11.7.2002, the Commission released the Guidelines (on Market 
Analysis) with the purpose of assisting NRAs in analysing whether a given product or 
service market is effectively competitive in a given geographical area, including an 
analysis as to whether the market is prospectively competitive, and thus whether any 
lack of effective competition is durable227. Given the aforementioned restrains of the 
Framework Directive in relation to product market definition by NRAs, the 
significance of the Guidelines at market definition level is twofold: the delineation of 
the accurate geographic scope of the markets of the Recommendation and the 
existence of exceptional circumstances in a member state allowing deviations from the 
recommended markets.  
 
The Recommendation also establishes three cumulative criteria that are necessary for 
any market, either identified by the Commission in the Recommendation or by NRAs 
on the basis of prevailing market conditions on a specific member-state, to be eligible 
for ex ante SMP regulation228: 
(a) the existence of high and non-transitory barriers to entry of a structural, legal 
or regulatory nature; these may become less relevant with regard to innovation-
driven markets characterised by ongoing technological progress229. 
(b) the existence of market structure not tending towards effective competition and 
(c) the insufficiency of competition law alone to address market failures in such 
market.   
 
These three criteria do not comply entirely with the competition law approach to 
market definition, because they do not form part of the traditional hypothetical 
monopolist test and the SSNIP test applied for market definition, which was described 
in the first section of this chapter. Rather, the first two criteria are taken into account in 
the calculation of market power of undertakings in a given market, not for the 
definition of the market itself. The third criterion repeats the Commission’s expressed 
position to abstain from regulation in markets where the application of competition law 
                                            
227 Par. 19-20 of the Guidelines. 
228 Par. 2 of the Recommendation. The same is repeated in par. 2 of the Draft Recommendation 2013. 
229 Recital 14 of the Draft Recommendation 2013. 
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may prove capable of remedying the problem identified. This is acknowledged by the 
Commission, who quotes in recital 11 of the Draft Recommendation 2013: 
“The first criterion is the presence of high and non-transitory barriers to entry. 
However, given the dynamic character and functioning of electronic 
communications markets, possibilities to overcome barriers to entry within the 
relevant time horizon should also be taken into consideration when carrying out 
a prospective analysis to identify the relevant markets for possible ex ante 
regulation. The second criterion addresses whether a market structure tends 
towards effective competition within a relevant time horizon. The application 
of this criterion involves examining the state of infrastructure-based and other 
competition behind the barriers to entry. The third criterion is that the 
application of competition law alone would not adequately address the market 
failure(s) concerned. The main indicators to be considered when assessing the 
first and second criteria are similar to those examined as part of a forward-
looking market analysis to determine the presence of significant market power. 
In particular, indicators of barriers to entry in the absence of regulation 
(including the extent of sunk costs), market structure, market performance and 
market dynamics, including indicators such as market shares and trends, market 
prices and trends, and the extent and coverage of competing networks or 
infrastructures”. 
 
The Commission’ s insistence on the abovementioned criteria in virtually all steps of 
the SMP process (market analysis, establishment of SMP and imposition of measures 
on SMP operators) involves the risk that, once their presence is accepted at the phase 
of market selection, the NRA starts its analysis under the following steps with a 
‘prejudiced’ mind230. In practice, the issue of the Recommendation in the form of a 
mandatory list induces less sophisticated NRAs to adopt market definitions without 
extensive market analysis and more sophisticated NRAs to treat the Recommendation 
as the minimum level of analysis required in the market231. Indeed, most of the 
                                            
230 Valcke, P., Querk, R., Lievens, E., EU Communications Law: Significant Market Power in the 
Mobile Sector, EE [2005], 23. 
231 Strivens, P., ibid. In January 2008, the European Competition Telecommunications Authority 
(ECTA) published a report on the basis of a benchmark of NRAs across the EU, indicating that the 
effectiveness of regulation varies significantly and that the actions of more effective regulators had 




notifications concerning market definitions different from the markets defined in the 
Recommendation that may be in force from time to time come from OFTEL, Ficora, 
the German, Dutch and other sophisticated NRAs, since the first days of the 
application of the original recommendation232.  
 
In terms of oligopolistic markets, there has never been any market identified on top of 
the markets of the Recommendation that may have been in force at the time of the 
relevant notification. Notably, in the period 2003-2007 the only markets where 
concerns of collective dominance have been identified as credible are the markets for 
broadcasting (Italy)233, broadband access (Malta, albeit withdrawn after the expression 
of serious doubts by the Commission)234 and for mobile access and call origination 
(Ireland, Malta, Spain235), which were all provided as eligible for ex ante market 
Regulation under the original 2003 Recommendation. It is noted, further, that Slovenia 
also notified in 2008 collective SMP in the market for mobile access and call 
origination, but the designation was removed after the expression of serious doubts by 
the Commission236. Also, none of the total 47 notifications with market assessments 
involving collective dominance in the period September 2003 – September 2013237 
referred to a market deviating from the list of the Recommendations. 
 
The foregoing remarks possibly show that, as a result of the difficulties involved in 
addressing competition concerns in oligopolistic markets238, unless the market 
definitions of the Recommendation are capable in themselves in capturing oligopolistic 
markets, NRAs and particularly less sophisticated NRAs will not be directed to the 
definitions of markets capable of catching oligopolistic behavior, but only to the 
                                            
232 E.g. refer to cases DE/2012/1358, DE/2012/1359, SE/2005/0188, FR/2005/0205, IE/2005/0158- 
163, DE/2005/0143 and DE/2005/0233, IE/2005/0137, IE/2005/0138, DK/2005/0141, DE/2004/0119 
and DE/2005/0150, AT/2004/0097, UK/2004/0094, FI/2004/0062, UK/2003/0037, UK/2003/0038, 
IE/2004/0042 and IE/2004/0114, AT/2003/0018, UK/2003/0003, 005-016). Also, Pelkmans and Renda 
(ibid.) argue that by-passing the three-criteria test on whether ex ante regulation was the proper action to 
take, national markets almost invariably became regulated without appropriate economic analysis. 
233 IT/2004/424. 
234 IE/2003/121, MT/2007/563, ES/2004/330. 
235 MT/2006/443,  
236 SI/2008/806. 
237 24 involving wholesale mobile access and call origination, 12 involving wholesale international 
roaming, 4 involving wholesale broadband access, 3 involving wholesale trunk segments of leased lines, 
2 involving transit services in the fixed telephone network and 2 involving broadcasting transmission 
services. The relevant table may be found in the bibliography section. 
238 Refer to the identification of the ‘oligopoly problem’ in chapter 1 and in the description of factors 
capable of establishing collective dominance in chapter 3. 
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regulation of single dominance. The analysis of the separate markets identified in the 
Recommendation that are described in the following sections will make this point. 
 
In fact, as quoted by some scholars, the markets identified in the Recommendation, 
reflect political decisions on areas susceptible to regulation239. This is particularly 
relevant for the review of regulatory approaches to oligopolistic markets in electronic 
communications. Indeed, all member states feature a player with SMP in almost all of 
the seven markets of the 2007 Recommendation240. This in itself shows that the 
Commission’s primary policy has been the regulation of single SMP and incumbents, 
not the promotion of effective competition through regulation in anti-competitive 
market structures with few players, despite the trend to oligopolistic market structures 
in electronic communications. Of particular interest is the statement made on pp. 3-34 
of the Report commissioned by the European Commission on the revision of the 2007 
Recommendation in relation to competition in the mobile access markets: 
“In the light of the impracticality of an attempt to apply SMP regulation in 
oligopolistic markets (and because there is an expectation of increased 
competition as a consequence of growing use of VoIP), it does not seem 
worthwhile to spend material effort in defining mobile access markets and 
considering whether or not the Three Criteria are satisfied. All in all, although 
the oligopolistic mobile markets are often not truly competitive, there is little 
that can be done under the Framework”. 
 
2.2.2. Markets susceptible to regulation 
 
In the 2007 Recommendation, the Commission identified one retail market and six 
wholesale markets susceptible of ex ante regulation. Unlike the 2003 recommendation, 
which discriminated between residential and non-residential customers at retail 
level241, the Recommendation identified a single retail market susceptible of ex ante 
                                            
239 Strivens, P., New Access Conditions – a Challenge to Competitive Telecoms Operators and Service 
Providers, [2003] CTLR, 121. 
240 Pelkmans, J., Renda, A., Single eComms Market? No such thing …, Bruges European Economic 
Policy Briefings [2011] 22, 8. 
241 Market segmentation by reference to the customer base has been applied frequently in the 
Commission’s decisionary practice in telecommunications. Refer, e.g. to Commission Decision of 
17.7.1996, Case No. IV/35.617, Phoenix/Global One (1996) OJ L239/57, where separate markets were 
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regulation, access to the public telephone network at a fixed location for residential 
and non-residential customers. 
 
At wholesale level, the Recommendation identified the following markets: 
1. Call origination on the public telephone network provided at a fixed location.  
2. Call termination on individual public telephone networks provided at a fixed 
location.  
3. Wholesale (physical) network infrastructure access (including shared or fully 
unbundled access) at a fixed location.  
4. Wholesale broadband access. This market comprises non-physical or virtual 
network access including ‘bit-stream’ access at a fixed location. This market is 
situated downstream from the physical access covered by market 3 listed above, in 
that wholesale broadband access can be constructed using this input combined with 
other elements.  
5. Wholesale terminating segments of leased lines, irrespective of the technology 
used to provide leased or dedicated capacity.  
6. Voice call termination on individual mobile networks. 
 
According to the Draft Recommendation 2013, only the following four (4) wholesale 
markets are susceptible to ex ante regulation: 
Market 1: Wholesale call termination on individual public telephone networks 
provided at a fixed location 
Market 2: Wholesale voice call termination on individual mobile networks 
                                                                                                                              
delineated for products destined for (i) telecommunications traffic carriers and service providers (the 
market for carrier services), (ii) corporate users (enhanced customised and/or packet-switched data 
communications services) and (iii) individuals who are away from their normal location (traveller 
services). Similar distinctions are also found in Atlas. In BT/MCI II, although it was recognised that 
there are different categories of customers to which international direct dialled call services are targeted 
(wholesale and retail customers, with the latter being broken down further into business and residential 
end-users), the Commission did not express its view as to whether a market segmentation on this basis 
would be necessary (par. 14 of the Decision). Other examples of market segmentation by reference to 
the customer base comprise low-cost roaming services for frequent travellers (e.g. Case No. IV/1430, 
Vodafone/Airtouch, Notification of 6.5.1999), dial-up markets for residential and business customers 
(Case No. COMP/M. 1838, BT/Esat, 27.3.2000). 
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Market 3:  a) Wholesale local access provided at a fixed location 
b) Wholesale central access provided at a fixed location for massmarket 
products 
Market 4: Wholesale high-quality access provided at a fixed location 
 
According to the Report commissioned by the Commission in the context of the 
revision of the Recommendation242, wholesale local access at a fixed location 
coincides with Market 4 of the 2007 Recommendation (wholesale (physical) network 
infrastructure access (including shared or fully unbundled access) at a fixed location) 
and Wholesale central access provided at a fixed location for massmarket products is 
equivalent to Market 5 of the 2007 Recommendation (wholesale broadband access). 
Market 4 of the Draft Recommendation 2013 encompasses market 6 of the 2007 
Recommendation, as well as other hybrid products that in a forward-looking 
prespective may offer the same result for high-quality access. 
 
In short, the list of the Draft Recommendation includes two markets pertaining to the 
termination of voice and three wholesale markets relevant to access to data 
transmission services. The two categories will be now examined in turn.   
 
2.2.2.1. The access markets to data transmission services at a fixed location 
 
Access to data transmission services is also considered the most developing part of 
electronic communications. Under both the 2007 Recommendation and the 2013 Draft 
Recommendation, the types of service that have been considered to be susceptible of 
ex ante regulation by the Commission in the Recommendation are a) wholesale 
(physical) network infrastructure access (including shared or fully unbundled access) 
at a fixed location (now Wholesale Local Access), b) wholesale broadband access 
                                            
242 The Final Market Report for DG Connect, 171. 
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(now Wholesale Central Access) and c) terminating segments of leased lines (now 
wholesale high-quality access)243. 
 
The first two sub-markets are related to the retail market for broadband services. 
According to the Commission, wholesale network infrastructure was tantamount to 
local loop access, which met the three criteria test due to the inherent difficulties in 
replicating local loop and to the insufficiency of competition law to address 
competition law issues as a result of the complexities involved in the intervention 
requirements244. The principle of technological neutrality was behind the deletion of 
the word ‘metallic’ in the definition of the local loop market in the Recommendation 
as opposed to the definition of the local loop market under the original 
recommendation245, which implied that long-term competitive effects regarding local 
end-customer access by technologies like WiMax, TV-cable, etc. should be taken into 
consideration. 
 
The Commission did not consider wholesale broadband access a substitute for local 
loop access due to network topology issues and associated investment from the part of 
the operator:  
‘From a demand perspective, a retail provider using wholesale broadband 
access will only consider unbundled local loops a substitute if it has all the 
other network elements needed to self-provide an equivalent wholesale 
service. The supply substitution possibilities depend on the same condition. 
Therefore, unbundled local loops and wholesale broadband access 
constitute distinct markets’246.  
 
The Commission’s justification for the separation of wholesale broadband access from 
wholesale network infrastructure access was not entirely in line with the principle of 
                                            
243 In NL/2012/1407-1408, the Dutch NRA identified a single wholesale market for physical network 
infrastructure access including LLU at a fixed location in the Netherlands, WBA and wholesale 
terminating segments of leased lines. 
244 Refer to pp. 31f of the Explanatory Note. 
245 Typical technical properties for common bitstream access could be defined by a maximum capacity 
of up to 16Mbit/s per line and it can be entirely left to the regulated undertaking whether it meets these 
requirements with a copper or a fibre connection, Kamecke, U., Korber, T., ibid., 333. 
246 Explanatory Note, p. 33. 
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platform independence, although the same principle was applied for the refinement of 
the local loop market. In fact, since the first days of the 2007 Recommendation, the 
Commission took a strict view in relation to the separation of alternative technologies 
from the delineated markets of the Recommendation, when it dismissed the plans of the 
German regulator to apply a regulatory holiday on the VDSL market247. The 
Commission supported the argument that the introduction of advanced technologies 
like VDSL should be included in the definition of the wholesale network infrastructure 
access, on the grounds that technological neutrality requires an extension of broadband 
regulation to the new technology248. Also, under proper spectrum management, 
wireless broadband is expected to be subject to significant technological progress, such 
that 4G wireless technologies (like LTE) can become genuine alternatives to fixed 
broadband with fairly high speeds249. This opportunity is of particular importance for 
non-cable countries, since platform based competition would thus become possible in 
broadband more or less like in cable countries250. 
 
In the same line of thinking it can be argued that considering other access technologies 
not equivalent to local loop unbundling is in breach of the principle of applying access 
obligations on all networks irrespective of the technology used. The fact that the 
Commission believed that regulated local loop access would be insufficient to constrain 
potential market power at the retail level, if wholesale broadband access remained 
unregulated, supports the view that the two submarkets should be considered to form 
part of a single market. The decision to consider separate markets for broadband access 
and local loop indicates the intention to impose specific obligations on the former 
incumbents and owners of local loop. This conclusion is reinforced by the 
Commission’s encouragement on NRAs to judge with a forward-looking approach to 
facilitate infrastructure-based competition, which indicates, on the one hand, 
acceptance of obligations imposed on the owners of existing local loop infrastructure 
                                            
247 [2007] Rapid Press Release IP/07/237. 
248 Refer also to p. 30 of the Recommendation. 
249 However, in the recent case CZ/2012/1322, the Commission adopted its decision of 10.08.12, 
whereby it rejected the definition of broadband access markets by the Czech NRA, which included WiFi 
and cable in the relevant broadband access market.  
250 Pelkmans, J., Renda, A., ibid., 10. The authors argue that, to seize the opportunity, it is important to 
make available scarce spectrum, particularly in view of the freeing of frequencies as a result of the 
transition from analogue to digital broadcasting and that spectrum regulation at European as opposed to 
national level is necessary in that respect.   
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and, on the other hand, prohibition of obligations imposed on the owners and 
developers of alternative infrastructure251. 
 
In its Recommendation on NGA, the Commission advised that the review of markets 
on wholesale broadband access and wholesale network infrastructure access should be 
performed in a coordinated and timely manner by NRAs, taking also into account of 
NGA networks252. In its response to the European Commission’s questionnaire for the 
public consultation on the revision of the Recommendation on Relevant Markets253, 
BEREC referred to the serious challenges posed by alternative infrastructure roll-out, 
in particular in the context of NGA deployments that will lead to different conditions 
of competition prevailing in different geographic areas. According to BEREC, the 
competitive scenario may thus develop from the traditional single firm SMP situation 
towards a duopolistic situation, where only two operators are competing in a given 
area (e.g. fibre networks and upgraded cable networks). 
 
Nonetheless, BEREC did not consider revisiting the boundaries between market 4 and 
5 of the 2007 Recommendation254; it took the view that the delineation between market 
4 (passive products) and market 5 (active products) is still justified with regard to the 
telecommunication markets of most European countries, on the grounds that a large 
number of providers still rely on passive products rather than on active products and, 
in most countries, those active products are not regarded as sufficient substitutes in 
terms of technological independence, capability to innovate, provision of quality 
differentiation and coverage. 
 
In the Report commissioned by the Commission in the context of the revision of the 
Recommendation, the wholesale markets for local loop unbundling and the wholesale 
broadband access as well as terminating segments of leased lines remain on the list, 
                                            
251 The Commission accepted, though for a temporary period of time, the application of differentiated 
treatment of the pricing for call termination by the Italian NRA on Telecom Italia, which was obliged to 
apply cost-oriented price formation, while allowing alternative providers to charge higher prices for 
traffic terminated over their networks, see Commission Press Release IP/06/685. 
252 Commission Recommendation of 20 September 2010 on regulated access to Next Generation 
Networks, [2010] OJ L251/35, par. 5. 
253 BoR(13) 22, at p. 14. 
254 Ibid., at. p. 19. 
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with modifications255. According to the Report, market 4 should be redefined as the 
market for Wholesale Local Access (WLA) comprising “wholesale (physical) network 
infrastructure access or functionally similar wholesale local virtual network access” 
and market 5 is redefined as the market for Wholesale Central Access (WCA) 
comprising wholesale bitstream access or other forms of central virtual network. The 
Report also distinguishes separate retail markets for mass-market broadband services 
and high quality bespoke broadband services – which are typically demanded by 
residential and non-residential users respectively. The distinction at retail level 
translates into distinct wholesale markets for WCA with possibly a different set of 
competition problems. 
 
Since the 2007 Recommendation, the Commission considered the merging of these two 
markets in the longer term: 
‘Depending on the way in which network upgrades occur or the particular 
demand and supply conditions evolve in Member States, these two 
wholesale markets may remain distinct or, conceivably merge into one’256.  
According to the 2013 Draft Recommendation, the markets are defined separately, but 
under the same umbrella of Market 3, possibly leaving more latitude to NRAs to assess 
them as a single market. 
 
The merger of the two markets will imply the increase of the number of players in the 
market and, although the emergence of oligopolies cannot be precluded in the 
wholesale central access market, its merger with the network access – local loop 
market will increase the possibility of examining the wholesale access market from an 
oligopoly perspective257. This is supported also by BEREC’s assessment in its 
response to the European Commission’s questionnaire for the public consultation on 
the revision of the Recommendation on Relevant Markets258, that due to the 
                                            
255 Ecorys, Final Report commissioned for DG Connect: Future electronic communications markets 
subject to ex ante regulation, Rotterdam, 18.09.2013. 
256 Explanatory Note, p. 35. 
257 Cave et al, ibid., note on p. 17 that, while the ability of rival operators to potentially offer wholesale 
services may not be strong enough in the short run, it may be strong enough in the long run to take into 
account in market analysis. 
258 BoR(13) 22, p. 8. 
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competitive dynamics and costs (mainly economies of scale and scope) associated with 
fibre deployment, the number of operators that will be able to make their own 
commercially viable roll-out of NGA infrastructure (including within dense areas) will 
likely remain limited.  
 
The definition of a single market for the supply of wholesale broadband access is 
reinforced also by the increasing discussions on the separation of networks and 
services, because it will increase the number of market participants through the 
inclusion of self-supply. The Commission has stated in the Explanatory Note that self-
supply is not taken into account for market assessment in the absence of a merchant 
market and potential demand or if alternative operators face capacity constraints, or 
their networks lack the ubiquity expected by access seekers, and/or if alternative 
providers have difficulty in entering the merchant market readily259. If networks and 
services are separated, the supply of network access, regardless of whether it is to the 
operator’s retail arm or to a third party, will be taken into account for market 
assessment purposes. 
 
It is also noted that, as far as end-to-end retail broadband is concerned, economists 
have argued that joint dominance by operators providing broadband through ADSL 
and wireless broadband is possible, although the different structures of wired and 
wireless platforms make tacit collusion less likely. In addition, in the absence of strong 
competition provided by wireless technologies, the possibility of joint dominance by 
operators providing broadband through ADSL and those providing the same services 
over cable cannot be ruled out: 
‘Where firms can offer both DSL – based on bitstream and ULL – and 
cable broadband, they can offer a national service in both cable and non-
cabled area. This will enhance the symmetry between operators and may 
promote tacit collusion. Overall, then, there are good grounds for 
anticipating market failure problems (up to and including dominance) in 
non-mobile retail broadband markets, the absence of regulation’260. 
                                            
259 Explanatory Note, 15. 




The 2013 Report on the revision of the markets of the 2007 Recommendation also 
suggests revisiting the market for the terminating segments of leased lines to 
encompass part of Market 5 of the Recommendation. The 2007 Recommendation 
distinguished the trunk segments of leased lines from their terminating segments, but 
they provide definitions of neither of the two. According to the explanatory note, what 
constitutes a terminating segment and, conversely, what part of the network forms part 
of the trunk network, will depend on the network topology to particular member states 
and will be decided upon by the relevant NRA261. 
 
The Commission justified its choice to identify the terminating segments of leased 
lines as a market susceptible to ex ante regulation on the grounds that such terminating 
segments rely on one form or another on the former incumbent’s ubiquitous access 
network262. The choice of this market also indicates the Commission’s intention to 
have SMP and single dominance established on this sub-market of leased lines263. 
Notably, the Commission has pre-established single dominance on the terminating 
segments of leased lines. This view is reinforced by the lack of identification of 
specific market boundaries, which creates the impression that each NRA is free to 
establish market limits depending on the presence of other competitors in the various 
parts of the leased lines networks264; the part(s) where only the former incumbent is 
present will probably be defined as terminating segments of leased lines and the former 
incumbent will be susceptible of regulatory measures265. Indeed, until 30.09.2013 there 
was no notification to the Commission claiming to have assessed prospective 
collective dominance issues on this market.  
                                            
261 Explanatory Note, p.38. 
262 Ibid., 38-39.  
263 However, the Commission does not preclude the perspective finding of individual trunk segments of 
leased lines as susceptible of SMP regulation, see p. 38 of the Explanatory Note. 
264In the study commissioned by DG Connect in the context of the revision of the Recommendation 
(supra at 57), it is emphasised (p. 142) that as a general rule, only the incumbent has near-ubiquitous 
network. Competing network operators will tend to have a significant trunk network and access network 
in areas where businesses (especially large businesses) are concentrated. Outside the business districts 
with the highest density of large businesses, it will often be the case that there are only one or two 
networks within reach of any particular building. In the absence of wholesale access products supplied 
by the incumbent, relatively few customers would be able to be served by any provider other than the 
incumbent, despite the existence of considerable amounts of competing fibre relatively close by.  
265 It is interesting to note that, in Vodafone/Cable and Wireless (Case COMP/M.6584, 03.07.2012, par. 
28f), a single market for wholesale leased lines was defined, although the final determination on a 
possible segmentation into trunk and terminating segments was left open. In Telefonica/Hansenet (Case 




This argument is not affected by the 2013 Draft Recommendation, where terminating 
segments of leased lines are re-defined into high-quality business data connectivity 
comprising traditional leased line segments, Ethernet services and suitably specified 
DSL services266. According to market study of DG Connect,  
“in some cases, where there is a good degree of replication throughout all parts 
of the trunk network, the market would be identical to the existing Market 
6/2007. Other NRAs would find it appropriate to include ‘long, thin’ trunk 
routes but this would need objective justification. The advantages of this 
scheme over the current one are that: 
1. It provides a generic approach which fits the circumstances of all NRAs 
better than the ‘trunk/terminating’ segmentation of the current 
Recommendation; and 
2. It provides for different treatment of different parts of the trunk network, 
where justified by differences in competitive conditions”267. 
 
2.2.2.2. Call termination 
 
The Commission has identified separate markets for the networks’ capacity to make 
outgoing calls (call origination) and to receive calls (call termination) on an individual 
network basis. Unlike call origination, which applies to calls on all networks, call 
termination is defined on an individual network basis.  
 
The termination of a call as a criterion for market segmentation is justified by the 
Commission in the Guidelines, as follows: 
“[i]f a fixed operator wants to terminate calls to the subscribers of a 
particular network, in principle, it will have no other choice but to call or 
interconnect with the network to which the called party has subscribed”268.  
                                            
266 The generic characteristics of the market are that the service should provide transparent dedicated 
capacity with a high specification service wrapper. Segmentation of such a market by bandwidth has 
been a common past practice and we would expect that this continued to be justified in many cases. 
267 The Final Market Report for DJ Connect, p. 146. 




A couple of years earlier, the Commission had explained in Telia/Telenor that,  
“in theory, a subscriber facing local loop competition could rent one line 
only for incoming calls, and a separate line only for outgoing calls, thus 
allowing him to buy different services from two different providers”269.  
 
In practice, though, it would be difficult to unbundle the individual price elements of 
the service for a final user, as the origination and the termination of a call is usually 
offered together, as a bundled product. Indeed, the Commission hastened to add in the 
same paragraph of the same decision that the argument could not be regarded as 
realistic at least at the time the decision was issued, because the result would be more 
expensive than having one line for both incoming and outgoing calls (the subscriber 
would incur two charges for fixed line rentals instead of one).  
 
Other views have supported the definition of different markets for incoming calls on 
the basis of the call’ s origin or of a notional market encompassing termination of calls 
on the same network (on-net terminating calls) and call origination (outgoing calls to 
all networks), on the grounds that, like call origination, no rate is paid for on-net 
termination of calls270. This means, also, that a separate (notional) market could be 
defined for the termination of all off-net termination calls, encompassing all networks. 
In the Guidelines, the Commission has also accepted, in relation to mobile networks 
that 
‘the question whether the access market to mobile infrastructure relates to 
access to an individual mobile network or to all mobile networks, in general, 
should be decided on the basis of an analysis of the structure and functioning 
of the market’271.  
 
                                            
269 Case IV/M.1459, Telia/Telenor [2001] OJ L40/1, par. 87. 
270 Cave et al., ibid., 38, 98. 
271 Par. 69 of the Guidelines. 
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The Commission established the need for the separation of markets for the origination 
and for the termination of calls in the existence of alternatives to call origination only, 
as opposed to the termination of the calls and specifically to  
“the treatment of services such as carrier pre-selection and call-by-call 
selection, which apply only to outgoing calls”272.  
 
Although carrier selection and pre-selection services exert some competitive pressure 
on the call origination services particularly at retail level, it is doubted whether at 
wholesale level the existence of such competitive pressure is decisive in determining a 
separate market for the origination and for the termination of the call on the same 
network on the basis of the hypothetical monopolist test or whether carrier pre-
selection and call-by-call selection services could be simply regarded as distinct 
markets for the provision of value-added services at retail level. The latter scenario has 
been identified in Mannesmann/Orange273, although no discussion on carrier pre-
selection and call-by-call selection specifically took place. The parties’ submissions 
were in favour of a segmentation of the mobile market into carrier services and 
downstream markets (markets for distribution of mobile telephony274) but the 
Commission left the issue open, as its resolution was found not to affect the 
assessment of the case at issue.  
 
The definition of termination markets on both mobile and fixed networks individually, 
unavoidably leads to the identification of SMP on each network, since each separate 
network is considered a separate market for the termination of calls on that network, 
irrespective of the market share that each operator holds in the overall mobile or fixed 
market for call termination. With its Recommendation of 7 May 2009 on the 
Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU (the 
Termination Rates Recommendation)275, the Commission urged NRAs to impose 
symmetric price control and cost-accounting obligations in accordance with Article 13 
                                            
272 Telia/Telenor, par. 87. 
273 Case No. Comp/M.1760 Mannesmann/Orange, Notification of 17.11.1999.  
274 Although no formal position was reached on the need for any segmentation of the overall mobile 
telephony market, the Commission does not seem to favour the parties’ s view that the sale of handsets 
is included in the general distribution market for mobile services. 
275 Commission Recommendation 2009/396/EC of 7 May 2009 on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed 
and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU, OJ L124/67. 
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of Directive 2002/19/EC on the operators designated by NRAs as having significant 
market power on the markets for wholesale voice call termination on individual fixed 
and mobile public telephone networks on the basis of costs incurred by an efficient 
operator and in applying a pure LRIC bottom-up modelling approach. 
 
Obviously, this reflects the Commission’s decision to regulate the termination of calls, 
through the imposition of measures on all operators, as a result of the calling-party-
pays (CPP) system, which is followed throughout the EU. In its explanatory 
memorandum to the Recommendation, the Commission accepts as the sole possibility 
for the finding of sufficient competition in termination markets the change of the 
charging system from CPP to a system where the receiving party pays for the 
termination of the service276, like the Bill and Keep (BaK) wholesale charging system. 
 
Under the BaK, which is followed in jurisdictions like the US and Singapore, 
wholesale tariffs for termination are set to zero, so operators cover the net cost of 
providing termination from their own retail users. In this way cost recovery is moved 
from a regulated market (termination) to a retail service that is generally offered in a 
competitive market277. Indeed, although termination charges have dropped as a result 
of regulation278, BEREC considers BaK more promising as a regulatory reaction 
against excessive rates for voice termination in the long run. Moving cost recovery to 
retail markets increases incentives for cost minimisation as more cost are subjected to 
competitive cost recovery. Cost recovery from retail users does not mean that the 
prices for those users will have to increase on average. In parallel to the eliminated 
wholesale revenue for termination there is overall the same amount of eliminated 
wholesale costs albeit effects on individual operators may differ, whereas in the retail 
market operators have several options to recover the cost of termination and to 
distribute the benefits of the eliminated costs279.  
 
                                            
276 Explanatory Note, ibid., 9. 
277 BEREC Common Statement on Next Generation Networks Future Charging Mechanisms/ Long 
Term Termination Issues, BoR(10) 24 Rev 1, 24. 
278 BEREC Common Statement on NGN etc., 51. 
279 Ibid., 25. 
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Under the CPP, the Commission has pre-established single dominance on the markets 
for call termination on both mobile and fixed networks through the definition of a 
separate market for the termination of calls on individual networks. In other words, the 
establishment of such narrow market and the unavoidable designation of single SMP 
on each network, whether fixed or mobile, forms the vehicle for regulation by the 
Commission of termination rates. Indeed, the review of notifications made under 
Article 7 of the Framework Directive demonstrates that the Commission has strictly 
requested the designation of single SMP on all networks, without exception and 
adherence to the provisions of the Termination Rates Recommendation. For example, 
under LV/2012/1356, the Lithuanian NRA re-notified to the Commission the market 
for mobile termination after the opening of a Phase II investigation caused by the 
original refusal of the NRA to notify 12 MVNOs as SMP and to impose access 
obligations on the smallest MNO. In DE/2013/1460 the Commission expressed serious 
doubts on the decision of BNetzA to designate only 2 out of the 57 operators providing 
termination over their respective networks and on the application of a LRAIC+ instead 
of a BU-LRIC methodology (which, among other things, increased the FTR/MTR 
difference). Under DE/2013/1424, BNetzA proposed to impose price caps for mobile 
termination rates based on a BU-LRIC plus methodology on all German MNOs until 
30.11.2014, which resulted in the Commission issuing a Recommendation to BNetzA 
setting out clearly the following: 
‘The Termination Rates Recommendation sets out a consistent approach that 
the NRAs should in principle follow regarding price control obligations for 
fixed and mobile termination rates, i.e. a pure BU-LRIC methodology with a 
narrow definition of the incremental cost. If NRAs don’t follow such 
methodology they should provide reasons for doing so’280. 
 
                                            
280 Also, in CZ/2012/1392-1393, the Commission opened a Phase II Investigation on termination 
charges on fixed and mobile markets, as a result of assymetric regulation imposed by the NRA on larger 
and smaller operators, whereas under CZ/2012/1327 the Commission commented against the exception 
of the 4th smallest MNO from regulation, because even if its termination rates had followed the three 
larger operators' regulated prices and there were no asymmetries between operators at the time of 
notification, an asymmetry of termination rates would still arise with the implementation of the 
proposed new rates, or with the application of the BU-LRIC model that was under preparation. In 
FR/2012/1304 the Commission expressed serious doubts for the setting of assymetric mobile 
termination rates in favour of new MNO and MVNOs, because it considered that full MVNOs and their 
respective host MNOs provide the same termination service since both operators made use of the same 
mobile network on the basis of the wholesale service for national roaming. Similar reasoning may be 
found in GI/2012/1334-1345, SK/2012/1324-1325, ES/2012/1314, BG/2012/1317 et al.  
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However, one can reasonably wonder if the identification of such narrow market as 
network termination may be a possible failure of the hypothetical monopolist and the 
SSNIP tests in oligopolistic environments, i.e. of the failure to capture the oligopolistic 
nature and interactions of many markets, as set out in the first section of this chapter, 
thus leading the designation of dominant operators as monopolists rather than 
oligopolists. In other words, the question raised is the following: Could the raising of 
termination rates by one operator be found to have profitably increased the termination 
rate by a hypothetical SSNIP and would such price increase lead also competitors to 
respond by raising price? Such exercise, which could lead to the identification of an 
oligopolistic -instead of monopolistic- market does not appear to have been performed 
in Commission documents. 
 
Of course, full market analysis would be required to support the foregoing assumption. 
However, it is remarked that, if the Commission had allowed the definition of wider 
markets for the origination and termination of calls, encompassing multiple networks 
and possibly multiple platforms, there would be room to assess the existence of SMP 
jointly with other operators281. Economists have supported the view that there is an 
increased risk of joint dominance problems that may be created by mobile operators as 
opposed to network operators using other platforms due to the existence of calls to 
mobile from other platforms282. In two-way access situations, namely in cases where 
two operators are needed to complete a call, the termination price is negotiated 
between the two networks. Although the countervailing buyer power may become 
important283, it is possible that the interconnect partners may be better off by setting a 
higher termination rate284, which is typical collusive behaviour under oligopolistic 
markets. 
 
Joint dominance issues could be assessed also if a narrower separate market were 
defined for the termination of all off-net calls with a possible further segmentation by 
                                            
281 The definition of a single market for the origination and termination of calls may also apply if 
BEREC’ s opinion is followed and BaK replaces CPP. Of course, if the expectations of BEREC 
materialise, the market will probably be considered competitive and regulation will not be necessary. 
282 Cave et al., ibid., 89-90. 
283 The countervailing power of customers is a factor affecting the finding of joint dominance, as 
explained in chapter 3. 
284 Cave et al, ibid., 56 -57. 
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reference to the platform where the call is terminated (mobile, fixed etc.). This 
approach would not prevent the NRAs, following market analysis, to impose on 
operators measures regarding termination services on individual networks, which 
would form part of the wider market for call termination or of an even wider market 
encompassing call origination and termination on fixed or mobile networks, i.e. one 
wholesale access market, should they consider that market conditions so warrant.  
 
The increasing trend for double, triple or quadruple offerings by operators which 
include fixed and/or mobile calls, broadband services, and, possibly, TV services, all 
bundled together, demonstrates the intention of operators to establish a market where 
the same network will be used for multiple product offerings285. In such environment, 
one wholesale market for access to all parts of the network may prove to reflect the 
scope of competition law inquiries more accurately. According to the BEREC Report 
on impact of bundled offers in retail and wholesale market definition286, the 
identification of a bundled market for multiple offerings at retail level may also 
indicate the existence of a bundled market at wholesale level allowing for the provision 
of the same services at retail287,288. 
                                            
285 Since 2006, the Commission has recognised in Case No. COMP/M.4063, Cisco/Scientific Atlanta, 
par. 19, the rapidly emerging character of triple play offerings.  
286 BoR (10) 64, 17f. 
287 Bundling practices are not necessarily anti-competitive. Modern economic analysis has demonstrated 
that tying often yields pro-competitive effects, as it can increase convenience and lower transaction 
costs under specific circumstances. The value of an unbundling policy depends on the state of 
competition in downstream markets that require intermediate productive inputs from the upstream 
market, because if an unbundling policy cannot increase economic efficiency in a downstream market, 
then there is no need and no justification for intervening in the economic decisions of players in 
upstream markets. Evans, D., Padilla, J., Polo, M., Tying in Platform Software: Reasons for a Rule-of-
Reason Standard in European Competition Law, [2002] 4 World Competition, 510-511. 
288 European case law on tying has endorsed a five-step test in assessing relevant cases consisting in the 
existence of the following elements: (i) Dominance of the supplier, (ii) Two products (one tied and one 
tying) that are separate of each other with distinct demand; (iii) Coercion; (iv) Restrictive effect on 
competition for the “tied” product. Markets characterised by network effects, such as telecoms, may be 
particularly vulnerable to tying, because in such markets the number of customers who acquire the 
product influences future demand; (v) Absence of objective and proportionate justification for the 
coercion. Case COMP/C-3/37.792, EC Commission v. Microsoft, decision of 24 March 2004. The 
decision was upheld by the GC on September 17, 2007, OJ L 32/23. Howarth, D., McMahon, K., ibid., 
127. Dolmans, M., Graf, Th., Analysis of Tying under Article 82 EC: the European Commission’ s 
Microsoft Decision in Perspective, [2004] 2 World Competition, 226-237. The scholars have criticised 
such approach for creating the risk that coercion will become a redundant proxy for market power and 
that the “single monopoly theory” developed by the Chicago School, as ignoring strategic considerations 
that may guide the dominant firm to tying other than extracting financial profits from the sale of the 
bundled products as a whole. According to this theory, tying a dominant product with a competitively 




If wider market definitions were adopted, collusive practices may have been found to 
exist as regards the setting of termination rates, as a result of high market concentration 
in network markets and transparency of rates resulting from access agreements289. 
Commission documents do not explain why none of the foregoing options for wider 
market definitions was adopted. However, it is plausible to assume that, through the 
establishment of artificial narrow termination markets, the Commission did not risk the 
establishment of SMP, as would have been the case if NRAs were invited to assess 
oligopolistic markets. In other words, the Commission’s resolution to adopt such 
narrow termination markets, did not leave room to NRAs to establish market 
conditions capable of negating eventual findings of collective SMP in oligopolistic 
markets. 
 
2.2.2.3. The Mobile Markets 
 
The majority of notifications made by NRAs to the Commission under Article 7 of the 
Framework Directive associated with issues of collective dominance involved the 
market for mobile access and call origination (Market 15 of the 2003 
Recommendation). Access and call origination to mobile networks was removed from 
the list of the 2007 Recommendation despite the oligopolistic structure of the market, 
which is due to spectrum limitations that have not been eliminated, albeit the 
Commission recognised that in Member States with small number of licenses and no 
prospect of entry in the medium term, there may exist incentives and possibilities for 
mobile operators to tacitly collude290. This reflected the view of economists, who had 
associated the direction of the mobile industry towards effective competition with the 
removal of non-structural barriers291.  
 
                                                                                                                              
because an attempt at raising the price of the tied product will serve to increase the price of the bundle as 
a whole. 
289 Refer to chapter 3 for a discussion on market conditions capable of creating tacit collusion.  
290 Explanatory Note, 45. 
291 Cave et al, ibid., 99. 
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In the same line of thinking, the Explanatory Note explained that in most Member 
States effective competition in mobile networks resulted from the lack of switching 
costs between operators and the degree of competitiveness in the market has been 
correlated with the presence of Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs), who 
provide mobile services over networks owned and operated by others292. Notably, the 
sale of excess capacity to MVNOs resulted to more efficient use of the network. In 
addition, the revised Directives293 of the 2009 reform package allowed the assignment 
of spectrum rights by operators, which may influence (increase) the number of players 
in the market294. However, the method applied for the original award of spectrum is 
also crucial to the decision of the operator on the assignment of the unused part: an 
operator who has paid a high bid to get spectrum through an auction process is more 
likely to be willing to trade unused spectrum rights in order to get a (quicker) refund 
on the initial investment than an operator who won a beauty contest on the basis of 
commitments made for the final use of the awarded spectrum rights295. 
 
Further, in an oligopolistic context, collusion may take place at wholesale level either 
preventing MVNO entry or refusing assignment of unused spectrum. In fact, the 
Commission has considered issues of oligopolistic structure in the mobile market, in 
terms of collusion at wholesale level preventing MVNO entry. It took the view, 
though, that, if there is competitiveness at retail, collusion at wholesale level to prevent 
MVNO entry cannot be sustained296. Nonetheless, albeit MVNOs are now common in 
many national markets, market studies argue that they have not made a significant 
contribution to increased competition everywhere; in some Member States they have 
little or no market share and in others, the terms on which they have been able to gain 
access do not allow for significant undercutting of the prices charged by the host 
                                            
292 Explanatory Note, 45. 
293 Articles 9 and 9b of the revised Framework Directive and Articles 5f of the revised Authorisation 
Directive. 
294 In the Explanatory memorandum to the Commission Proposal amending the Framework, Access and 
Authorisation Directives, the Commission pointed out that technological development and convergence 
underline the importance of spectrum, and that a more flexible approach is thus needed to exploit the 
economic potential and realise the societal and environmental benefits of improved spectrum usage. 
Refer also to Pelkmans, J., Renda, A., ibid., who claim that for efficient measures to be taken towards 
proper spectrum management, the European Commission should mandate spectrum management, not 
the member states separately, as is the case today.  
295 Binmore, K., Klemperer, P., The Biggest Auction ever: the sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses, 
[2002] The Economic Journal, 112: 75f. 
296 Explanatory Note, 45. 
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network operator297. BEUC reported that in the Czech Republic, the network operators 
were all sister companies of foreign MNOs who all charged significantly less in their 
home markets. There is good reason to believe that prices are not yet close to the 
competitive level throughout Europe, despite the difficulty in establishing SMP, either 
at retail or wholesale level. 
 
Overall, the study commissioned for DG Connect in the context of the assessment of 
markets as susceptible to ex ante regulation recognised that, although the oligopolistic 
mobile markets are often not truly competitive, but took the view that there is little that 
can be done under the Framework298. According to the same study, benchmarking 
studies indicate significant retail price variations across Europe (which may not be 
mainly attributable to cost variation)299, market developments may alleviate any such 
concerns over time (e.g. OTT communication) and, if not, the area is a candidate to be 
reviewed during any future review of the Framework. 
 
The foregoing reflects the Commission’s decision to leave mobile services unregulated 
ex ante, with the exception of call termination300 and international roaming301. Notably 
it indicates the political choice to apply general competition law principles for the 
regulation of mobile services, save as for the termination of calls, as for any other 
platform.  
 
2.2.2.4 Other voice markets 
 
No other voice market has been included in the list of the Draft Revised 
Recommendation.  
 
                                            
297 P. 161. 
298 P. 34. 
299 P. 164. 
300 With respect to call termination, the Commission had no choice but to include mobile networks in the 
ex ante regulation of call termination, since the opposite would imply asymmetric treatment of mobile to 
fixed and fixed to mobile calls (refer to Cave et al., ibid., 95). 
301 The regulation of wholesale international roaming is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
79 
 
The original recommendation of 2003 identified the retail markets for local and 
national and for international telephone services, subdivided into markets for 
residential and business customers as susceptible of ex ante regulation. These markets 
were excluded from the list of the 2007 Recommendation, because wholesale 
regulation, including carrier selection and pre-selection services and wholesale line 
rental, in combination with Voice over Broadband, implied that the markets tend 
towards a competitive outcome302. 
 
The 2007 Recommendation included the retail market for access to the public 
telephone network at a fixed location, on the grounds that, like call termination and 
origination, it is the least replicable element of the wholesale input required to provide 
retail services303. This market has been also removed from the list of the 2013 Draft 
Recommendation, as a result of the development of multi-play offerings through 
broadband network access, which evolves into an alternative to fixed access in the 
short term304 and the convergence towards a multi-service (including voice) NGN IP-
network, where a separate fixed voice market may not be sustainable or efficient in the 
long run305. Albeit the study commissioned in the context of the review of the 
Recommendation pointed towards the increased substitutability of fixed calls with 
VoIP and mobile calls306, it also emphasized that with the exception of the 
Netherlands, the UK and Finland, NRAs consider that the market for retail access to 
the public telephone network is not entirely or effectively competitive and is 
susceptible to ex-ante regulation307.  
 
                                            
302 Explanatory Note, 28. 
303 Explanatory Note, 26. 
304 Broadband networks allow customers to access multiple services over a single connection and 
terminal device, including VOIP and internet access. Even though in most member states the demand 
for multi-play offerings is at a very early stage, it is expected that it will gain momentum in the medium 
term throughout the EU (refer to Cave. M., Stumpf, U., Valetti, T., ibid, 35). In cases NL/2008/0821-
0822, the Dutch NRA included fixed telephony access and voice calls services in the market for retail 
fixed access. 
305 BEREC Common Statement on Next Generation Networks Future Charging Mechanisms/ Long 
Term Termination Issues, BoR(10) 24 Rev 1, 1. 
306 Supra at 79, p. 77. 
307 Ibid., 78. Both the Netherlands and the UK consider large sub-segments of this market to be 
competitive and therefore only impose limited retail (cf. Netherlands) or wholesale (cf. UK) remedies on 
the non-competitive segments (respectively the single calls market and the ISDN2 and ISDN30 access 
markets). In Finland the market was deemed competitive because the NRA successfully convinced the 
Commission and the Court to include public mobile access in Market 1/2007. Overall, one may 
conclude that Market 1/2007 is not deemed effectively competitive by the NRAs across the EU. 
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The debate around the substitutability of various types of calls and the prospective 
definition of a market for integrated and convergent fixed and mobile and/or 
VoIP/VoB services has been ongoing since several years. In Vodafone – Tele2308, the 
Commission dismissed arguments in favour of the existence of a market for 
convergent fixed and mobile services solely by reference to earlier case-law. One year 
later, in DT – OTE309, the Commission accepted that cable operators or fixed telephony 
services provided by mobile operators may exercise competitive constraint on 
providers of retail fixed telephony services over the public telephone network, but the 
exact market definition was left open because it did not influence the case at issue. 
 
Since 2010, BEREC has highlighted in tis Report on impact of bundled offers in retail 
and wholesale market definition310, that bundles can be efficiency enhancing, and their 
ability to disrupt competition cannot be judged in absolute terms, but should be 
considered on a case-by-case basis. In addition, BEREC’s report highlighted the 
difficulties associated with defining a retail market characterised by bundled offers, 
such as the risk of overestimating demand substitution as a result of potential 
anticompetitive behaviour (e.g. dominant firms reducing bundle prices below an 
efficient cost level, thus artificially incentivizing substitutability and damaging 
competition in the longer run). In 2012, BEREC released its Report on the impact of 
fixed mobile substitution (FMS) in market definition311 where it pointed out that FMS 
is likely to become a more relevant consideration in market definition for electronic 
communications services going forward, since in some member-states (like Finland) 
there is clear FMS. 
 
In its response to the European Commission’s questionnaire for the public consultation 
on the revision of the Recommendation on Relevant Markets, BEREC highlighted312 
that bundling of broadband retail services has become, in a number of Member States, 
the standard form of electronic communications services. According to the latest 
Eurobarometer, in 2011, more than 60% of the households in the EU purchased 
                                            
308 Case COMP/M.4947, Vodafone – Tele2 Italy – Tele2 Spain, 27.11.2007, par. 51. 
309 Case  No. COMP 5148, Deutsche Telekom/OTE, 2.10.2008, par. 16. 
310 BoR (10) 64. 
311 BoR (12) 52. 
312 BoR(13) 22, p. 9. 
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broadband services as part of a bundle, while this percentage was 48% for fixed 
telephony. Broadcasting and mobile services are also offered via bundles, although in 
lower proportions. BEREC considers that, prospectively, consumer preferences may 
reinforce the trend already shown by these data, increasing the penetration of bundles 
and, at the same time, adding new services to the packages. Indeed, this is already the 
pattern identified in some Member States, where aggressive quadruple play offers exist 
(including mobile and audiovisual content).  
 
The impact of the foregoing trend on the potential assessment of oligopolistic markets 
in the future remains to be seen. It is noted, though, that concerns may arise out of the 
offer of the same bundles of services by operators of a similar size and financial 
strength (e.g. network operators and broadcasters or IT multinationals), particularly 
when the requirement to provide such bundled offers also drives alliances across the 
fixed and mobile segments of the market, as operators are under pressure to become 
quad-play providers313.    
 
2.3. Geographic delineation of electronic communication markets 
 
Unlike product market definition, the 2002 regulatory framework requires from NRAs 
complete analysis of the geographic dimension of the identified product markets. 
 
2.3.1 Criteria for geographic delineation 
 
The economics of competition law require the geographic market in all industry 
sectors to comprise an area where  
“the conditions of competition are similar or sufficiently homogeneous and 
which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas in which the prevailing 
conditions of competition are appreciably different”314. 
 
                                            
313 European Commission, Staff Working Document - Implementation of the EU regulatory framework 
for electronic communications – 2014, at p. 9. 
314 Par. 56 of the Guidelines. 
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As described in paragraph 59 of the Guidelines, geographical markets in electronic 
communications have been traditionally defined by reference to two main criteria: a) 
the area covered by the network and b) the scope of application of legal and other 
regulatory instruments. As set out in par. 2.4 of the Commission’s explanatory note to 
the 2007 Recommendation,  
‘this corresponds generally to the territory of the member state concerned, 
since the consideration centres on the scope of the potential SMP operator’ 
s network and whether that potential SMP operator acts uniformly across its 
network area or whether it faces such different conditions of competition 
that its activity is constrained in some areas but not in others’. 
 
Some commentators have taken the view that, instead of describing the geographical 
market of the service in question, it is better to add a geographical dimension to the 
product market. According to this view, the traditional delineation of markets on the 
basis of the geographical area in which they operate contributes to an undue narrowing 
of the market,  
“which creates a risk that competition law concerns would be voiced whereas 
on a proper view of the relevant market they would not arise”315.  
 
With the exception of regulation, which may limit de facto the operation of 
undertakings in a specific area, the definition of a geographical market with sufficient 
homogeneity from a competition law perspective is a lot more complex than the 
delineation of the area of their operation. Elements such as the network coverage or 
customer preferences as to the area over which the services need to be provided are 
undoubtedly essential for the proper delineation of the geographical market of a 
service. Sub-national markets exist where competing infrastructures exist in some 
areas of the country, particularly urban areas316.  
 
However, the geographic definition of the market should not automatically tantamount 
to the area of presence of all operators, given that regional operators may exert 
competitive pressure on the national operator and vice-versa. That would be the case 
                                            
315 Larouche, ibid., p. 164. 
316 Schillemans, K., Markets for Internet Network Access Defined, The Dutch Approach: A Negative 
Precedent for ISPs seeking Access to Broadband Intern Networks? [2003] CTLR, 82f. 
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for example of wireless operators providing fixed voice services in major cities only or 
regional broadcasters. National operators face competitive pressure in the regions 
where local providers operate, but this pressure affects the rates throughout the 
country, because national operators are obliged to apply the same rates, regardless of 
the geographical location of the customer317.  
 
This last observation is valid particularly for services that are not included in universal 
service, as defined under the USO Directive and the separate NRAs, like high speed 
technology broadband access318. Albeit not addressed in the Guidelines, it is also 
particularly relevant for the establishment of oligopolistic markets, given that a 
national market may be established for the provision of the services at issue, 
encompassing national and regional operators319. Whether SMP may exist in such 
(oligopolistic) market, this should be the object of a different exercise.  
 
Reference should be also made to the route-by-route approach, which constitutes one 
specific feature of the geographical dimension of market definition in voice markets. It 
is based on the premise that the delivery of a service to one country or one city is not a 
substitute for the delivery of the same to another country or another city. In BT/MCI 
II320, the Commission had identified two distinct geographic markets within any 
international route each comprised of the originating bilateral traffic from the countries 
concerned. 
 
The route-by-route approach stems from Commission precedents in network-based 
sectors and specifically the airline flights, where the origin and the destination of the 
                                            
317 Ibid.     
318 In case of services covered by universal service obligations, the final price may have been set at 
artificially lower rates, subsidised through public funds or sharing mechanism among providers of e-
communications (refer to Articles 12 and 13 of the USO Directive).  
319 The study commissioned for DG Connect recognises (p. 114) in terms of WCA the disciplining effect 
of other infrastructure-based competition, if it does not belong to the relevant wholesale market, should 
be taken into account during SMP analysis. This means that, even though the copper incumbent’s 
market share may be high at the relevant wholesale market level, there may be significant indirect 
competitive constraint from competition at the retail level. 
320 Commission Decision of 14.5.1997, Case No. IV/M.856 British Telecom/MCI (II), [1997] OJ L 
336/1, par. 19. 
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flight condition the demand in such flights. As the ECJ held in Ahmeed Saeed321, in 
principle  
“and, in particular as far as intra-Community routes are concerned, the 
economic strength of an airline on a route served by scheduled flights may 
depend on the competitive position of other carriers operating on the same 
route or on a route capable of serving as a substitute”.  
 
A similar wording was used by the Commission in BT/MCI II:  
“From the consumers’ point of view, the relevant geographic market for 
international voice telephony services has to be defined with reference to call 
traffic routes between any country pair, since different international routes 
cannot be considered as viable demand substitutes. From the supply side, 
according to most of the operators contacted by the Commission, the 
possibility of hubbing, i.e. re-routing US-UK traffic through third countries, 
does not appear to be a viable commercial possibility at present, since under 
the existing system of accounting rates and proportionate return, it would be 
more expensive than using direct routes”322.  
 
This approach is favoured by the Commission in the Guidelines323, albeit characterised 
as “exceptional”. However, as a result of the technological developments causing the 
‘death of distance’ due to re-routing or transit practices via third countries, the 
Commission has taken a stance towards the route-by-route approach, which is said to 
depend on the specificities of the market and is recommended to be decided on a case-
by-case basis. The route-by-route approach is followed in the context of market 
definition for leased lines324, thus narrowing further the relevant market definition. 
                                            
321 Judgement of 11.4.1989, Case C 66/86, Ahmeed Saeed Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur Bekampfung 
unlauteren Wettbewebs [1989] ECR 803, par. 40. Since then, such approach should be regarded as 
established case-law in the air transport sector. Indicatively, refer to Case IV/M.157, Air France/Sabena 
[1992] OJ C272/5, Decision of 16.1.1996, Lufthansa/SAS [1996] OJ L 54/28. 
322 Par. 19 of the judgment. 
323 Paragraph 61 of the Guidelines. 
324 According to the study commissioned for DG Connect on the re-evaluation of market definitions (p. 
146), routes between major cities would normally fall outside the definition (of areas of low replication) 
but many low-intensity regional routes could fall within it. Excessive atomisation of the trunk market 
needs to be avoided since the resource requirements for analysing competitive conditions on every route 




2.3.2. Markets escaping national borders 
 
Under the current framework, following advice by BEREC, the Commission may 
adopt a decision identifying transnational markets that are not sufficiently competitive 
and merit the application of ex ante regulatory measures325. Such decision has been 
neither passed nor is pending to date. Given the limited number of undertakings that 
operate trans-nationally, such inactivity is the least worth noting. Indeed, it would be 
very interesting to review such decision for the purposes of this thesis, since it is likely 
that pan-European markets may exhibit more oligopoly than monopoly characteristics. 
  
Moreover, the number of alliances and mergers between operators throughout the EU 
particularly in the course of the previous decade indicated a trend towards 
consolidation in the sector, including a number of fixed-mobile transactions, in order 
to respond to higher levels of competition, decreasing revenues from traditional 
sources and to the increasing need to invest in data capacity326. Most of the major 
European operators followed the strategy of acquiring presence in several member-
states through various corporate structures, with the purpose of expanding their 
presence in various member states327. The history of mergers described in chapter 4 
behind excessive roaming rates makes this point328. 
 
Although the review of prevailing cross-border market conditions throughout the EU 
escapes the scope and the potential of this thesis, if some speculation is made in this 
direction, it is expected that in the course of the review for the identification of 
European-wide markets as susceptible to ex ante regulation, the Commission examines 
the structure of existing European networks, whether applied for voice, Internet or 
                                            
325 Article 15 par. 4 and article 16 par. 5 of the Framework Directive. 
326 European Commission, Staff Working Document - Implementation of the EU regulatory framework 
for electronic communications in 2012 and 2013, at p. 9. 
327 This strategy is endorsed by the Commission, refer to section 1.2 of the Proposal for a Regulation 
amending the Framework Directive etc. 
328The failure of SMP regulation on wholesale international roaming is discussed in detail in chapter 4 
and is also attributed to the geographical dimension of roaming which escapes national borders.  
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other applications, to identify potential ‘top-level’ or key networks for the connectivity 
of trans-national network markets.  
 
In WorldCom/MCI329, the Commission had found that different global markets exist 
within the Internet depending on the level of the Internet structure on which each party 
operates (or the level of supply network). Through a detailed analysis of the history of 
the Internet, the technical characteristics of the services and their mode of 
transmission, as well as of the structure of the market, the Commission reached the 
finding that there were three levels of supply network, host to point of presence, 
‘ordinary’ Internet service providers (ISPs) and ‘backbone providers’ or ISPs 
providing top level connectivity. This delineation was established on the premise that 
the conditions of competition at the various levels are different. The Commission 
implied that there was sufficient competition at the level of local ISPs, but the finding 
was different for the upstream markets. By applying the hypothetical monopolist test, 
the Commission established that top-level network operators are acting independently 
from the remaining ISPs, as one unit, as a small but significant price increase in 
Internet connectivity services would be ultimately passed on to the customer. The 
market at this upper level was regarded as oligopolistic. 
 
The Commission also envisaged the possibility of a future further narrowing of the 
market for smaller ISPs. It is quoted in paragraph 73 of the decision:  
“If the smaller ISPs who currently peer only at the NAPs (National Access 
Points) were refused settlement-free private peering by the largest networks, 
they would no longer be capable of acting as top-level networks, and would 
drop out of the market definition. Because this process is in its early stages, 
the market definition adopted here will not be narrowed to anticipate such 
future developments, but the fact that this is likely to happen should be borne 
in mind as a relevant factor when considering the market power of the 
parties”.  
 
                                            
329 Commission Decision of 8.7.1998, Case IV/M.1069, WorldCom/MCI (1999) OJ L116/1. 
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In the 2007 Recommendation, the Commission did not consider access to the Internet 
susceptible to ex ante regulation:  
‘Entry barriers to [the Internet connectivity] market are low and although 
there is evidence of economies of scale and that the ability to strike mutual 
traffic exchange (peering) agreements is helped by scale, this alone cannot 
be construed as inhibiting competition. Therefore, unlike the case for call 
termination […], there is no a priori presumption that ex ante market 
analysis is required’330.  
 
However, as a result of the transnational effect of Internet backbone, the foregoing 
considerations could have been assessed in the frame of an assessment of prospective 
transnational markets, irrespective of the specific platform used. In view of increased 
market concentration that are likely to appear at the backbone- or top-level mainly due 
to the extensive investment required to set up such networks, such assessment would in 
all likelihood address competition in oligopolistic markets.  
2.4. Conclusions 
 
Proper market delineation is a condition precedent for the success of SMP regulation, 
because it establishes the frame which will catch undertakings susceptible to regulatory 
measures. The Commission has opted in favour of the pre-definition of markets 
susceptible to ex ante regulation and the markets identified in the Recommendation, 
reflect political decisions on areas susceptible to regulation. The impression created is 
that the Commission placed particular weight to the convergence of regulatory 
approaches, given also eventual differences in the degree of sophistication of the 
NRAs of the separate member-states. 
 
The Commission has defined narrow product markets and through such narrow pre-
definition, it limits considerably the assessment of prospective collective dominance 
issues. These policy decisions place the regulation of oligopolistic markets at the lower 
end of regulatory priorities, as opposed to regulation of market power exercised by 
monopolists, possibly in view of the complexities involved in the assessment of 
                                            
330 Explanatory Note, 37. 
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oligopolistic markets. It is noted that in the first ten years of application of the SMP 
framework, none of the notifications on markets different from the list of the 
Recommendation involved a market with oligopolistic characteristic or concerns of 
collective dominance.  
 
Through the definition of a separate market for the termination of calls on individual 
networks, the Commission has pre-established single dominance on the markets for 
call termination on both mobile and fixed networks. It may have been the case, that the 
narrow market definition of the termination markets is the result of cellophane fallacy 
effects, notably of the failure to capture the oligopolistic nature (and interactions) of 
the relevant market, hence defining network operators as monopolists rather than 
oligopolists. One possible explanation may be that the Commission, in recognising the 
complexities involved in the assessment of factors capable of establishing collective 
dominance, did not want to leave lea-way to NRAs to refuse the regulation of 
termination charges unregulated. 
 
The delineation of a separate market for terminating segments of leased lines also 
points to the designation of the former incumbent as monopolist in the relevant market. 
The two markets defined for broadband access are the only markets where, 
theoretically, joint dominance could be established between operators providing 
broadband through different platforms, particularly as the Commission does not 
preclude the merging of the two markets into one.  
 
The Commission has excluded mobile services, which is the classic example of 
oligopolistic structure in telecoms, from the list of regulated markets, with the 
exception of call termination which applies on calls made on both fixed and mobile 
platforms, despite indications that the market may not be sufficiently competitive in 
some member-states.  
 
To allow regulation of future oligopolistic markets, the Commission should revise 
market delineation under wider market definitions, in order to allow the assessment of 
prospective joint SMP held by operators present in the market. In that respect, the 
Commission should consider the definition of wider markets for the origination and 
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termination of calls, encompassing multiple networks and possibly multiple platforms. 
Alternatively, the Commission may opt for the definition of a market for the 
termination of all off-net calls with a possible further segmentation by reference to the 
platform where the call is terminated (mobile, fixed etc.).  
 
The trend towards the supply of bundled products through the operators with a pan-
European footprint on several member-states may also have to be taken into account in 
future market (pre-)definitions.  
 
Finally, the lack of definition of any transnational market provides further 
demonstration of the fact that, through SMP regulation, the Commission’s focus is still 
on incumbents’ operation at national level. For the purposes of the review of oligopoly 
regulation in the telecommunications sector, such decision would be of particular 
interest, given the limited number of undertakings that operate trans-nationally. It is 
expected that, in this process and in view of the increasingly global character of 
network markets, the Commission examines the structure of existing European 
networks, whether applied for voice, Internet or other applications, to identify potential 









Article 14 par. 2 of the Framework Directive provides that, when assessing whether 
two or more undertakings are in a joint dominant position in a market, NRAs shall act 
in accordance with Community law and take into the utmost account the guidelines on 
market analysis and the criteria of Annex II. These criteria stem from competition law 
precedents and may be divided into the following categories:  
a) Indications of ineffective competition; 
b) Market concentration 
c) Transparency and retaliation 
d) Potential pressure put by third parties. 
As indicated in Annex II, the list is neither cumulative nor exhaustive, but it is 
intended to illustrate only the type of evidence that could be used to support assertions 
concerning the existence of joint dominance. The separate categories are examined in 
turn in each of the sections of this chapter, both from the point of view of their 
theoretical background as well as their practical application in NRA notifications to the 
Commission.  
 
The analysis will show that joint dominance is considered a very rare occasion in 
markets involving highly symmetrical duopolies. This is attributed to the unavoidable 
generality of the criteria, some of which are capable of being interpreted as capable of 





3.1.Effective competition and significant market power 
3.1.1. Defining effective competition in theory 
 
Annex II of the Framework Directive allows intervention for the regulation of joint 
dominance if the undertakings operate in a market which is characterized by lack of 
efficient competition. This is in line with the general approach to Article 102 cases, as 
expressed also in the Commission Guidance on the same article331, although the latter 
deals only with single and not collective dominance. 
 
According to the Commission Guidance, (substantial) market power with respect to 
price-based competition is defined by reference to the lack of effective competitive 
constraints332. “Effective competition” is not defined in European competition law 
legislation, although the term has been widely used especially in the assessment of 
mergers. The concept is related to the meaning of restriction on competition under 
Article 101(1) TFEU, which lacks also precise meaning333.  
 
The Commission Guidance, as well as the Discussion Paper on Article 82 that 
preceded it334, called for a more economic approach to the assessment of Article 102 
cases, because this allows greater emphasis on efficiency and consumer welfare. Such 
an effects-based test does not necessarily mean fully quantifying and weighting all the 
costs and benefits of the alleged abusive behaviour335, as it may simply involve the 
                                            
331 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, 
2009/C 45/02, in particular section C. 
332 Paragraphs 23-24 of the Guidance Paper. 
333 One approach expressed in the little literature on the subject has been to argue that restrictions of 
competition for the purposes of Article 101(1) are restrictions of the economic freedom of other market 
participants (the ‘ordoliberal approach’). Such approach has been criticised for being more of a political 
than legal term and incapable of providing the required certainty to market participants (Monti, M., 
Article 81 and Public Policy, [2002]39 CMLR 1057, Robertson, B., What is a Restriction of 
Competition? The implications of the GC’s judgement in O2 Germany and the Rule of Reason, [2007] 
ECLR 255). Fairness and the competitor’s freedom to compete have also been identified as objectives of 
the legislators (Mertikopoulou, V., DG Competition’s Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 
to Exclusionary Abuses: the Proposed Economic Reform from a Legal Point of View, [2007] ECLR., 
243). 
334 DG Competition Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary 
abuses, December 2005 (the ‘Discussion Paper’). 
335 Concerns have been expressed as to the lack of enough metrics in economic theory to calculate all 
parameters and values integrated in Art. 102, which renders a strict economic analysis of competition 




consideration of a range of economic indicators of actual and likely competitive effects 
that go beyond the assessment of dominance, such as the degree of foreclosure of the 
market to competitors and possible efficiency benefits336.  
 
Economic theory has defined efficiency in terms of consumer surplus (the difference 
between what a consumer is willing to pay for a service and what he actually pays), 
producer surplus (the difference between the price in the market that producers 
collectively receive for their products and the sum of those products’ respective 
marginal costs at each level of output) and total welfare (i.e. effects on all markets 
bypassing the markets directly involved in the antitrust analysis)337. Microeconomic 
theory has also defined “efficiency” in three areas:  
(i) allocative efficiency is achieved when the existing stock of goods and 
productive output are allocated through the price system to those buyers who 
value them most, in terms of willingness to pay or willingness to forego 
other consumption; (ii) production efficiency is achieved when goods are 
produced using the most cost-effective combination of productive resources 
available under existing technology; while (iii) dynamic innovation 
efficiency is achieved through the invention, development and diffusion of 
new products and production processes that increase social welfare”338. 
 
In simple terms, from an economics perspective, the results aimed at by competition 
should be the means of linking business behaviour (more profit at less cost) to 
consumer welfare (best quality at the lowest price). In this line of thinking, the 
Commission has defined restrictions on competition efficiency both in terms of Article 
101 and Article 102 by reference to appreciable negative effects on prices, output, 
innovation or the variety or quality of goods and services339.  
                                            
336 Niels, G., Jenkins, H., Reform of Article 82: Where the Link between Dominance and Effects Breaks 
Down, [2005] ECLR, 610. The so-called ‘efficiency defence’ can be invoked when the dominant 
company shows that the conduct in question is indispensable to generate efficiencies, that benefit also 
consumers, provided that competition with respect to a substantial part of the products concerned is not 
being eliminated (Article 82 Commission Guidance, par. 28-31). The concept of efficiency defence has 
been criticised as alien to competition case-law, refer to Dreher, M., Adam, M., Abuse of Dominance 
under Reform – Sound Economics and Established Case Law, [2007] ECLR 278-282. 
337 Camesasca, P., European Merger Control: Getting the Efficiencies Right, Intersentia Hart, London 
2000, 40. 
338 Ibid., 38. 
339 Commission Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, [2004] OJ C101/8, par. 24, 




In oligopolies, the assessment of the effectiveness of competition is a difficult exercise. 
If we could describe competitiveness in a given market through the use of a spectrum, 
the monopoly equilibrium would be found at one end, where the single monopolist or 
the perfect cartel achieves maximum profit in a market that cannot be challenged by 
entrants. The competitive fringe, with a sufficient number of players and with prices 
oriented to actual cost, would occupy the other end of the spectrum. However, the 
perception that a market may be found somewhere in the middle part of the spectrum 
does not necessarily imply that competition in that market is not effective, because 
market conditions may be such as to bring prices in the neighbourhood of the costs of 
production. In oligopolistic situations, competitive forces may range from full 
competition to virtually monopoly effects, depending on the characteristics of the 
market’s structure.  
 
Consumer surplus is always equal to the monopoly case when firms collude, as perfect 
collusion only implies splitting the monopoly profits by the number of firms in the 
market. Consumer surplus is significantly higher in Bertrand competition than under 
Cournot competition, when products are homogeneous and firms do not collude340. In 
practice, the existence of a competitive market structure is generally seen as indicating 
either the existence of many players or the existence of sufficient degree of 
competition to bring prices in the neighbourhood of the costs of production in the 
longer term341. 
 
In the words of Briones and Padilla342, 
“the main condition that distinguishes a competitive oligopoly from a 
dominant one is precisely whether market conditions make the collusive 
behaviour not so much rational, but possible and sustainable. 
 
And it has to be possible in at least two directions. Firstly, with regard to the 
position of each oligopolist relative to the other members of the oligopoly: 
                                            
340 Maier-Rigaud, F., Wiesen, D., Parplies, K., Experimental economics and competition policy: 
Unilateral and Co-ordinated Effects in Competition Games, [2008] ECLR, 415. 
341 Kloosterhuis, E., Joint Dominance and the Interaction between Firms [2001] ECLR., 81. 
342 Briones, J., Padilla, A., The Complex Landscape of Oligopolies under EU Competition Policy: Is 
Collective Dominance Ripe for Guidelines? [2001] World Competition., 312. 
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hence the criteria of assessing symmetries and asymmetries among them. 
Secondly, in relation to the sustainability of collusion, that is, with regard to 
(i) the facility with which an individual member is able to deviate from the 
collusive behaviour; and (ii) with regard to likely reactions to external 
shocks. Hence the need to examine the transparency of the market in the 
context of retaliation, including again symmetries/asymmetries and type of 
relations with customers”. 
 
In the context of regulation on electronic communications, ‘effective competition’ is 
designated among the primary targets of regulation. Article 1 of Directive 2002/21/EC, 
as replaced by Directive 2009/136/EC reads: 
‘The aim is to ensure the availability throughout the Community of good 
quality publicly available services through effective competition and choice 
and to deal with circumstances in which the needs of the end users are not 
satisfactorily met by the market’. 
 
Similarly, the intervention threshold of NRAs for asymmetric regulation on SMPs is 
set at a level where competition in the identified markets is not effective343. However, 
competition efficiency in network markets is not defined by reference to consumer 
surplus (many players or prices oriented to costs). Rather, recital 54 of Directive 
2009/140/EC defines efficiency of infrastructure-based competition by reference to 
infrastructure duplication and fair return of investment of alternative operators: 
“An efficient level of infrastructure-based competition is the extent of 
infrastructure duplication at which investors can reasonably be expected to 
make a fair return based on reasonable expectations about the evolution of 
market shares”.  
 
Put differently, the Commission defines competition efficiency in network markets by 
reference to the existence of a profitable alternative infrastructure which can compete 
with the incumbent. This principle shows that, as matter of policy, there is little room 
left to NRAs for regulation in markets with more than one players, for as long as an 
                                            
343 Articles 8 and 16 of Directive 2002/21/EC, as amended by Directive 2009/140/EC, Article 17 of 
Directive 2002/21/EC. Recitals 5, 7 and 54 of Directive 2009/140/EC. 
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alternative provider exists of a size capable of competing with the incumbent, 
competition efficiency may be presumed344.     
 
Lack of competition efficiency does not tantamount to elimination of competition 
between the members of the group. In the event, a certain degree of competition may 
exist in the relationship of interdependence between oligopolists345. Indeed, SMP 
regulation is a prevention mechanism against distortions of competition. Distortion of 
competition is rather different from lack of any price competition346, which indicates 
elimination of competition at least in the price level. The Guidelines take a similar 
stance by explaining in paragraph 72 that  
‘a finding of a dominant position does not preclude some competition in the 
market’.  
 
But, later on, in paragraph 103 they cite the Commission’ s finding in MCI 
WorldCom/Sprint, which dismissed concerns of collective dominance on the grounds 
that 
‘it was not able to show absence of competitive constraints from actual 
competitors’ [emphasis added].  
 
Also, in the Guidance Paper, the Commission declares its intention to concentrate its 
enforcement on certain exclusionary abuse methods where the anticompetitive harm 
is seen likely. It is therefore not required that the anticompetitive effects have 
already been produced347. However, the next section will show that NRAs have 
                                            
344 Also, the Commission view on the efficiency of infrastructure-based competition ignores other 
parameters, such as quality, that come into play in the competition field. Such observation is particularly 
relevant for high technology environments such as telecommunications, where innovation plays a 
considerable role. Monopoly power in such environments has been defined as “not a situation of high 
market share; nor is it a situation where profits are high, or where prices are above marginal cost. 
Rather, a monopolist would be a firm shielded from other innovators or imitators. The monopolist could 
stay ahead without innovating or lowering prices. The crucial difference between monopoly and 
competition is that with competition market forces compel improvement in the product offerings 
available to the consumer. With monopoly, there is no such compulsion from the marketplace”.Teece, 
D., Coleman, M., The meaning of monopoly: Antitrust Analysis in High Technology Industries, [1998] 
Antitrust Bulletin, 824-825. 
345 In TACA, the Commission held that ‘the continued existence of a possible degree of competition 
between the parties does not rule out the finding of a collective dominant position’; Commission 
Decision 1999/243/EC [1999]4 CMLR 1454, par. 522. 
346 It is argued that even in single dominance cases, the appropriate test is not the complete elimination 
of competition in the market (Christensen, P., Rabassa, V., ibid., 234-235). 




required proof of existence of anti-competitive behavior in order to consider 
potential concerns on lack of efficient competition in oligopolistic electronic 
communications markets. 
 
3.1.2. Interpretation of lack of efficiency in NRA Decisions 
 
We shall now turn to see how the NRAs have applied the requirement for a finding of 
inefficient competition in the event of oligopolies in the pre-defined markets of the 
Recommendation.   
 
In the period from the first notification in August 2003 until 30.09.2013, out of the 
total Article 7 notifications, which exceeded one thousand notifications, there have 
been in total 47 notifications involving markets with oligopolistic elements: 24 
involving wholesale mobile access and call origination, 12 involving wholesale 
international roaming, 4 involving wholesale broadband access, 3 involving wholesale 
trunk segments of leased lines, 2 involving transit services in the fixed telephone 
network and 2 involving broadcasting transmission services. The relevant table may be 
found in the bibliography section. 
 
With the exception of the cases on wholesale international roaming, where concerns 
arose from complaints for excessive rates at retail level, the main element for the cause 
of concerns for ineffective competition that were investigated by NRAs in their 
respective national markets in the other markets (mainly the market for mobile access 
and call origination) was access-related impediments.  
 
An oligopoly, once it wishes to pursue monopolistic profits, would restrict their output 
beneath the competitive level, thereby making the supply below the actual demand. 
According to the Commission, if there is a common policy of not granting access to 
third parties by a collective SMP, it must be shown that pent-up demand exists, which 
means that it must be demonstrated that third parties have been denied access to the 
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networks of mobile networks operators despite their reasonable request348, i.e. that 
there are some customers that cannot be served. In other words, not granting access to 
third parties, must necessarily result in the appearance of a new service provider or an 
increased output in the related retail markets349. 
 
The Italian NRA designated RAI and RTI as enjoying collective SMP on the national 
market for analogue TV broadcasting services. According to AGCOM, RAI and RTI 
maintained a huge amount of frequencies, which were not used in an efficient manner. 
This behaviour derived from a parallel conduct aimed at keeping the frequencies they 
owned in order to enjoy the advantages of the ownership of transmission facilities in 
order to have a coverage and quality for the broadcasting over their own networks that 
could not be easily duplicated with the further aim of maximizing their revenues in the 
downstream advertising market350. Notably, the maximisation of revenues in the 
downstream market was found to provide a rent to protect by the anti-competitive 
conduct in the upstream broadcasting services. The Commission did not raise doubts to 
the Italian decision, but one cannot but wonder if the Commission would keep the 
same stance on a market, which would not have a foreseeable termination date in view 
of the transition to digital markets, unlike wholesale analogue broadcasting351. 
 
The appraisal of absence/existence of pent-up demand mainly depends on actual 
complaints about denial of access. Concerning the conditions under which a complaint 
of denial of access can be regarded as evidence of pent-up demand, the German NRA 
considered that a simple complaint of refusal to supply may be not sufficient; and that 
“denial of access only has to be examined if no offer at all exists on the market”352. In 
addition, the absence of pent-up demand can be proved either by no complaints of 
                                            
348 European Commission, Accompanying Document to the Communication from the Commission to the 
Council, the European Parliament, the European  Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions on market reviews under the EU Regulatory Framework, COM(2007) 401 final, 12. 
349 ES/2005/0330, MT/2006/0443, IE/2004/0121, MT/2007/0563. 
350 Case IT/2006/0424. 
351 A couple of years later, in IT/2010/1157 AGCOM found that the national terrestrial TV broadcasting 
market was no longer susceptible of ex ante regulation, taking account mainly of the forthcoming 
transition to digital technology and the implementation of the regulatory framework adopted by 
AGCOM. Despite these findings, AGCOM proposed to maintain existing regulation until analogue TV 
switch-off by 31 December 2012 to give affected third parties a reasonable period of notice to adapt to 




denial of access in the relevant market353, or the incumbent mobile network operators 
voluntarily granting access to third parties354. 
 
It is noteworthy that the existence of pent-up demand is found in all three collective 
SMP positive decisions involving the market for mobile access and call origination, 
while in the other decisions, almost all NRAs found no evidence of any355.  In the 
Maltese wholesale market for broadband access, there were two undertakings, but only 
the first Maltacom opened its network to third party service providers, as a result of 
regulation, and the second (Melita Cable) not granting access at all. Based on the 
market’s characteristics conducive to tacit collusion, the Maltese NRA reached a 
conclusion of the existence of pent-up demand, i.e. of customers that could not be 
served356. In particular, the NRA was concerned that without the current access 
regulation Maltacom would have a strong incentive to discontinue its wholesale offer 
and establish a collective SMP with Melita Cable, hence, designated the two 
undertakings as holding collective SMP. However, the Commission expressed serious 
doubts on the grounds that Maltacom would not risk losing wholesale revenue for third 
parties offering retail broadband services to 30% of the retail market without a 
guarantee of gaining the retail customers. The notification was subsequently 
withdrawn by MCA, who decided on re-notifying the case that there was no collective 
SMP mainly by the reason of the entry of a newcomer who, despite the low market 
share at the time, had quickly established a wireless broadband network covering the 
whole territory of Malta with new wireless technology, capable of exercising 
competitive pressure on the two fixed broadband operators, who were originally 
considered capable of establishing collective SMP357. Some years later in 
MT/2012/1375, MCA observed that –albeit no measures were taken against the two 
operators- the retail offers of both had considerably improved in terms of prices, 
speeds and download limits and that the broadband market had, in the meantime, 
                                            
353 SK/2006/0442, LU/2006/0369, IT/2005/0259, HU/2004/0096, CZ/20060405, EL/2006/0492, 
GE/2007/0627.  
354 SE/2005/0203, LT/2006/0406, LV/2006/0545, BE/2007/0610, PL/2008/0756, UL/2003/001, 
AT/2004/063, DK/2005/0243. 
355 The value of pent-up demand to the assessment of collective SMP is, in particular, witnessed in the 
Commission decision concerning BE/2007/0610, where the conclusion of an absence of collective SMP 
on the market for mobile access and call origination is entirely based on absent pent-up demand, without 
having recourse to any other criterion 
356 MT/2007/563. 
357 MT/2008/0803, following the expression of serious doubts by the Commission on the finding of joint 
dominance in the market under MT/2007/0563. 
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featured increased product differentiation with the provision of a vast array of bundles. 
Such features, coupled with the prospect that new fibre-based infrastructure will be 
rolled out, resulted in insufficient evidence to support a finding of joint dominance. 
 
The fact that at the wholesale level no access to third parties is granted does not per se 
mean that the market is anti-competitive. Competitive conditions at retail level are of 
crucial importance: they may provide an indicator or a rent to protect by the refusal to 
grant access at the wholesale level. Past market conduct may be also taken into 
account, since markets with history of cartel behavior are likely to be susceptible to 
cooperation358. In SI/2008/806, the Commission challenged the finding of joint 
dominance between the two biggest mobile operators in the mobile access market on 
the grounds of the degree of retail price competition, lack of evidence on the existence 
of the joint refusal to grant access and that past retail price movements allow clear 
conclusions on future behaviour of the undertakings. 
 
It is, therefore, noted that the practice followed both by NRAs and the Commission, 
also in consistency with the approach to light-handed regulation, is the decision to 
intervene in cases of established anticompetitive effects. Such approach resembles 
more to an examination of Article 102 cases, i.e. where the abuse has already occurred, 
than ex ante regulation. However, it is recognized that this observation is more of 
theoretical value, since this work is not in a position to suggest a specific case where 
intervention should have been warranted, on the basis of indications for future abuse, 
as opposed to effects that have already occurred. On the contrary, it is acknowledged 
that the Commission’s approach to the Malta cases on wholesale broadband access was 
proved to be correct, since the theoretical concerns of the Maltese NRA on future 
impediments to competition were proved incorrect and prices fell despite the lack of ex 
ante regulatory measures on the two operators of the duopolistic market.       
 
3.2. Factors affecting the creation of collective dominance 
 
                                            
358 Evidence of past coordination was taken into account for the sustainability of concerns on future 
collusion in Nestle/Perrier and Gencor/Lonrho. However, in Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95, France v. 




On top of the requirement for a finding of inefficient competition, European 
competition law has established a number of factors that are considered to affect the 
creation of collectively dominant positions. These factors are based on the findings of 
economic literature and apply to any collusion between market players, whether 
explicit or tacit359, since cartels also often occur in markets where normal competition 
is itself imperfect360.  
 
The Framework Directive summarises the factors that NRAs should take into account 
in assessing significant market power for the purposes of electronic communications 
regulation in Annex II361. In this Annex, market concentration is considered 
indispensible for the establishment of joint SMP, if coupled with other factors, notably: 
- low elasticity of demand, 
- similar market shares, 
- high legal or economic barriers to entry, 
- vertical integration with collective refusal to supply 
- lack of countervailing buying power, 
- lack of potential competition. 
 
The revised list of Annex II is considerably shorter than the list of the original 
Framework Directive, which included also the following factors: 
- mature market, 
- stagnant or moderate growth on the demand side, 
                                            
359 Alfter, A., Jount, J., Economic Analysis of Cartels – Theory and Practice, [2005] ECLR, 548. 
However, explicit coordination may allow the cartel members to co-ordinate on a price level higher than 
the one that could have been achieved under tacit co-ordination. Further, explicit agreements may make 
it easier to monitor an agreement that has been established and may allow coordination with a larger 
number of firms than would be possible absent explicit communication. 
360 Ibid., 557. 
361 Article 14 of the Framework Directive. 
101 
 
- homogeneous product, 
- similar cost structures, 
- lack of technical innovation, mature technology, 
- absence of excess capacity, 
- various kinds of informal or other links between the undertakings concerned, 
- retaliatory mechanisms, 
- lack or reduced scope for price competition. 
 
Although it is explicitly stated in the Annex that the listed factors are indicative, the 
removal of transparency and retaliation from the list is surprising in view of the 
significant emphasis placed on these two factors by European case-law and economists 
for the finding of on collective dominance362.  
 
The Guidelines are very poor in the analysis of the factors in terms of their application 
for the purposes of SMP regulation. The following sections will examine how NRAs 
have applied these factors in practice.  
 
3.2.1 Market Concentration 
3.2.1.1 The number of players 
 
Collective dominance occurs in highly concentrated markets with a small number of 
players, who recognize their interdependence and the futility of aggressive behavior363. 
A high degree of concentration will increase the risk of collusion, because in a market 
with a reduced number of firms, there is less incentive to deviate from the common 
agreement since the detection is more likely364. 
 
                                            
362 Refer to the discussion in section 1.1.2. 
363 Kokkoris, I., The Development of the Concept of Collective Dominance in the ECMR. From its 
Inception to its Current Status, [2007] World Competition, 420. 
364 Kokkoris, I., ibid., 427. 
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The concept of joint dominance has not been defined by reference to specific numbers 
of players involved in the game. However, the type of interdependence, which is 
necessary for the establishment of collective dominance, is the result of market 
conditions that are more frequent in oligopolistic markets, such as product 
homogeneity or the existence of high entry barriers, that increase the possibility of 
conscious parallelism between the parties, which means that all players adopt more or 
less the same stance towards the market.  
 
In Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand365 the Commission was reluctant to consider 
collective dominance in oligopolistic markets involving more than two major players 
because of the complexity of the interrelationships involved and the consequent 
temptation to deviate366. One year later, in Airtours/First Choice, the Commission took 
a different approach and refused to clear the merger on the grounds that it would 
strengthen the oligopoly of the remaining three big operators, who would collectively 
hold a dominant market share of approximately 70%. Until then, collective dominance 
had been found in dominant duopolies only.  
 
The wording adopted by the Commission in Airtours does not preclude a finding of 
joint dominance in oligopolies of more than three firms, depending on the 
characteristics of the market’s structure367. But, in SONY/BMG368, the Commission did 
not find sufficient evidence that a reduction from five to four of the world-wide active 
record companies would facilitate transparency and retaliation to such an extent that 
the creation of a collective dominant position of the remaining four majors would be 
anticipated as a likely outcome.  
 
As repeatedly stated in the context of this thesis, it does not follow that, because a 
market is oligopolistic, the firms will necessarily tacitly collude and become 
collectively dominant. It is the particular characteristics of the oligopolistic market that 
                                            
365 Case IV/ M. 1016 Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand [1999] OJ L 50/27, para. 103. 
366 This position was criticised as surprising and dogmatic, refer to Cook & Kerse, ibid., 172. 
367 Refer, e.g. to par. 53 of the decision. 
368 Case M.3333, Sony/BMG, [2005] OJ L62/30. The decision was annulled by the GC Case T-464/04, 
IMPALA v. Commission, judgement of 13.7.2006, which is the first case to annul a Commission 
decision clearing a merger on the grounds of the evidence pleaded by the Commission, but was 
subsequently overturned by the CJEU in Case C-413/06 published on July 10, 2008.  
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contribute to successful co-ordinated behaviour and lead to tacit collusion369. Indeed, 
economic analysis has suggested that in mobile markets, increasing the number of 
mobile operators does not necessarily tantamount to better competition, because 
incentives to invest and innovate are minimised by operators to cope with lower 
returns370. Market experience across large and small markets suggests that the right 
number is less than five; probably three or four371.  
 
On the other hand, experimental economists have concluded that changing the number 
of competitors in any given market from four to two and vice versa, can have large 
effects on behaviour and market outcomes, because the vast majority of participants in 
an oligopoly manage to sustain a collusive outcome in the two-firm Bertrand game372. 
Conversely, experiments have shown that moving from two to four firms made 
collusion substantially harder to sustain under both Bertrand and Cournot 
competition373. As the number of sellers increases and the share of industry output 
supplied by a representative firm decreases, individual producers are increasingly apt 
to ignore the effect of their price and output restrictions on rival reactions and the 
overall level of prices. In addition, as the number of sellers increases, so also does the 
probability that at least one will be a maverick, pursuing an independent, aggressive 
pricing policy374.  
 
It is reported that the ‘disappointing performance’ with respect to long-distance 
services in the Australian telecommunications market until 1997 might be explained 
by the fact that this market remained a duopoly until 1997, whereas in the US and 
Chile mobile prices substantially decreased only after at least three operators started to 
operate in most geographic areas375. In its Implementation Report for 2012-2013, the 
                                            
369 Kokkiris, I., ibid., 423. 
370 Waters, P., Mobile Competition: How many is too many?, [2005] CTLR, 55-59. The scenario has 
materialised in Hong Kong, where six operators are active and the rates are the cheapest in the world, 
but 2G operators are said to struggle for survival. 
371 Ibid., 58. 
372 Maier-Rigaud, F., Wiesen, D., Parplies, K., ibid., 415. 
373 Ibid., 414. 
374 Scherer, F. M., Ross, D., ibid. 277. However, according to the GC’s judgement in Airtours, the 
numerous acquisitions made by the large operators in the recent past were indicative of strong 
competition between those operators (par. 111f ). 
375 Geradin, D., Kerf, M., Controlling market power in telecommunications, OUP, 2003, 325-326.  
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European Commission noticed increased price pressure in Member States where the 
number of mobile operators has increased from 3 to 4 main players376.  
 
However, in the EU electronic communications markets, collective dominance issues 
were established only in markets where the numbers of the active market player are 
two377 and in the case of ES/2005/0330 no more than three. Nevertheless, there were 
also NRAs who undertook collective SMP assessment in markets with more than three 
market players, though they did not find collective SMP in the end378. 
 
In MT/2012/1349, the Maltese NRA opened the mobile access and call origination 
market to competition, when a third mobile operator with considerable penetration 
rates started to operate in the previously duopolistic market structure and the NRA 
established the conclusion of two access agreements with two MVNOs. Some years 
earlier, the Maltese NRA had also shown that the broadband access market displayed a 
number of characteristics that could make it conducive to coordinated behaviour, like 
high and similar market shares, highly concentrated market, similar costs and prices, 
market transparency, market approaching maturity and lack of countervailing buyer 
power, but concluded against a finding of joint dominance on the evidence of 
increased retail competition and the presence of a third infrastructure operator having a 
constraining effect on the potential coordinated strategy between the two biggest 
players379. 
 
The Commission is also relaxed in the presence of three players in the market, unlike 
duopolistic market structures380 and this is shown also in a number of merger cases. In 
TeliaSonera/Orange, the Commission cleared the merger between the third and fourth 
(in market shares) mobile operator in Denmark, despite the reduction of operators from 
                                            
376 European Commission, Staff Working Document - Implementation of the EU regulatory framework 
for electronic communications – 2014, at p. 8. 
377 IE/2004/121,IT/2006/424, MT/2007/0563. 
378 In CZ/2006/0448, there were 10 undertakings operating in the market for fixed transit services. 
379 Case MT/2008/0803. 
380 Stoyanova, M., ibid., 2008, Kluwer, 192, argues that a concentration in telecoms that changes the 
market structure to a duopoly is very likely not to get regulatory approval. However, in Case  
COMP/M.4204, Cinvin/UPC France, 13.7.2006, the Commission established that the concentration did 
not create any (single nor joint) dominance nor any significant impediments to competition because of 
the platform independency in the definition of the product market for distribution of pay-TV. Each cable 
operator was considered a monopoly in its zone of operation, but this was deemed reasonable, as the 
only way to sustain a profitable investment.  co-ordinated effects were established, in view of the strong 
efforts deployed by all cable operators to increase penetration vis-à-vis satellite operators. 
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four to three, on the grounds that the proposed transaction was not expected to 
significantly change the Danish market for mobile telephony, which was expected to 
be competitive in the future381. The combined entity would hold a <25% market share, 
whereas the market was considered saturated, characterised by strong price decrease, 
the lowest in the EU, which, in turn, impacted on the low level of switching costs and 
volatile market shares.  
 
In T-Mobile/Orange Netherlands, which involved the merger of the 3rd and 4th (out of 
the 4) mobile operators in the Netherlands, the Commission examined the existence of 
coordination both before and after the merger and reached a negative conclusion in 
both cases, primarily due to the lack of transparency in the market and the existence of 
fringe competitors382. At wholesale level, the merger was found not to significantly 
affect competition, because of the existence of excess capacity, particularly in the 
hands of the largest operator KPN383. 
 
On the other hand, the elimination of the third competitor (out of a total of three) in the 
Belgian mobile market was the reason for the expression of serious Commission 
doubts in relation to the impact of the concentration on the market in FT/Orange. 
Despite the low market share of one of the two merging operators, the Commission 
considered that it exerted significant pressure in breaking the duopolistic pricing 
behaviour of the other two operators, coupled with indications of high barriers to entry, 
collusive behaviour, transparency and non-differentiation of pricing structures384.  
 
However, in BT/Esat385, the Commission did not consider the elimination of BT as the 
third player in the dedicated internet access market in Ireland to create a duopoly, 
despite the combined market shares of the parties amounting to 30%-40%. The 
capacity of Eircom as the largest market player, together with the existence of several 
small players holding together less than 10% market share influenced positively the 
Commission’ s approach to the merger. The Commission took also into account the 
existence of fluctuating market shares, technological developments and the increasing 
                                            
381 Case  COMP/M.3530, TeliaSonera AB/Orange AS, 24.9.2004. The decision was issued in the context 
of the new ECMR. 
382 Case  COMP/M. 4748, 20.08.2007, par. 43f. 
383 Ibid., par. 47f. 
384 Case  COMP/M.2016, France Telecom/Orange, 11.8.2000, par. 28. 
385 Case  COMP/M. 1838, BT/Esat, 27.3.2000. 
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demand for Internet access services, as well as the expectance of new entries by TV 
companies (cable and digital) and product differentiation, although the details given in 
the decision are very few to allow the review of the Commission’ s choice. 
 
In T-Mobile/Orange, the Commission expressed concerns on the effects of the merger 
on wholesale access and call origination, because the merger could drive also 3UK out 
of business, through the compromise of its 3G RAN-sharing agreement with the 
merging parties, hence, lead to market concentration from 5 to 3 operators386. The 
merger was cleared on condition of commitments towards 3UK for the continuation of 
agreements and divestment of part of the spectrum held by the entities to third parties. 
 
The Carphone Warehouse/Tiscali UK merger was examined in terms of coordinated 
effects in the residential segment of the retail broadband market, because the 
transaction resulted in a market structure where the three largest players (including the 
notified undertaking) held near-symmetric shares. The concerns were dismissed, 
because of the high customer switching rates, the complexity and diversity of the 
players’ cost structures, non-homogeneous product offers and the pressure exercised 
by the competitive fringe387. 
 
In Cisco/Scientific Atlanta388, a horizontal merger between providers of products for 
the delivery of content over networks (Internet networking equipment, set-top boxes 
etc.), the Commission held that the existence of three remaining competitors against 
the combined entity, holding similar market positions and coupled with “not 
significant” barriers to entry, did not create competition concerns, although 
interoperability of products was accepted as a factor affecting potential switch of 
suppliers.  
 
                                            
386 Case COMP/M.5650, 1.3.2010. The concerns were reinforced because the JV might be the only 
possible undertaking able to offer LTE (4G) services due to the amount of spectrum held by the two 
separate undertakings. 
387 Case  COMP/M. 5532, 29.06.2009, par. 77-78. In the market for the provision of fixed-line 
telephony services to end-customers in the UK the combined entity holds 31% in terms of minutes, but 
<20% in terms of revenues, with low entry barriers. 
388 Case  COMP/M.4063, Cisco/Scientific Atlanta, 22.2.2006. 
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However, the Commission approved the merger of the two out of three suppliers of 
data clearing services in the EEA in Syniverse/BSG389 unconditionally, on the grounds 
that none of the parties exerted significant constraint on the other. The Commission 
took the view that the continued consolidation of MNOs and the sophisticated bidding 
processes followed in the market created countervailing buyer power, which, coupled 
with the lack of capacity constraints, did not allow adverse unilateral effects on 
competition. The Commission did not express concerns on coordinated effects on the 
grounds that common understanding is not feasible due to the sophisticated bidding 
processes, which also reduces transparency and the possibility for swift retaliation in 
the course of the tender, whereas new competitors are also expected to enter the 
market390. 
 
On 12.12.2012, the Commission cleared the merger between Orange and Hutchison 
3G in Austria, which lead to the elimination of the fourth mobile operator in the 
Austrian market, under strict commitments from the parties to alleviate the concerns of 
the Commission on the increase of prices in the mobile services market to the 
detriment of consumers391. The commitments included divestment of radio of spectrum 
and additional rights to an interested new entrant in the Austrian mobile telephony 
market. The potential new mobile network operator would have the right to acquire 
spectrum not only from H3G but also additional spectrum at an auction planned in 
2013 by the Austrian NRA. The latter would reserve spectrum for a new entrant, in 
order to enable such an operator to build up a physical network for mobile 
telecommunication services in Austria. The new entrant would also benefit from 
privileged conditions for the purchase of sites for building up its own network in 
Austria. H3G also committed to provide, on agreed terms, wholesale access to its 
network for up to 30% of its capacity to up to 16 mobile virtual network operators in 
the following 10 years, in order to increase consumer choice and the offer of mobile 
telecommunications services to end customers in Austria at competitive terms and 
conditions and the merger would be completed only after the execution of such 
wholesale access agreement by H3G. 
 
                                            
389 Case COMP/M. 4662, 4.12.2007. 
390 Par. 104f of the decision. 
391 Case COMP/M.6497/Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria. 
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3.2.1.2. Market Shares 
 
In the realm of the effects-based approach to dominance, there is no presumption of 
dominance on the basis of specific market share thresholds, in the sense that market 
shares alone cannot make a firm fall foul of Article 102 TFEU392. The efficiency of 
pure market share analysis in markets characterized by a high degree of product 
differentiation has been challenged393, since  
“such analysis implicitly gives no weight to the competitive influence of 
products outside the defined market and gives weight to products within the 
market in direct proportion to their market shares”394.  
 
In addition, market shares are not a reliable proxy of market power if rivals can 
increase output in response to a price increase395, whereas they fail to take into account 
competitive pressures exerted by firms not yet operating on the market, but with 
capacity to enter it. Hence, concentration thresholds can provide no more than an 
initial screen for a detailed case-specific competitive assessment396.  
 
The period over which market shares are computed and the relevant volume or value 
are considered instrumental for the use of market shares in market power analysis397. 
The Guidelines refer both to volume sales and value sales favouring the former method 
when dealing with homogeneous (or bulk) products and the latter in the case of 
differentiated products398, but, the criteria to be used to measure the market share of 
the undertaking(s) concerned will depend on the characteristics of the relevant 
market399. The Guidelines identify reference to value sales in wholesale markets with 
the firm’s earnings in the specific market: 
                                            
392 Even super-dominance, which was considered to define firms holding market shares in excess of 
90%, has been regarded as ‘a thing of the past’, Appeldoorn, J., He Who Spareth his Rod, Hateth his 
Son? Microsoft, Super-dominance and Article 82 EC, [2005] ECLR, 657. 
393 Baker, S., Coscelli, A., The Role of Market Shares in Differentiated Product Markets [1999] ECLR 
412. 
394 Baker, S., Coscielli, A., ibid., 413-414. 
395 Dethmers, F., Dodoo, N., The abuse of Hoffmann-La Roche: the meaning of dominance under EC 
Competition Law, [2006] ECLR, 543. 
396 Maier-Rigaud, F., Wiesen, D., Parplies, K., ibid., 409. 
397 Dethmers, F., Dodoo, N., ibid., 541. 
398 Para. 76. 
399 Para. 77. 
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“the use of revenues, rather than for example call minutes, takes account of 
the fact that call minutes can have different values (i.e. local, long distance 
and international) and provides a measure of market presence that reflects 
both the number of customers and network coverage”400. 
 
It is noted, though, that significant differences in market shares calculated in terms of 
volume and in terms of value may indicate that certain products may constitute 
separate relevant product markets401. 
 
The Guidelines take the view that market shares comprise the starting point of the 
assessment of market power, on the grounds that it is unlikely that undertakings with 
low market shares may exercise significant market power402. In oligopolistic 
environments no certainty may be created on the basis of such statement, since small 
market shares may be consistent with market power, like in the case of several 
colluding firms with small market shares403. 
 
Unlike single dominance, the Commission has been reluctant in giving instructions on 
the market share threshold for the assessment of joint dominance. Earlier drafts of the 
Guidelines set such threshold at 25%404 and defined “normal” concerns of dominance 
                                            
400 Ibid. Navarro, E., Font, A., Folguera, J., Briones, J., Merger Control in the EU, Law Economics and 
Practice, Oxford University Press, 2002, 153 argue that the Commission’s practice in merger cases, in 
general, is to calculate market shares according to operator’s annual turnover (by value), which allows 
relatively different or heterogeneous products (fundamentally as regards price) to be added together, e.g. 
Case IV/M 190 Nestle/ Perrier [1992] OJ L365/1 and, further, that measuring market shares by volume 
(units sold or production capacity) may be more appropriate in markets where there is an excess of 
production capacity, like electronic communications, because high revenues may be an indicator of high 
profit margins, depending on the firm’s financial policy. Even the more so, when inevitable cross-
subsidisation in the firm’ s activities in different markets resulting from the firm’ s overall policy may 
create misleading impressions as to dominance, where demonstration of low profits in one market is due 
to subsidies received by the firm’ s products in another market. The Commission has also favoured this 
approach in merger cases in other network industries, e.g. Case IV/ M 1088, Thomson/ Friditresor, Case 
IV/ M 157 Air France/ Sabena, Case IV/ M 490 NSD. 
401 Case IV/ M 1357, Nordic Capital/ Hilding Anders, 1999. 
402 Para. 75. 
403 Arowolo, O., Application of the Concept of Barriers to Entry under Article 82 of the EC Treaty: is 
there a Case for Review?, [2005] ECLR, 252. 
404 A presumption in favour of dominance in market shares in excess of 25% can be also made from 
recital 32 of the preamble of the ECMR. The 25% threshold has also been defined by scholars as the 
threshold for single dominance (Wish, R., Competition Law, Butterworths, 2001, 153, Cook, C.J., 
Kerse, C.S., EC Merger Control, 3rd ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, 153. 
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for undertakings with market shares above 40%405. The adopted text of the Guidelines 
omits reference to 25% and clarifies that the 40% threshold applies for the calculation 
of “single” dominant positions only406. In the Block Exemption Regulation on vertical 
agreements, a definite safe harbour is created for single dominance with the exemption 
itself for companies having less than 30% market share407.  
 
No similar clear guidance is provided for joint dominance, but the clarification that the 
40% threshold applies on single dominance implies that the individual thresholds for 
each of the colluding firms may be lower than 40%. Similarly, the Commission does 
not distinguish between single and joint dominance for market shares above 50%, 
which are considered, save as in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence 
of a dominant position408, but it is argued in literature that the presumption of 
dominance in market shares of 50% or more should apply only to cases of single and 
not collective dominance409, because in oligopolistic markets there is a number of other 
factors that are likely to influence a finding against dominance.  
 
As observed by Hou, in their market assessments, the NRAs have examined collective 
dominance issues only in cases where the first largest undertakings’ market shares are 
less than 60%, whereas single dominance issues arise in NRA notifications for 
undertakings with a market share exceeding 60%410. Indeed, in SI/2009/913, which 
followed the withdrawal of a previous notice indicating joint dominance on the market 
for mobile access and call origination, APEK established single dominance of Mobitel, 
which was claimed to hold market shares in excess of 60% and 70% in terms of voice 
                                            
405 Draft Guidelines on market analysis and the calculation of significant market power under Article 14 
of the proposed Directive on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks 
and services, COM (2001) 175, 28.3.2001 
406 Para 75 of the Guidelines. The same position is taken in par. 31 of the Discussion Paper and par. 14 
of the Guidance Paper. 
407 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2790/1999 of 22 Dec. 1999 on the application of Art. 81(3) of the 
Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, Art. 6. 
408 Par. 75 of the Guidelines. 
409 Whish, Competition Law, 4th edition, 2001, 485, Richardson, R., Gordon, C., ibid., 417. In Airtours, 
the Commission established joint dominance for collective market shares of 60-70%. 
410 Hou, L., Collective Dominance within the context of EU electronic communications regulation, 
[2009] Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, vol. 10, 288, who also argues that this 
finding also tallies with the research of Davies, Olczak and Coles (2007) in the area of EC merger 
control, who tend to reach a conclusion that when the largest firm with more than 60% market share 




traffic and voice revenues respectively (including self-supply)411. On the same product 
market, in PL/2010/1147, the Polish NRA examined potential joint dominance issues 
between the three largest MNOs (Polkomtel, PTC and PTK), who had in 2009 market 
shares between 29% and 33% in terms of end users, but concluded against such 
finding, because P4's market shares were found to be growing, reaching 7.7% in 2009 
and because of the presence of two other small MNOs and 12 MVNOs, albeit these 
generated slightly less than 1% of the market.   
 
Economic theory has accepted that even the creation of a market share of less than 
25% could give cause for concern in the context of an oligopoly412. The scenario was 
identified in Airtours/First Choice, where the market shares of the collectively 
dominant parties ranged from 20.4% to 34.4%.  
 
In NRA notifications that examined concerns of joint dominance, all the second largest 
undertakings’ market shares are above 24%413. This figure accords with a report of the 
Competition Commission in the UK414 that once an MNO (mobile network operator) 
has captured 20%-25% of the market volume, there are very limited remaining 
economies of scale for mobile network operators who have captured 20-25% of the 
market volume:  
‘Although it is not clear whether the figure (20%-25%) in this report can also 
apply to other electronic communications markets, it is of no doubt that there 
must be a threshold in terms of market shares in every market above which the 
average cost of an undertaking increases when its output grows. If there is still 
scope of economies of scale, the newcomers may have incentives to increase 
their outputs in order to lower down their costs and consequently may have no 
incentive to establish collective SMP with the largest undertakings, in most 
case namely the incumbents that have already achieved economies of scale 
before the liberalisation. Only after achieving this threshold the newcomers 
may possibly consider tacit collusion with the undertakings enjoying 
economies of scale. Therefore, this 24% market share may imply the lowest 
                                            
411 However, the Commission requested further evidence on the substantiation of Mobitel’s dominant 
position. 
412 Etter, B. , The Assessment of Mergers in the EC under the Concept of Collective Dominance [2000] 
Journal of World Competition, 105.  
413 Ibid. 
414 Quoted in ES/2005/0330. 
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market share above which the second largest undertakings achieve economies 
of scale’415. 
  
In the area of merger control in the electronic communications sector, the Commission 
has cleared mergers where the parties’ combined market shares did not exceed 30% 
unconditionally416. Combined market shares in excess of 30% (and less than 40%417) 
have been also cleared where other factors like the existence of credible competitors 
with comparable market size, award of contracts through tenders, standardisation of 
interfaces enabling interoperability418 or the existence of strong competition at pricing 
level419. In France Telecom/STI/SRD420, the Commission dismissed concerns on the 
parties’ combined market shares (30% - 40%) because the Portuguese market for 
dedicated access to ISPs was found to be rapidly growing and also in the light of the 
higher market shares of the incumbent operator Telepac421.  
 
In the Alcatel/Lucent422 and Nokia/Siemens423 decisions, the Commission has 
examined the mergers between providers of telecommunication equipment, which 
were all active in several submarkets. Despite the limited number of players in most of 
these markets, the Commission has conducted detailed market share analysis of all 
                                            
415 Hou. L., ibid. 
416 Case  COMP/M.4003, Ericsson/Marconi, 20.12.2005, Case  COMP/M. 1982, Telia/Oracle/Drutt, 
11.9.2000, Case  COMP/M. 1747, Telekom Austria/Libro, 28.2.2000, Case  COMP/M. 4034, 
Telenor/Vodafone Sverige, 20.12.2005. In the last case, the Commission also dismissed concerns of 
third parties on potential bundling with products offered by other subsidiaries of Telenor in other 
markets, on the grounds of low market shares and the ability of other operators to do the same. Similar 
concerns were also dismissed in TA/Libro in the market for sale of digital mobile handsets for pre-paid 
cards or contracts, despite TA’ s high market share in the mobile market (>50%), not only because of 
the offer of several alternatives in the purchase of handsets and mobile contracts in the market, but also 
because TA’s market share was decreasing and in new subscriptions TA’ s market share was the same 
as its competitor MaxMobil (35%-45%). 
417 However, in Case  COMP/M.3411, UGC/Noos, 17.5.2004, the Commission decided to clear the 
concentration, although it acknowledged that, had a narrower market definition been adopted, the 
combined market shares of the parties would exceed 40%. It appears that the existence of France 
Telecom as a powerful competitor has influenced the Commission’ s decision to clear the merger. 
418 Ericsson/Marconi, ibid. Conversely, combined market shares in excess of 60% create serious doubts 
for competition in the respective markets, Case  IV/M.2300, Yle/Tdf/Digita JV, 26.6.2001. 
419 Case  COMP/M.2257, France Telecom/Equant, 21.3.2001. 
420 Case  COMP/M.1679, France Telecom/STI/SRD, 21.10.1999. 
421 Also in Case  COMP/M.4417, Telekom Italia/AOL German Access Business, 28.11.2006. Case  
COMP/M.4217, Providence/Carlyle/UPC Sweden, 2.6.2006. The reader notes an inconsistency between 
the geographic definition of the relevant cable market (network-based), which supports a limited 
horizontal overlap between the merging parties, with the calculation of market shares nation-wide, 
which supports the existence of three major cable operators accounting for 85% of the total national 
market. 
422 Case  COMP/M.4214, Alcatel/Lucent Technologies, 24.7.2006.  
423 Case  COMP/M.4297, Nokia/Siemens, 13.11.2006. 
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players and cleared the mergers unconditionally, albeit the combined market shares of 
the parties were considered between 30-40% or even in the region of 50%424, which 
would render the entities strongest or second strongest players in some of these 
markets in the EEA. The clearance was based on the premise that markets for 
telecommunications equipment were generally considered competitive by the parties’ 
customers (network operators) even in markets where the joint market share of the 
combined entity and the major player would reach 60-70%425. Possible concerns that 
may have risen out of allegations on the existence of two major suppliers were 
dismissed on the finding of a third credible operator426. 
 
In the same line, the Cisco/Tandberg merger, which raised competition concerns in the 
VCS (dedicated room solutions) market because of the combined shares of the parties 
(30-40%), which were closest competitors before the merger, and of the barriers linked 
to interoperability of Cisco’s equipment, was not considered to raise significant 
constraints in the multi-purpose room solutions, because of Cisco’s minimal addition 
on Tandberg’s shares and the presence of other competitors and lack of significant 
interoperability problems. It is noted, though, that the potential of coordinated effects 
with other competitors of a similar size were not examined and it is not clear from the 
information published in the non-confidential version of the case, if the addition of 
Cisco’s shares increases the symmetry of shares between the two biggest competitors 
in the global market427.  
 
Potential market share thresholds in oligopolistic markets capable of establishing joint 
SMP are left open in the Guidelines and, as a result, the review of the notifications 
made by NRAs in the context of Article 7 of the Framework Directive demonstrates 
                                            
424 The combined market share of Alcatel/Lucent in the DSLAM market was found to range between 
40-50%. It is ted that 4 months later, in Nokia/Siemens Alcatel/Lucent’s market share was found to have 
been increased to 50-60%.  
425 Nokia/Siemens, par. 90. Collective dominance was also considered unlikely to appear in the future 
because of rapid technological developments in the mobile sector. 
426 Ibid., par. 75. A similar approach was also followed in Avaya/Nortel, Case COMP/M.5607, 
18.11.2009. The high percentages of the parties combined market share in the PBX market (circa 30%) 
were considered to over-estimate the actual market presence of the parties, since the majority of their 
sales was done to existing customers for upgrades/updates, other major players were operating globally 
and players from neighbouring markets had recently entered the market and mainly in view of the 
limited length of contracts, overridden technology and Nortel’s weak financial position. 
427 Case  COMP/M.5669, 29.03.2010. 
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that individual market shares are not considered unless in excess of 40%, regardless of 
the collective market share that they may hold with other market participants. For 
example, in Case HU/2007/0739, in assessing the effectiveness of competition in the 
wholesale market for trunk segments of leased lines the Hungarian NRA did not 
examine the prospect of collective dominance by the four market players holding 
35,3%, 27,2%, 17,1% and 15,1% respectively and dismissed concerns of single 
dominance primarily on the grounds that the largest operator’s market share was below 
40%. In Case AT/2008/0757, the Austrian NRA did not place weight on the 30% 
market share held by the second largest operator in the broadband access market, 
whereas the Commission in its comments invited the NRA to monitor the competitive 
pressure to be exercised on the former incumbent by the second operator in the future, 
but did not raise the potential of their joint influence on the market.  
 
The review of notifications made in the context of Article 7 of the Framework 
Directive also shows that NRAs examine prospective collective dominance issues 
between the two biggest in terms of market shares undertakings if these hold 
collectively no less than 75%, with the exception of the Czech NRA who examined 
also cases where the undertakings held approximately 60%428. As pointed out by 
Hou429, in cases where the concentration ratios are less than 75%, a third largest 
undertaking with similar size can always be found. In the three notifications where 
collective SMP is found by the NRAs430 and approved by the Commission, the two-
undertaking concentration ratios were 84.1%431, 94%432 and 100%433. 
 
3.2.1.3 Indispensable symmetries 
 
US antitrust apply the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (HHI) for measuring market 
concentration. The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the individual market 
shares of all participants and, then, market concentrations are categorised into 
“unconcentrated”, “moderately concentrated” and “highly concentrated”, depending on 
                                            
428 CZ/2006/0448 and 451. 
429 Hou, L., ibid, 286. 






their ranking on the index434. Airtours was the first Commission judgement where the 
HHI was applied435. Markets in which the HHI is between 1000 and 1800 points are 
usually considered to be moderately concentrated while those in which the HHI is in 
excess of 1800 are considered to be concentrated. However, the application of the HHI 
has been debated by economists on the grounds that it is a blunt tool for identifying 
size assymetries amongst the leading firms and is misleading when attempting to 
identify the likelihood of collective dominance436. 
 
Also, this rule cannot be easily adapted to electronic communications markets, given 
the fact that the HHIs in all the notifications involving collective SMP analysis are 
much higher than 1800.  Since the very first notification UK/2003/001 involving the 
market for access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks, the 
Commission placed little value on HHI, by taking the view that the fact that the UK 
had a lower HHI score than markets in other member states is not in itself an indication 
of its propensity towards or away from collective dominance437. 
 
However, the allocation of market share between the firms has a role to play in the 
establishment of joint dominance since the symmetry of market positions must be 
taken into account438. Similarity in market shares reduces the incentive to compete, 
because of the impression of fairness created by the balance in market shares, which 
decreases the likelihood of the parties competing for higher market shares439.  
 
In Kali & Salz the CJEU noted that a collective market share of 60% subdivided in 
percentages of 37% and 23% “cannot of itself point conclusively to the existence of a 
collective dominant position”440. Asymmetric market positions establish competitive 
price equilibrium, since smaller operators struggling for customers with aggressive 
pricing and marketing may expose operators with bigger market shares to substantial 
                                            
434 Etter, B., ibid., 134. 
435 Para. 139. 
436 Davies, Olzac, Coles, H., Tacit Collusion, Firm Asymmetries and Numbers: Evidence from EC 
Merger Cases, February 2010, http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107587/ccp07-7.pdf.  
437 In CZ/2006/451 on wholesale trunk segments of leased lines, the HHI was around 2525, but it was 
considered to indicate low market concentration. 
438 In Airtours/First Choice the Commission took into account the increase in symmetry of market 
positions among the leading suppliers with respect to vertical integration, which would be caused by the 
merger. 
439 Navarro and others, ibid., 227. 
440 Para. 226 of the judgement. 
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competition441. That was considered to be the case in the German mobile market in the 
first years of the previous decade, where the two smaller operators and especially the 
smallest Viag Interkom, who was trying to make up for the relative late market entry, 
were found to put considerable competitive pressure on the two major players (T-
Mobile and Vodafone), each holding approximately 40% of the mobile market442. The 
similar market positions held by GO and Melita led MCA to analyze in MT/2012/1375 
whether they might together hold a position of joint dominance in the wholesale 
broadband access market, albeit SMP was not found to exist as a result of signs of 
competition (improved in terms of prices, speeds and download limits and increased 
product differentiation with the provision of a vast array of bundles). The asymmetry 
in market positions was considered focal by the Slovenian NRA in determining lack of 
joint dominance on the national market for mobile access and call origination443, 
although the NRA had originally concluded in favour of the existence of collective 
dominance between the two biggest mobile operators444. Asymmetry in market shares 
has been regarded a predominant factor in dismissing concerns of joint dominance also 
in merger cases in the electronic communications sector445. 
 
On the other hand, the French mobile operators Orange, SFR and Bouygues Telecom 
were fined in 2007 by the French competition authority for having engaged in 
collusion by exchanging confidential information for several years and for market 
partitioning practices. Bouygues was a very small player compared to the other two 
operators, which was struggling to survive against the two major players; it, therefore, 
decided that, if modest and growing, market share gave it sufficient relief from 
competitive pressures446. 
 
                                            
441 Economic theory suggests that when output is increased and marginal costs are rising, the lowest 
price is preferred by the firm with the smallest market share, whereas when marginal costs fall with 
higher output, the lowest price is preferred by the firm with the largest market share, which has an 
incentive to expand and take full advantage of the low costs associated with high outputs. Scherer, F. 
M., Ross, D., Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 1990, 240.  
442 Groebel, A., Why Germany Does Not Regulate Wireless Carriers – Under which Circumstances 
should Wireless Carriers be Regulated?, [2002] CTLR 155. 
443 Case SI/2009/0913. 
444 Case SI/2008/0806. 
445 E.g. Case No. IV/M. 570, TBT/BT/Teledanmark/Telenor, 24.4.1995. Case No. COMP/M. 1943, 
Telefonica/Endemol, 11.7.2000. Case No. COMP/M. 2851, Intracom/Siemens/STI, 10.2.2003 Case No. 
COMP/M.2016, France Telecom/Orange, 11.8.2000. 
446 Sutherland, E., Collusion among Mobile Network Operators in France, [2007] CTLR, 91-93. 
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Also, in its notification IE/2004/0121, the Irish NRA established collective dominance 
by the two major network operators in the market for mobile access and call 
origination, despite the lack of symmetry in their market shares (54% Vodafone, 40% 
O2) on the basis that their absolute size (94% in terms of subscribers and 97% in terms 
of revenue) gave them a strong enough incentive to coordinate447. The Commission did 
not challenge this finding, but pointed out the significance of closely monitoring the 
third competitor who had recently entered the market and, although incapable of 
exercising competitive pressure at this stage, could develop in the near future into a 
credible alternative access provider448.  
 
Stability of market shares is also considered conducive to collective dominance. Non-
stable market shares instead imply competition and accordingly can immediately 
remove concern of tacit collusion449.  The declining, though symmetrical, market 
shares of the four major mobile operators in Denmark over the period 2004-2007 has 
been crucial in the NRA’s finding against collective dominance, despite the existence 
of entry barriers450. Also, volatility of market shares was, together with the lack of 
significant entry barriers, the key points in determining lack of SMP by the Estonian 
NRA in the duopoly for transit services451.  
 
In addition, economists link the symmetry of market shares with the similarity of cost 
structures, which was also included in the original list of Annex II of the Framework 
Directive as a separate factor inductive to collective dominance452. Similarity in cost 
structures entails a strong possibility of the undertakings having similar points of view 
on the prices that would like to see prevailing on the market. For example, for the high 
cost firms, agreeing to reduce output substantially would tantamount to disarming, 
unlike low cost firms453. In case SK/2006/0042, the Commission observed that the 
existence of significantly different profitability margins between T-Mobile and Orange 
                                            
447 In other cases, the possibility of tacit collusion was not examined at all in the event of asymmetric 
market shares (e.g. notification UK/2008/0787 on the submarkets for terminating segments of leased 
lines in the UK). 
448 EC’ comments pursuant to Article 7(3) of Directive 2002/21/EC – SG Greffe(2005)D/200269, p. 7. 
449 Hou, L., ibid., 283. 
450 EC’s comments on notification DK/2008/0863, SG-Greffe (2009) D/633, p. 3. 
451 Case EE/2007/0670. 
452 That was the case in Gencor/Lonrho (Case IV/M 619 [1997] OJ L11/30), where the Commission 
considered that similar cost structures reduce the incentive to compete particularly on mature markets 
with low technological innovation. 
453 Scherer, F. M., Ross, D., ibid., 242. 
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indicated the lack of parallel interests in preventing MVNO entry, despite the lack of 
any MVNO access agreement on the Slovakian mobile market454. 
 
It follows from the foregoing, that NRAs and the Commission consider that concerns 
of tacit collusion in oligopolistic markets may only arise in the context of symmetrical 
duopolies (never in markets involving more than three players) with combined market 
shares in excess of 80%. Also, undertakings with market shares lower than 
approximately 25% will not be considered as capable of participating in tacit collusion. 
This accords also with the presumption of the old regulatory framework that only 
undertakings with market shares in excess of 25% may be held to enjoy SMP455.     
 
3.2.2. Transparency and retaliation 
3.2.2.1 Transparency 
 
An adequate degree of market transparency is considered determinative for the 
establishment of collective dominance, so that firms are able to monitor other firms’ 
conducts and detect deviations456. High market transparency depends on the ability of 
firms to observe transaction prices and levels of sales of competitors as well as on the 
degree of concentration of the market, since in concentrated, highly transparent 
markets deviations from tacit agreements are easily identifiable457. In Airtours, the 
Commission based its transparency arguments on capacity rather than pricing, but 
contrary to the Commission’s contention, the GC concluded that the fact that the major 
tour operators negotiated between themselves to acquire or supply capacity or to 
arrange seat or slot swaps did not provide for a sufficient degree of transparency when 
decisions were taken458. 
 
                                            
454 Similarly, in Case PL/2008/0756, the Polish NRA noted cost differences between 24% and 700%, 
also due to tax reasons, which pointed against the presence of collective dominance in the wholesale 
market for mobile access and call origination. 
455 Refer to section 1.2.1. 
456 Stroux, S., Collective Dominance under the Merger Regulation: A Serious Evolutionary Reprimand 
for the Commission, [2002] ELRev, 740. 
457 Kokkoris, I., ibid., 436. 
458 Par. 179-181 of the judgement. 
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In that respect, information sharing, which may have pro-competitive effects on highly 
competitive markets with atomised sources of supply, becomes a competition law 
problem in oligopolistic highly concentrated markets459. The GC has held that on a 
highly concentrated market on which competition was already reduced and the 
exchange of information facilitated, frequent exchange of precise information 
identifying individual sales by competitors is likely to impair substantially the 
competition between traders in the relevant market460.  
 
Transparency may be established through multi- market contact, not necessarily 
limited to the market under scrutiny. The parties may be found to explicitly co-operate 
in other markets, whether neighbouring or not, which may have resulted in the 
establishment of solid channels of communication between them, leaving room for 
future co-ordination461. 
 
In IMPALA, the GC illustrated transparency by reference to  
‘close alignment of prices over a long period, especially if they are above a 
competitive level, [which] together with other factors typical of a collective 
dominant position, might, in the absence of an alternative reasonable 
explanation, suffice to demonstrate the existence of a collective dominant 
position, even where there is no firm direct evidence of strong market 
transparency, as such transparency may be presumed in such 
circumstances’462,  
And that  
‘discounts are not capable of really affecting the transparency of the market as 
regards prices resulting from, in particular, public list prices, since it is stated 
[by the Commission] that “[i]f a significant deviation from pricing policies was 
                                            
459 Vollebregt, E., EC Competition Law Aspects of Peer-to-Peer Networking, [2002] CTLR, 64. 
460 Case T-35/92, John Deere vs Commission, par. 51. 
461 In a wide range of circumstances, multimarket contact relaxes the incentive constraints that limit the 
extent of collusion. Indeed, the literature has found a significant multimarket effect, although the sign of 
this effect has tended to vary across industries. The effect of multimarket contact on the price or profits 
of any one industry depends greatly on the set of markets over which the firms have contact and on the 
characteristics of active (and potentially active) firms. E.g. when firms are identical and markets differ, 
prices and profits may rise in some markets, but fall in others, as a result of multimarket contact. 
Bernheim, D., Whinston, M., Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior, [1990] Rand Journal of 
Economics, 22. 
462 Case T-464/04, IMPALA v. Commission, judgement of 13.7.2006, par. 252. 
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being implemented by the majors through the grant of discounts, this deviation 
would have been reflected in their average net prices”’463 
And  
‘the differences in the ranges of discounts over time could be the result of 
differences in performance and do not preclude the discounts being based on a 
known set of rules’464. 
 
The CJEU upheld the finding of the GC that the condition relating to market 
transparency, might, in certain circumstances and in the absence of an alternative 
explanation, suffice to demonstrate the existence of a dominant position, as opposed to 
the creation of such a position, without its being necessary positively to establish 
market transparency and indicated that competition authorities should avoid 
mechanical approach to the Airtours criteria based on the separate verification of each 
criterion in isolation, while disregarding the general economic mechanism of potential 
tacit coordination465. The Court did not take a position on the whether the GC was 
correct to infer transparency of discounts from their impact on average net prices and 
dismiss the relevance of complex pricing structures and price variations when 
assessing transparency, but it held that  
‘the [General Court] was content to rely, in paragraphs 427 to 429 of the 
judgment under appeal, on unsupported assertions relating to a hypothetical 
industry professional …[and] disregarded the fact that the burden of proof was 
on Impala in relation to the purported qualities of such a hypothetical ‘industry 
professional’ … [thus] misconstruing the principles which should have guided 
its analysis of the arguments raised before it concerning market transparency in 
the context of an allegation of a collective dominant position, the Court of First 
Instance committed an error of law’466. 
 
Market transparency is affected by homogeneity of services, which simplifies pricing 
decisions and renders (explicit and tacit) collusion easier as it increases the likelihood 
                                            
463 Ibid., par. 309 of the judgement. 
464 Ibid., par. 420 of the judgement. 
465 Case C-413/06, Bertelsmann and Sony Corp. vs Impala, Judgement of the Court of 10.07.2008,  Par. 
123-125. In support of this interpretation, Van Rompuy B., Implications for the Standard of Proof in EC 
Merger Proceedings: Bertelsmann and Sony Corp. of America v. Impala (C-413/06 P) CJEU, [2008] 
10, European Competition Law Review, 611.  
466 Ibid., par. 131-133. 
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of the same reaction towards the market. With perfect homogeneity, there remains only 
one dimension along which rivalrous actions and counteractions can take place: 
price467. Hence, on examining markets for the purposes of establishing prospective 
collusive behavior, the relevant issue should be whether the nature and the pricing of 
the product are differentiated in such a way that co-ordinated behaviour is inhibited468.  
 
Indeed, the review of Article 7 notifications involving joint dominance issues indicates 
that, when examining price-oriented coordination, the NRAs always set their emphasis 
on market transparency, in other words whether the markets in question is transparent 
enough for undertakings concerned to monitor other’s pricing behaviors. In this 
context it is considered that, an unstable price, i.e. steadily decreasing prices or a 
fluctuating price or different tariff packages, is considered to make it difficult to 
monitor the other undertakings’ behaviors469. For example, in IE/2004/0121 the Irish 
NRA acknowledged that the apparent complexity of these tariffs can work against the 
establishment of a consensus position even on a market where all the operators offer 
broadly the same portfolio services in their retail clusters. 
 
The Commission emphasised the importance of market transparency in Nestle and in 
Gencor, where it considered actions such as publication of price lists and production 
and sales statistics as enhancing market transparency. Indeed, published price470 or 
sometimes information disclosed in the negotiation with customers471 were found by 
NRAs to enhance transparency. It is noted that regulatory obligations, like the 
obligation to interconnect and transparency obligations including the publication of 
reference offers provided in Article 9 of the Access Directive, as well as market 
practices, like auctions for spectrum allocation enhance market transparency. Auctions 
for licenses are considered to induce credible signalling for collusion in the post-entry 
                                            
467 Homogeneity of services was included in the original list of factors of Annex II, but was omitted 
from the list of the revised Annex II. Hou (ibid, 289) argued that the appraisal of homogeneity in 
practice was less meaningful to collective SMP assessment, since “old” technologies are still dominating 
the markets and thus market players usually offer homogeneous products in electronic communications 
markets, which can be observed in almost all of the Commission decisions. 
468 Refer to Scherer, F. M., Ross, D., ibid., 279 and Christensen, P., Rabassa, V., ibid., 231. 





stage472, particularly since the same major players are present in most European 
markets473. 
 
Also, the obligation to interconnect creates in itself communication routes between the 
already limited number of market players474. Transparency may be created through 
such agreements as well as from memberships to international associations and fora, 
like the GSM and UMTS Association475. Also, it may encompass less direct 
communication channels between market players, such as the use of the same suppliers 
and/or customers in access agreements476. It follows from the foregoing that, as a result 
of the various forms of communication between market players, establishing 
transparency in electronic communications markets should not be that difficult. Indeed, 
                                            
472 Gruber, H., Spectrum limits and competition in mobile markets: the role of license fees, [2001] 
Telecommunications Policy, 67.  
473 That was claimed to be the case of the obligatory spot market in the California electricity market, 
which was accounted for a high degree of transparency, which allowed for increased oligopolistic 
behaviour among the few players and an artificial inflation of the price of electricity by approximately 
900% in one year Manoussakis, S., Liberalisation of the EU Electricity Market: Enough to Power Real 
Progress?, [2009] 232. Technological advances have also led to new types of commodities being 
exchanged in the marketplace: for example, cell phone minutes and bandwidth (refer to 
http://www.aaii.com/journal/article/investing-in-commodities). However, interest in bandwith 
reservation schemes have not caught on for a number of reasons, notably lack of interest on the part of 
the bandwidth providers. This, in turn, was partially caused by the lack of an efficient way of charging 
for bandwidth. Refer to Turner, D., Prevelakis, V., Keromytis, A., A market-based bandiwith charging 
Framework, ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. 10, issue 1, Feb. 2010. 
474 In IE/2004/121, the Irish NRA recognised the existence of considerable links between the electronic 
communications undertakings in the form of agreements of access, interconnection and infrastructure 
sharing, or through “millions of customer and a number of ‘churning’ customers on the demand side 
every month”. 
475 The UMTS forum was established in 1996 and is intended to draw together network operators, 
regulators and manufacturers of network infrastructure and terminal equipment with an interest in 
mobile broadband. The UMTS Forum participates in the work of the ITU, ETSI, 3GPP and CEPT as 
well as other technical and commercial organisations, voices the concerns of its members to regulators 
and supports the interests of its membership with a range of studies, reports and other outputs (on 
market trends, mobile broadband services and applications, spectrum & regulation, technology & 
implementation issues (http://www.umts- forum.org/content/view/2885/203). Participation in such fora 
increases market transparency since it allows the coming together of market players, the exchange of 
ideas and the establishment of common practices, like e.g. in international roaming agreements. 
476 Although considered competitive due to the existence of significant countervailing buyer power, the 
market for the supply of mobile handsets and terminal equipment is also concentrated on a global basis, 
and the operators around the world use the same supplier. Refer to Case No COMP/M.4297, 
Nokia/Siemens, 13.11.2006, Case No COMP/M.4214, Alcatel/Lucent Technologies, 24.7.2006. 
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the majority of cases that dismissed concerns of collective dominance did it on 
grounds other than the lack of transparency477.  
 
However, the NRAs of the ten out of the twelve member-states that conducted market 
assessments of their respective wholesale national roaming markets concluded against 
market transparency as a result of the individual rebates given to alliance partners in 
the different member states478. It is noted that the findings of the GC in Impala with 
respect to transparency appear not to have been taken into account by the NRAs in the 
examination of international roaming markets, at least in the cases notified after the 
issue of the GC’s decision479. Notably, if a finding of a common policy on excessive 
roaming rates, given the existence of other factors characteristic of a collective 
dominant position, might have sufficed -under the specific circumstances of the 
roaming market and in the absence of an alternative explanation- to demonstrate the 
existence of a dominant position, without them being necessarily required to positively 
establish market transparency480. This issue is discussed in detail in the following 
chapter. 
 
3.2.2.2 Retaliation mechanisms 
 
Even if oligopolists have an incentive to co-ordinate their behaviour, tacit co-
ordination may not occur, because of the presence or absence or other factors that 
affect market performance, like the existence of retaliation mechanisms481. Collusion is 
usually sustainable when there are effective mechanisms in place threatening worse 
results for the “cheater”, who decided to deviate from the collusive equilibrium. In 
                                            
477 In DE/2007/0627, the German NRA considered that there was a number of factors capable of 
supporting a finding of collective dominance in the market on mobile access and call origination, but, 
concluded against it as a result of lack of transparency. 
478 FI/2005/304, DK/2006/419, SI/2006/434, SE/2006/496,  PL/2006/0517, AT/2006/466, ES/2006/460, 
IE/2006/477 and GR/2006/558, EE/2007/629. 
479 Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 13.07.2006, Case T-464/04. 
480 In comparison with the Court’s finding in par. 252 of the judgment. It is reminded that the CJEU 
upheld the relevant finding of the GC and indicated that competition authorities should avoid 
mechanical approach to the Airtours criteria based on the separate verification of each criterion in 
isolation, while disregarding the general economic mechanism of potential tacit coordination (par. 123-
125).  
481 Hrawick, E., Clipping the Commission’s Wings: The GC’s Airtours Ruling, [2001/2002]4, ULR 95. 
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such case, it remains rational for the firms involved not to compete in an active way, 
even when there is no commitment from competitors to do the same482.  
 
In Airtours, the Commission denied the necessity of a retaliatory mechanism483; the 
General Court did not contest the argument as such, but argued that deterrents must 
exist that provide incentives not to cheat484. Such deterrents may be found in markets 
other than the market under scrutiny, since multi-market contacts may be exploited as 
a retaliatory mechanism in case there is deviation from the collusive outcome485. In 
Impala both the GC and the CJEU confirmed the indispensability of retaliatory 
mechanisms for the establishment of collective dominance486. The GC had held, with 
the approval of the CJEU, that proof of a firm’s threat of use or effective use of 
retaliatory mechanisms is not necessary and that the Airtours criterion can be 
established not only by means of direct evidence but also indirectly487.  
 
Not all market structures provide the necessary ground for the development of credible 
retaliatory mechanisms, despite high concentration and transparency. In fact, Bishop 
and Walker argue that, coordination on a long term variable, such as introduction of 
new capacity or new investment is less likely to be adopted and sustained since the 
retaliation mechanism is not as effective and credible as in the case where coordination 
is on a short term variable such as price or output488. In access markets in the electronic 
communications sector quantity commitments are essential features of each firm’ s 
business plan, because of high sunk costs incurred and the long term of the investment, 
                                            
482 The inability to establish the existence of credible retaliation mechanisms,  as a result of the 
participation of operators to different pan-European groups was determinative for the finding against 
concerns of joint dominance in the wholesale international roaming markets, IT/2006/393, 
AT/2006/466, ES/2006/460, IE/2006/477 and GR/2006/558 
483 Case M1524, Aitrours/FirstChoice, par. 55. 
484 Par. 192-193 of the judgement. 
485 Kokkoris, I., ibid. at footnote 60, 432. 
486 In the CJEU Impala judgement, at par. 126, the CJEU stated that the analysis of the sustainability of 
tacitly collusive conduct needs “...to take into account the monitoring mechanisms that may be available 
to participants in the alleged tacit coordination in order to ascertain whether, as a result of those 
mechanisms, they are in a position to be aware, sufficiently precisely and quickly, of the way in which 
the market conduct of each of the other participants in that coordination is evolving” (also at par. 242. 
487 Ibid., at par. 123-124. Mezzanote, F., Tacit Collusion as Economic Links in Article 82 EC. Revisited, 
[2009] ECLR, 136-141argues that although the court laid down guiding principles as to how this theory 
of indirect proof should function, this issue remains unclear and merits further discussion. 
488 Bishop, S., Walker, M., The economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and 
Measurement, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002, 286. Co-ordination on capacity is generally difficult to achieve, 
because decisions on capacity restrictions are said to be more complex and difficult to take, let alone in 
a co-ordinated fashion, Caffara, Ch., Kuhn, K., ibid. 358.  
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whereas output in the services markets is strongly dependent on their capacity. The 
existence of over-capacity is said to weaken the strength of future retaliations489.  
 
Currently, there is excess capacity as a result of spectrum dividend490, whereas after 
the 2009 revision package spectrum rights are tradable491, which facilitates the use of 
excess capacity by alternative technologies and NGA networks. Also, excess capacity 
exists as a result of dark fiber, notably of fiber left idle for many years, particularly 
after the bust of the dot.com boom in 2000, when network operators sank a lot of 
money into infrastructure equipment and fiber, much of it remaining unused for over a 
decade492: lighting up the dark fiber has been suggested as a solution for the continuing 
growth of internet broadband, prompting companies to invest in upgraded optical 
equipment493. This increases the possibility of a finding against the existence of 
credible retaliation mechanisms in wireless markets and broadband. 
 
Under notification MT/2006/0443 the Maltese NRA pleaded in favour of the existence 
of retaliation mechanisms in the market for mobile access and call origination on the 
grounds of the disposal of over-capacity by Vodafone and Go-Mobile, which was 
claimed to permit the development of MVNOs. The Commission challenged the 
credibility of such mechanism due to the time involved in the start of operation of 
MVNO, which may also end up in mutual profit loss for the operators, although it 
agreed on the existence of other retaliation mechanisms through price-cutting.  
 
The Spanish NRA established collective dominance in the market for mobile access 
(wholesale level) consisting in the denial of wholesale access to third parties and on 
the basis of alignment of commercial strategies at retail, because of the existence of 
retaliation mechanisms at retail level494. The Spanish NRA also identified retaliation 
mechanism at wholesale level consisting in MVNO access, which could be realised 
                                            
489 Easter, C., Hughes, M., ibid., 192. Over-capacity reduces the likelihood of co-ordination, because it 
is in the interests of all parties disposing of excess capacity to sell it even at a reduced price, thus 
making profit through increases in the volume of sales as opposed to price increases, Case IV/M.358 
Pilkington-Techint/SIV [1994] OJ L 158/24. 
490 Refer to section 1.1.2.2. Spectrum dividend is the unused spectrum granted to broadcasters, which is 
valuable to the providers of wireless services, who are expected to reinforce competition in the 
broadband market. 
491 Refer to section 2.2.2.4. 
492 http://mwrf.com/content/optical-telecommunications-gear-recovers-dot-com-bust. 
493http://www.pcpro.co.uk/news/interviews/376357/lighting-up-dark-fibre-could-improve-uk-broadband 
494 Case ES2005/0330. 
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because of the sufficiency of spectrum enabling all operators to adapt quickly the 
capacity of the network to the evolution of the traffic. The Commission expressed 
concerns on the immediate effect of such mechanism as a result of the time-consuming 
process of negotiating and signing access contracts and invited the NRA to provide 
additional supporting evidence on the credibility of such mechanism in future 
notifications. But the Commission accepted the existence of retaliatory mechanisms at 
retail level through ‘price wars’ consisting in the deviation from the principles of the 
common commercial strategy. 
 
The lack of transparency was also the reason pleaded by the NRAs who undertook 
assessments of the wholesale international roaming, which was considered difficult to 
be established as a result of the operators’ participation in different European alliances 
for the provision of roaming services to European travellers. Like in the case of 
transparency, it may be argued that a finding of a common policy on excessive 
roaming rates, given the existence of other factors characteristic of a collective 
dominant position, might have sufficed -under the specific circumstances of the 
roaming market and in the absence of an alternative explanation- to demonstrate the 
existence of a dominant position, without them being necessarily required to positively 
establish retaliation mechanisms. This issue is discussed in detail in the following 
chapter. 
 
3.2.3. Other factors 
3.2.3.1. Barriers to entry 
 
The significance of barriers to entry and/or expansion is high for the establishment of 
anti-competitive effects in oligopolistic markets. In fact, it is claimed that price-fixing 
cartels can be stable if they depend less on output restriction than on discouraging 
entry or expansion by existing firms, because the added output of new entrants may 
drive down price immediately495.  
 
                                            
495 Scherer, F.M., Ross, D., ibid., 245-246. 
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Entry barriers prevent firms from entering markets and competing and may take 
various forms, like legal restrictions, economic barriers linked to production or 
proprietary technology, branding, scale or scope economies. The level of entry barriers 
to the market is of concern to dominant undertakings, because ease of entry implies 
that their share of industry/market profits decline on the entry of new competitors496. 
The significance of potential market competition for the determination of dominance 
has lead commentators to express the view that for firms with large market shares, the 
presence and nature of barriers to entry is a much more useful guide to antitrust 
analysis than the market shares themselves497.  
 
In electronic communications, high barriers to entry are said to appear in wholesale 
markets for the provision of mobile and wireless services, which require spectrum 
allocation and associated licensing requirements or other network markets as a result 
of high investment requirements498. However, economic theory argues that the higher 
fixed costs are, relative to total costs, the less prone an industry is to collusive 
behaviour, because firms in high-cost industries seem to exercise extraordinary 
restraint in their pricing actions499. In addition, economists have challenged the level at 
which spectrum may limit market development particularly in the light of 
technological advances enabling better and more use of spectrum availability and have 
taken the view that licensing requirements are no more than artificial barriers to entry 
in the sense that the market would not sustain more than few players. They support this 
view by reference to the example of digital markets, which start with more players in 
the first stages of their development, but tend to lose market players gradually, mainly 
through merger processes500.  
 
                                            
496 Arowolo, O., ibid., 249-253. 
497 Ibid. 252. 
498 Under Articles 3, 6 and 7 of the Authorisation Directive, as amended by Directive 140/2009/EC, the 
provision of electronic communication services requiring the use of radio frequencies is subject to 
general authorisation, unless member states give reasons explaining the need to give individual rights of 
use and follow the procedures set out in the Authorisation and the Framework Directive for the 
allocation of such rights. 
499 Scherer, F. M., Ross, D., ibid., 289f. Nonetheless, the same authors refer to examples of industries 
that have been successful in minimising rivalrous pricing despite high fixed and low variable costs and 
depressed demand and this is attributed to the presence or absence of other conditions conducive to 
cooperative pricing. 
500 Gruber, H., ibid., 59-70. 
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Yet, the fees paid in the frame of licensing requirements for electronic communications 
may comprise inducement for collusive behaviour: the government typically 
determines the number of licenses, hence, sets exogenously the number of firms in the 
industry501. But the endogenously determined license fee might become incompatible 
with the exogenously set market structure if, for instance, firms are paying very high 
license fees. In oligopolistic markets, there would be two options: exit for some firms 
or collusion502. This is also in line with the scepticism that has grown about the true 
significance of entry barriers in all industry sectors, as some scholars have argued that 
the real obstacle is not the cost of entry, but the cost of exit (risk of non-recovery of 
investment cost)503.  
 
Particular emphasis should be placed on barriers to expansion. High investment costs 
create impediments to the market’s expansion, either in terms of the number of players 
or in terms of the market’s growth on the supply side. In the absence of such barriers, 
collusive firms will not be able to exert market power, because if they raise prices, 
output will be lost to the non-collusive firms, which will expand output to reap the 
higher profits resulting from the increased prices504. For example, the coverage of the 
various networks can also limit the ability of smaller players to compete, which is 
particularly relevant to new entrants, if they have not yet rolled out their networks505.  
 
Spectrum trading and liberalisation can lower barriers both to entry and expansion and 
permit new entry and was thus suggested as the remedy to potential anti-competitive 
practices to prevent market entry. Studies commissioned for European bodies showed 
that, if change of use is not possible, the risk of collusion is higher in spectrum 
markets, since it may be profitable to collude in order to exclude entrants or block 
expansion by rivals506. If change of use is possible, blocking entry by acquiring 
spectrum becomes impractical, because liberalisation of spectrum use creates new 
opportunities for entry by acquiring spectrum outside traditional patterns of use. In 
                                            
501 The government sets also the method of award, i.e. highest bid or beauty contest; for the implications 
of such choice on competition refer to section 2.2.2.4. 
502 Ibid., 66-67. 
503 Weatherill, S., Beaumont, P., ibid., 739. 
504 Kokkoris, I., ibid., 429. 
505 Easter, C., Hughes, M., Collusion and Co-operation in the Mobile Sector, [2001] CTLR, 192. 
506 Final report for the European Commission: Study on conditions and options in introducing secondary 
trading of radio spectrum in the European Community, May 2004, par. 69. 
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addition, there is greater opportunity for dislocating innovation, which can generate 
substantial benefits for customers in the long run507.  
 
Hence, through Decision 2009/766/EC of the Radiospectrum Committee, the EU has 
called for the variation of licenses of GSM operators to permit use of licensed 
frequencies both for GSM and UMTS508. This results in the lowering of barriers to 
entry and expansion on the mobile market, thus rendering collusion between operators 
less likely.  
 
It is reminded, though, that, in the process of market assessments for the purposes of 
SMP regulation, the existence of barriers to entry is examined in the context of market 
definition, since they comprise one of the three criteria set out by the Recommendation 
for the definition of markets susceptible of ex ante regulation. This means that, under 
the current framework, NRAs should take the existence of barriers for granted in the 
markets under examination and that these should not re-appear in the list of factors 
appraised for the finding of collective dominance. 
 
3.2.3.2. Pressure exercised by third parties 
 
The Second Report on market reviews made particular reference to fringe competitors, 
including potential competition, as a factor affecting the finding of joint SMP in the 
                                            
507 Ibid., par. 68. In the UK, there has been considerable debate on whether Ofcom should proceed with 
the re-farming of unused 900 MHz spectrum held by O2 and Vodafone to existing or new entrants for 
the deployment of 3G mobile services (Ofcom Consultation document, Application of Spectrum 
Liberalisation and Trading to the Mobile Sector, 20.09.2007). Finally, Ofcom implemented 
amendments to all concession contracts to vary the licenses to permit 3G services over 900 MHz and 
1800 MHz bands and make the relevant licenses tradable (Ofcom, Notice of proposed variation of 900 
MHz and 1800 MHz Wireless Telegraphy Act licenses, 28.10.2010 and Statement on variation of 900 
MHz and 1800 MHz Wireless Telegraphy Act licenses, 06.1.2011). More recently, Ofcom allowed 
Everything Everywhere, the company that resulted from the merger of T-Mobile and Orange in the UK, 
to offer 4G services through its unused 2G spectrum rights, before the spectrum auction for 4G licenses 
(Ofcom, Decision to vary Everything Everwhere’s 1800 MHz spectrum licenses to allow use of LTE and 
Wimax technologies, 21.08.2012). Ofcom was more concerned with the release of additional spectrum 
in the 800MHz and 2.6GHz bands which will enable other operators to launch competing LTE services 
during the course of 2013, despite the first-mover advantage granted to Everything Everywhere, which it 
considered “non-enduring”. 
508 On 5.11.2012, the European Commission has decided to make it mandatory for Member States to 
open UMTS spectrum to 4G technologies by 30 June 2014 at the latest, by adding another 120 MHz to 
the radio spectrum portfolio for 4G technologies around the 2 GHz band and laid down harmonised 
technical conditions to allow coexistence between different technologies. On this basis the EU will 
enjoy up to twice the amount of spectrum for high speed wireless broadband as in the United States, 
namely around 1000 MHz: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1170_en.htm.  
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wholesale market of mobile access and call origination. It is reminded from the 
analysis in section 3.2.1 that the presence of a third operator was determinative against 
the finding of SMP between the two major players. For example, reference has already 
been made to the Maltese re-notification on the market for wholesale broadband 
access, where MCA decided that there was no collective SMP mainly by the reason of 
the entry of a newcomer who, despite the low market share at the time, had quickly 
established a wireless broadband network covering the whole territory of Malta with 
new wireless technology, capable of exercising competitive pressure on the two fixed 
broadband operators, who were originally considered capable of establishing collective 
SMP509. Further to the competitive fringe, the potential appearance of new entrants in 
the market also affects the stability of market shares of existing players.  
 
There may be undertakings, which have already fully duplicated the incumbents’ 
infrastructure and nevertheless have not yet provided services to third parties (captive 
sales), have ability and incentive to serve third parties (merchant sales), provided that 
the formation of collective SMP in the merchant markets leads to monopolistic 
profits510. That was said to be the case in EE/2007/670, CZ/2006/448 and 
SI/2006/0362, where theories of collective SMP between existing operators collapsed 
as a result of other operators, who, although they had not yet actually provided services 
to third parties could, however, easily enter this market if market prices for the services 
were high enough.  
 
Also, the presence of strong buyer power may have a negative impact on the 
sustainability of tacit collusion. Customers negotiating contracts of a significant value 
or the limited number of buyers themselves (concentration of demand) may act as an 
incentive to competitive behavior, especially in markets with few players, where there 
is need to attract that particular customer511. On the other hand, a fragmented buyer 
                                            
509 MT/2008/0803, following the expression of serious doubts by the Commission on the finding of joint 
dominance in the market under MT/2007/0563. 
510 Hou, L., The assessment of collective SMP: Lessons learned from the first market review, December 
1st, 2008, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1309684, at p. 8. 
511 In Enso/Stora, Case IV/M.1225, [1999] OJ L254/9, the Commission regarded the countervailing 
buying power of customers in the liquid packaging board market arising out of a peculiar market 
structure with very few producers and very few buyers as the decisive factor to clear the merger. 
Airtours has also placed significant weight on this factor. 
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side makes cheating less likely as detection is easier and any deviator would become 
known to more market players512.  
 
Kokkoris and Day513 summarise the main factors that influence buyer power in i) the 
dependence of supplier on a buyer or buyer group, in case of large buyers or limited 
number of buyers, ii) the buyers’ incentive to exploit their power, in case they face no 
repercussions, which may be achieved through collusion with suppliers. It is suggested 
that if a market has a strong buyer, this buyer will be in a better relative position to 
collude with suppliers to exclude a rival buyer, which may be especially true when the 
buyers sell directly to end customers. Also, iii) in negotiations, which is especially true 
in individually negotiated discounts, bearing in mind, though, that one buyer’s power 
may influence the buyer power of other buyers in the market. Nonetheless, one buyer’s 
successful negotiations to obtain a discount may increase the price to other buyers, as 
suppliers may try to recoup lost margins from giving one buyer a discount by 
increasing prices to other buyers. In addition, the reduction in retail prices of the 
powerful buyer may have the effect of forcing weaker rivals to exit the market or 
reduce variety, which will end up in reducing competition or choice for consumers514. 
The stronger buyer will grow at the expense of the weaker rivals and can potentially 
gain a large share of the market515. 
 
In MCI WorldCom/Sprint516 the countervailing power of customers for global 
telecommunications services was an important argument put forward by the 
Commission to overcome its objections to the merger on the grounds of collective 
dominance. In 2012, the Maltese NRA established low countervailing power of 
customers both in the wholesale market for mobile access and call origination517 and in 
the broadband access market518, which was considered a factor contributing to the 
creation of prospective collective dominance between the two biggest operators, but 
the concerns were lifted in both cases on the evidence of increased retail competition 
and the existence of fringe or potential competitors. 
                                            
512 Kokkoris, I., ibid., 438. 
513 Kokkoris, I., Day, L., Buyer Power in UK Merger Control, [2009] ECLR, 176-188. 
514 Ibid., 182. 
515 Refer also to Dobson P., Inderst, R., Differential Buyer Power and the Waterbed Effect: Do Strong 
Buyers Benefit or Harm Consumers?, [2007] ECLR, 393f. 






3.2.3.3. Ambivalent criteria  
 
The former list of Annex II of the Framework Directive included also other factors 
indicating the lack of prospect for additional market entry notably the existence of a 
mature market and/or stagnant or moderate growth on the demand side. There is less 
incentive to enter a mature market, because of high sunk costs and the increased 
difficulty to attract customers from others as opposed to the possibility of getting 
customers which are new to the market directly519.  
 
A market’s growth expectancy may be low, even if entry barriers are low. This might 
be the case of e.g. saturated markets. In the telecommunication industry, the advances 
of technology may put the maturity of the markets in question. Indeed, the lack of 
technical innovation or the presence of mature technology is also considered a factor 
inductive to coordination. Technological innovations, especially when progressed at a 
considerable speed, affect the quality of the offered products, thus change the 
conditions of competition over time by rendering markets unpredictable. Conversely, 
the competitive advantage offered by technological innovations is absent from markets 
with mature technology, as well as the need to adopt an aggressive competitive 
strategy520. The maturity of technology often leads to market stability, i.e. to markets 
with stagnant demand growth, which make competition on prices unprofitable since 
the size of the market and each firm’s market share cannot significantly change521.  
 
However, NRAs do not seem to take a unanimous approach to the foregoing factors. 
For example, one of reasons for the Irish NRA to conclude the existence of collective 
SMP on the market for mobile access and call origination was that the demand on that 
market is steadily increasing522. By contrast, the Hungarian NRA found that the market 
players on the market for mobile access and call origination do not collectively hold a 
dominant position because of the increasing market demand523. 
 
                                            
519 Navarro and others, ibid., 180-181. 
520 Ibid., 228-229. 





Demand elasticity, which continues to appear in the list of factors of Annex II, has 
been considered also an ambivalent criterion in the context of collective SMP 
assessment, because both a high and a low elasticity of demand can enforce 
collusion524. The own price elasticity of demand shows the percentage change in the 
firm’s sales volume following a change in its own price of one per cent. Firms with no 
observable market power should have a high own price of elasticity at the competitive 
price level since this indicates that customers can easily switch to another product if 
the firm were to raise its price. Conversely, a firm with substantial market power 
should have a low elasticity at the competitive price level since customers will not 
easily switch to another product if the firm raises its price525.  
 
The greater the level of price inelasticity of demand, the bigger the incentive for 
oligopoly members to engage in parallel behaviour rather than to compete, because 
joint increases in prices will result in greater collective income and profits526. In 
FI/2005/304 and SI/2006/434, the NRAs considered the low elasticity of demand for 
wholesale roaming services an indication favouring the existence of collective SMP in 
the relevant market527.   
 
However, economists claim that the practical usefulness of such factor is very limited 
in establishing dominance, particularly in markets where cellophane fallacy problems 
may occur, like oligopolistic markets528, because measuring a dominant firm’s 
elasticity at such price level (of cellophane fallacy) will show that the firm has a 
relatively high own-price elasticity and so cannot profitably raise prices529. In any 
event, even economists who support the measurement of dominance on the basis of 
elasticity, suggest the combination of rivals’ price elasticity and quantity elasticity with 
own price elasticity as more appropriate530. 
                                            
524 The ERG paper, p. 10. 
525 Pearce de Azevedo, J., Walker, M., Market Dominance: Measurement Problems and Mistakes, 
[2003] ECLR 641. 
526 Easter, C., Hughes, M., ibid., 193. Case M190, Nestle/Perrier, [1992] OJ L 356/1. 
527 Also in IT/2006/0424 and in MT/2006/0443. 
528 Refer to chapter 2 for the definition of the cellophane fallacy problem. It is reminded that in 
oligopolistic markets, the problem is said to be more acute, because of the complexities that result from 
the interrelations of the oligopolists.  
529 Pearce de Azevedo, J., Walker, M., ibid.  
530 La Cour, L., Mollgaard, H.P., Meaningful and Measurable Market Domination, [2003] ECLR: 132-
135. Output restriction elasticity has been suggested as a useful complement to market share analysis, 
which would allow to take account the extent of product substitutability across the market. In 




Finally, vertical integration was first included in the list of factors inductive to 
collective dominance of Annex II of the Framework Directive under the revisions 
purported with Directive 2009/136/EC. Indeed, the degree of integration in the 
upstream and downstream market may affect the supplier’s willingness to engage in 
parallel behavior, because it may confer a competitive advantage over its 
competitors531. Commission precedents have considered vertical integration in terms of 
the homogeneity created between the members of an oligopoly, which may encourage 
parallel behavior. In Airtours/First Choice532 the pre-merger asymmetries in the degree 
of vertical integration between oligopoly members were considered a disadvantage 
against collusion, which would cease to exist after the merger. Also, all operators who 
were found to be collectively dominant in the NRA notifications to the Commission 
enjoyed symmetrical degrees of vertical integration.  But, in terms of flexibility in 
restructuring costs, as in the case of economies of scale and economies of scope,  
‘the degree of vertical integration in either upstream or downstream markets 
should not confer a clear cost advantage or disadvantage.  It must be assumed 
that the option of each undertaking as regards its own degree of vertical 
integration is rational and optimal’533. 
 
Hence, vertical integration is taken into account in assessing the symmetry of market 
positions between market players; it does not appear to place much weight in itself as a 




Oligopolies comprise grey areas in terms of competitive conditions, hence their 
assessment entails some degree of arbitrariness and generalization. The decisive factor 
is the interaction of the criteria and their combined impact on the delineated market, in 
order not to confuse the normal functioning of an oligopolistic market with 
                                                                                                                              
good substitutes, because they fill the gap following the output restriction by the firm(s) under 
investigation, Dobbs, B., Richards, D., Output restriction as a measure of market power, [2005] ECLR 
572-580. 
531 Kokkoris, I., ibid at footnote 60., 432. 
532 Par. 128f of the decision. 
533 Navarro and others, ibid., 231. 
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oligopolistic dominance. As a result, the same facts may lead to conflicting credible 
conclusions, i.e. they may support credibly either the existence or the absence of 
collective dominance on the same market534.  
 
It is repeated that this work has not undertaken any complete competition law market 
analysis on any Member-State to support the existence of collective dominance which 
escapes regulation. 
 
However, the review of Article 7 notifications by NRAs shows that once an 
oligopolistic market is identified, the burden of proving that it breaches Article 102 is 
very onerous. Even in cases where a prima facie case of collective SMP can be 
established, like in the case of wholesale international roaming markets, the subsequent 
analysis of collective SMP resembles to a search for market characteristics that can 
negate this preliminary conclusion by proving the absence of one condition. This is 
comparable with the observation made in the first chapter that there are no Article 102 
case precedents, where collective dominance was found to exist. The roaming cases 
that are discussed in the following chapter make this point. 
 
The impression gained from the review of NRA notifications is that joint dominance is 
considered a very rare occasion that may arise in symmetrical duopolies, a position 
that may be possibly in compliance with the approach to light-handed regulation and 
avoidance of decisional abuse. However, this impression creates concerns on whether 
SMP regulation may address more complex situations of collective dominance. The 
roaming cases that are discussed in the following chapter also raise this point. 
 
The analysis of the third chapter supports the conclusion that the factors that should be 
taken into account by NRAs in prospective determinations of collective dominance in 
electronic communications markets are limited to the following:  
i) market concentration and particularly the number of players in the market 
as opposed to market shares, although the existence of symmetries between 
market players in terms of shares and of cost structures must be taken into 
account;  
                                            
534 Etter, B., ibid., 125. 
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ii) transparency, which may be presumed in the absence of credible 
explanation for the justification of alignment of prices in the frame of the 
Impala  judgement; 
iii) the existence of retaliation mechanisms, which may be also determined 
indirectly after the Impala judgement; 
iv) the exercise of competitive constraints by the competitive fringe and 
potential competitors; 
v) the countervailing power of buyers. 
 
The NRAs should collect market data suggestive of tacit collusion and, on this basis 
build a theory of harm. They should then verify the foregoing factors and establish if 
they comply with the theory of harm. It is, therefore, suggested that the Guidelines, 
which were issued before the Impala judgements, are revised to provide for the clear 




Chapter 4: The history of Roaming as 
a potential failure of SMP regulation 
on oligopolistic markets  
 
Having discussed the problem of narrow market definitions and the issues associated 
with the difficulties in establishing collective dominance under the existing framework 
for SMP regulation, the present chapter discusses the history behind the regulation of 
international roaming markets in Europe, as a demonstration of the failure of SMP 
regulation to address collective dominance issues. International wholesale roaming is 
taken as a case study of the failure of SMP regulation to fit complex oligopolistic 
practices involving more than two players into ex ante regulation of market power in 
electronic communications.  
 
The chapter commences with the description of the development of European alliances 
which lead to the establishment of market power in the European wholesale roaming 
market. Then, it turns to the review of the twelve market notifications submitted by 
NRAs on wholesale international roaming under the procedure of Article 7 of the 
Framework Directive. The notifications are tested against the findings of the previous 
chapter relative to the difficulties in establishing collective dominance under the SMP 
framework for electronic communications and particularly to the associated high 
evidentiary burden. It is submitted that the case of wholesale international roaming is a 
case more complex than the simpler national collective duopolies that may be capable 
of being caught under the existing framework; hence, collective market power in 
wholesale international roaming was dealt with under the Roaming Regulations. 
 
4.1. The development of international roaming through 




In the pan-European market for the supply of advanced seamless mobile services to 
businessmen and frequent travelers, including discounted roaming services, the 
Commission has found oligopoly characteristics, as shown by the evidence collected 
from merger cases since 1999 and discussed in detail in the present section. According 
to the Commission findings in the majority of merger cases involving the relevant 
market, the relevant market of advanced seamless mobile services, including roaming 
services, presented entry barriers, because of the non-replicable multi-country-
coverage nature of relevant networks535. The Commission cleared the mergers 
involving the said market, through the imposition of a number of remedies, which 
supported a finding of insufficiency of competition law to address the estimated 
market failures536.  
  
At the first stages of development of mobile markets, the Commission considered the 
establishment of pan-European mobile markets premature and examined solely the 
horizontal dimension of the concentration in the respective national market and 
disregarded the intention to create pan-European communication networks. This is 
strange, because the short intervals between the notifications of acquisitions of 
European operators create the impression that the acquiring party had a general plan to 
strengthen its position as a pan-European operator, which was in all likelihood, the 
predominant factor in the decision to merge. As a result, within the relatively short 
period of less than one year, it allowed oligopolies to develop at European level, since 
the same major players were active in a number of European markets and started to 
impose remedies when SMP had already been established. 
 
In Deutsche Telekom/ One2One, Deutsche Telekom, owner of the then second biggest 
mobile operator in Germany, acquired 100% interest in One2One, one of the four 
British mobile operators by purchase of shares from its former owners. As DT had no 
interests in other mobile operators in the UK, the concentration was cleared537. The 
Commission rejected arguments brought by third parties as to the reinforcement of 
DT’ s position in the German mobile market through the offer of pan-European 
                                            
535 E.g. Case No. COMP/M.1795 VodafoneAirtouch/ Mannesmann, 12.4.2000. 
536 Case No. Comp/M.1760 Mannesmann/Orange, Notification of 17.11.1999, Case No. 
COMP/M.2305, Vodafone Group Plc/Eircell, 2.3.2001, etc. 
537 Case  IV/M.1669 Deutsche Telekom/ One2One, Notification of 24.8.1999. 
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services (at least on the route between Germany and the UK), on the grounds that 
One2One was not active in the German mobile market, and 
‘[e]ven if DT were to start offering services between Germany and the United 
Kingdom, DT would encounter competition from other mobile operators (such 
as Mannesmann Mobilfunk, which is jointly controlled by Mannesmann AG 
and Vodafone/Airtouch) which would be able to offer such services in 
competition with DT because Vodafone is also operating a mobile service in 
the United Kingdom. Mannesmann Mobilfunk is the market leader with a share 
of some 43.5% in the German market. T-Mobil is the second largest operator 
with a share of 42.6 % of the total subscribers. This is confirmed also by 
figures provided by the Party, which show that there is currently insignificant 
traffic between T-Mobil and One2One. Therefore, the notified operation does 
not lead to a creation or strengthening of a dominant position’538. 
 
A couple of months earlier, the Commission had recognised for the first time in 
Vodafone/Airtouch the increasingly European character of mobile markets as a result 
of roaming facilities. It, nonetheless, established that, because of the then technical 
impediments, such as difficulties of accessing voice-mail and huge cost divergences, 
the market under investigation should be considered national539. The agreement 
involved acquisition of sole control by Vodafone over Airtouch, an American operator 
with participation interests in several European countries. In two of them (Germany 
and Sweden) the parties had overlapping interests. As the concentration would have 
raised serious doubts in the German market, where the merged entity would control 
two out of the three major mobile operators, rendering the market duopolistic, the 
agreement was cleared upon Vodafone’ s undertaking to divest its interest in one of the 
aforementioned German operators (E-plus). 
 
A similar scenario was identified later on the same year in Mannesmann/Orange when 
the German operator Mannesmann offered to acquire sole control over Orange UK540. 
Both operators were also present in the French and Austrian mobile markets, hence, 
the concentration was cleared upon Mannesmann’s undertaking to divest Orange’s 
                                            
538 Par. 14 of the decision. 
539 Case  IV/1430, Vodafone/Airtouch, Notification of 6.5.1999, paras. 13-17. 
540 Case  Comp/M.1760 Mannesmann/Orange, Notification of 17.11.1999. 
140 
 
stake in Connect Austria. In this case, the Commission accepted the horizontal overlap 
in the German and French mobile markets created by the indirect participation of 
Orange through Hutchinson Telecommunications on the premise of the latter’s low 
market share (<10%) being incapable of affecting Mannesmann’s position in the 
market, also vis-à-vis the strong position enjoyed by FT in the French market and 
competition by smaller operators.    
 
Less than a month later, on 14.1.2000, VodafoneAirtouch and Mannesmann, the former 
being present in 10 European markets and the latter in 7 European markets, including 
partnerships between them with varying percentages in mobile operators in France, 
Germany and Italy, announced the former’s take-over over the latter. The merger was 
cleared on condition of de-merger of Orange, which would prevent the new entity from 
enjoying horizontal cross-interests in more than one mobile operator in the UK and 
Belgian markets. In its clearance, the Commission established an emerging market for 
advanced pan-European mobile telecom services to internationally mobile customers, 
as a separate market from national mobile services541.  
 
In this context, the Commission considered that it would be highly unlikely for third 
parties to replicate, by agreement, the merged entity’ s network in the near future, 
comprising of 12 countries, in total. This, in turn, created the entity’s ability and 
incentive to eliminate actual and/or potential competition, as existing and new 
customers would be attracted by the ability to provide such unique services, and 
consequently, reinforcement of its market position vis-à-vis other competitors. As a 
further result, the reinforced position increased the likelihood of dependence on 
Vodafone’s network by other operators542. The merger was cleared on condition of the 
entity’s commitment to supply non-discriminatory access to competitors to wholesale 
services necessary for the launch of seamless pan-European services (wholesale 
interconnection services and discounted inter-operator roaming tariffs) for three years, 
which was the estimated necessary period to build competing infrastructure, 
particularly UMTS543. However, UMTS infrastructure did not materialise within the 3-
                                            
541 Case  COMP/M.1795 VodafoneAirtouch/ Mannesmann, 12.4.2000, par. 12f. The geographic scope of 
the market was left open (par. 26).  
542 Ibid., par. 36f. 
543 Ibid., par. 58-60. 
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year period set by the Commission, whereas upon expiry of the term, access 
obligations were not revisited.  
 
One year later, the Commission cleared also the acquisition of Vodafone’s sole control 
over Eircell, the latter being the vehicle to enter into the Irish mobile market. Despite 
the lack of progress in the establishment of UMTS infrastructure, which had already 
shown indications of delay, foreclosure concerns in roaming markets in the UK and 
Ireland were dismissed in the context of undertakings in the Vodafone/Mannesmann 
decision544, without renewal of the term of the obligation.  
 
In the course of the same year, FT offered to buy the divested Orange undertaking in 
exchange of a purchase of 10% of FT’ s shares by VodafoneAirtouch. As far as the 
market for seamless pan-European mobile telecommunication services to 
internationally mobile customers was concerned, the Commission did not express 
serious doubt because it considered the possibility of FT becoming an effective player 
on this market within a short-term period unlikely545.  
 
On 18.5.2001, Vodafone announced the taking of full control over Airtel, a Spanish 
mobile operator, formerly owned jointly by Vodafone and BT. The Commission 
deemed that any concern for market foreclosure in pan-European mobile services and 
international wholesale roaming services was covered by Vodafone’ s undertakings in 
the Mannesmann case546. 
 
Part of the response of other European mobile operators to Vodafone’s consecutive 
merger cases leading to the creation of an international group and an almost pan-
European network was to form alliances; aiming primarily at the internalisation of 
traffic. Vodafone used the vertical integration which resulted from its international 
footprint to start to buy wholesale international roaming increasingly from own group 
affiliates than from third party network operators. The FreeMove alliance was formed 
by four of the largest incumbents in the EEA (Telefónica, France Télécom, Telecom 
Italia and Deutsche Telekom) as a reaction to this new development, thereby 
                                            
544 Case  COMP/M.2305, Vodafone Group Plc/Eircell, 2.3.2001. 
545 Case  COMP/M.2016, France Telecom/Orange, 11.8.2000. 
546 Case  COMP/M. 2469, Vodafone/Airtel, 26.6.2001. 
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simulating the effects of vertical integration by agreements and being better able to 
respond to demand from multinational customers. A second alliance was formed by a 
number of smaller operators, the Starmap alliance, with the predominant motivation to 
make joint offers to multinational customers547. 
 
At the end of 2005, Telefonica announced its public bid to takeover the UK O2 mobile 
operator. The review of the notification to the European Commission revealed 
significant concerns on the future of Starmap alliance, in which O2 was a member, but 
also for other independent operators. Given the significance of UK and Germany for 
international roaming, losing O2 as an available transaction partner for reciprocally 
exchanging international roaming (which would switch to the FreeMove alliance or at 
least to the roaming policies of its mother company) would affect the Starmap mobile 
network operators and independent operators, who would be forced to buy 
international roaming to a larger extent unilaterally, thereby increasing their costs. The 
only mobile service provider able to compete on an equal foot with FreeMove 
members would be Vodafone, whereas independent network providers and Starmap 
members would have their roaming costs increased, which would, in turn, result in 
increased retail roaming charges to their customers548. The Commission cleared the 
merger on Telefonica’s commitment to withdraw from FreeMove alliance549. ‘Softer’ 
commitments, such as the establishment of an independent roaming committee for O2 
and the creation of firewalls in Telefonica were rejected as inadequate, as the 
Commission also identified the risk of reducing the number of European alliances in 
the future, because of potential collusion between alliances resulting from the 
participation of Telefonica and O2 in different roaming groups550.   
 
It is clear from the foregoing that, with respect to mobile markets, the Commission has 
mainly focused on the horizontal assessment of merger cases in the light of 
strengthening the position of smaller players against market leaders in national 
markets. As a result, no emphasis appears to have been placed on the effects of the 
                                            
547 Case  COMP/M.4035, Telefonica/O2, par. 40. 
548 Par. 61f of the decision. 




transaction in related markets such as pan-European networks until SMP was already 
established on such market551.  
 
This development is attributed to the original approach of the Commission against any 
form of intervention in the emerging market of seamless pan-European services (which 
is the approach of the Commission to all emerging markets552) and disregard of 
minority shareholdings that ultimately developed into exclusive control of national 
operators.  
 
When the Commission expressed for the first time concerns on the potential leverage 
of Vodafone/Mannesmann’s position as mobile operator on the market for seamless 
pan-European services to international customers, the merging entities had already 
established separate considerable presence as providers of pan-European services 
through subsidiaries or alliances in several European countries. The table on p. 3 of the 
VodafoneAirtouch/Mannesmann decision also shows that the merging entities were 
already present in a number of European countries through the gradual acquisition of 
minority shareholdings, which had not been examined in the context of the merger 
regulation. 
 
Minority share acquisitions are not caught prima facie in the ambit of merger control, 
since the ECMR is intended to catch transactions which lead to one or more 
undertakings acquiring decisive influence over another553. The ECMR covers only 
situations in which an agreement on a minority share acquisition below the control 
threshold is part of a long-term plan to acquire control554. Apart from such scenario, 
transactions on minority interests may infringe Article 101(1)555. 
                                            
551 The same pattern was followed also in more recent decisions, taken also after the putting into force of 
the first Roaming Regulation. In FT/MidEuropa/ONE, 21.09.2007, the Commission cleared the 
acquisition of One by FT and MED, as the means for both partners entering the Austrian mobile market. 
The impact of the concentration on wholesale international roaming was examined and it was 
considered not impairing competition, because of the countervailing power or the two bigger mobile 
operators in Austria and the possibility of operators outside Austria of re-directing traffic if roaming 
tariffs are worsened. 
552 For example refer to the statements made by Commissioner Liikanen in Press Release IP/04/528 of 
23 April 2004. 
553 Article 3 par. 2 of the ECMR. 
554 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings, [2008] OJ C 95/01, par. 38f. For the significance of 




However, the existence of other forms of possible influence conferring some form of 
financial dependence may support the reassessment of the position against review of 
minority share acquisitions from a merger control perspective, particularly in 
oligopolistic markets. In Philip Morris556, which was heard before the entry into force 
of the first Merger Regulation, the CJEU stated that an abuse of dominant position can 
also arise in situations where the minority shareholding results at least in some 
influence on the commercial policy of the undertaking in question, which could take 
e.g. the form of a loan, as the Commission later stated in Gilette557.  
 
With respect to oligopolies, economic studies have supported the view that minority 
share acquisitions, not granting to the acquiring party a decisive influence in the sense 
of Article 3 par. 1(b) of the ECMR, can have an impact on competition in Cournot 
oligopoly markets with high entry barriers and that ownership interests are also 
capable of facilitating tacit or explicit collusion558. This submission is reinforced by 
the trend of European corporate law to produce initiatives for the participation of 
minority shareholdings in the management of the company559. Petit and Henry also 
argue that minority shareholdings may significantly contribute to the emergence of 
collective dominant positions on the market560. 
 
In BT/MCI, the Commission held that an agreement granting to BT a 20% interest in 
MCI was not caught by merger control, because, despite provisions in the agreement 
allowing BT to block any third party from acquiring control over MCI, it did not 
confer positive control of BT over MCI561. However, too much focus on shareholding 
percentages alone would be a wrong policy, particularly if these are combined with 
                                                                                                                              
Shhareholdings and Restriction of Markets’ Competitiveness in the European Union, [2006] World 
Competition, 607-633. 
555 In Philip Morris, joined cases 142 and 156/84, BAT v. Commission, [1987] ECR 4487, the CJEU 
held that, in some cases, acquisitions of minority shareholdings can infringe Article 81(1). 
556 Ibid.. 
557 Commission decision of 10.11.1992, Warner-Lambert/Gilette, [1993] IV/33.440. 
558 Struijlaart, R., ibid., 177-179.  
559 Refer e.g. to Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
takeover bids, [2004] OJ L142/12 
560 Petit, N., Henry, D., Why the EU Merger Regulation should not Enjoy a Monopoly over Tacit 
Collusion – A Close Look at Five Common Misconceptions, 31.1.2010, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1545506.  
561 Case IV/M.353, 13.9.1993. 
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other forms of influence conferring some form of financial dependence, for example, 
interconnection or roaming agreements in the same or other markets. 
 
Hence, the acquisition of minority shareholdings in several European mobile operators 
should not have been examined in isolation but in connection with eventual 
interconnection or roaming agreements that are capable of conferring some form of 
control in the meaning of Philip Morris and Gilette. The acquisition by operators of 
minority shareholdings in undertakings that operate horizontally or vertically in their 
chain of activities may increase transparency and form the vehicle for collusion 
between the undertakings in roaming markets. The potential influence of minority 
shareholdings was not examined in the cases assessed until the Vodafone/Mannessman 
case. 
 
At that stage, the parties committed themselves to ensure non-discriminated access by 
third parties on the merging entity’s network, which appeared in practice the less 
burdensome remedy: given the background of development of the market, it is unlikely 
that the Commission would impose any kind of impediment on the newly developed 
market. In addition, the Commission’s expectations on the development of UMTS did 
not materialise562.  
 
At the time there were already concerns voiced about excessive charges on 
international roaming rates, as discussed in the following sub-section. Such concerns 
were not examined in the context of the merger decisions between European operators. 
The following section will demonstrate that the existence of different alliances across 
Europe for the provision of roaming services was crucial for the inability of NRAs to 
establish SMP on the respective wholesale national markets. 
 
4.2. Regulation of international roaming in Europe 
4.2.1. The original complaints about excessive prices in roaming markets  
 
                                            
562 Rowe, H., Local Loop Unbundling – UK: The UK Trade and Industry Committee Report on Local 
Loop Unbundling, [2001] Comp. & Sec. Law Rep., 252-253. Only 16 out of the 42 licenses offered in 
auction in November 2000 were sold.  
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Since the end of the nineties, the European Commission received a number of 
complaints that roaming charges were too high and/or complaints about refusal to 
provide roaming services563. The pan-European study conducted by the International 
Telecommunications Users Association (INTUG) on European roaming retail tariffs 
had indicated differences in price between roamed and non-roamed international 
mobile calls to the same destination within the EU up to 500%, which suggested lack 
of effective competition at wholesale level564. The suggestion was enhanced by the 
poor response to the attempt of the European VPN Users Association (EVUA) to 
solicit interest from suppliers in providing borderless services to a range of very large 
corporate customers, which indicated reluctance by the major operators to break away 
from the established collusive inter-operator practices with respect to international 
roaming565.  
 
Further, GSM operators had been structuring prices in a way, which made it extremely 
difficult for customers to ascertain the best suitable price of roaming calls, since from 
one country to another prices depended on the time of the call, the unit charged etc. 
According to the data published by INTUG in the aforementioned report and quoted by 
Sutherland566, information provided may be inaccurate, incomplete or only 
approximations, whereas costs and mark-ups varied between operators. Although there 
was some plausible technical explanation for differences in costs (such as marketing 
strategies of operators, costs of access to international circuits, volume of traffic, 
differences in labour or capital costs, international exchange rates, licence fees), the 
level of difference in rates raised concern as to the true existence of plausible 
explanation. The ERG identified possible abuses of SMP at retail level resulting from 
high margins imposed by operators for international roaming567. 
 
In the International Roaming Inquiry launched by the Commission in 1999568, the 
Commission found evidence of knowledge of IOT tariffs between European operators. 
Prices had been aligned and there had been synchronised price increases. In particular, 
                                            
563 European Commission, Working Document on the Initial Findings of the Sector Inquiry into Mobile 
Roaming Charges, Brussels, 2000, at p.6. 
564 Sutherland, E., International Roaming Charges: over-charging and competition law, [2001] 25 
Telecommunications Policy, 9. 
565 Ibid., 10. 
566 Ibid., 14-18. 




it was discovered that in the course of the Inquiry (1997-2000), most of the operators 
that had the lowest wholesale tariffs have raised their tariffs gradually, while most of 
the operators that had the highest wholesale tariffs have lowered their tariffs, but all 
tariffs converged to a higher overall level that did not appear to bear relation to cost569. 
This was considered indication of collective reaction towards raising the benchmark 
price which might have been imposed under future regulation, notably, that the 
operators had tried to create a level of IOTs at which the benchmark would have been 
considered satisfactory; hence, instance of collusion570.  
 
Also, the results of the Inquiry into roaming established lack of price elasticity, 
similarity of cost structures, symmetrical market positions, transparency of roaming 
agreements and homogeneity of roaming services as factors contributing to a market 
conducive to parallel behaviour by oligopolists571. It was also found that the GSM 
operators had chosen to interpret the non-discrimination obligation so absolutely that 
they offered only the most trivial discounts on Inter-operator Tariffs (IOTs), which 
established instance of collusion, because in a properly functioning market, a large or 
an expanding buyer should be able to negotiate a better price572.  
 
The European Parliament adopted the Report on the 1999 Communications Review, 
which identified high charges for international roaming as evidence of market 
imperfections and urged the Commission to consider possible ways of lowering such 
prices to acceptable and transparent levels. However, at the same time, it opted against 
regulatory intervention in the mobile communications market, which was said to have 
grown freely573. 
 
4.2.2. Roaming under the 2002 regulatory framework for electronic communications  
 
                                            
569 European Commission, Working Document on the Initial Findings of the Sector Inquiry into Mobile 
Roaming Charges, Brussels, 2000, at p.3. 
570 Sutherland, E., International Roaming and Competition Law, [2001] CTLR, 147. 
571 European Commission, Working Document on the Initial Findings of the Sector Inquiry into Mobile 
Roaming Charges, Brussels, 2000, at p.23-25. 
572 Sutherland, E., International Roaming and Competition Law, [2001] CTLR, 146. 
573 Ibid., 11. Report on the Commission communication to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled: ‘Towards a new 
framework for Electronic Communications infrastructure and associated services – The 1999 
Communications review’, COM(1999) 539, A5-0145/2000. 
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Wholesale international roaming was included in the list of markets susceptible of ex 
ante regulation under the 2002 framework574. However, NRAs did not show eagerness 
to conduct the relevant research on their respective national markets, despite the 
launching of Commission investigation in 2004 and 2005 for the high Inter-Operator-
Tariffs (IOTs) charged by the mobile operators Vodafone and T-Mobile in Germany 
and by Vodafone and O2 in the UK, which, according to the Commission, resulted in 
high roaming charges for consumers, as the IOTs are passed on to the end-users575. By 
the end of 2005, only the Finnish NRA had conducted an analysis of the roaming 
market576. 
 
In FI/2005/304, FICORA established the existence of factors inductive to co-ordinated 
behaviour between the two players active in the national roaming market, like high 
market concentration, low elasticity of demand, homogeneity of the product, and high 
entry barriers. Nonetheless, it found no evidence that the undertakings have 
coordinated their behavior, on the grounds that they have competed for roaming traffic 
by concluding preferential agreements and offering discounts to foreign MNOs. Ficora 
also observed that market growth has not been evenly distributed and that market 
shares have varied significantly among operators. Discount agreements have in 
Ficora’s view made the market less transparent which would make it difficult to 
monitor rivals’ behaviour and observe any deviation from a coordinated outcome. 
 
The Commission did not share Ficora’s optimism on future reduction of roaming rates 
and the lack of SMP in the market, so, it asked it to monitor the development of 
Finnish operators’ effective IOTs net of all discounts and analyse very closely these 
findings:  
“Should effective IOTs net of discounts continue to rise or remain at their 
present level despite the ongoing implementation of traffic direction 
techniques, then Ficora is invited to review the effectiveness of competition 
without any undue delay in close co-operation with the National Competition 
Authority (“NCA”)”. 
 
                                            
574 Market 17 of the 2003 Recommendation. 
575 IP/05/161, February 10, 2005 and IP/04/994, July 26, 2004. 
576 Case FI/2005/0304. 
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Less than two months later, in February 2006, the European Commission announced 
its intention to impose an EC Regulation governing IR charges577. Then, the NRAs of 
another 11 member-states commenced gradually their market research on the 
international roaming market578. None of them concluded on a finding of joint (or 
individual) SMP on the relevant markets. However, like in FI/2005/304, the reading of 
the decisions does not convince that the Commission shared the views of the NRAs on 
the lack of (joint) dominance; rather, it accepted the inability to establish joint SMP 
due to the complexities involved in this task or to the unwillingness to reach such 




In IT/2006/393, AGCOM concluded based on the analysis of the criteria for finding of 
collective dominance in the form of tacit coordination, that these criteria are not 
cumulatively met, particularly due to the lack of a credible retaliation mechanism, 
although it recognized the high level of international roaming prices for end-users, 
which may limit the use of mobile communication services outside national boundaries 
and which may constitute an obstacle to the development of the single European 
electronic communications market. The Commission recognized the difficulties 
inhered, which it attributed mainly to the cross-border nature of wholesale 
international roaming charges:  
“The Commission notes in this respect that it has not so far been possible, for a 
national regulator alone, also because of the cross-border nature of 
international roaming services, to act effectively to address the high level of 
wholesale international roaming charges. The Commission is therefore 
considering the adoption of EU measures to address the high international 
roaming prices” [emphasis added]. 
 
In AT/2006/0466, TKK pointed to the fact that the firms active on the Austrian market 
for wholesale roaming services were highly asymmetric (in particular with regard to 
economies of scale and financial performance), thus making co-ordinated forms of 
                                            
577 Commissioner Reading, Towards a true internal market for electronic communications, European 
Regulators Group Paris, 8 February 2006,  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-06-69_en.htm  
578 These member states were Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Poland, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. 
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behaviour difficult and ultimately unlikely to sustain. Similarly, TKK argued that on 
markets characterized by high levels of demand fluctuation (as in Austria, where most 
roaming traffic occurs during only a few months of the year, the holiday season) 
collusive or concerted forms of market behaviour among firms were unlikely to be 
sustainable and considered insufficient level of market transparency:  
“Thus, overall, TKK has not been able to prove the existence of collective 
dominance in the market”. 
 
The Commission noted that TKK has not found SMP in the market and therefore has 
not been in the position to regulate it, despite concerns related to high prices and, 
“To deal with such difficulties, the Commission adopted on 12 July 2006 a 
proposal for a regulation of roaming on public mobile networks within the 
European Union”. 
 
Exactly the same comment was raised by the Commission in CZ/2006/452579, in 
DK/2006/419 and in SI/2006/434580. In the last two cases, as well as in AT/2006/466, 
ES/2006/460, IE/2006/477 and GR/2006/558, the NRAs placed much emphasis on the 
fact that, in each of the different countries, the large operators belonged to different 
pan-European alliances and therefore received traffic directed from their alliance 
partners, which made it difficult to reconcile with co-ordination also at the national 
level; the difficulties lay in the lack of transparency due to the frequent rebates given to 
alliance partners and to the absence of a credible retaliation mechanism, as a result of 
the participation of operators to different pan-European groups. The Danish and Greek 
NRAs581 did not exclude the possibility of collective dominance in the short term, but 
considered that such dominance would not be tenable in the long run. The Irish NRA 
recognized that the international roaming market exhibited characteristics that would 
                                            
579 Although the decision gives no details of the reasons pleaded by the Czech NRA on its inability to 
prove the existence of joint SMP. 
580 APEK listed a number of circumstances that would indicate that Mobitel and Si.mobil could possibly 
exercise market power collectively, i.e. the highly concentrated market, the fact that market shares have 
remained stable over time, the high barriers to entry, the maturity of the market, the non-elasticity of 
demand and the homogeneity of the products concerned (calls and SMS). However, APEK mentions 
five circumstances which, in APEK’s view, prevent the existence of a collective dominant position: 
1) the lack of price alignment between the two operators, 2) the high degree of countervailing buyer 
power from large operators belonging to alliances, 3) the fact that operators belonging to the same 
alliance may offer each other discounts on IOTs, which decreases market transparency and prevents 
retaliation, 4) the absence of informal links between Mobitel and Simobil, and 5) the existence of traffic 
direction technology. 
581 DK/2006/419 and GR/2006/558 respectively. 
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be conducive to coordinated behaviour between O2 and Vodafone, but considered 
sustainability of such form of coordination unlikely, since membership of an 
international alliance is difficult to reconcile with coordination at the national level. In 
the same line, in SE/2006/496, the lack of market transparency and of credible 
retaliation mechanisms resulting from the participation of operators to different 
international alliances were crucial in the finding against collective SMP582, albeit the 
Swedish NRA established a number of factors inductive to collective dominance like 
high market concentration, the saturated market, lack of market dynamics and the 
absence of dramatic shifts in wholesale prices583, as well as the existence of market and 
cost symmetries between the three large operators. 
 
The lack of transparency and of retaliation mechanisms was determinative in the 
finding against SMP also in the Estonian international roaming market584. SIDEAMET 
found that inbound originating prices are not public so that Estonian MNOs cannot 
observe the price strategy of the others and that the overall capacity growth on the 
market and the increase in the use of traffic direction technology resulting from 
agreements made in the context of international alliances prevent any kind of 
coordination. 
 
It is also noteworthy that the UK and Germany, involved in the investigations launched 
by the Commission in 2004 and 2005 did not have the research conducted in their 
relevant markets, albeit the Commission recognised in Telefonica/O2585 the increased 
significance of these two markets for European international roaming. The French 
NRA did not conduct the relevant market research either.  
 
In short, the NRAs that conducted their market research on the international roaming 
market, on the one hand, acknowledged the existence of excessive international 
roaming charges compared with national calls, as well as the existence of factors 
                                            
582 In PL/2006/517, UKE stated that the use of confidential rebates agreed individually between roaming 
partners decreased market transparency and made it increasingly difficult for MNOs to monitor 
competitors’ activities. UKE concluded that the market was insufficiently transparent to enable MNOs 
to reliably detect if a competitor deviated from a possible co-ordinated behaviour. Nonetheless, in this 
case, the market, although concentrated, was found also to be immature, with unstable market shares 
and significant differences in the pricing of the relevant services. 
583 Although PTS emphasized the fact that prices are generally lower in Sweden than in most other 
Member States. 
584 EE/2007/629. 
585 Case  COMP/M.4035, Telefonica/O2, 10.1.2006. 
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inducing the market to a co-ordinated outcome. On the other hand, they placed 
emphasis on the existence of the pan-European alliances for the provision of roaming 
services, which they considered inhibiting transparency and retaliation mechanisms 
among national operators, hence tacit co-ordination between them. It is noted, though, 
that, despite the increasing use of manual roaming possibilities, which enabled 
travellers to chose non-preferred networks, the prospect of retaliatory mechanisms at 
retail level through ‘price wars’ consisting in the deviation from the principles of the 
common commercial strategy, was not examined (albeit accepted by the Commission 
in Case ES2005/0330 on mobile access and call origination). 
 
4.2.3. The introduction of Roaming Regulations 
 
However, the NRAs failed to identify the root cause of the problem586. It is noted that 
before completion of the relevant market reviews by NRAs, the ERG had found that 
the direction of international roaming traffic towards alliance or group partners was 
increasing at the expense of international traffic towards independent mobile network 
operators, even if non-alliance operators offered lower prices, which indicated low 
elasticity of demand587. In the same line, it is also noted that the findings of the Court 
in Impala with respect to transparency in the examination of collective dominance 
cases appear not to have been taken into account by the NRAs in the examination of 
international roaming markets, at least in the cases notified after the issue of the GC’s 
decision588. Notably, if a finding of a common policy on excessive roaming rates, 
given the existence of other factors characteristic of a collective dominant position, 
like the factors established by the Greek and Irish NRAs, might have under the specific 
circumstances of the roaming market and in the absence of an alternative explanation, 
suffice to demonstrate the existence of a dominant position, without them being 
necessarily required to positively establish market transparency589.  
 
                                            
586 Refer also to Sutherland, E., International Mobile Roaming, [2006] CTLR, 269. 
587 The ERG paper, par. 61. 
588 Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 13.07.2006, Case T-464/04. 
589 In comparison with the Court’s finding in par. 252 of the judgment. It is reminded that the CJEU 
upheld the relevant finding of the GC and indicated that competition authorities should avoid 
mechanical approach to the Airtours criteria based on the separate verification of each criterion in 




Hence, the position that eventual discounts granted to alliance partners affected market 
transparency may have been debatable.  
 
On the other hand, the Commission recognised the transnational nature of the 
services590, but did not commence the process of Article 15 par. 4 of the Framework 
Directive for the identification of the relevant transnational market that would merit 
the application of ex ante regulatory measures, although a) in April 2006, average 
international roaming charges across the EU were almost four times higher than 
domestic tariffs and the operator’s average margins for calls originated while roaming 
were above 200%591 and b) the Commission acknowledged earlier the same year in 
Telefonica/O2 the possibility of collusion between the biggest international alliances 
operating in the European roaming market592. Instead, it decided to depart from the 
mechanism of the Framework Directive and passed Regulation No 717/2007 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on roaming on public mobile telephone 
networks within the Community introducing price caps on both wholesale and retail 
roaming charges for a period of three years593.  
 
The Commission attributed the reasons behind the decision to depart from the 
framework for the regulation of SMP on electronic communications to the trans-border 
nature of international roaming services and to the fact that 
“regulatory authorities at national level have indicated that the problem cannot 
be addressed using existing regulatory tools, considering its cross-border 
dimension and have called on the Commission to propose a single market 
solution”594.   
 
This explanation does not mean that the Commission was convinced of the lack of 
concerns about the exercise of SMP in international roaming markets. On the contrary,  
                                            
590 Refer particularly to IT/2006/393. 
591 European Commission, Commission staff working paper – Impact assessment of policy options in 
relation to a commission proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on 
roaming on public mobile networks within the Community, SEC (2006) 925. 
592 Case  COMP/M.4035, Telefonica/O2, 10.1.2006, par. 40f.  
593 [2007] OJ L 171/32. 
594 European Commission, Commission staff working paper – Impact assessment of policy options in 
relation to a commission proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on 
roaming on public mobile networks within the Community, SEC (2006) 925, 10, 25. 
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“the work undertaken by the national regulatory authorities (both individually 
and within the European Regulators Group) in analysing the wholesale national 
markets for international roaming has demonstrated that it has not yet been 
possible for a national regulatory authority to address effectively the high level 
of wholesale Community-wide roaming charges because of the difficulty in 
identifying undertakings with significant market power in view of the specific 
circumstances of international roaming, including its cross-border nature”595. 
 
The Commission did not challenge directly the findings of the twelve NRAs who did 
not prove SMP on their relevant roaming markets, but put more politely the following: 
“The national regulatory authorities responsible for safeguarding and 
promoting the interests of mobile customers normally resident within their 
territory are not able to control the behavior of the operators of the visited 
network, situated in other Member States, on whom those customers depend 
when using international roaming services”596.  
  
Indeed, it is doubted that any national regulator would address the issue of tariffs 
imposed on foreign operators for delivering calls on domestic operators’ networks, 
thus limiting the latter’s profit margins set in favor of international roaming customers 
and foreign mobile network operators, particularly since the cause of the difference 
behind costs and retail rates was attributed to cross-subsidization practices of (lower) 
national rates by roaming rates charged to the international wholesale and retail 
customers597. The practice of favoring domestic operators against operators from other 
member-states is not uncommon: for example, it is interesting to note that such 
approach was followed by the French NRA with respect to the termination of SMS 
services; as a consequence of the proposed reciprocity clause, operators established in 
other EU countries would not always be offered SMS termination in France at the 
same rates as French mobile operators. In case they did not agree on the price level 
regulated in France, or were not regulated at this price level, a higher, non-regulated 
                                            
595 The Roaming Regulation, recital 6. 
596 The Roaming Regulation, recital 8. 
597 Forrester, I., Sector-specific Price Regulation or Antitrust Regulation A Plague on Both Your 
Houses?, [2007] European University Institute Papers, 12-13. 
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price would apply598. The Commission considered that the reciprocity clause 
constituted a measure which may lead to an indirect discrimination prohibited under 
EU law599. Also, in DK/2011/1181 and DK/2012/1283 the Commission expressed 
serious doubts because the Danish NRA only operators competing with Danish 
operators at retail level may obtain the regulated rates for SMS termination services, 
hence the measure would apply to the detriment of foreign operators who would not 
compete on the Danish retail market and would be charged with rates almost three 
times higher than the regulated rate600.  
 
It is, thus, reasonable to assume that NRAs would have refrained from regulating 
wholesale international roaming tariffs at a national level601.  
 
Despite considerations on consumer protection and the fostering of internal market 
expressed by the Commission602, it is supportable to assume that the Roaming 
Regulation objectively enhances market efficiency and market conditions by removing 
appreciable (economic) distortions of competition in the international roaming 
sector603. This appears to be the true objective of the Roaming Regulation, since 
neither the wholesale nor the retail sector for international roaming services was fully 
competitive604. It is also supportable to assume that such competition concerns stem 
mainly from joint rather than single SMP, since it was acknowledged both by NRAs 
                                            
598 FR/2010/1094. ARCEP explained that a different treatment was justified because operators were 
placed in situations which were objectively different (i.e. regulated and non-regulated operators) and 
that a different treatment addressed a general interest objective (i.e. to remedy the fact that French 
regulated operators would be put at a disadvantage if their non-regulated partners established in other 
countries charged a different SMS termination rate) 
599 The Commission considered that ARCEP's differentiation based on the administrative nature of the 
"regulated" and "non-regulated" operators lacks well-founded rationales and is artificial since all 
operators established in other EU countries than France, are de facto to be considered as "non-regulated" 
operators, and therefore potentially subject to different operating conditions, independently of any other 
objective criteria relating to the provision of the SMS services. Finally, the Commission notes that 
reciprocity is not foreseen to be fully applied between regulated national operators, which makes the 
differentiation criterion less obvious. 
600 The serious doubts were lifted in DK /2012/1323, after the change of remedies and to the imposition 
of symmetric regulation on all operators regardless of their operation in Denmark. 
601 Brenncke, M., The EU Roaming Regulation and its non-compliance with Article 95 EC, October 
2008, Heft 79 in Essays on Transnational Economic Law, Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, 
33.  
602 Refer to recital 11 of the Roaming Regulation. 
603 Brencke, M., ibid., 40. In fact, Brencke argues that Article 95 (now article 114 TFEU) should not 
have been taken as the legal basis for the Roaming Regulation, but that the correct basis should have 
been article 308 (now article 356 TFEU).  
604 Ibid., 37-38. 
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and the Commission that roaming markets display more oligopoly than monopoly 
characteristics. 
 
In 2009, following review of the roaming market by the Commission in September 
2008, the Regulation was amended by Regulation 544/2009605, in order to extend the 
regulated period for roaming charges by two additional years (until 30.06.2012), to 
include SMS and data (wholesale only) roaming services in the basket of regulated 
services and to introduce stricter price caps and common billing unitisation practices. 
The persistence of high wholesale charges in roaming was primarily attributable to 
high wholesale prices charged by operators of non-preferred networks, with the result 
of having variances of up to 30 times higher the charges between preferred 
networks606. By expiry of the extended term of roaming regulation, the Commission 
estimated that, despite the drop of roaming rates below, but close to regulated price 
caps, retail roaming prices were on average at least 118% higher than their underlying 
costs607.  
 
The persistence of high wholesale charges after the first two years of application of 
regulated roaming rates, despite the termination of the international alliances in the 
meanwhile creates additional doubt on the NRAs findings in their notifications on the 
increased significance of such alliances in terms of transparency and retaliation in their 
national markets.  
 
In June 2012, the 2009 Roaming Regulation was replaced by Regulation No 531/2012 
on Roaming on Public Mobile Communications Networks within the Union608. The 
new Roaming Regulation maintains price caps until 30.06.2017 for retail and until 
30.06.2022 for wholesale, but as an interim measure only. The difference purported 
with the 2012 Roaming Regulation is that by 2014, at wholesale level, network 
operators will have to unbundle European roaming services, notably they must give 
network access to alternative operators, including MVNOs and resellers from other 
                                            
605 [2009] OJ L 167/12. 
606 Regulation 544/2009 amending regulation 717/2007 on roaming on public mobile telephone 
networks within the Community, recital 45. 
607 Stuckmann, P., EU Roaming Regulation – Towards Structural Solutions, presentation for the WTO 
in Geneva 2012, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/sym_march12_e/ 
presentation_stuckmann.pdf 
608 [2012] OJ L 172/10. 
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Member States at regulated wholesale prices to enable separate sale of roaming 
services in other European countries609. This is claimed to make it easier for alternative 
operators to offer competitive roaming services610. At retail, consumers will have the 
right to choose an alternative provider for EU-wide roaming services, benefiting from 
lower prices, while keeping their usual provider when they're at home611.   
 
The introduction of unbundling in roaming services was the result of the increasing 
demand for mobile broadband by travellers. But, despite transparency measures 
introduced with the 2007 and 2009 roaming regulations, the reductions at wholesale 
level were found not to be passed on to retail level in data services and for this reason 
price caps on retail data roaming services were also introduced by virtue of the latest 
Roaming Regulation612, at least for a period that the Commission considers that 
competition will remain ineffective. 
 
According to the information provided by the European Commission in September 
2013613, the introduction of the Regulations on Roaming were successful from the 
point of view of prices and volume:  
·  Retail prices across calls, SMS and data were reduced by over 80% since 2007; at 
the same time, concerns expressed on the potential raising of domestic mobile rates, as 
a result of the limitation or termination of subsidies from roaming rates614 did not 
materialize,  
·  Data roaming was up to 91% cheaper compared to 2007 and increased by 630% in 
terms of volume. 
 
However, these data did not stop the Commission from going even further. In 
September 2013 the Commission introduced radical proposals for the total pushing of 
roaming out of the market starting with the ban of charges for incoming calls from July 
                                            
609 Article 1 par. 1 of Regulation 531/2012. 
610 Article 1 par. 3 of Regulation 531/2012.  
611 Speech 11/502 of 06.07.2011 by Neelie Kroes, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/roaming/index_en.htm.  
612 Commission Report on the outcome of the functioning of Regulation No 717/2007 as amended by 
Regulation No 544/2009, COM(2011) 407 final, 9. 
613 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/roaming 
614 Forrester, I., ibid. 
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1st, 2014615. As announced by Commissioner Kroes on 12.09.2013, the determination 
is now to end roaming, not just reduce the price, through a ‘carrot and stick’ approach 
to operators with the carrot being the lifting of European regulation, on condition of 
extension of domestic bundles from 2014 so that by 2018 at the latest, customers 
throughout the Union are able to use their phones and smartphones while travelling 
throughout the Union at domestic rates. The stick is the application of the 2012 
Roaming Regulation forcing operators to offer their customers the possibility to roam 
with alternative roaming providers in order to take cheaper roaming services from a 
local company or a rival company in the home country with the same number and the 
same bill616. 
 
This development is to be examined also in relation to the suggestion for the adoption 
of wider product market definitions encompassing all on-net/off-net calls that was 
discussed in the second chapter. Notably, it may be the case that, had wider market 
definitions been adopted for all on-net and off-net calls respectively, domestic rates 
may have been applied on all roaming services, whether national or international. It 
may have been the case that the competition concerns in relation to international 
roaming stemming from possible tacit co-ordination between international operators 
may have been dealt with at an earlier stage through the regulation of on-net and off-
net call termination markets, instead of having recourse to additional regulatory 
instruments like the Roaming Regulations.  
4.3. Brief conclusions on the case of roaming 
 
In summary, a careful reading of the history behind roaming regulation appears to 
support the argument of this thesis that SMP regulation has failed to address issues of 
collective dominance in wholesale roaming markets617. On the one hand, the NRAs of 
the biggest national markets in terms of wholesale international roaming markets 
refrained from conducting the relevant market review; on the other hand, the NRAs of 
                                            
615 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures 
concerning the European single market for electronic communications and to achieve a Connected 
Continent, and amending Directives 2002/20/EC, 2002/21/EC and 2002/22/EC and Regulations (EC) 
No 1211/2009 and (EU) No 531/2012, Article 37. 
616 SPEECH/13/693 of 12/09/2013.  
 




the member states that did perform the relevant exercise declared themselves unable to 
prove the existence of SMP, because of the trans-border dimension of roaming issues, 
albeit they all recognised the existence of high rates and in the majority of cases, they 
accepted the existence of factors indicative of a market with collective dominance, 
whereas some of them accepted the potential existence of joint SMP in the short term.       
 
The justification provided for the existence of different alliances across Europe for the 
provision of roaming services was crucial to the inability of NRAs to establish SMP on 
the respective wholesale national markets. However, starting from the late nineties, 
such alliances were created as a result of consecutive mergers and minority share 
acquisitions between European operators that were cleared unconditionally as far as 
roaming issues were concerned or were not notified at all. It is also reasonable to 
assume that NRAs have refrained from regulating wholesale international roaming 
tariffs at a national level, thus, from limiting the profit margins of national operators 
set in favor of international roaming customers and foreign mobile network operators.   
 
Further, the process for the identification of trans-border roaming markets susceptible 
to ex ante regulation was not adhered to, despite the acknowledged cross-border nature 
of the services and the possibility of collusion between the biggest international 
alliances operating in the European roaming market. It is, therefore, supportable to 
assume that, in recognizing the failure of SMP regulation to address collective 
dominance in wholesale roaming markets, the Commission decided to depart from the 
SMP framework in electronic communications and passed the Roaming 
Regulations618. According to the Commission, the volume of the roaming market has 
increased and rates have fallen, whereas concerns on adverse effects on national 
mobile rates did not materialize. 
 
Having now completed the analysis of factors capable of establishing collective 
dominance in the context of SMP framework for electronic communications, we shall 
turn to the remedies imposed on SMP operators under the same framework and 
examine them from the aspect of their application on oligopolistic markets.   
                                            
618 For an opposite view, refer to Forrester, I., ibid, 13, who considers this regulatory intervention ‘a case 
of opportunistic populism in the guise of consumer protection’.  
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Chapter 5: Available remedies under 
SMP regulation and their effectiveness 
for the regulation of oligopolistic 
markets – Part I. 
5.1. Outline of the measures provided in the Directives 
 
The present chapter is the first of the three chapters of this thesis that examine the 
effectiveness of remedies imposed on SMPs that operate in oligopolistic markets. The 
remedies are distinguished into transparency, non-discrimination, access obligations, 
separation of accounts and functions and pricing obligations.  
 
The chapter commences with the description of applicable provisions of the legislative 
framework and then examines the separate categories of measures, in turn. The present 
chapter deals with obligations on transparency, non discrimination, separation of 
accounts and functions and access obligations. The following analysis will show that 
the first two (transparency and non discrimination) together with accounting separation 
form essentially one and the same measure. Functional separation is also discussed in 
the present chapter, because the underlying principles behind its establishment are 
similar to, if not the same as those behind accounting separation.  
 
Access issues are found at the core of SMP regulation, since the market position of 
alternative providers has developed on the basis of pervasive access regulation, 
although many entry barriers remain619. Access obligations rest on earlier competition 
case law on refusal to supply by dominant undertakings and the essential facility 
doctrine which is widely discussed in competition law literature.  
 
                                            
619 Refer to Commission Staff  Working Document accompanying to the Commission Recommendation 
on regulated access to Next Generation Access Networks (NGA), SEC 2010, 237 final, 9. 
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The review will demonstrate that the categories of remedies discussed in the present 
chapter should be applied with caution in oligopolistic markets, whereas the 
effectiveness of functional separation in oligopolistic environments is debatable. 
Although inevitable for the regulation of electronic communications markets, access 
obligations enhance co-operation between the undertakings involved and, as such, are 
capable of enhancing collusion. The chapter ends with the suggestion for an alternative 
in the form of quasi-contract that may apply instead of direct access obligations in 
oligopolistic markets. 
 
5.1.1. Applicable provisions and principles 
 
The obligations imposed by NRAs on SMPs in wholesale markets with ineffective 
competition are selected out of a pool of measures listed in Articles 9-13 and 13a of 
the Access Directive (as revised under Directive 2009/140/EC)620, notably: 
a) Transparency obligations, i.e. the obligation to make public specific information 
(e.g. accounting information, technical specifications, network characteristics, 
conditions for supply and use, prices or other), and/or to publish a “sufficiently 
unbundled” reference offer for access to their networks621. The publication of a 
reference offer is mandatory for SMPs with an obligation to provide wholesale 
network infrastructure access622. 
b) Non-discrimination, i.e. the obligation on an operator to provide interconnection 
and/or access to competitors under equivalent terms623. 
c) Obligations on accounting separation in relation to specified activities624. 
d) Obligation to provide access to and use of specific network facilities. This includes 
the requirement to negotiate in good faith and meet reasonable requests for access 
to the local loop or other network elements, interconnection, co-location or other 
forms of facility sharing, operational support systems or similar software systems, 
                                            
620 Directive 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and 
associated facilities, [2002] OJ L108/7. 
621 Article 9 of the Access Directive. 
622 Ibid., Article 9 par. 4. 
623 Ibid., Article 10. 
624 Ibid., Article 11. 
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etc. NRAs may attach to this obligation conditions of fairness, reasonableness and 
timeliness625. 
e) Price control and cost accounting obligations626 and 
f) Functional separation of vertical operations627. 
 
Article 17 of the Universal Service Directive628 provides for “appropriate” regulatory 
controls on retail services, based on the nature of the problem identified, proportionate 
and justified in the light of the objectives laid down in Article 8 of the Framework 
Directive629, including  
“requirements that the identified undertakings do not charge excessive 
prices, inhibit market entry or restrict competition by setting predatory 
prices, show undue preference to specific end-users or unreasonably bundle 
services. National regulatory authorities may apply to such undertakings 
appropriate retail price cap measures, measures to control individual tariffs, 
or measures to orient tariffs towards costs or prices on comparable markets, 
in order to protect end-user interests whilst promoting effective 
competition”630. 
 
The Universal Service Directive establishes the additional requirement that NRAs 
cannot impose measures on SMPs operating in any retail market, unless they have 
concluded first that the obligations imposed under the Access Directive at wholesale 
level did not result in achieving the objectives of Article 8 of the Framework Directive. 
In this sense, retail regulation is regarded as a tool of last resort631. The general trend 
away from retail regulation towards wholesale regulation reflects a desire on the part 
of regulators to treat the cause rather than the effects of market power632. Also, the 
principle of the minimum possible intervention in the frame of the general trend 
                                            
625 Ibid. Article 12. 
626 Ibid. Article 13. 
627 Ibid. Article 13a. 
628 Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications 
networks and services, [2002] OJ L108/51. 
629 The principles laid in Article 8 of the Framework Directive include network independence, no 
distortion or restriction of competition, promotion of legal certainty, promotion of network-based 
competition, if possible, and of trans-European networks, effective spectrum management, addressing 
special users’ rights, imposition of regulatory measures only in markets with ineffective competition etc. 
630 Article 17 par. 2 of the Universal Service Directive. 
631 Refer also to the ERG Common Position on SMP Remedies, 90 and 101. 
632 Waters, P., Yuen, A., Operational Separation: A new Style of Regulation?, [2006] CTLR 231. 
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towards moving away from regulation, requires abstention from regulation at retail 
level, if measures at wholesale level contribute to the creation of a competitive 
environment at retail level.  
 
Nonetheless, in an oligopolistic context, the effects of collusive behaviour of 
oligopolists at wholesale level may be passed on to retail customers exclusively, 
despite the existence of other form of competitive pressure at retail level633. Under a 
speculative case where oligopolists in broadband access markets collude to gain high 
profits from the access rate, the high cost of access may be passed on to the retail 
customers directly, despite the existence of competition in terms of quality of service 
(e.g. more speed) or competition in terms of the retail margin only. In such case, price 
measures taken at retail directly may exert the desired pressure on wholesale rates, 
provided that the same players are active both at wholesale and retail level634. Notably, 
measures taken at retail may be capable of remedying anti-competitive practices at 
wholesale level, which means that there should be no absolute approach against 
intervention at retail level in oligopolistic situations. The same does not follow in 
monopolies, because measures taken at retail exclusively may result in margin squeeze 
practices from the part of the monopolist635. Hence, unlike monopolies, an absolute 
ban on measures at retail, unless the measures at wholesale have proved insufficient 
may not have the desired effect in an oligopolistic environment; more latitude may be 
given to NRAs to apply measures at retail in oligopolistic markets if the same players 
are active both at wholesale and retail level.  
 
With the above in mind, the separate categories of measures will now be examined in 
turn. 
 
                                            
633 In Case SI/2009/0913 the Commission accepted that the existence of price competition at retail level 
does not preclude a finding of SMP at wholesale level in the Slovenian oligopolistic mobile access 
market. 
634 If different players are active at wholesale and retail level, the scenario may not occur, because 
wholesalers will not be affected by measures taken at retail or may embark on price squeezes. 
635 Price squeezes are discussed in detail under section 5.2.2. 
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5.2. Transparency and non-discrimination 
5.2.1 Transparency 
 
Transparency, in the sense applied in the SMP legal framework, is the obligation to 
make public specified information, such as prices and other accounting information, 
technical specifications, network characteristics, conditions for supply and use, prices 
etc636. The obligation to publish a ‘sufficiently unbundled reference offer’ on operators 
under the obligation not to discriminate in relation to interconnection and/or access637 
and the obligation of the NRAs to publish the minimum set of leased lines and 
associated standards in the Official Journal of the European Communities638 are 
specific demonstrations of this principle. 
 
The Access Directive leaves to the discretion of NRAs the precise information to be 
made available, the level of detail required and the manner of publication639. This 
applies in principle to the mandatory reference offer for operators entrusted with 
obligations to provide wholesale network infrastructure access, but the minimum 
content is set out in Annex II of the Access Directive. The minimum information 
includes details of the elements to which access (full or shared) is granted (physical 
entry to sites and technical information), details of support systems and of supply 
conditions, including standard terms and prices. Publication may be in paper or in 
electronic form, although preference is expressed to publication in the National 
Gazette640. The Directive leaves also the issue of associated charges open. However, 
for transparency to meet the purpose of its application, the information published 
should be easily accessible and clearly comparable. 
 
Transparency is the least interventionist of all categories of measures and is usually 
considered complementary to the remaining categories of measures. The ERG had 
taken the view that the situations where transparency will be rendered an effective 
remedy by itself rather than helping identifying anti-competitive behaviour in 
wholesale markets to be remedied with the application of one or more of the remaining 
                                            
636 Article 9 par. 1 of the Access Directive. 
637 Article 9 par. 2 of the Access Directtive. 
638 Article 18 par. 3 of the Universal Service Directive. 
639 Article 9 par. 3 of the Access Directive. 
640 Recital 22 of the Access Directive. 
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measures, will be scarce641. Indeed, the analysis of the underlying principles of the 
other categories of measures will show that transparency obligations are rather the 
means of controlling and implementing the other four categories of obligations on the 
SMP list of measures642. 
 
The significance of transparency is depicted in the obligation imposed on all operators 
in retail markets of publicly available telephone services, irrespective of their market 
power, to make available transparent and up-to-date information on applicable tariffs 
and on standard terms and conditions to end-users and consumers643. In retail markets, 
similar transparency obligations would arise anyhow from the application of 
Community rules on consumer protection644. Economic theory suggests that 
transparency of retail prices may mitigate the excessive pricing problem to the extent 
that customers aware of prices of calls to individual networks can better adjust their 
demand in response to price increases following from the increase of termination 
rates645. In wholesale markets, transparency obligations arise only for SMPs.  
 
Recital 16 in the preamble of the Access Directive quotes: 
“Transparency of terms and conditions for access and interconnection, 
including prices, serve to speed-up negotiation, avoid disputes and give 
confidence to market players that a service is not being provided on 
discriminatory terms. Openness and transparency of technical interfaces can 
be particularly important in ensuring interoperability. …”. 
 
In a competitive environment, undertakings are willing to make their prices and terms 
of supply transparent in order to obtain a competitive advantage. This does not apply 
on markets exhibiting signs of ineffective competition, like the markets of the 
Recommendation, where players embarking on anti-competitive practices would like 
to find ways to conceal proof of the same.  
 
                                            
641 European Regulators Group, Revised ERG Common Position on the Approach to Appropriate 
Remedies in the ECNS regulatory framework, May 2006, (the ERG Common Position on SMP 
remedies), 48. 
642 It is noted that in none of the cases notified to the Commission under Article 7 of the Framework 
Directive have transparency obligations been imposed as an isolated measure in any wholesale market. 
643 Article 21 par. 1 of the Universal Service Directive.  
644 Directives 97/7/EC and 93/13/EC. 
645 Refer to the ERG Common Position on SMP remedies, 114. 
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In cases MT/2006/0443, IT/2007/0729 and SI/2008/806, the Maltese, Italian and 
Slovenian NRAs respectively included transparency obligations in the remedies 
notified to the Commission on the oligopolistic markets for mobile access and call 
origination and analogue broadcasting. The Commission did not comment on the 
suggested transparency measures646.  
 
However, in oligopolistic markets, the situation is much more complex. We have seen 
in chapter 3 that an adequate degree of market transparency is determinative for the 
establishment of collective dominance, so that firms are able to monitor other firms’ 
conducts and detect deviations. In this sense, transparency obligations create the risk of 
causing the opposite result of their intended purpose in oligopolistic environments, 
since they may enhance (and not hamper) collusion.  
 
In Nestle647 and in Gencor648, the Commission considered actions such as publication 
of price lists and production and sales statistics as enhancing market transparency. On 
this basis, it is doubted whether transparency obligations like publication of access 
rates are capable of bringing the desired outcome in the regulation of oligopolistic 
wholesale markets in electronic communications. The ERG had also expressed 
concerns on the effectiveness of transparency both at wholesale and retail level on the 
grounds that it is likely to further collusion rather than prevent it, as it allows the 
operators to observe each other’s charges and thus makes cooperation easier649.  
 
On the other hand, some degree of transparency may also prove necessary even in 
oligopolistic markets. That would be the case, e.g., of publication of information 
suitable to ascertain the level of excess capacity, since we have seen in chapter 3 that 
the existence of excess capacity operates detrimentally to the development of 
retaliation mechanisms which are necessary to establish collusion650. Also, 
transparency on some price information may prove useful in strengthening buyers’ 
power, which is also a factor capable of preventing collusion.  
                                            
646 In SI/2008/806 the Commission challenged the designation of the second mobile operator as holder 
of SMP. The Slovenian NRA amended the notification and designated a single operator as susceptible of 
ex ante regulation. 
647 Case IV/M 190 Nestle/ Perrier [1992] OJ L365/1. 
648 Case T-102/96, Gencor v. Commission [1999] 4 CMLR 971 
649 The ERG Common Position on SMP remedies, 55 and 111.  




At the bottom line, NRAs should be cautious in the application of transparency 
obligations when regulating SMP in oligopolistic markets. A general obligation on 
transparency, if not defined properly, may reach the opposite result of its stated aim 
and facilitate instead of impede collusion. Transparency obligations should rather 
focus on issues that may bring factors capable of preventing collusion into light. This 
should be made clear in a future revision of the Access Directive or of the Guidelines.  
5.2.2 Non-discrimination 
 
According to Article 10 par. 2 of the Access Directive,  
“[o]bligations of non-discrimination shall ensure, in particular, that the 
operator applies equivalent conditions in equivalent circumstances to other 
undertakings providing equivalent services, and provides services and 
information to others under the same conditions and of the same quality as it 
provides for its own services, or those of its subsidiaries or partners”. 
 
At wholesale level, the meaning of the obligation not to discriminate is that when the 
vertically integrated incumbents provide carriage of telecommunications services to 
their retail arms, they should do so on the same terms and conditions as for other 
operators651. The rationale behind this principle is that, this may ensure a level playing 
field at the retail level. At retail level, operators are required not to show undue 
preference to specific end-users. 
 
Prohibition of discrimination on the price that products or services are offered to the 
various customers (price discrimination) is the most common form of discrimination in 
all industry sectors and is a controversial issue in competition law precedents. 
However, discrimination on other terms of supply may also discourage competitors 
from embarking on the service at issue or deprive end-users from the requested service 
on more favourable terms. 
 
Economists generally define price discrimination as arising where a firm charges 
different price-cost margin on different transactions, typically to reflect different 
                                            
651 Refer also to rec. 17 of the Access Directive. 
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demand conditions, although such difference in demand conditions does not 
necessarily exist652. Scherer and Ross have defined price discrimination as the sale or 
purchase of different units of a good or service at price differentials not directly 
corresponding to differences in supply cost653. European competition law precedents 
have considered abusive price discrimination under different practices, such as volume 
discounts (application of discounted rates against the placing of big orders)654, sales 
growth rebates aiming at persuading customers to increase their purchases of the 
product655, discounts in return for exclusivity656, as well as discounts targeted against 
competing suppliers. All categories of customers involved in these types of discounts 
enjoy the privilege of a high elasticity of demand, affording them a higher negotiating 
power vis-à-vis the supplier. This leads the supplier to structure prices such as to earn 
higher price-cost margins on more secure sales, thus, discriminating to the detriment of 
the latter657. 
 
In a dynamic context, price discrimination can have bad effects on welfare if it is used 
as an instrument for predatory pricing or other exclusionary practices that eliminate 
competition and thereby allow the price discriminating firm subsequently to raise price 
above competitive levels. The greater the market power of the firm, the more likely for 
price discrimination to cause distortions in competition. In downstream markets, price 
discrimination can also cause collateral distortions, particularly where the price-
discriminating firm is the owner of a facility at the upstream level and also acts in the 
downstream market in competition with the customers of its upstream business658. This 
                                            
652 OFT Competition Act Guidelines, p. 414.  
653 Scherer, Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Performance, 3rd ed., 1990, 489. 
654 With the exception of short-term measures, discounts not related to genuine cost reductions in 
manufacturer’ s costs (price discrimination) have been held abusive in Michelin, Case C-322/81 
Michelin v. European Commission [1983] ECR 3461; in AKZO, Case C-62/86 AKZO v. European 
Commission [1991] ECR I-3359, discounts targeting at competitors were also found to be abusive, to the 
extent that such discounts merely switch demand between one brand and another without generating 
overall welfare and market growth. According to the Commission Recommendation of 11.09.2013 
C(2013) 5761 final, rec. 19, NRAs should accept volume discounts by SMP operators to their own 
downstream businesses, for example their retail arm, only if they do not exceed the highest volume 
discount offered in good faith to third party access seekers. 
655 In Case COMP/35.141, Deutsche Post AG, 2001. discounts aimed at securing customer loyalty, 
solely by reason of the method by which they are calculated, were considered to have an anti-
competitive tying effect.  
656 Exclusivity discounts being used as an exclusionary device, particularly if associated with leverage 
effects, were criticised in Case C-85/76 Hoffman La Roche v. European Commission [1979] ECR 461. 
657 Muysert, P., Price Discrimination – An Unreliable Indicator of Market Power, [2004] ECLR,, 351. 
658 Ridyard, D., Exclusionary Pricing and Price Discrimination Abuses under Article 82 – An economic 
Analysis, [2002] ECLR., 288. 
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is exactly the case of network operators discriminating in favour of their retail arms in 
wholesale access markets. 
 
Price discrimination was identified in relation to termination charges imposed by the 
Dutch incumbent telecommunications operator Koninklijke KPN NV659. Following a 
complaint by MCI Worldcom, the Commission suspected KPN of abusing its 
dominant position regarding the termination of telephone calls on the KPN mobile 
network through discriminatory or otherwise unfair behaviour, on the grounds that 
fixed to mobile termination rates in Europe could be ten times higher than the average 
charge for fixed to fixed interconnection. Originally, WorldCom's complaint also 
concerned mobile operators in other EU countries, namely Sweden and Germany, but 
the complaint against Germany was withdrawn after the German operators reduced 
their termination rates by 50% and in Sweden the national competition authority 
started dealing with the issue660. 
 
However, price discrimination has been found to commonly occur in competitive 
markets and that, in such markets, it is an acceptable method of increasing producer 
and consumer welfare.  Schmalensee’s analysis of price discrimination has shown that 
it can enhance both consumer and producer welfare (overall welfare) if it succeeds in 
increasing the sales and output levels of the firm, e.g. through extension into new 
market segments661. In this line, the CJEU and the General Court accept in principle 
that rebate schemes may be based on economically justified considerations (e.g. 
quantity efficiency gains, security in planning). A transaction-specific efficiency 
defence is acceptable, if the firm can show that the specific price discrimination 
practice gives rise to economies of scale for the customer662. An infringement of 
Article 82 occurs only in the absence of such justification for the rebate, as price 
discrimination is not a per se prohibition even if it is the conduct of a dominant firm663. 
 
                                            
659 IP/02/483, March 27, 2002. 
660 Ibid. 
661 Schmalensee, R., Output and Welfare Implications of Third Degree Price Discrimination, [1981] 71 
American Economic Review, 242-247. 
662 Case T-203/01, Michelin v. Commission, judgement of September 30, 2003, par. 98-110, Case C-
163/99, Portugal v. Commission, [2001] ECR I-2613. 




It is observed that significant price discrimination characterises competitive industries 
with substantial fixed and common costs, such as telecoms, because: 
a) there are significant fixed and common costs to be covered, so high value 
customers are able to benefit from low value customers being offered prices below 
average cost but above marginal cost, spreading the fixed and common costs that 
need to be covered over more customers; 
b) there are identifiable customers, who are prepared to pay more than the marginal 
cost of the service, but relatively few of this group are prepared to pay the average 
cost; and 
c) serving the low value segment does not displace high value customers664. 
 
In fixed cost recovery industries, customer loyalty is of increased significance, because 
even lower margin incremental sales can contribute crucially to overall profitability665. 
In this context, fixed cost recovery and low marginal costs have been argued as 
possible grounds for establishing legitimate reasons for price discrimination, even in 
the absence of underlying cost reductions, because they may generate market 
growth666: 
“The fact that the price-cost margin on the incremental sale is less than the 
margin earned on some other sales of the same firm does not mean that the 
incremental sale is abusive, and nor does it prove that the infra-marginal sale 
was made at an excessive price. Such considerations are central to an 
understanding of the economics of fixed cost recovery industries”667.  
 
With respect to wholesale access markets, the European Commission has reiterated in 
the Access Notice668, that market conditions may justify price and/or other forms of 
discrimination in the provision of access. Article 7 of Directive 97/33/EC (the 
Interconnection Directive), which is no longer in force, provided that  
“different tariffs, terms and conditions for interconnection may be set for 
different categories of organisations which are authorised to provide 
networks and services, where such differences can be objectively justified on 
                                            
664 Muysert, P., ibid., 353. 
665 Ridyard, R., ibid., 293-294. 
666 Vickers, J., When is Discrimination Undue? in Regulating Utilities: Understanding the Issues. 
667 Ridyard, R., ibid., 291. 
668 European Commission, Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in 
the telecommunications sector, [1998] OJ C 265/02, par. 120-128. 
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the basis of the type of interconnection provided and/or the relevant licensing 
conditions …”. 
 
A similar provision was not included in the Access Directive, but this omission should 
by no means be construed to mean that such “rule of reason” approach to 
discrimination does not apply in the imposition of non-discrimination obligations on 
SMPs, pursuant to the Access Directive669. Also, price differentials to the benefit of 
less privileged retail customers finds wide support and is explicitly provided in the 
Universal Service Directive670.  
 
Practical difficulties are inherent in assessing the threshold for establishing abusive 
behaviour in price discrimination. The European Commission has put forward some 
kind of average variable cost as a workable proxy for marginal costs or of avoidable 
cost test, which assesses whether the revenues earned by the firm in question are 
sufficient to cover the costs that the firm would be able to avoid or save if it chose not 
to offer that product671. But, pricing above avoidable cost can still have adverse effects 
on competition, e.g. in a situation where the lowering of prices on legitimate grounds 
(lower costs) may lead to considerable future price increases, when competitors have 
been driven out of the market for reasons of own inefficiencies672.  
 
Another practical problem in the application of non-discrimination is that its scope 
covers the firm’s internal purposes. This is particularly relevant in dealing with forms 
of discrimination other than price. Some scholars have adopted a more pragmatic view 
towards the principle of non-discrimination arguing that it will work only if there is 
genuine separation of decision-making between the up-stream and down-stream 
                                            
669 We should not forget that the protection of competitors is not an end in itself, but an aim contributing 
to consumer welfare. Refer also to Kallaugher, J., Sher, B., Rebates Revisited: Anti-competitive Effects 
and Exclusionary Abuse under Article 82, [2004] ECLR, 263-285, who claim that European case-law 
has placed too much emphasis in protecting competitors without much impact on consumer welfare. 
670 For example refer to Article 7 of the USO Directive. 
671 Refer to Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission [1993] 5 CMLR. Ridyard maintains that 
the avoidable cost test is more versatile than the average variable cost test, because it can be carried out 
across various dimensions of a dominant firm’s conduct (e.g. it may be related to an individual product 
or an individual customer), ibid., 295. 
672 Kahn, A., Comments on exclusionary airline policy, [1999] 5 Journal of Transport Management. 
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operations, to be able to ignore incentives that maximise the overall profitability of the 
group673. 
 
Discrimination in contexts other than price may relate to elements such as delays, 
technical access, routing, numbering, restrictions on network use and use of customer 
network data674. Examples of discriminatory behaviour with respect to wholesale 
electronic communications markets are listed below: 
- failure to offer non-discriminatory collocation 
- discrimination in the provisioning of conduit space and access to poles 
- failure to provide non-discriminatory access to operational support services for 
order processing and other functions 
- problems provisioning competitor orders for local number portability 
- failure to include the directory listings of competitor customers in directory listings 
databases at the same level of accuracy, timeliness and reliability as it provides to 
its own customers. 
 
The Access Notice placed particular weight on discrimination that may arise in respect 
of the technical configuration of the access and, specifically, in respect of the degree of 
technical sophistication of the access and/or the number and/or location of connection 
points675. In the event of discrimination, the access-seeker may be forced to incur 
additional expenses by either providing links at a greater distance from its own 
switching centre or being liable to pay higher conveyance charges or it may end up 
with reduced technical capabilities compared with the incumbent’ s network. 
 
In its sector inquiry into local loop unbundling, the Commission detected 
discriminatory behaviour resulting from the fact that incumbents are often vertically 
integrated providing both wholesale input and retail products676. Regulation 2887/2000 
on unbundled access to the local loop provided for a direct obligation on SMPs in the 
provision of fixed public telephone networks and services to 
                                            
673 Ridyard, D., Essential Facilities and the Obligation to Supply Competitors under UK and EC 
Competition Law, [1996] ECLR, 450. 
674 Par. 125 of the Access Notice. 
675 Par. 127 of the Access Notice. 
676 Commission press release IP/02/849 of June 12, 2002.  
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“provide beneficiaries with facilities equivalent to those provided for their 
own services or to their associated companies and with same conditions and 
time-scales”677. 
 
The significance of the principle was underlined by the Committee on Industry, 
External Trade, Research and Energy in its 1st report on the Commission proposal for 
the Access Directive678. The Committee suggested that the non-discrimination 
obligation automatically applies to undertakings designated as SMPs in the relevant 
market: 
“The NRAs should oblige all operators to respect the non-discrimination 
principle, because it is the only way to create a real competitive market. 
Indeed, several operators could slow down the establishing of real 
competition in the telecommunication market by delivering to new operators 
worse services than they provide for their own services, or those of their 
subsidiaries or partners”. 
 
Like transparency, the ERG had considered non-discrimination as a complementary 
obligation in the frame of obligations imposed on SMPs679. In the majority of notified 
measures to the Commission, access obligations are complemented by non-
discrimination obligations680. Non-discrimination obligations have been also imposed 
by NRAs on SMPs in oligopolistic markets681.  
 
However, the foregoing analysis demonstrates that non-discrimination obligations 
entail complexities in their application. Such complexities include the disclosure of 
information necessary to establish the threshold for the imposition of non-
discrimination obligations in relation to price and other sensitive information of 
internal decision-making processes, capable of establishing efficiency-defence for the 
SMP operator. On 11.09.2013, the Commission issued its Recommendation of 
11.9.2013 on consistent non-discrimination obligations and costing methodologies to 
                                            
677 Article 3 par. 2 of Regulation 2887/2000. 
678 Document A5-0061/2001 Final, Amendment 36. The amendment was not accepted by the 
Commission, though no reasons for the rejection are expressed in the in the amended proposal. 
679 The ERG Common Position on SMP remedies, 49. 
680 E.g. out of 2009 cases refer to BG/2009/0911-0912, CZ/2009/0964, EE/2009/0942-0943, 
FI/2009/0900, DE/2009/0947-0948, EL/2009/0934-0935, MT/2009/0979. 
681 Cases IE/2004/121, MT/2006/0443, IT/2007/0729 and SI/2008/806. 
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promote competition and enhance the broadband investment environment682, having 
observed considerable variations in the application of the non-discrimination 
obligation across the Union with regard to the scope, the application, compliance 
monitoring and enforcement of this obligation, in particular with regards to the 
equivalence model chosen (if one is applied at all), even where the underlying market 
problems are comparable683.  
 
In the Recommendation, the Commission designates ‘equivalence of input’ (EoI)684 as 
the surest way to achieve effective non-discrimination, since it ensures a level playing 
field between the SMP operator’s downstream businesses and third-party access 
seekers, and promotes competition, if such obligation is appropriate, proportionate and 
justified. Where the provision of wholesale inputs on an EoI basis is disproportionate, 
as a result of high compliance costs, NRAs should ensure that the SMP operator 
provides the wholesale inputs to access seekers on an ‘equivalence of output’ (EoO) 
basis685. In addition, NRAs should require SMP operators subject to a non-
discrimination obligation to provide access seekers with regulated wholesale inputs 
that allow the access seeker to effectively replicate technically new retail offers of the 
downstream retail arm of the SMP operator, in particular where EoI is not fully 
implemented. The Commission also recommends the use of KPIs, complemented by 
SLAs and SLGs, as the most appropriate tools to detect potential discriminatory 
behaviour and enhance transparency with respect to the delivery and quality of the 
SMP operator’s regulated wholesale access products in the relevant markets taking into 
account the time requirements set out in Annex I.  
 
It is, thus obvious, that transparency becomes a de facto condition precedent for the 
application of non-discrimination obligations, possibly also on issues that may be 
                                            
682 C(2013) 5761 final. 
683 Recital 6 of the Recommendation. 
684 According to par. 6 (g), ‘Equivalence of Inputs (EoI)’ means the provision of services and 
information to internal and third-party access seekers on the same terms and conditions, including price 
and quality of service levels, within the same time scales using the same systems and processes, and 
with the same degree of reliability and performance. EoI as defined here may apply to the access 
products and associated and ancillary services necessary for providing the ‘wholesale inputs’ to internal 
and third-party access seekers. 
685 According to par. 6 (h) of the Recommendation, ‘Equivalence of Output (EoO)’ means the provision 
to access seekers of wholesale inputs comparable, in terms of functionality and price, to those the SMP 




capable of advancing collusive practices, thus impairing the efficiency of this measure 
on oligopolistic markets for the reasons set out in the previous sub-section686. Further, 
non discrimination obligations enhance stability and similarity in cost structures, but 
we have seen in Chapter 3 that similarity in cost structures is also considered a factor 
inductive to tacit collusion, as it entails a strong possibility of the undertakings having 
similar points of view on the prices that would like to see prevailing on the market. 
The imposition of obligations of non discrimination in relation to pricing issues aim at 
combating differences in profitability margins by the SMPs, which, in turn, may bring 
profitability margins of the operators closer, as well as the operators themselves.  
 
Moreover, there may be efficiency defences that would allow the SMP operator to 
challenge the obligation not to discriminate. It is easier for SMP operators to plead 
efficiency defences in oligopolistic markets, since a transaction-specific efficiency 
defence finds more ground in a complex oligopolistic environment with no monopoly 
equilibrium, as opposed to a market environment dominated by the former incumbent. 
On an oligopolistic market, the granting of rebates to customers, discriminatory pricing 
or selective price-cutting by one of the undertakings may mean that price competition 
is in fact operating between the oligopolists687. This will probably be the result of the 
strong buyer power exercised by specific customers, which has a negative impact on 
the sustainability of tacit collusion688.  
 
On the other hand, in oligopolistic access markets exhibiting characteristics of 
collusive behaviour, the collusive access price may already be non discriminatory. In 
such cases welfare can be potentially increased by bringing prices back to a cost-
oriented level, not by imposing obligations not to discriminate. The ERG accepted that 
non discrimination obligations can facilitate collusion among operators689, whereas we 
have also seen in section 4.2.1 that under the International Roaming Inquiry GSM 
operators were found to interpret the non discrimination obligation so absolutely that 
they offered only the most trivial discounts on Inter-operator Tariffs (IOTs), which 
                                            
686 Refer also to the ERG Common Position on SMP remedies, 111, where it is stated that transparency 
and non-discrimination at retail level have the tendency of creating collusive practices between market 
players, thus leading to the opposite results in relation to anti-competitive practices. 
687 Jones, A., Suffrin, B., EC Competition Law, 2nd edition, 2005, OUP, 840. 
688 Refer to section 3.2.3.3. 
689 The ERG Common Position on SMP remedies, 43. 
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established instance of collusion, because in a properly functioning market, a large or 
an expanding buyer should be able to negotiate a better price690.  
 
Like transparency, non discrimination obligations should be applied with caution in 
oligopolistic markets and focus on issues that may be capable of preventing collusion, 
depending on the particulars of each case691. This should be made clear in a future 
revision of the Guidelines. 
 
5.3. Separating accounts and functions 
5.3.1 Accounting Separation 
 
The purpose of accounting separation is to provide a financial picture for each part of 
the integrated business which reflects as closely as possible how it would have 
performed if it had operated as a separate business, because the regulator is able to 
review if the internal transactions are taking place on terms similar to transactions 
between the company and competitors692. Accounting separation, as provided in 
Article 11 of the Access Directive, should make transparent the internal transfer prices 
to the regulated firm’s own downstream operation in order to ensure compliance with a 
non-discrimination obligation or to prevent unfair cross-subsidies693. Unfair cross-
subsidy would occur where an unjustifiably low price in one product market is 
facilitated by excessive charges in another product market. 
 
However, the separation of costs is not a straightforward exercise. In multi-product 
firms, such as telecommunication firms, judgements as to how joint or common costs 
are to be apportioned between activities are inevitably arbitrary in nature694. More 
specifically, the difficulties encountered in the preparation of separate accounts for 
                                            
690 Sutherland, E., International Roaming and Competition Law, [2001] CTLR, 146. 
691 The Commission has matched non-discrimination obligations with single SMP and this is shown in 
recital 21 of the Recommendation on Non-discrimination obligation, which quotes: ‘When carrying out 
the technical replicability test or assessing the results of the test carried out by the SMP operator, NRAs 
should also take into account the risk of monopolisation of the downstream market through the new 
offer and the impact on innovation’. 
692 Commission Recommendation 98/322/EC of April 8, 1998 on interconnection in a liberalised 
telecommunications market, [1998] OJ L141/6, par. 1.  
693 The ERG Common Position on SMP remedies, 41. 




integrated telecommunications operators are at large caused by the fact that much of 
the relevant plant is used in common in the provision of a number of services and 
much of the relevant personnel supports more than a single service. The situation is 
more difficult with corporate costs, the so-called head office overheads, including 
executive, legal, finance and other general functions695. The cost accounting model that 
BT published in 2004 provided that 15% of BT’ s fixed assets referred to corporate 
costs, which could only be allocated by apportionment, as opposed to direct 
allocation696. Additional challenges occur in deciding how to apportion the costs of 
common infrastructure between individual services, which is endemic in 
telecommunications operations697.  
 
There is a variety of different methods that may be adopted to attribute overhead costs 
to business activities, the most common being the application of a mark-up calculated 
as a percentage from the operations of the past years (a percentage that overheads 
represent on the total business of the company). Of course, such methods do not isolate 
costs due to inefficiencies of the operator, which raises the issue of whether 
competitors should be called to pay for the part of such costs that may be attributed to 
prices charged for services provided to them.  
 
In that respect, the choice of proper regulatory accounting principles and systems 
becomes of crucial importance for the effective application of accounting separation. 
Economists have recognised that the choice of an accounting system may depend on 
the result that the firm wants to present, namely the method of apportionment may be 
driven by the costs that the firm wants to show as attributed to specific activities. 
Billing provides a representative example of this case. If an operator uses as allocator 
relative volumes of traffic, this results in a larger apportionment of costs to relatively 
high-priced services, such as international direct dialled calls; whereas in the event of 
billing per minutes of traffic, this results in higher costs being apportioned to local 
calls, where traffic volumes are high, but prices relatively low698. 
 
                                            
695 Ibid at footnote 23. 
696 BT, Primary Accounting Documents, November 2004, section 2.3.3.3. 
697 Waters, P., Yuen, A., ibid., 237. 
698 Ibid. In the first set of separate financial accounts that BT released in October 1995, it was suggested 
that access and apparatus supply were provided at a loss, whereas local, national and international calls 
generated more than double the access deficit. 
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The Commission has always viewed favourably accounting separation as a measure 
against exploitative behaviour in telecoms. Directive 96/19/EC699 had already required 
putting a system of separate accounts for operator services in place in view of the 
liberalisation of voice telephony services in 1998. Accounting separation was also 
considered a useful tool for the implementation of interconnection obligations, with 
particular regard to the principles of transparency and cost-orientation700. 
 
Under the current framework, accounting separation may be imposed both at 
wholesale and at retail level. The USO Directive does not include specific guidance on 
the implementation of such obligations other than the general principles of 
reasonableness, proportionality etc., of Article 17 of the USO Directive. Article 11 of 
the Access Directive places the following limitations with respect to the application of 
accounting separation as a measure against SMP at wholesale level: accounting 
separation may be imposed a) in relation to specified activities related to 
interconnection and/or access; and b) the obligation may be placed on vertically 
integrated companies only.  
 
Accounting separation has been regarded as the only efficient and practical means of 
achieving the requirements of non-discrimination and transparency701. Without 
accounting separation, the principles of non-discrimination and transparency run the 
risk of remaining aspirations, as the only credible way of ascertaining whether the 
correct costs are being applied respectively to wholesale and retail products is through 
accounting separation702. In this line of thinking, the ERG have viewed the separation 
of the company’ s business accounts more as a measure complementing transparency 
                                            
699 Article 8 of Commission Directive 96/19/EC amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the 
implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets, [1996] OJ L74. 
700 Recital 11 and Articles 7 and 8 of Directive 97/33/EC.  
701 Tarrant, A., Accounting Separation: The Hole in the Heart of the EU Telecommunications Regime, 
[2003] ECLR,, 273-274. He also argues that benchmarking exercises demonstrate that prices for some 
typical wholesale products are often 50 to 100 per cent higher in the member-states that do not appear to 
have implemented accounting separation than in the UK and Ireland where accounting separation is 
applied. 
702 The accounting information that NRAs may require under Article 9 par. 1 of the Access Directive is 
not tantamount to the imposition of specific accounting format and methodology pursuant to Article 11 
par. 1 of the same Directive. Similarly, the imposition of specific accounting format and methodology 
for the application of accounting separation is different and less strict than the cost accounting 
obligations that may be imposed pursuant to Article 13 par. 1 of the Access Directive. These are 
discussed in chapter 5. 
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and non-discrimination obligations703 or price controls704 rather than a measure in 
itself. Indeed, in the majority of accounting separation measures notified under Article 
7 of the Framework Directive, the respective notifications included obligations on 
transparency, non discrimination and pricing obligations705. This means that 
transparency, non-discrimination and accounting separation obligations are essentially 
one and the same measure, since the latter forms the means of ensuring application of 
the former. 
 
The direct association of accounting separation with the obligations on transparency 
and non-discrimination suggests that problems similar to that identified in relation to 
transparency and non-discrimination also apply in this area regarding co-ordinated 
effects and the possible promotion or facilitation of tacit collusion706. Information 
required for accounting separation purposes may not be available in the normal course 
of business operations through the use of the more general Article 5 of the Framework 
Directive obliging undertakings to provide NRAs with the financial information 
necessary to ensure conformity with the provisions of the Directive; this means that 
through the imposition of obligations on accounting separation, if the relevant 
accounting details are publicly disclosed, the exchange of business information may be 
facilitated and, consequently, the sustainability of a common position towards 
competitors and consumers.  
 
According to Article 11 of the Access Directive, the publication of the relevant 
information is not mandatory, but rather an option for the NRAs that decide to apply 
obligations on accounting separation: 
“National regulatory authorities may publish such information as would 
contribute to an open and competitive market, while respecting national and 
Community rules on commercial confidentiality”. 
 
                                            
703 The ERG Common Position on SMP remedies, 41, 48, 49, 52 etc. 
704 Ibid., 14. 
705 Indicative reference is made to the following recent cases: FR/2010/1050, IT/2009/1025- 1027, 
PL/2010/1056, FR/2010/1094, RO/2010/1101-02, IE/2010/1104, AT/2010/1107, DK/2010/1099, 
LT/2009/1022, SE/2010/1032, EE/2010/1038, LV/2010/1043-1044, AT/2010/1046-1048, 
SE/2010/1061-1062, CZ/2010/1070, EL/2010/1072, 1074, CY/2010/1076, UK/2010/1062, 
DK/2010/1023  In CZ/2010/1037, accounting separation was imposed together with access obligations 
on carrier selection and pre-selection. 
706 The ERG Common Position on SMP remedies, 44. 
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On the other hand, Article 15 par. 1 of the Access Directive quotes:  
“Member States shall ensure that the specific obligations imposed on 
undertakings under this Directive are published and that the specific 
product/service and geographical markets are identified. They shall ensure 
that up-to-date information, provided that the information is not confidential 
and, in particular, does not comprise business secrets, is made publicly 
available in a manner that guarantees all interested parties easy access to that 
information”.  
 
And recital 13 of the Framework Directive: 
“Information gathered by national regulatory authorities should be publicly 
available, except in so far as it is confidential in accordance with national 
rules on public access to information and subject to Community and national 
law on business confidentiality”.  
 
The foregoing provisions of Article 15 par. 1 of the Access Directive and the recital 13 
of the Framework Directive should not be interpreted as negating the option of NRAs 
not to disclose information collected through the application of accounting separation 
obligations save as to the personnel of NRAs, acting under strict confidentiality duties. 
In fact, such option is valuable for oligopolistic markets, since the revelation of 
business processes, efficiencies and strategies to competitors can be mitigated by 
appropriate control of information707. In oligopolistic markets, should NRAs decide to 
apply accounting separation obligations on operators for the control of transparency 
and/or pricing obligations, the publication of the relevant information should be 
avoided, in order to mitigate the downsides of accounting separation in oligopolistic 
environments, notably the risk of enhancing collusion between market players. 
 
In Cases IE/2004/121, MT/2006/0443 and IT/2007/0729, the Irish, Maltese and Italian 
NRAs imposed obligations of accounting separation on the entities designated as 
holding SMP in the oligopolistic markets for mobile access and call origination and 
analogue broadcasting, but the non- confidential version of the relevant notifications 
does not provide information on whether the relevant data were made public or not. 
The Commission did not express any concern as to the suitability of the relevant 




measure (nor to its publication or not), which shows the similar treatment of 
monopolistic and oligopolistic situations despite the differences between the two. 
5.3.2 Functional Separation 
 
The degree of uncertainty and arbitrariness entailed in the application of proper 
accounting methods for implementing accounting separation have led some to question 
the meaningfulness of the results generated by cost separation processes and, as a 
consequence, the degree of protection which costing can provide against anti-
competitive pricing of access facilities708. The failure of costing as a mechanism for 
preventing cross-subsidisation of the competitive long-distance business of Bell 
Operating Company by its monopoly local revenues is said to be one of the reasons for 
its breaking-up into AT&T and Regional Bell Companies709.  
 
Structural (or functional) separation was not included in the original list of measures of 
the Access Directive and was added as a new measure on the list by virtue of Directive 
2009/140/EC. Structural separation commonly involves the spinning off of a business, 
formerly part of a larger integrated whole, into a separate legal operating entity710. 
Structurally separated businesses remaining under ownership of the same entity, are to 
be distinguished from divested, separately owned entities.  
 
Advocates of the structural separation argue that conventional regulatory approaches 
address specific occurrences of abusive behaviour, but do nothing to remove the 
incentive to repeat similar behaviour in the future711. The benefit of this measure lies 
mainly in the potential for the divested entity to act independently from its former 
integrated whole, develop its own marketing policy and promote its services in the 
industry with the prospect of widening its target client group, which would not 
necessarily comprise solely of its mother company. Structural separation has also been 
                                            
708 Ryan, M., BT’ s Separate Accounts, [1996] 4 CTLR, 146. 
709 Ibid., 148. 
710 Solomon, J., Walker, D., ibid., 86. 
711 Ryan, M., Structural Separation: A Prerequisite for Effective Telecoms Competition?, [2003] ECLR,, 
245. Unbundling and accounting separation have been suggested as alternatives to structural separation. 
In the US, other alternatives have referred to behavioural regulation, such as codes of conduct 
prescribing the behaviour of the incumbent in sensitive areas (non-discrimination against competitors, 
no cross-subsidisation, no unfair or deceptive advertising or marketing, etc.). Pennsylvania PUC, 
Proposed Rulemaking, L-00990141, November 30,2001, 32 Pa.B. 1986, in Ryan, ibid., 246-249. 
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supported by those who believe that there is little point in duplicating infrastructure, 
particularly in a broadband environment with excess capacity over existing 
networks712.  
 
The hesitation of regulatory authorities to adopt structural remedies is usually 
attributed a) to the risk of welfare losses outweighing any gains flowing from increased 
competition, as a result of abolishing the economies of scale and scope associated with 
the integration of services and b) to the concern that the remaining set of functions will 
not operate as incentive to innovate713. In October 2005, the Commission published a 
study on remedies which evaluated the effectiveness of remedies adopted in merger 
decisions in the period 1996 – 2000. The study challenged the preference of the 
Remedies Notice714 to divestiture commitments because of the various practical 
problems entailed in structural separation (insufficiently defined scope of the divested 
business, which was usually confined in the parties’ overlapping activities, 
unsuitability of the purchaser, deterioration of the divested package during the 
divestiture process)715. 
 
In fact, heavy investment requirements in broadband networks have been used as an 
argument in favour of vertical integration and in favour of relaxed views on dominant 
positions, including prevention of legal separation of networks under the competition 
rules716. It is reported that Australia’s Productivity Commission had rejected structural 
and operational separation models for Telstra, because the transaction costs involved in 
its separation would be too large and would be disproportional to any potential benefits 
of any such separation717. 
 
Operational separation makes the fundamental problems of accounting separation in 
network industries and telecoms in particular worse, as the concept of notionally 
dividing assets that cannot physically be divided or separated requires a ‘duct-tapping’ 
                                            
712 Solomon, J., Walker, D., ibid., 88. 
713 Ryan, M., ibid. at footnote 147, 242.  
714 Commission Notice on Remedies Acceptable under Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89 and under 
Commission Regulation (EC) 447/98, [2001] OJ C68/3. 
715 DG Competition, Merger Remedy Study, October 2005, available at 
http//:europa.eu.int/comm./competition/mergers/others/remedies_study.pdf, (the Remedies Study). 
716 Sauter, W., Telecommunications: The Consultation on EU Regulation for Convergence, (1999)1 Util. 
LawRev., 4-5. 
717 Waters, P., Yuen, A., ibid., 233. 
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solution, where notional physical lines are drawn through common assets. The end 
result is that a complex mechanism for internal transfer pricing will need to be 
developed718. 
 
The European Commission had adopted a pro-structural separation approach between 
telecommunication and cable TV networks in Directive 1999/64/EC719, by imposing 
the structural separation of telecommunication and cable TV networks for dominant 
undertakings. However, the reasons brought forward for applying such measures were 
slightly different from the arguments described above. In particular, in the Cable 
Review, issued by the Commission shortly before drafting the Directive, it was 
explained that cable-TV operators had no incentive to upgrade their networks, which 
could be used for unilateral communications with the users, to provide bi-directional 
operations, such as voice telephony720. In addition, the Commission saw further 
restrictions in the fact that access to the local loop with regard to both networks was 
controlled by the same operator. In justifying this context, the Commission referred to 
the reduction of BT’ s market share in the local loop after the arrival of cable 
companies, which was more effective than the entry of Mercury as a new 
competitor721.  
 
It also identified in the preamble of the Directive that the accounting separation of the 
same networks, which was previously imposed by Directive 95/51/EC722  
“has not provided the necessary safeguards against all forms of anti-
competitive behaviour […] in situations where serious conflicts of interest 
exist as a result of joint ownership”. 
 
Commentators have supported this choice on the grounds that a non-profitable 
operation of non-upgraded cable-TV networks becomes particularly obvious with legal 
separation, whereas full profits and losses of either network operation do not become 
                                            
718 Waters, P., Yuen, A., ibid. 
719 Commission Directive 1999/64/EC of 23 June 1999 amending Directive 90/388/EEC in order to 
ensure that telecommunication networks and cable TV networks owned by a single operator are separate 
legal entities, OJ L175/39.  
720 Commission Communication concerning the review under competition rules of the joint provision of 
telecommunications and cable TV networks by a single operator and the abolition of restrictions on the 
provision of cable TV capacity over telecommunications networks, [1998] OJ C71/4, par. 31. 
721 Ibid., par. 34. 
722 Commission Directive 95/51/EC of 26.10.1995, OJ L256/49. 
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apparent with mere accounting separation723. It is noteworthy that in the Cable Review, 
the Commission had even suggested divestment of cable TV networks in the light of 
special circumstances724.  
 
In September 2007, two months before the launching of the proposals for the revised 
telecommunications framework, the Commission published its proposals for the 
reform of the energy market, later passed as Directive 2009/72/EC725, including the 
separation of generation and supply activities of undertakings active in energy markets.  
 
In the revised 2009 Access Directive726, the Commission added functional separation 
in the list of measures that NRAs may apply on vertically integrated 
telecommunication operators in the frame of SMP regulation on wholesale markets and 
allowed voluntary separation of networks and services in the model adopted a couple 
of years earlier by BT. In view of the principle of proportionality and the significant 
downsides entailed in the separation of business entities, Article 13a of the Access 
Directive explains that the application of functional separation should be regarded as a 
measure of last resort: 
‘Where the national regulatory authority concludes that the appropriate 
obligations imposed under Articles 9 to 13 have failed to achieve effective 
competition and that there are important and persisting competition problems 
and/or market failures identified in relation to the wholesale provision of 
certain access product markets, it may, as an exceptional measure, in 
accordance with the provisions of the second subparagraph of Article 8(3), 
impose an obligation on vertically integrated undertakings to place activities 
related to the wholesale provision of relevant access products in an 
independently operating business entity. 
That business entity shall supply access products and services to all 
undertakings, including to other business entities within the parent company, 
                                            
723 Bartosch, A., E.C. Telecommunications Law: The New Draft Directive on the Legal Separation of 
Networks, [1998] ECLR, 519. 
724 Par. 68. This view has been supported also in jurisprudence, e.g. refer to Mc Callum, Linsey, EC 
Competition Law and Digital Pay Television, [1999] 1 Competition Policy Newsletter, 10-11. 
725 Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning 
common rules for the internal market on electricity repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, OJ L211/55. 
726 Article 13a of the Access Directive. 
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on the same timescales, terms and conditions, including those relating to 
price and service levels, and by means of the same systems and processes’.  
 
Functional separation requires the separation of network infrastructure from the units 
offering services on top of this infrastructure with the overall ownership remaining 
unchanged, despite the creation of operationally separate business entities. Functional 
separation is claimed to fuel competition and at the same time strengthen incentives for 
the operator and for new entrants to invest in networks and services727. In order to 
avoid distortions of competition in the internal market, proposals for functional 
separation must be approved in advance by the Commission728.  
 
Until 2005, the typical paradigm of structural separation in the telecommunications 
sector for regulatory purposes was the structural separation of the local operating units 
of AT & T in the US into what were known as the regional Bell operating 
companies729. On 22 September 2005, BT announced the structural separation of its 
networks and services. The decision came as no surprise to many, who had predicted 
such solution as the only way-out from the unenforceable ‘equivalence’ principle 
imposed by Ofcom with its 2004 telecommunications review, instructing the 
‘operational separation’ of BT730. Ofcom proposed to roll back regulation at retail level 
and to offer a way of avoiding a forced separation of the company’s retail and 
wholesale divisions, if BT achieved securing ‘equivalence’ between its retail arm and 
other access-seekers, which would be implemented through the operational separation 
of BT’ s networks and services. ‘Equivalence’ would be enforced by making a 
presumption of undue discrimination if the main features other than price of a 
regulated product (the ‘non-price transaction conditions’) are not identical to the 
product used by BT’s own downstream operations. In effect, Ofcom wished partially 
to reverse the burden of proof; BT would have to show that the non-price differences 
were justified.  
 
                                            
727 Recital 61 of Directive 2009/140/EC. 
728 Ibid. 
729 On January 1, 1984 the Bell System ceased to exist. Twenty-two Bell Operating Companies  were 
combined to form seven Regional Bell Operating Companies (which later merged to leave just four); 
and a new AT&T that retained its long distance, manufacturing, and research operations. The break-up 
was the result of the landmark antitrust case United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (DDC 1982). 
730 Issued November 18, 2004, available at : www.ofcom.org.uk/consultations/current/telecoms_p2/. 
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This change was designed to create positive incentives for BT for the development of 
workable wholesale products. In this way competitors would not only buy wholesale 
products under the same terms and conditions as BT’ s retail arm, but they would also 
influence over the development and deployment of such products and BT retail obtains 
no advantage at the retail level from being associated with BT wholesale, including 
benefits from sharing a brand731. 
 
BT would create a separate body (the ‘Access Services Division’), which would 
control and maintain both the local loop and backhaul duct and fibre assets. A very 
large number of BT staff would be employed in this organisation, which would have a 
new brand, and would be operationally separate from the rest of BT. The structure was 
designed to remove the incentives for BT to exploit its control of these assets, but from 
the very beginning the measure was considered as forcing BT’s structural separation. 
The separation was welcomed by BT’s competitors at service level who have long 
complained that the company was hindering competition by maintaining its 
stranglehold on the local loop. According to the European Commission, when BT’s 
business was separated in 2005 only 105,000 unbundled access lines existed, and in 
two years, the number grew to 3 million732. However, reference is also made to the 
high costs of the restructuring, which were estimated to exceed 200 million BP for 
upgrading the IT systems only733. 
 
Voluntary structural separation, in compliance with BT’s paradigm, has been favoured 
by scholars as a way-out from the dual regime subjecting only some activities to 
regulation, because it limits the scope of economic activity which is subject to 
regulation and creates more certainty734 and was ultimately endorsed under Article 
                                            
731 For a summary of the debate around the viability of the proposed regulation refer to Richardson, T., 
BT faces life changing three months, 22 November 2004, www.register.com. The fact that BT 
Wholesale and BT retail continue to be part of the same legal and economic entity inevitably put such 
ambitious plan into question, not only because of the pragmatic difficulties inhered in the associated 
economies of scale and scope (which are precisely aiming at creating benefits for the associated 
undertakings), but also because of the psychological effects created by the reality of belonging to same 
group and the incentives to maximise its overall profitability. 
732 European Commission, 2007 Telecoms Reform No. 2, November 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/ecomm. 
733 Refer to www.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0,3604,1576402100.html, www.theregister.co.uk/2004/ 
11/18/ofcom_ukif_review, www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/18/review_ofcom, www.theregister.co.uk 
/2004/11/22/bt_telecom_review. 
734 Lehr, W., Hubbard, G., Economic case for voluntary structural separation, at 
http://itc.mit.edu/itel/docs/2003/struct-separation.pdf. Also, Salerno, F., Neutral Networks: The Paradox 
of Unbundling in the European Regulation of Energy and Telecommunications, [2008] ECLR 471-479. 
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13(b) of the revised Access Directive. It is reported that BT’s main motivation for the 
separation of its networks and services operations was the desire for more certainty in 
terms of costs of capital and returns prior to investing in next generation networks 
(NGNs)735. 
 
The background to the adoption of functional separation obligations shows that the 
measure was primarily intended to regulate the business of former incumbents. This is 
corroborated by the main examples of such forms of business separation in the 
telecommunications sector, notably AT&T and BT. Also, in 1999, when the 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission mandated structural separation of the 
incumbent Verizon, it considered structural separation as the most efficient tool to 
ensure local telephone competition where a large incumbent monopoly controls the 
market736. 
 
In addition, as set out in the previous paragraphs, according to the Commission in the 
Cable Review, structural separation of cable and telecom networks was suggested as a 
remedy to restrictions stemming from the fact that access to the local loop with regard 
to both networks was controlled by the same operator. It is also noted that structural 
separation was adopted as an additional measure at a time when a lot was being 
discussed at European Commission level on the effective separation of distribution 
networks from the activities of generation and supply, notably of activities of 
incumbent operators on national electricity markets737. This observation also shows 
that structural separation is mainly intended to apply on monopolistic situations.  
 
This approach remains unaltered under the revised framework. The Commission itself 
has justified the endorsement of functional separation as a new measure with the 
ability to assist against unfair discrimination of new entrants by incumbents738.  
 
In electronic communications, structural separation is claimed to be introduced in 
markets where there is still a flagrant lack of competition by incumbent operators, still 
                                            
735 Waters, P., Yuen, A., ibid., 233. 
736 Ibid., 238. 
737 Refer to Salerno, F., Neutral Networks: The Paradox of Unbundling in the European Regulation of 
Energy and Telecommunications, [2008] ECLR 471-479, for a description of the rules of the electricity 
markets.  
738 European Commission, 2007 Telecoms Reform No. 2, November 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/ecomm. 
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controlling the vast majority of the fixed access lines, where facilities-based 
competition has been limited and regulatory requirements designed to facilitate entry 
into the local segment through resale or unbundling requirements have proven very 
difficult to implement in large part due to the regulators’ inability to prevent local 
incumbents from resorting to exclusionary tactics739. Economic literature has 
summarised the factors warranting structural measures on telecommunications access 
markets in the following: 
i) competition in the local loop is limited; 
ii) unbundling is either not required or difficult to implement; 
iii) the telecommunications regulator appears unable to enforce non-structural 
safeguards; and 
iv) there seem to be few competitors strong enough to enter the local market 
and mount a strong challenge to the incumbent740. 
 
In other words, structural separation is not introduced as a measure enhancing 
facilities-based competition, which is the most efficient means against market 
concentration in network markets, but as the means of achieving better competitive 
results in the short to medium term.  
 
When competition starts to take hold, and this is what is happening in oligopolistic 
markets, where competitive forces may range from full competition to virtually 
monopoly effects, depending on the characteristics of the market’s structure, structural 
separation does not improve the effectiveness of competition.  
 
There is no reported implementation of structural or operational separation for 
regulatory purposes in oligopolistic markets. In fact, the efficiency of structural 
separation for the purposes of regulating oligopolistic markets is disputed, because of 
the increased transparency created through the separation of operations. The Australian 
Government favoured the operational separation of Telstra’s activities, because, among 
other, it would improve transparency of Telstra’s operation and equivalence to 
Telstra’s wholesale customers quickly without significantly impacting on Telstra’s 
                                            
739 Geradin, D., Kerf. M., Controlling market power in telecommunications, OUP, 2003, 329. 
740 Ibid., 331. 
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existing commercial activities741. In its Cable Review, the Commission had explained 
that 
“the mere separation of accounts will only render financial flows more 
transparent, whereas legal separation will lead to more transparency of assets 
and costs and will facilitate monitoring of the profitability and the 
management of the cable network operations”742 [emphasis added]. 
 
It is reminded from preceding analysis that, transparency is a key factor to the 
establishment of collusive behaviour in oligopoly members and that transparency 
obligations should be imposed with caution for the regulation of SMP in oligopolistic 
markets. 
 
Further, economists have challenged the effectiveness of structural remedies in 
oligopolistic environments on the grounds that inappropriate divestments may actually 
facilitate collusion by restructuring an industry in a more symmetric way743. Structural 
remedies have been considered inappropriate in the context of mergers leading to the 
creation of an asymmetric oligopoly, where the predicted collusive outcome takes the 
form of price leadership, since they may concomitantly increase the overall symmetry 
of market shares within the entire oligopoly. In such cases, a divestiture to a third party 
will simply change the nature of collusion on the market744. 
 
The reduced effectiveness of structural separation in oligopolistic environments should 
be also examined in the light of the risks entailed in such measure which were 
described at the beginning of this sub-section, notably of the risk of welfare losses, as a 
result of abolishing economies of scale and scope and particularly of the concern that 
                                            
741 Waters, P., Yuen, A., ibid., 233. 
742 Par. 53. 
743 Papandropoulos, P., Tajana, A., The Merger Remedies Study – In Divestiture we Trust?, [2006] 
ECLR,, 449. 
744 Petit, N., Remedies for Coordinated Effects under the European Union Merger Regulation, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1639906, 12. Petit refers also to  Alcan/Pechiney, 
where the Commission found that the merged entity and VAW (the second largest producer of 
aluminium flat-rolled products) would occupy a duopolistic dominant position. The Commission 
observed that thanks to its prevailing position within the duopoly, the merged entity would be able to 
enrol VAW into a tacitly collusive scheme. To alleviate the Commission’s concerns, the parties offered 
to divest part of their aluminium rolling capacity. The Commission rejected the proposed remedy. 
Anticipating that VAW would likely acquire the divested capacity, the Commission predicted that the 




the remaining set of functions will not operate as incentive to innovate. The last 
concern is of particular significance, since oligopolistic markets are likely to arise in 
relation to products and services with heavy investment requirements. 
 
5.4 Access Obligations 
5.4.1 The duty to share an (essential) facility 
 
Article 102 does not, in principle, impose upon dominant companies a general duty to 
deal with others or to share their assets with others primarily because the freedom of 
contract is a fundamental principle enshrined in EC competition law and the laws of 
the member states745 and the dominant position of an undertaking does not deprive it of 
the right to protect its commercial interests. Protecting competitors is not an end in 
itself, but rather the means of protecting consumers, all the more so when limitations 
on the firm’ s decision-making runs the risk of hindering innovation746.  
 
However, an undertaking may be found to abuse its dominant position in the market, if 
it uses that position to eliminate competition in a neighbouring market by means of a 
refusal to supply. The first time the CJEU adopted such approach was in Commercial 
Solvents747, where it held that a refusal to supply an existing competitor by an 
undertaking abusing its dominant position in a market to force its way into a 
neighbouring market is in breach of Article 102 of the Treaty. The Court went further 
in United Brands748, by ascertaining that the dominant firm cannot stop supplying a 
long-standing customer, who abides by regular commercial practice. Magill749, which 
concerned the refusal of three TV operators to grant access to their weekly programme 
listings750, was the first case to establish a positive obligation on the dominant firm to 
supply a new customer willing to compete with it on an ancillary market.  
                                            
745 Grewlich, K., “Cyberspace”: Sector-Specific Regulation and Competition Rules in European 
Telecommunications [1999] C.M.L.Rev,, 959. 
746 Subiotto, R., O’ Donogue, R., Defining the Scope of the Duty of Dominant Firms to Deal with 
Existing Customers under Article 82 EC, [2003] ECLR, 683-684. 
747 Cases 6, 7/73, Commercial Solvents v. Commission, [1974] ECR 223. 
748 Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, [1978] ECR 207. 
749 Joined Cases C-241/91 and 242/91, RTE and ITP v. Commission of the European Communities, 
Judgement of April 6, 1995. 
750 As such, Magill has been regarded as a “ghost” oligopolistic case (refer to Petit, N., The Oligopoly 




In IMS Health751, the ECJ held that a refusal to provide access to indispensable 
elements for a competitor to carry on its business is abusive if three conditions are met, 
namely that the refusal is preventing the emergence of a new product that consumers 
may demand, that it is unjustified, and it is likely to eliminate all market competition 
where the new product emerges. “Elimination of all competition” and 
“indispensability” do not need to be absolute. If the Court has to wait until all 
competition is actually eliminated, the harm to consumers and industry would be 
irreparable752. The position was reiterated in Deutsche Telekom753 and TeliaSonera 
Sverige754. 
 
‘Refusal to deal’ principles apply equally to existing customers and first-time requests. 
This is also the position taken in the Access Notice, which was the first Commission 
document to set out comprehensive access principles in the telecommunications 
sector755. The practical differences between the two lie in that in existing customers 
cases, it is more difficult for the defendant to argue that it has a valid business 
justification for ceasing to supply the complainant, unless circumstances have changed 
and in that in new customer cases, it is more difficult to resolve the issue of 
determining the proper price and terms of access756. 
 
US antitrust law has developed the essential facility doctrine to justify imposing an 
obligation on a dominant firm to share its assets with competitors757. A facility 
                                            
751 Case C-418/01, judgement of 29 April 2004. 
752 Le, N., What Does “Capable of Eliminating all Competition” Mean?, [2005] ECLR 7. 
753 Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission [2010] ECR I-9555. The judgment of the 
ECJ confirms that even in circumstances where the conduct of a national regulatory authority may be 
regarded as having encouraged a dominant company to act in an abusive manner, this cannot serve to 
absolve a company from responsibility under Article 102 TFEU. Provided that national law affords a 
dominant company a margin of discretion, that company must use that margin in a way so as to avoid 
engaging in abusive conduct.  
754 Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB [2011] ECR I-527. 
755 The Access Notice, par. 83f. 
756 Ritter, C., Refusal to Deal and “Essential Facilities”: Does Intellectual Property Require Special 
Deference Compared to Tangible Property?, [2005] World Competition, 285. 
757 The doctrine has been expressed by lower Courts in the US in several cases including United States 
vs Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis (1912) 224 U.S. 383, 32 S. Ct. 507, Associated Press v. 
United States (1945) 326 U.S. 1, Otter Tail Power v. United States (1948) 334 U.S. 100, Aspen Skiing 
Co v Aspen Skiing Corp (Aspen) (1985) 472 U.S. 585, 610. In MCI v. AT & T, 708 F.2d 1081, the Court 
summarised four premises for the application of the essential facilities doctrine, as follows: a) control of 
the essential facility by a monopolist, b) a competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate 
the essential facility, c) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor and d) the feasibility of 
providing the facility. 
192 
 
controlled by a single firm will be considered “essential” under the essential facilities 
doctrine only if the control of the facility carries with it the power to eliminate 
competition in a downstream market758. The essential facility concept was at the centre 
of the Access Notice, as it was considered that the concept would be of relevance in 
determining the duties of relevant Telecommunications Operators759. The Access 
Notice summarised the elements that must be taken into account for the imposition of 
access obligations as follows: a) access to the facility must be essential for companies 
to compete on the related market; b) there is sufficient capacity to provide the access; 
c) the facility owner fails to satisfy demand on an existing service, blocks the 
emergence of a potential new service or impedes competition on an existing or 
potential service or product market; d) there is no objective justification for refusing to 
provide access on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and prices760. 
 
However, the significance of the essential facilities doctrine is debatable under EC 
competition law, since for the application of Article 102, such doctrine is not required. 
In an EC context,  
‘The only benefit of the doctrine is its function as a catchword for a specific 
group of cases, in which the abuse of a dominant market position, and often 
the dominant position itself, emerges from the exclusive control over a 
specific facility’761. 
 
Reliance on the essential facilities doctrine or refusal to deal principles should not be 
over-zealous, because this carries the risk of damage to the system of dynamic 
incentives to economic efficiency on which economic and technical progress relies762. 
An asset may qualify as essential facility if it is acknowledged that it is neither feasible 
nor even desirable for competitors to replicate the asset concerned. The owner of the 
                                            
758 Subiotto, R., The Right to Deal with Whom One Pleases under EEC Competition Law: A small 
Contribution to a Necessary Debate, [1992] ECLR, 243. 
759 European Commission, Notice on the application of competition rules to access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector, [1992] OJ C 265/2, par. 68f. 
760 Par. 91 of the Access Notice. 
761 Mueller, U., Rodenhausen, A., The Rise and Fall of the Essential Facility Doctrine, [2008] ECLR, 
319. The authors also rebut the thesis that European law adopted the essential facilities doctrine from 
US law on the grounds that neither the Commission nor the ECJ ever refer to US law in the essential 
facility cases, like Commercial Solvents, CBEM/Telemarketing, Port of Rodby and Oscar Bronner, 
although it is not excluded that they were factually influenced by US judicature. 
762 Nikolinakos, N., The New Legal Framework for Digital Gateways- the Complementary Nature of 
Competition Law and Sector-specific Regulation, [2000]9 ECLR, 411-414. 
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essential facility should not be subject to competitive pressure, either in the form of 
existing assets also competing at the upstream level, or in the form of potential assets 
that other firms might create763. If competitors were able to immediately enter the 
market and become fully competitive in the static sense, then prices would drop and 
profits would be driven to zero, thus eliminating future incentives to innovate764.  
 
In very innovative environments, in which the interconnection knowledge is constantly 
under challenge, the control over the system’s design configuration can become an 
essential precondition for the capacity of the firm to innovate its own activity765. In 
Microsoft766, the Commission imposed the burden of proof on defendants, who must 
show that their refusal to supply does not reduce incentives to innovate767. In the same 
case, the Commission and the GC were considered to give overwhelming importance 
to the regulation of conduct which distorts market structure and damages competitors, 
rather than an assessment of what this behaviour may indicate about possible 
anticompetitive purposes and consumer detriment768, which supported the view that 
the judgement should be characterised as an essential facility case, because of the 
importance of compatibility and connectivity in the software industry where network 
effects were pervasive769.  
 
                                            
763 Ridyard, D., Essential Facilities and the Obligation to Supply Competitors under UK and EC 
Competition Law, [1996] ECLR,, 438-448. 
764 Wielsch, D., Competition Policy for Information Platform Technology, [2004] ECLR, 103. 
765 Kerber, W., Vezzoso, S., EU Competition Policy, Vertical Restraints and Innovation: An Analysis 
from an Evolutionary Perspective, [2005] World Competition, 527. 
766 Case COMP/C-3/37.792, EC Commission v. Microsoft, decision of 24 March 2004. The decision was 
upheld by the GC on September 17, 2007, OJ L 32/23. The Commission considered whether the 
information requested by Sun which Microsoft was deemed to have refused was needed by rival server 
operating system vendors to enable their work group server operating systems to interoperate with 
Microsoft’s client computers as well as with Microsoft’s work group server operating systems on the 
same network. The Decision concluded that Microsoft’s competitors needed access to “protocols” that 
provide “set[s] of “rules of interconnection and interaction” between Windows client and work group 
server operating systems on different computers in a work group network.”, par. 39) 
767 Leveque, F., Innovation, Leveraging and Essential Facilities: Interoperability Licensing in the EU 
Microsoft Case, [2005] World Competition, 71-91. 
768 Howarth, D., McMahon, K., “Windows has Performed an Illegal Operation”: the Court of First 
Instance’s Judgement in Microsoft v Commission, [2008] ECLR, 124. 
769 Ibid. Howarth and McMahon express the view that reconciling Microsoft with the Discussion Paper 
is difficult in that in par. 4 it sets out the object of Article 82 as a means of enhancing consumer welfare 
and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. In the same line, Colomo Ibanez, P., The Law on 
Abuses of Dominance and the System of Judicial Remedies, LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers 13/2013, http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2013-13_Ibanez.pdf, argues that where 
the Microsoft standard applies, it is not necessary to show that rivals have actually been (or are likely to  
be, in light of the context in which the practice is implemented) foreclosed from the relevant market; this 
creates legal uncertainty since it shows that lower or different substantive standards may be 
subsequently endorsed by the Commission and European Courts. 
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The Remedies Study770 suggested the failure of access obligations in merger cases, but 
the small sample of cases with access remedies that were examined does not allow 
firm conclusions to be drawn. In fact, remedies involving the granting of access to 
infrastructure or other types of technology platforms were imposed on 9% of merger 
cases examined under the Remedies Study, whereas only 4 out of a total of 96 cases 
examined under the study involved access to infrastructure771. Nonetheless, the study 
pointed out that in 3 out of these 4 cases, i.e. in 75% of the cases, access obligations 
were not proved effective mainly because of the limited period of application (3 years), 
which was not revisited upon expiry of this original term. According to the Study, this 
was due to the fact that the Commission’s original assessments as to the prompt 
development of the related market under review, which was considered ‘emerging’, 
did not materialise772. 
 
5.4.2. Ex ante access obligations as a specific demonstration of the refusal to deal 
principles 
 
Access obligations in European electronic communications were imposed for the first 
time in 1990 by means of the ONP Directive773, as the means of gradually liberalising 
an environment where telecommunication services were provided by the incumbent 
operator. Access obligations rest on competition law principles of refusal to supply. 
Access to wholesale electronic communication networks is vital for the economic 
success on many downstream markets for the provision of retail services.  
 
The former regulatory framework assumed that competition would be established if 
new operators were authorised not only to provide all telecommunications services in 
competition with historical operators, but also to build their own telecommunication 
networks (e.g. through equal access to public and scarce resources)774. But, 
competition among local networks cannot be introduced efficiently if it is not done 
quickly and on a massive scale. Access obligations were imposed on SMPs, because 
                                            
770 DG Competition, Merger Remedy Study, October 2005, available at 
http//:europa.eu.int/comm./competition/mergers/others/remedies_study.pdf, (the Remedies Study). 
771 The Remedies Study, par. 36-38. 
772 Ibid., p. 164f. 
773 Commission Directive 90/387/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the establishment of the internal market for 
telecommunications services through the implementation of open network provision, [1991] OJ L 192/1. 
774 E.g. article 1 par. 1 of the ONP Directive (Directive 90/387/EEC, refer to section 1.2.1 for details).  
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operators seeking to develop retail telecommunication services without their own 
networks depend on access to the former incumbent’ s facilities for local conveyance 
and connection to the customer base775. Wholesale open access rules for competitive 
suppliers utilising the facilities of the incumbent to reach end users, coupled with some 
form of a rate of return valuation has been considered the best policy response in static 
sectors plagued by last-mile monopoly776.  
 
Nonetheless, in electronic communications, the successful differentiation between the 
main access markets comprising an essential facility and the downstream markets may 
not be as clear as in the off-line economy777, whereas, doubts have been expressed on 
the indispensability of networks, like an internet-user network, as a facility778. The 
Access Notice describes the situations where the incumbent’s network may be 
considered an essential facility779.  
 
The most characteristic example of a market necessitating access obligations has been 
traditionally the local loop, which is a typical single dominance issue of the former 
incumbent780. Given the magnitude of investment required to reproduce a historical 
operator’s local network with full geographic reach, alternative operators are generally 
forced to roll out according to a linear protracted timetable781. This is the reason why 
                                            
775 The fundamental difference between the rules on liberalisation of telecommunications and rules in 
other sectors in the process of opening up to competition, such as electricity or railway transport is that 
in these sectors the starting point was a belief that the networks could not be reproduced and that it was 
therefore necessary to organise the regulatory framework so that the various players in the services 
market could use a sole network under equivalent conditions, Dupuis-Toubol, F., The French 
Telecommunications Monopoly: How to Break the Bottleneck of the Local Loop, [2002] CTLR,.131. 
776 Bittlingmayer, G., “Open Access:” the ideal and the real, [2002]26 Telecommunications Policy, 
300. 
777 Mueller, U., Rodenhausen, A., ibid., 329. 
778 Ibid. 
779 Par. 87f. 
780 Local loop is defined as the physical circuit between the telecommunications operator’s local 
exchange and the final customer’s premises. Traditionally, it takes the form of pairs of copper wires. 
With few exceptions (some areas of Finland and Denmark), in the pre-liberalisation period, the local 
loop of the incumbent operators was considered a utility and was built over a significant period of time 
through State funding. Vinje, Th., Kalimi, H., Does Competition Law require Unbundling of the Local 
Loop?, [2000]3 World Competition, 52. 
781 In the UK, despite the adoption of a network based competition policy, the goal of creating effective 
nationwide competition as regards local network infrastructure by means of operators other than BT 
building their own networks never came close to being realised (refer to Hunt, A., Dogma and 
Pragmatism in Telecoms Regulation: The case of Local Loop Unbundling, [2000] 4 Util. Law Rev., 
114). At the beginning of the 21st century, after one decade of operation by private cable companies, less 
than twenty per cent (20%) of UK households were connected to cable networks, whereas the 
extravagant amounts spent by operators for auctioning 3G licenses impeded the success of auction for 
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in the early years of the liberalisation competition was considered not emerging in this 
area782, which necessitated the adoption of the LLU Regulation783.  
 
Competition in the local loop may be enhanced by means of using part(s) of the 
exchange network of the incumbent in conjunction with facilities provided by the 
competitor, i.e. by local loop unbundling (LLU)784, or through resale, i.e. by leasing 
wholesale circuits from the incumbent and selling capacity directly to users785. The 
increased demand for broadband services at affordable prices even for small to 
medium size enterprises (SMEs) operated as incentive for operators other than the 
incumbent to engage in the investment in DSL technologies786. On the contrary, the 
ability to offer competing services with the incumbent’ s traditional offering through 
the use of DSL technologies, such as voice over IP, acted as disincentive for the 
incumbents to invest in DSL787. 
 
However, long-term advantages of investing in infrastructure should not be sacrificed 
in the name of short-term consumer benefits.  Perhaps of the low returns available and 
short-sightedness about demand for broadband, under the former regulatory 
framework, the European Council and the Parliament underestimated the need of all 
operators, but particularly incumbents, to continue to invest heavily in 
                                                                                                                              
wireless fixed networks. Only 16 out of the 42 licenses offered in auction in November 2000 were sold. 
(Rowe, H., ibid, 252-253). 
782 European Commission, Communication from the Commission: Unbundled Access to the Local Loop: 
Enabling the competitive provision of a full range of electronic communication services including 
broadband multimedia and high-speed internet, COM (2000) 237 final, 26.4.2000, par. 1.2. 
783 Council Regulation 2887/2000 subsequently repealed under the 2009 revision of the Directives.  
784 The need to unbundle network elements allowing use of local loop only, acquired particular 
importance with the development of broadband services, which could not be supported by the 
technology of old copper wire networks, which had to be upgraded to allow provision of broadband. 
DSL technology can have the effect of extending the bandwith of the copper loop in order to render it 
capable of delivering high-speed services, such as high-speed internet access and broadband multi-
media services. Until then, local loop unbundling was not considered necessary and, in fact, was even 
thought to form an obstacle to the development of alternative infrastructure, Hunt, A., ibid., 114-115. 
785 Although resale appears to be the easiest method to enter the local market, it is the least financially 
attractive, because the discount between a competitive retail price and the assessed wholesale price for 
the use of the network tends to be small. Huntley, J., ibid., 332. 
786 Before the passing of Regulation 2887/2000, OFTEL had favoured a regulatory approach in a form 
of partial baseband leased circuit (PBLC) distinguished from complete LLU, in that an operator 
purchasing PBLC would also lease a low frequency portion enabling it supply over it telephony services 
together with DSL services over the high frequency portion. Refer to OFTEL, Access Network 
Facilities: OFTEL Guidelines on proposed condition 83 of BT’ s License (July 2000). At the time, 
Germany seemed to be the most advanced member state in LLU, as it obliged Deutsche Telecom to 
lease the copper pair without bundling it to other services and with terms and conditions for the 
provision of the copper pair set by the regulator. 
787 Vinje, Th., Kalimo, H., ibid., 51 
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telecommunications infrastructure in order to upgrade local networks to support high-
speed internet access services for both fixed and mobile services, resulting in a 
combination of very high levels with equally heavy expenditure commitments788. 
 
Under Recital 54 of Directive 2009/140/EC, the priority is on the promotion of new 
investment and the principle that access through regulation may be necessitated in 
order to achieve effective competition in retail services789. Under the framework for 
electronic communications the Commission has defined the markets at wholesale level 
where NRAs may impose compulsory access, thus qualifying the underlying facilities 
as essential for the provision of downstream telecom services. The obligations are 
similar to, but significantly broader than those in which the essential facilities doctrine 
is applied under competition law790. The extension lies in the replacement of the 
precondition on the ‘essentiality’ and ‘non-replicability’ of the asset by a much broader 
condition that NRAs can mandate access in circumstances where its denial would 
hinder the emergence of a sustainable competitive market at the retail level, or would 
not be in the end-user’s interest791. 
 
Imposing an obligation to allow access carries more weight when the facility has been 
built with public money rather than acquired under competitive conditions. This is 
made clear in the revised wording of Article 12 par. 2(c) of the Access Directive:  
“When national regulatory authorities are considering the obligations referred 
in paragraph 1, and in particular when assessing how such obligations would 
be imposed proportionate to the objectives set out in Article 8 of Directive 
2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), they shall take account in particular of 
the following factors: (a)… (b)… (c) the initial investment by the facility 
                                            
788 Dupuis-Toubol, F., ibid., 132-133. In the US, cable companies, who –at the time the 1996 
Telecommunications Act was introduced- were the only ones in a position to provide significant 
facilities-based competition, chose not to invest in upgrading their networks so as to enable them to 
provide telecommunications services, because it was thought that there were few incentives and there 
were cheaper options to compete in the local loop, if they so wished, Huntley, J., New Directions in US 
Telecommunications Regulation: The impact of the Telecommunications Act 1996 on “Local” 
Provision, [2000]3 International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 319. 
789 It has been reported that the DG Competition intended to develop an exclusivity period awarding the 
investments in tangible products, but it is unclear what kind of test should be applied, Toth, A., 
Protection of Investments in European Abuse of Dominance Cases, [2008] ECLR, 715. 
790 Cave, M., Crowther, P., Pre-emptive Competition Policy meets Regulatory Anti-trust, [2005] ECLR, 
484. 
791 Refer, e.g. to recital 55 of Directive 140/2009/EC. 
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owner, taking account of any public investment made and the risks involved 
in making the investment;”.  
 
The Commission argued in favour of a duty to allow access on Telefonica792, because 
the original investments on the network were undertaken in a context where the 
company was benefiting from special or exclusive rights, which implied that the 
investment criteria used by the former monopoly at that time would have led to the 
investment being made, even if there would have been a duty to supply793. Conversely, 
it cannot be upheld that only brand new infrastructure is subject to competition law’s 
regulatory holiday794. 
According to article 9 of the Access Directive, as amended by Article 2 of Directive 
2009/140/EC, operators may be required inter alia: 
(a) to give third parties access to specified network elements and/or facilities, 
including access to network elements which are not active and/or unbundled 
access to the local loop, to, inter alia, allow carrier selection and/or pre-
selection and/or subscriber line resale offer; 
(b) to negotiate in good faith with undertakings requesting access; 
(c) not to withdraw access to facilities already granted; 
(d) to provide specified services on a wholesale basis for resale by third 
parties; 
(e) to grant open access to technical interfaces, protocols or other key 
technologies that are indispensable for the interoperability of services or 
virtual network services; 
(f) to provide co-location or other forms of facility sharing, including duct, 
building or mast sharing; 
(g) to provide specified services needed to ensure interoperability of end-to-
end services to users, including facilities for intelligent network services or 
roaming on mobile networks; 
                                            
792 Case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo Espagna v Telefonica [2008]OJ C83/6, par. 304. 
793 The same position is taken also in the Discussion Paper, par. 235. 
794 Toth, A., Protection of Investments in European Abuse of Dominance Cases, [2008] ECLR, 712. 
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(h) to provide access to operational support systems or similar software 
systems necessary to ensure fair competition in the provision of services; 
(i) to interconnect networks or network facilities. 
National regulatory authorities may attach to those obligations conditions 
covering fairness, reasonableness and timeliness”. 
 
The determination of the terms governing access is a key to the proper functioning of 
access obligations. If network access is viewed as an essential facility, free negotiation 
can hardly be expected to provide a satisfactory solution795. In this sense, the non 
discrimination obligation described under section 5.2 is a condition precedent to the 
proper application of access obligations.  
 
On 20.09.2010, the Commission issued its 2010 Recommendation on NGA with the 
primary intention of covering remedies to be imposed upon operators designated as 
SMP, pursuant to the market analysis procedure of the Framework Directive with the 
view of increasing regulatory certainty to prospective investors796. Under the 
Recommendation the Commission requires in market 4 of the 2007 Recommendation 
the mandating of access to civil engineering infrastructure and in the case of FTTH of 
access to the terminating segment under the Equivalence of Input principle and at cost 
oriented rates797, as well as unbundled access to the fibre loop, unless the presence of 
several alternative infrastructures, such as FTTH networks and/or cable, in 
combination with competitive access offers is likely to result in effective competition 
on the downstream level798. In the migration to NGA from PSTN broadband, NRAs 
may impose on SMP operators ‘alternative access products which offer the nearest 
equivalent that constitutes a substitute to physical unbundling’799, although the ‘nearest 
equivalent’ is not defined further. On market 5 of the 2007 Recommendation, NRAs 
                                            
795 On 22.06.2011, the European Commission has imposed a fine of €127,5 million on Telekomunikacja 
Polska S.A. (TP) for abusing its dominant position in the Polish market for consistently refusing access 
(or making it more difficult) to alternative operators on downstream broadband markets by proposing 
unreasonable conditions governing access to the wholesale broadband products (e.g. exclusion or 
modification of contractual clauses and extension of deadlines to the detriment of alternative operators), 
delaying the negotiation process, rejecting alternative operators' access orders on unreasonable grounds 
and by refusing to provide reliable and complete General Information on its network (IP/11/771 and 
MEMO/11/444). 
796Recitals 4 and 6 and par. 1 and 2 of the Recommendation. 
797 Par. 13-20 of the Recommendation. 
798 Par. 23 of the Recommendation. 
799 Par. 21 of the Recommendation. 
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should oblige the SMP operator to make new wholesale broadband access products 
available in principle at least 6 months before the SMP operator or its retail subsidiary 
markets its own corresponding NGA retail services, unless there are other effective 
safeguards to guarantee non-discrimination800. 
 
 
The NGA Recommendation does not include any reference to collective SMP; on the 
contrary repeated references to applicable measures “on the SMP operator” (in the 
singular) create the impression that collective dominance issues were not considered at 
all in the context of the Recommendation. We shall now discuss problems associated 
with the application of access obligations in oligopolistic markets. 
 
5.4.3 Are oligopolies compatible with access obligations? 
 
Although the principles of the Access Notice are expressly said to apply in cases of 
collective dominance also801, the application of the principles behind access 
obligations in oligopolistic environments is not free from risks. 
 
First, the underlying principle of access obligations, which is found in the essential 
facilities doctrine, depends on the existence of a monopolistic situation and it is 
difficult to see how the essential facilities doctrine may apply in oligopolistic markets, 
unless the oligopolists control jointly the essential facility, as was the case of Port of 
Rodby802. In Phoenix/Global One803, the Commission imposed access obligations on 
DT and FT access to their respective X-data packet switched networks, on non-
discriminatory terms, including availability of volume or other discounts and the 
quality of the interconnection provided as a condition precedent for the clearance of 
the notification. But, that was for the separate national markets that DT and FT were 
                                            
800 Par. 32 of the Recommendation. 
801 Section 1.3, par. 76-80 of the Access Notice. 
802 Case 94/119/EC, [1994] OJ L55/52. In this case, the undertakings at issue were controlling jointly the 
Rodby-Putgartten route linking Germany and Denmark by sea and the refusal to allow a Swedish 
subsidiary to operate from the port of Rodby was found to constitute abuse of the parties’ joint dominant 
position. However, it is reminded from the analysis of section 5.1.2 that access obligations on SMPs 
may be broader than those applied under the essential facilities doctrine, since NRAs can mandate 
access in circumstances where its denial would hinder the emergence of a sustainable competitive 
market at the retail level, or would not be in the end-user’s interest. 
803 Case IV/35.617, Commission decision of 17 July 1996, OJ L 239/57.  
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operating. Also, in MCI/WorldCom804 the merging parties were considered part of the 
“big four” top-level ISPs globally, who were found to have a position stronger than the 
other ISPs, although possible oligopolistic or collusive behaviours between these four 
were not specifically examined. However, it was the merger itself that was found to 
cause the merged networks an essential facility, to which all other ISPs would have no 
choice but to interconnect (directly or indirectly) in order to offer a credible Internet 
access service805.  
 
Albeit statements relevant to collective dominance were omitted from the 
Commission’s Guidance on the enforcement of Article 102, in its 2005 Discussion 
paper, the Commission included in the enumerated possibly abusive practices from 
oligopolists refusal to supply access to an essential facility. In this document806 the 
Commission pointed primarily to the refusal of access to an input that is collectively 
owned by a group of companies, but it also accepted that refusal of access to the 
individual owned inputs can also constitute an abuse. 
 
However, if two or three dominant entities control access to their networks and they all 
unilaterally refuse to provide access to a potential competitor, it is difficult to make an 
equitable choice of the competitor that would have to allow access, whereas the 
existence of more than one network means a lack of essentiality807. The ERG pointed 
to the case of replicability of the assets as being a criterion which can be used to 
choose an appropriate remedy. If an asset is virtually non-replicable in the medium 
term, the imposition of pricing obligations is considered more appropriate, especially if 
there are no investment issues. The imposition of access obligations is considered 
more appropriate in cases where the asset is replicable, but after some time808. 
 
In IE/2004/0121, ES/2006/0330 and MT/2006/0443, the Irish, Spanish and Maltese 
NRAs considered that MNOs had strong incentives to deny wholesale access to third 
                                            
804 Case M.1069, Commission decision of 08 July 1998, OJ L 116/1. 
805 Par. 126 of the decision. 
806 Par. 74 and 211 of the Discussion Paper. 
807 However, Stratakis, A., Comparative Analysis of the US and EU approach and enforcement of the 
Essential Facilities Doctrine, [2006] ECLR, 440, argues that the essential facilities doctrine may be 
applied in a greater variety of situations in the EU, especially because taking advantage of a bottleneck 
situation through a collective denial of the use of a facility seems fairly easy to implement and monitor 
exclusionary behaviour on behalf of a group. 
808 ERG Common Position on SMP remedies, 58-59. 
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parties (MVNOs) and imposed access obligations on all mobile operators (two in 
Ireland and Malta and three in Spain) so that all reasonable requests for access are met. 
In case disputes arose as to the reasonableness of the request, the NRA would decide 
on the matter. However, the equitable choice of the operator that would allow access 
was not made. 
 
In IT/2007/0729, the Italian NRA imposed on the Italian broadcasters that were found 
to enjoy SMP in the analogue broadcasting market access obligations in the form of 
collocation and sharing of infrastructures and offer management of transmission 
devices on the grounds that this would enable the development and integration of third 
party broadcasters’ networks and the increase of their associated coverage. 
 
Second and more importantly, access remedies, involve the co-operation between the 
entity under scrutiny and third parties, may facilitate the exchange of information 
between competitors and, thus, collusion809. Indeed, the idea behind access obligations 
is the joint use of the same network or infrastructure by several competitors. The joint 
use of the same facilities by competitors produces more co-operation between them 
than necessary for independent companies, whereas free competition requires the 
independence of all competitors on the same market810. In other words, access 
obligations may enhance collusion between market players and access agreements may 
be instrument of market sharing.  
 
The Access Notice recognises the existence of potential anti-competitive effects in 
access agreements, including the risks, a) of coordinating prices, b) of market sharing 
and c) of exchange of commercially sensitive information between parties811. The 
Access Notice places particular emphasis on the risk of price coordination under 
access agreements : 
‘The risk of price coordination is particularly acute in the 
telecommunications sector, since interconnection charges often amount to 
50% or more of the total cost of the services provided, and where 
interconnection with a dominant operator will usually be necessary. In these 
                                            
809 Papon, S., Structural versus Behavioural Remedies in Merger Control: A Case-by-Case Analysis, 
[2009] ECLR, 38. 
810 Mueller, U., Rodenhausen, A., ibid., 321. 
811 Par. 134 of the Access Notice. 
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circumstances, the scope for price competition is limited and the risk (and the 
seriousness) of price coordination correspondingly greater’812. 
 
This remark has not been repeated in the 2002 Guidelines on market analysis, nor has 
any relevant hint been made in the preambles of either the 2002 directives or of their 
2009 revision; this suggests, again, that the primary focus of the SMP package is on 
the incumbent and that oligopolies are simply dealt with as a small part of the 
dominance problem in the sector.   
 
Nonetheless, in electronic communications, access is inevitable, even if not a remedy, 
since network markets entail some form of co-operation between market players 
anyhow due to inherent network externality features. It is also stressed that, Article 5 
of the Access Directive, as currently in force, obliges NRAs to encourage and, where 
appropriate ensure adequate access, interconnection and interoperability of services, 
without prejudice to measures taken in the scope of SMP regulation813.  
 
However, economic studies have shown that in oligopolistic markets with bottlenecks 
being held by more than one player, additional entry –which is favoured through the 
taking of access measures – is not necessarily welfare improving, because it may lead 
the retail prices of the access provider rise above pre-entry levels814. Notably, entry 
through access obligations, if they are not complemented by some form of price 
regulation, may also lead to higher prices, particularly in markets with more than two 
players or where there is already collusion between the oligopolistic players. Because 
if the access price is collusive, the oligopolists may continue to charge higher prices to 
the consumers they keep after entry and, at the same time, obtain a large wholesale 
profit from the consumers lost to the entrant815.  
 
                                            
812 Ibid., par. 135. 
813 Article 5 par. 1 of the revised Access Directive. 
814 Goliath, Access to Bottleneck Inputs under Oligopoly: a prisoner’s dilemma?, Southern Economic 
Journal, 2010, available at http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-12143888/Access-to-bottleneck-
inputs-under.html  




Hence, for the reasons set out above, access obligations may bring the desired results 
against SMP exercised by oligopolists, only to the extent that these are complemented 
by price regulation.  
 
5.4.4. Is there any alternative? 
 
Is there an alternative to such access measures? 
 
In mergers, as an alternative to divestiture, but also in an attempt to avoid collusive 
practices that may appear as a result of the application of behavioural remedies, 
economists have proposed the design of a contract, whereby the merging parties would 
commit to pay a third party (e.g. a major lender to the merging firms) a per unit penalty 
for lowering production, but would be paid a per-unit reward for increasing 
production816. This proposal is claimed to merit particular attention in Cournot-style 
oligopolies, where the parties are inclined to set profit maximising output levels. 
Notably, in such markets, instead of divestments, the merging parties could commit to 
pay a per unit penalty for non-disposal of unused capacity in excess of a capacity 
threshold set to that effect.  
 
The Commission has also cleared mergers on the basis of quasi-contract types of 
remedies. In AirFrance/KLM817, the parties committed to apply an equivalent 
reduction on the fare Lyon-Amsterdam, on which they enjoyed SMP, every time they 
reduced the corresponding fare on the Paris-Amsterdam route. 
 
The benefit of the foregoing suggestions is that they resemble more to supply 
contracts, instead of access obligations, which makes them easier to monitor and 
enforce and less volatile to manipulations. Of course, one should balance the benefits 
with the risk associated with direct intervention in market prices and the potential 
distortion of competition.  
 
                                            
816 Ezrachi, A., Behavioural Remedies in EC merger control – scope and limitations, [2006] World 
Competition, 462 
817 Case COMP/M.3280, Air France/KLM.  
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In oligopolistic wholesale markets in electronic communications a similar pattern 
could be followed. If NRAs detected refusal to supply access-seekers by oligopolists in 
a network market with ineffective competition, instead of imposing access obligations, 
oligopolists could be enforced to pay a penalty to a Fund or Trust entrusted with the 
power to fund the creation of alternative infrastructure. Access seekers could have 
recourse to the Fund/Trust for funding for the deployment of own networks. Hence, on 
the one hand, access is enhanced through the roll out of alternative networks and, on 
the other hand, the downsides of access remedies in oligopolistic markets may be 
minimised.  
 
It is reminded from the analysis in Chapter 3 that the Commission has always placed 
emphasis on the introduction of new market players, as the main source of competitive 
constraint against either single or collective SMP, since the first and most important 
criterion for the eligibility of a market as susceptible to ex ante regulation is the 
existence of high barriers to entry preventing the emergence of new players.  The main 
benefit of the alternative remedy suggested above over access obligations in 
oligopolistic markets with indications of tacit collusion is that it may act as a deterrent 
to future collusive behaviour818 it enhances the development of new competitive forces 
through the deployment of new infrastructure, capable of operating without 
dependence on existing market players. 
 
In the UK mobile market of the early nineties, the two incumbents, Cellnet and 
Vodafone, adopted parallel pricing and were obliged by the UK regulator to provide 
access to their network to a maximum of independent service providers. However, it 
was the entry into the market of the networks of One2One and Orange in 1993 and 
1994 respectively, which led to sharp price reductions and made UK mobile services 
among the cheapest in the world819. The UK example shows that the main source of 
competitive constraint is the appearance of new entrants through the deployment of a 
new infrastructure, not the provision of services by additional providers over the 
incumbents’ networks. This complies also with the finding of the 2013 Final Report on 
                                            
818 The deterring effect is one of the main underlying principles of the imposition of fines in the case of 
explicit collusion, Kaplow, L., An economic approach to price fixing, [2011]2 Antitrust Law Journal, 
418. 
819 Geradin, D., Kerf, M., ibid., 325. 
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market assessment commissioned by the DG Connect820, that MVNOs with a market 
share of more than 5% are uncommon across the EU and that on average only one 
MVNO per five countries has a ‘significant’ market share, albeit the term ‘significant’ 
is not defined further; MVNO access may not have been as successful as anticipated in 
all member-States.  
 
On several occasions, the Commission considered the introduction of new networks 
crucial in prejudicing the parallel behaviour of existing operators. For example, the 
elimination of the third competitor (out of a total of three) in the Belgian mobile 
market, despite its low market share, was the reason for the expression of serious 
Commission doubts in relation to the impact of the concentration on the market in 
FT/Orange821. In Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria822, the merger was cleared on 
condition of divestment of radio of spectrum and additional rights to an interested new 
entrant in the Austrian mobile telephony market, who would have the right to acquire 
spectrum not only from H3G but also additional spectrum at the next auction, so that 
the new entrant would build up a physical network for mobile telecommunication 
services in Austria. The new entrant would also benefit from privileged conditions for 
the purchase of sites for building up its own network in Austria. Also, in MT/2008/803 
the Maltese NRA decided against the existence of collective dominance in the 
wholesale broadband market mainly by the reason of the entry of a newcomer who, 
despite the low market share at the time, had quickly established a wireless broadband 
network covering the whole territory of Malta with new wireless technology, capable 
of exercising competitive pressure on the two fixed broadband operators. 
 
In 2001, Gal suggested a method for regulating oligopoly pricing by way of 
introducing a government-supported maverick into an oligopolistic industry for a 
limited time823. The maverick would price its products at competitive or near-
competitive levels in order to force its competitors to follow its pricing. According to 
Gal, the proposal may significantly reduce allocative inefficiency by reducing the 
welfare losses from supra-competitive pricing and productive inefficiency by 
                                            
820 Ecorys, Future electronic communications markets subject to ex ante regulation, 18.09.2013. 
821 Case  COMP/M.2016, France Telecom/Orange, 11.8.2000, par. 28. 
822 Case COMP/M.6497/Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria. 
823 Gal, M., Reducing Rivals Prices: Government-Supported Mavericks as New Solutions for Oligopoly 
Pricing, [2001] 7 Stanford Journal of Law, Business and Finance, 73-102. 
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combatting the problem of inefficient plant and firm sizes. The threat of intervention 
might be sufficient, in itself, to reduce the problem of oligopoly pricing.  
 
Gal also mentions that, granting tax expenditures (in the form of subsidy payments, tax 
exemptions, or tax credits) to new firms that enter an oligopolistic market or to 
existing competitors that invest in infrastructure and increase output, may also reduce 
oligopolistic pricing. She argues that, tax expenditures have been used in the electricity 
generation industry in the US to combat market imperfections and to increase 
competition, but cost reductions should be high enough to enable potential competitors 
to earn rewards similar to those earned in a competitive industry824. If cost reductions 
like tax expenditures in an oligopolistic market are appealing enough to assist new 
entry, thereby causing increased competition and reduced prices, the same result may 
be also effected with other cost reductions like financing costs, according to the above 
suggested alternative. Like in the case of Gal’s direct government subsidy to the 
maverick firm, the threat of intervention might be sufficient, in itself, to reduce the 
problem of oligopoly pricing. 
 
However, governments’ interventions in support of maverick players would likely 
infringe the prohibition of State aid under Article 107 TFEU, whether direct or 
indirect825. Hence, it needs to be examined if the suggested option for the imposition of 
a penalty capable of being applied for the financing of alternative infrastructure may be 
considered State aid. 
 
In line with Article 107(1) TFEU, the concept of State aid includes the following 
conditions: (a) there must be an intervention by the State or by means of State 
resources; (b) the intervention must be liable to affect trade between Member States; 
(c) it must confer an advantage of the beneficiary; (d) it must distort or threaten to 
distort competition. The existence of State aid has to be assessed on an objective basis, 
taking into account the jurisprudence of the Community Courts. 
 
According to such jurisprudence, the granting of loan and credit facility by State 
controlled organizations may comprise State aid, if the terms of the facility are more 
                                            
824 Ibid., 87. 
825 Petit, N., ibid., 56. 
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advantageous to the terms that the borrower could agree under normal market 
conditions826. In Sloman Neptun827, the CJEU defined State intervention also in cases 
of entities or bodies acting under statutory authorization, albeit not included in the 
wider public sector. In Credit Agricole828, albeit the private origination of the funds 
was not disputed, the CJEU considered it a case of illegitimate State aid, mainly on the 
basis of French legislation allowing the exercise of decisive influence from the part of 
the French State on the management of the Fund distributing the capitals at stake.  
 
In its landmark judgment on Altmark829 the Court held that there is no State Aid where 
a State financial measure must be regarded as compensation for the services provided 
by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge public service obligations and set 
out the four conditions necessary for such compensation to escape classification as 
State aid: (a) the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to 
discharge and those obligations must be clearly defined; (b) the parameters on the basis 
of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective 
and transparent manner; (c) the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to 
cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, 
taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit; and (d) where the 
undertaking is not chosen in a public procurement procedure, the level of 
compensation must be determined by a comparison with an analysis of the costs which 
a typical transport undertaking would incur (taking into account the receipts and a 
reasonable profit from discharging the obligations).  
 
According to settled case-law, it is not necessary to establish in every case that there 
has been a transfer of State resources for the advantage granted to one or more 
undertakings to be capable of being regarded as a State aid within the meaning of 
Article 107(1) TFEU830. Measures which, in various forms, mitigate the burdens 
                                            
826 Case C-301/87, France vs European Commission, Case C-303/88, Italy vs European Commission, 
Case C-278/00, Greece vs European Commission. 
827 Cases C-72 and 73/91, Firma Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AG vs Seebetriebsrat Bodo Ziesemer der 
Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AG. 
828 Case 290/83. 
829 Judgment of 24.07.2003, Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg 
v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH. 
830 Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior de España [1994] ECR I-877, paragraph 14; Case C-6/97 Italy v 
Commission [1999] ECR I-2981, paragraph 16; and Case C-482/99 France v Commission [2002] ECR 
I-4397, paragraph 36, Joint Cases C-399/10P and C-401/10P, Bouygues S.A., Bouygues Telecom S.A. vs 
European Commission, paragraph 100). 
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normally included in the budget of an undertaking, and which therefore, without being 
subsidies in the strict meaning of the word, are similar in character and have the same 
effect, are considered to be aid831. Recently, in Bouygues832 the Court held that it is not 
necessary to identify a reduction of the State budget or a sufficiently concrete 
economic risk of burdens on that budget, closely linked and corresponding to, or 
having as a counterpart, a specific advantage deriving from the intervention. 
 
For the purposes of establishing the existence of State aid, the Commission must 
establish a sufficiently direct link between, on the one hand, the advantage given to the 
beneficiary and, on the other, a reduction of the State budget or a sufficiently concrete 
economic risk of burdens on that budget, but it is not necessary that such a reduction, 
or even such a risk, should correspond or be equivalent to that advantage, or that the 
advantage has as its counterpoint such a reduction or such a risk, or that it is of the 
same nature as the commitment of State resources from which it derives833. 
 
On 16.09.2013, the GC issued its judgment on Colt et al. vs Commission834, in 
compliance with the Altmark judgment, whereby it upheld the Commission’s decision 
that a project envisaged granting €59 million in compensation for the public service 
costs for the establishment and operation of a very high speed (fibre-optic) broadband 
electronic communications network in Hauts-de-Seine, France did not constitute State 
aid. However, in making such judgment, the Court took particular note of the fact the 
no commercial operator had deployed a very high speed broadband network serving 
domestic and professional users as a whole in that area. 
 
Taking account the foregoing, the suggested financing of network roll-out by proceeds 
from penalties collected from SMP by a Fund or Trust entrusted with the power to 
fund the creation of alternative infrastructure, may fall in the concept of State aid of 
Article 107 TFEU, despite the private origin of the funds and possibly the private 
                                            
831 Banco Exterior de España, paragraph 13; Case C-75/97 Belgium v Commission [1999] ECR I-3671, 
paragraph 23; and Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission [2000] ECR I-6857, paragraph 25, Joint 
Cases C-399/10P and C-401/10P, Bouygues S.A., Bouygues Telecom S.A. vs European Commission, 
paragraph 101). 
832 Decision of the Court of 19.3.2013, Joint Cases C-399/10P and C-401/10P, Bouygues S.A., Bouygues 
Telecom S.A. vs European Commission, par. 105. 
833 Ibid, paragraph 109-110, also citing, Case C-279/08 P Commission v Netherlands [2011] ECR I-
7671, paragraph 111. 
834 Cases T-79/2010 Colt Telecommunications France vs Commission, T-258/10 Orange vs Commission 
and T-325/10 Iliad and others vs Commission. 
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nature of the Fund or Trust. The problem lies in that the funds to be used for conferring 
credit facilities with privileged terms to new entrants will have been collected not on 
the SMP’s own initiative, as in the case of commitments in merger cases like in the 
case of spectrum assignment in Hutchinson3G Austria/Orange Austria, but in 
implementing a penalty imposed by statutory instruments and collected by authorities 
acting under statutory authorisation.  
 
Nonetheless, such aid may qualify as facilitating the development of the economic 
activities of a market with inefficient competition, since the suggested financing will 
assist the deployment of additional infrastructure. Also, given the failure of 
competition law to remedy the existing inefficiency (or else the market would not have 
been subject to ex ante regulation), the aid would not adversely affect trading 
conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest; on the contrary, it would 
improve the state of competition in the market835. Hence, the suggested option may be 
considered compatible with the internal market under Article 107 paragraph 3 TFEU, 
in which case the prior approval of the aid by the Commission must be obtained, 
pursuant to the provisions of Regulation 659/1999, as in force today836. On the other 
hand, the required approval may be also taken at EU level through the revision of the 
regulatory framework to allow the suggested option, in which case individual 
notifications on a case-by-case basis may not be required. 
 
On assuming that the requisite approval could be obtained, the parameters on the basis 
of which the penalty is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and 
transparent manner. The applicant for the receipt of the credit facility must be chosen 
pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the selection of the 
bidder capable of providing those services in a cost-efficient manner, on the basis of 
                                            
835 In its Communication Community Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to rapid 
deployment of broadband networks [2013] OJ C 25/01, the Commission set out that Government 
support for  the deployment of broadband networks may be considered compatible with the internal 
market, provided that the following conditions are met: 1. Contribution to the achievement of objectives 
of common interest; 2. Absence of market delivery due to market failures or important inequalities; 3. 
Appropriateness of State aid as a policy instrument; 4. Existence of incentive effect; 5. Aid limited to 
the minimum necessary; 6. Limited negative effects; 7. Transparency.     
836 Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the 
application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty [1999] OJ L 083/1, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 1791/2006, Council Regulation (EU) No. 517/2013 and Council Regulation (EU) No. 734/2013. 
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reviewed financial and business models showing the costs of a typical, well run and 
adequately equipped undertaking837.  
 
Notably, it must be secured to the best possible extent that the new entrant is a credible 
entity, capable of acting as the maverick player in the oligopoly game, who is willing 
to invest heavily in the inefficient market. It is important to note that the new entrant 
must commit to invest in the same market as the market of operation of the tacitly 
coordinated players for the provision of the same or value added services, not in 
similar or neighboring markets, as in the latter case the aim of having a new player 
capable of exerting competitive pressure on the collectively dominant undertakings 
would be compromised.  
 
Undoubtedly, these suggestions merit a lot more thought, particularly from an 
economic aspect. The setting of the appropriate penalty, which will have to be at a 
level such that it is capable to deter the oligopolists from refusing access but at the 
same time proportional to the type of market failure detected by NRAs is a very 
difficult exercise838. The economic implications of this suggestion necessitate the 
investigation of a cost and benefit analysis which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 




The analysis of the present chapter has demonstrated that the categories of remedies 
discussed should be applied with caution in oligopolistic markets, whereas the 
effectiveness of functional separation in oligopolistic environments is debatable.  
 
Transparency, non-discrimination and accounting separation obligations are essentially 
one and the same measure, but their application may create additional distortions in 
                                            
837 Arguments taken from Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans [2003] ECR I-7747. 
838 The general principle in antistrust is that fines or damages should equal external harm times a 
probability multiplier, in the simplest case equal to one divided by the probability that sanctions will be 
imposed. For example, if firms contemplating price fixing anticipate that there is only a 50 percent 
chance of being caught and fined, fines should (at least somewhat) exceed twice any profits, for 





oligopolistic environments. Transparency obligations create the risk of causing the 
opposite result of their intended purpose, since they are likely to further collusion 
rather than prevent it by allowing the operators to observe each other’s charges and 
making cooperation easier, hence, should be applied with caution and focus on issues 
that may bring factors capable of preventing collusion into light.  
 
The indispensability of transparency for the application of non-discrimination 
obligations also impairs the efficiency of the latter on oligopolistic markets. In 
addition, non discrimination obligations enhance stability and similarity in cost 
structures, which is considered a further factor inductive to tacit collusion. Non-
discrimination obligations should be treated with caution in the context of regulation of 
oligopolistic markets also because excuses supporting a transaction-specific efficiency 
defence under general competition law principles, are easier to find in a complex 
oligopolistic environment with no monopoly equilibrium. The collusive access price 
may already be non discriminatory, whereas discriminatory pricing or selective price-
cutting by one of the undertakings may mean that price competition is in fact operating 
between the oligopolists.  
 
The direct association of accounting separation with the obligations on transparency 
and non-discrimination suggests that problems similar to that identified in relation to 
transparency and non-discrimination also apply in this area regarding co-ordinated 
effects and the possible promotion or facilitation of tacit collusion through the 
imposition of obligations on accounting separation; the exchange of business 
information may be facilitated and, consequently, the sustainability of a common 
position towards competitors and consumers. However, the downsides of the measure 
may be mitigated if the information is not disclosed by NRAs to third parties. 
 
Finally, functional separation is not considered appropriate for the regulation of 
oligopolistic network markets. On top of the generally known risks entailed in 
structural separation (risk of welfare losses and particularly of the concern that the 
remaining set of functions will not operate as incentive to innovate), the efficiency of 
structural separation for the purposes of regulating oligopolistic markets is disputed 
further, because of the increased transparency created through the separation of 
operations. Also, economists have challenged the effectiveness of structural remedies 
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in oligopolistic environments on the grounds that inappropriate divestments may 
actually facilitate collusion by restructuring an industry in a more symmetric way.  
 
Access obligations are inevitable for the regulation of SMP in electronic 
communications. However, they enhance co-operation between the undertakings 
involved and, as such, facilitate the exchange of information between competitors and, 
thus, collusion, which may eventually reduce the efficiency of their several application 
in oligopolistic environments. Economic analysis has shown that entry through access 
obligations, if they are not complemented by some form of price regulation, may also 
lead to higher prices, particularly in markets with more than two players or where there 
is already collusion between the oligopolistic players.  
 
The foregoing remarks should be made clear in a future revision of the Access 
Directive or of the Guidelines. 
 
As an alternative, it is worthy of exploring with further economic analysis the option 
of imposing penalties on collectively dominant undertakings and applying the 
receivables of such penalties for the financing of network roll-out by new entrants. On 
condition that such scheme could obtain the required prior consent under Article 
107(3) TFEU, the suggested option may exercise competitive pressure on the 
oligopolists, since there is general consensus that the most credible pressure in anti-
competitive oligopolies may be exercised by new entry. 
 
In closing, it should be borne in mind that there should be no absolute approach against 
intervention at retail level in oligopolistic situations (unless measures at wholesale 
have proved insufficient), because measures taken at retail may be capable of 
remedying anti-competitive practices at wholesale level, in oligopolies where the same 
players are active both at wholesale and retail level and the effects of collusion at 
wholesale are passed on to retail customers directly. 
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Chapter 6: The effectiveness of 
Available Remedies in oligopolistic 
contexts – Part II: Price control 
 
6.1. Prices, telecoms and oligopolies 
 
In closing the review of the applicable SMP framework in electronic communications, 
the present chapter examines pricing measures as the last category of remedies 
provided under SMP regulation. According to Article 13 par. 1 of the Access Directive 
these are applied if NRAs detect margin squeezes or excessive pricing in the course of 
their market assessments. The analysis of the present chapter will show that margin 
squeezes or predation is unlikely to occur in oligopolistic markets. If pricing remedies 
are necessitated, they will be probably required against excessive pricing. In such 
cases, there may be oligopolistic markets where pricing regulation may be more 
efficient than other behavioural remedies, albeit conclusion on this cannot be reached 
without further economic analysis. This is discussed in the first section. 
 
The chapter then turns to the discussion around margin squeezes and excessive pricing 
on the basis of competition law precedents and closes with the description of the 
methodologies available for the application of pricing measures in electronic 
communications. The research has not revealed the existence of specific economic 
analysis on the method of optimum price regulation in oligopolistic markets in 
electronic communications, which indicates that economic research on the subject may 
be warranted, if the Commission decides to regulate specific electronic 
communications markets in the future. 
 




The European Commission has been reluctant in regulating market prices under EC 
competition law rules to avoid embarking on the role of a regulator839. The 
effectiveness of price regulation is challenged, on the one hand, because it comprises 
direct intervention in market prices and the potential distortion of competition, and, on 
the other hand, because it may lead regulated firms to compromise quality in their 
attempt to maintain profitability840. This is in line with economic theory, which takes 
the view that introducing effective competition in the market is a far more efficient 
way of imposing downward pressure on prices than imposing direct controls on such 
prices841. The 50-year history of cable TV in the US, where retail rates have been 
regulated and deregulated a couple of times, is taken as an example, which is said to 
support the conclusion that rate regulation does indeed lower nominal rates, but at the 
cost of lowering service quality; subscribers were said to have generally believed they 
were worse off with price controls, in part because of reductions in investments for 
marketing and capital infrastructure by operators842.  
 
In its 1st report on the Commission proposal for the Access Directive, the Committee 
on External Trade, Research and Energy expressed the view that pricing obligations 
and particularly cost-orientation should be refrained from being enforced whenever 
there is a potential for achieving competition: 
“Price controls should only be imposed as a last resort, where effective 
market analysis has shown that there is an existing and enduring market 
failure with no prospect of competition in the long term. …Otherwise, the 
cost orientation obligation would send the wrong signals to the market, 
preventing competition from developing in a balanced way and would 
consequently harm investments and innovation.”843. 
 
                                            
839 Kon, S., Turnbull, S., Pricing and the Dominant Firm: Implications of the Competition Commission 
Appeal Tribunal’ s Judgement in the Napp Case, [2003] ECLR, 70. Refer also to European 
Commission, Fifth Report on Competition Policy, 1975, par. 76. 
840 Ezrachi, A., Behavioural Remedies in EC Merger Control – Scope and Limitations, [2006] World 
Competition, 474. 
841 Geradin, D., Kerf, M., Controlling Market Power in Telecommunications, 2003, OUP, 332. 
842 Bittlingmayer, G., “Open Access:” the ideal and the real, [2002]26 Telecommunications Policy, 302 
– 308. 
843 Justification to Amendment 42 and 43. 
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The proposed amendment was accepted and the Access Directive incorporated this 
principle, albeit with a less stringent wording requiring evidence of actual lack of 
competition for the application of price controls844.  
 
The ERG have identified as the key problem with pricing remedies the setting of the 
appropriate price control level, which facilitates services competition without 
reinforcing network market power, and the associated distortion which can result from 
setting charges too low or too high845.  
 
However, in the words of Geradin and Kerf,  
‘price regulation does remain necessary, as long as competition cannot be 
relied upon to introduce sufficient market discipline on the provision of 
certain services’846.  
 
The review of cases involving joint dominance notified under the procedure of Article 
7 of the Framework Directive shows that NRAs have not been in favour of immediate 
application of price control on oligopolistic markets. In Case IE/2004/121, the Irish 
NRA suggested the application of price control and cost orientation on mobile access 
and call origination if access and non-discrimination obligations failed. In 
MT/2006/0443, the Maltese NRA decided to apply cost-orientation in the event of 
failure of general obligations on mobile operators on price control, which, in turn, 
would apply only if the negotiations on access obligations between SMP and non-SMP 
operators failed. In ES/2005/330, the Spanish NRA imposed on the mobile operators 
the general obligation to apply reasonable prices and in SI/2008/806 the Slovenian 
NRA opted in favour of a price cap for mobile access and call origination, which was 
never applied because the notification was subsequently withdrawn following the 
Commission’s expression of serious doubts. 
 
Economic analysis has supported that price regulation in oligopolistic markets is 
welfare-impairing because while sellers did not typically converge to a readily 
                                            
844 Article 13(1) of the Access Directive: “ A national regulatory authority may … impose obligations 
relating to cost recovery and price controls, … where a market analysis indicates that a lack of effective 
competition means that …”. 
845 The ERG Common Position on SMP Remedies, 54. 
846 Geradin, D., Kerf, M., ibid.. 
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characterised equilibrium in the unregulated phase, regulation leads to a rapid 
convergence to a regulated Cournot, Stackleberg or collusive solution847. Economists 
have also expressed concerns, because of collective rate-making; notably that, in most 
cases of price regulation, the initiation of price proposals for price regulation comes 
from the regulated firms, not the regulator. This, in turn, creates room for further co-
ordination between the regulated parties848. 
 
However, other economic studies have shown that under oligopolistic competition and 
Cournot equilibrium in particular, where firms know the true value of the marginal 
cost, price regulation may be more efficient than the free market 849. They argue that in 
oligopolistic industries with high marginal costs, price regulation is the optimal policy, 
because in this case the regulator faces very little uncertainty. When the difference 
between high and low marginal costs between firms is low, the optimal policy is to set 
a regulated price equal to the value of the large marginal cost. When there is difference 
between the high and low marginal costs, the optimal policy is to set a regulated price 
equal to the value of the low marginal cost850. When the intercept of the demand 
function is close to the high value of the marginal cost, the best policy is a regulated 
price equal to the low value of the marginal cost, since, if costs are high, loss is small. 
When the intercept is very large the best policy is a regulated price equal to the high 
value of the marginal cost in order to secure positive output whatever happens851. 
 
                                            
847 Daughety, A., Forsythe, R., The effects of industry-wide price regulation on Industrial Organisation, 
[1987] Journal of Law, Economics & Organisation, vol. 3, No. 2, 400. 
848 Ibid., 398. 
849 Corchon, L., Marcos, F., Price Regulation in Oligopoly, University Carlos III of Madrid Working 
Papers, Economic Series, January 2010. 
850 Corchon, L., Marcos, F., ibid., 3. 
851 Ibid. Indeed, the motivation of this study by Crochon and Marcos was that price regulation has been 
used to regulate oligopolistic markets like gasoline, natural gas, electricity generation, pharmaceuticals 
etc. Also, Tyers, R., Service Oligopolies and Australia’s Economy-Wide Performance, at 
http://www.business.uwa.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/2585102/14-18-Service-Oligopolies-and-
Australias-Economy-Wide-Performance.pdf argues that relative to a baseline with full exploitation of 
their oligopoly power, the minimization and redistribution of oligopoly rents in privatized services 
industry, including telecommunications, collectively raises real wages by 14 per cent and depreciates the 
real exchange rate by six per cent. Thus, price caps in these industries are shown to have significant 
effects of the performance of other sectors and the economy as a whole. 
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Do the findings of the economic studies referred above on the appropriateness of 
pricing regulation in oligopolistic industries with competition problems apply also in 
the electronic communications industry, despite the difficulties entailed in the 
identification of marginal costs in telecommunications? The conducted research has 
not been able to provide the thesis with an answer, since relevant studies on industries 
with incremental pricing have not been identified. The last section of this chapter 
discusses the unsuitability of marginal cost pricing in electronic communications is 
related to the difficulties linked with the identification of marginal cost as well as to 
the need to maintain reasonable profit for the operators to enhance investment. This 
does not mean that marginal cost does not exist in electronic communications services, 
but it is more difficult to identify than in other industry markets. The adoption of 
incremental pricing as an alternative to marginal cost pricing in the 
telecommunications industry reinforces this view.  
 
Hence, the foregoing suggest that there may be oligopolistic markets where pricing 
regulation may be more efficient than other behavioural remedies, albeit the setting of 
the appropriate price level may be more complicated than in industries where marginal 
cost pricing is considered the suitable pricing method. The case of excessive 
international roaming rates that was discussed in chapter 4 makes the same point. 
Roaming rates have been significantly reduced since the introduction of the first 
roaming regulation, as a result of outright price regulation; at the same time concerns 
on prospective total welfare losses resulting from forecasted increases in national rates 
did not materialise. If it is considered that termination markets may be the result of 
competition inefficiencies in oligopolistic markets, as suggested under section 2.2.2.2, 
the successful regulation of high termination rates through price regulation and the 
resulting consumer welfare makes also the same point. 
 
However, conclusions on this principle cannot be reached without further economic 
research particularly on the parameters of industries where marginal cost pricing is not 




6.3. Exclusionary pricing practices 
6.3.1 Price Squeezes 
 
According to Article 13 par. 1 of the Access Directive, NRAs may impose obligations 
relating to cost recovery and price controls for the provision of specific types of 
interconnection and/or access, if the market analysis indicates lack of effective 
competition because the operator concerned may either sustain prices at excessively 
high level, or may apply a price squeeze, to the detriment of end-users. 
 
A price squeeze may arise when a vertically integrated undertaking, with a dominant 
position in the provision of an essential upstream input, prices that input (and/or the 
downstream service relying on this input) in such a way as to deny an equally or more 
efficient downstream rival a normal profit over the long period852. Price squeezes are 
generally considered part of cross-subsidisation practices, occurring where an 
undertaking uses revenues from one market to subsidise losses in another market. 
Competition problems may arise when, for cross-subsidisation purposes, the 
undertaking uses revenues from a market where it is dominant.  
 
Price squeeze resembles to predation, as they both aim at driving the competitor out of 
the market through the setting of prices that the latter cannot sustain853. However, 
unlike predation, where the recoupment occurs in the long run, price squeeze does not 
necessarily involve initial losses854. Also, under price squeeze practices, the focus is on 
the difference between the upstream and the downstream price and not the price level 
                                            
852 Garzaniti, L., Liberatore, F., Recent Developments in the European Commission’ s Practice in the 
Communications Sector, Part 1, [2004] ECLR, 172.  
853 Some scholars have expressed the view that price squeezes are not to be distinguished from predatory 
and excessive pricing, Tarrant, A., Accounting Separation: The Hole in the Heart of the EU 
Telecommunications Regime, [2003] ECLR, 278f., footnote 5. However, it appears that the European 
Commission has distinguished the terms and the tests applied to establish price squeezes are different 
from the tests suggested for predatory and excessive pricing. OFT’ s position is in line with the position 
of the European Union. In BTOpenworld, OFT distinguished between predation and margin squeezes, 
among other, on the grounds that predation involves a trade-off for the predator between short-term 
losses and long-term profit, whereas margin squeezes involve a trade-off of losses and profit between 
different businesses of the vertically integrated undertaking (refer to par. 3.33 – 3.34 of the decision). 
854 Crocioni, A., Price Squeeze and Imputation Test, [2005] ECLR, 558, Fernandez Alvarez-Labrador, 




of the upstream input per se. This involves an imputation test, which aims at 
determining whether net downstream margins are profitable855. 
 
Predation is equivalent to pricing below cost. This, in itself does not comprise anti-
competitive practice, unless if carried out systematically and with the intention of 
driving a competitor out of the market856. Noting the importance of a cost-based 
approach, the CJEU established in AKZO the following two-fold test857: 
 prices set at below average variable costs are presumed to be predatory; 
 prices set at below average total costs, but above average variable costs will be 
predatory, if some documentary evidence of intention to eliminate a competitor can 
be demonstrated; such intention is also presumed in case of systematic practice of 
selling below average total cost858.  
 
The AKZO test has been criticised for various reasons, including the inherent 
difficulties in determining the average variable costs859. Further, firms cannot be held 
responsible for conducting anti-competitive predatory pricing, if their market power is 
such that it does not allow them to recoup for the losses resulting from predation860. 
Pricing below average total costs may be due to the firm’ s facing a temporary slack in 
demand for any reason, including the efficiency of a competitor. In such case, any 
price may assist the firm in recouping losses861. In addition, in industries with high 
investment costs, a firm’s pricing policy depends particularly on the amortisation 
                                            
855 Garzaniti, L., Liberatore, F., ibid., 172-173.  
856 European Commission’ s Decision of December 15, 1985, ECS/AKZO [1985] OJ L374/1, par. 75. 
857 Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission [1993] 5 CMLR, 215. 
858 Refer also to Case C-333/94 Tetra Pak International v. Commission [1996] ECR I-5951. Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act requires the recoupment of temporary losses in predation through higher profits earned 
in the absence of competition, refer to Areda, P., Turner, D., Predatory Pricing and Related Practices 
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, [1975] 88 Harv.L.Rev., 705. 
859 Kon, S., Turnbull, S., ibid., 74-75. 
860 European case-law has not yet required proof that the dominant undertaking is able to recoup its 
losses for a predatory pricing to occur. However, the significance of this element was recognised by the 
European Regulators Group, in the ERG Common Position on SMP remedies, 100. Also, Garzaniti, L., 
Liberatore, F., Recent developments in the European Commission’ s Practice in the Communications 
Sector, Part 2, [2004] ECLR, 235. It must be noted, though, that scholars have also argued that if 
dominance is understood in its dynamic economic context of high barriers to entry and expansion by 
actual and potential competitors, i.e. translated in a weakened competitive process, this should suffice to 
establish the likelihood of recoupment, Moura e Silva, M., Predatory Pricing under Article 82 and the 
Recoupment Test: Do not go gentle into that Good Night, [2009] ECLR, 66. 
861 Nicolaides, Ph., Polmans, R., Competition in EC Telecommunications: Cross-Subsidisation, Access 
and Predatory Pricing, [1999]4 World Competition, 26-27. 
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periods that are taken into account862. Short amortisation periods may lead to 
assumptions on predation, where the firm has decided to make profit in the late life of 
the investment. Finally, in emerging markets it may be a commercially sensible 
behaviour to launch a new product or service at a price below average variable costs in 
order to create an initial phase of awareness for the new product or service863. 
 
In the case law post AKZO, the test was upheld, although it was made clear by the 
CJEU that the specific circumstances of each case must be considered864. In Napier 
Brown/ British Sugar865, the Commission set out the following conditions precedent 
for a price squeeze to occur: 
 non-effective competition in the downstream market; 
 the upstream service should qualify as an essential facility for the downstream 
service, provided in fixed proportions; 
 access to the upstream service must be controlled by the vertically integrated 
dominant undertaking; 
 the downstream firm must be equally or more efficient than the vertically 
integrated downstream competitor; 
 the price squeeze must have occurred over a sufficiently long period of time 
(persistence). 
 
In Deutche Post866, the specific circumstances for network industries with high fixed 
costs and low variable costs, like telecommunications, were held to comprise 
consideration of the relationship between the costs of maintaining capacity and the 
incremental costs of providing the particular service using an avoidable cost standard. 
In the same line of thinking, the European Commission recognised in the Access 
Notice that in network industries, like telecommunications, the price equating to 
                                            
862 The NGA Recommendation states that the importance of taking an appropriate timeframe into 
account for the calculation of margin squeezes (recital 26). 
863 Garzaniti, L., Liberatore, F., ibid. As an alternative to the AKZO test, the “net revenue principle” lies 
in the firm demonstrating that it makes a combined profit from the sale of different products, of which at 
least one is priced predatorily, to the same customer. The net revenue principle was adopted in Napp 
Pharmaceutical Holdings Limited v. DGFT, [2002] 4 All ER 376. Although the Court of Appeal 
rejected the case on its merits, it accepted the net revenue principle. Kon, S., Turnbull, S., ibid., 80, 
claimed that the argument could possibly succeed, where the sales of one product below cost can be 
expected to generate sales of complementary products and, hence, in the medium term, to increase sales. 
864 Refer e.g. to Tetra Pak, par. 20 and to Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar plc v. Commission [1999] ECR 
2969, par. 114. 
865 Decision 88/518, Napier Brown/British Sugar [1988] OJ L284/41. 
866 Commission Decsion of May 5, 2001, Deutche Post AG, [2001] OJ L125/27. 
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variable costs may be lower than the price the operator needs in order to cover the cost 
of providing the service867.  
 
6.3.2 Margin squeeze and predation in the telecommunications sector 
 
There are several examples of predatory pricing in the telecommunications sector 
found in European jurisprudence, since the telecommunications markets of the former 
incumbents exhibit characteristics of markets susceptible of margin squeezes. A 
predatory squeeze may arise where the vertically integrated incumbent firm cuts the 
retail prices as much as possible868.  
 
The Access Notice suggested two ways to apply an imputation test869: 
(A) Where the downstream division of the dominant vertically integrated undertaking 
could not “trade profitably” on the basis of the price charged to its competitors 
upstream. In essence, the test aims at assessing whether the vertically integrated 
undertaking is cross-subsidising its downstream operations870; or, 
(B) Where the difference between the vertically integrated undertaking’s retail and the 
wholesale input prices is not sufficient for a “reasonably efficient” downstream 
competitor to make a normal profit871. This test makes sense in a regulatory 
environment, where entry by newcomers must be encouraged in the short run, 
expecting that, in the long run, they will achieve a good efficient level of 
activity872. 
 
                                            
867 Par. 110-116 of the Access Notice. 
868 Fernandez Alvarez-Labrador, M., ibid., 256. 
869 Par. 117-119 of the Access Notice. 
870 This so-called cost-allocation test seems to make more economic sense, because it is less vague in 
meaning and takes into account the advantages of the dominant firm resulting from vertical integration 
and its disadvantages vis-à-vis more efficient downstream competitors. Fernandez Alvarez-Labrador, 
M., ibid., 260. 
871 Par. 117-118 of the Access Notice. The Commission does not take a clear view on whether the two 
tests are mutually exclusive, although an affirmative approach to this question is inferred from the 
Access Notice. However, some commentators have argued that the second test should be applied at all 
times, even if the result of the first test is positive. Garzaniti, L., Liberatore, F., ibid., 174.  In telecoms, 
competition authorities have shown a preference for the first test; examples are found in Freeserve 
(Oftel, Investigation by the Director General of Telecommunications into alleged anti-competitive 
practices by BT in relation to BTOW consumer broadband products, November 20, 2003) and Deutsche 
Telekom, Commission Decision of 14 October 2003, [2003] OJ L 263/9.  
872 Fernandez Alvarez-Labrador, M., ibid., 259. 
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In BTOpenworld II, OFT applied a different test than the Commission’ s test (B) in the 
Access Notice and required proof of the wholesale input prices being insufficient for 
an ‘equally or more efficient downstream competitor’ to compete in the upstream 
market, but it considered the ‘reasonably efficient competitor’ test more appropriate to 
promote competition under sectoral powers873, which would be the case of electronic 
communications regulation. The same approach was later adopted by the Commission 
in the NGA Recommendation874. BEREC has underlined the increased risk of anti-
competitive cross-subsidization in the NGNs environment, as a result of the higher 
percentage of common costs to be distributed between regulated and unregulated 
products875.  
 
Price squeezes have been found to occur in some of the most controversial cases in the 
sector, all comprising typical demonstration of single dominance.  
 
In Deutsche Telecom876, the Commission found that Deutsche Telecom was applying a 
margin squeeze generated by a disproportion between wholesale charges and retail 
charges for access to the local network. The Commission established that DT was 
cross-subsidising its downstream retail activities through the revenues from its 
upstream wholesale activities, thus charging to new entrants higher fees for wholesale 
access to the local loop than for retail connection to subscribers. As a result, efficient 
competitors could not make a normal profit in providing retail internet access services, 
thus were refused the scope to compete with Deutsche Telecom for end consumers. 
The Commission said that a margin squeeze would occur where  
                                            
873 Par. 3.23 of the decision. 
874 Recital 26 of the NGA Recommendation: “Margin squeeze can be demonstrated by showing that the 
SMP operator’s own downstream operations could not trade profitably on the basis of the upstream 
price charged to its competitors by the upstream operating arm of the SMP operator (‘equally efficient 
competitor’ test). Alternatively, a margin squeeze can also be demonstrated by showing that the margin 
between the price charged to competitors on the upstream market for access and the price which the 
downstream arm of the SMP operator charges in the downstream market is insufficient to allow a 
reasonably efficient service provider in the downstream market to obtain a normal profit (reasonably 
efficient competitor test). In the specific context of ex ante price controls aiming to maintain effective 
competition between operators not benefiting from the same economies of scale and scope and having 
different unit network costs, a ‘reasonably efficient competitor test’ will normally be more appropriate”. 
875 BEREC Common Statement on Next Generation Networks Future Charging Mechanisms/ Long 
Term Termination Issues, BoR(10) 24 Rev 1, 26. 
876 Ibid at footnote 84. 
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“the spread between DT's retail and wholesale prices is either negative or at 
least insufficient to cover DT's own downstream costs”877.  
 
DT would have been unable to offer its own retail services without incurring a loss if it 
had had to pay the wholesale access price. As a consequence the profit margins of 
competitors would be squeezed, even if they were just as efficient as DT878. The 
judgement was upheld by the GC879 and the CJEU880. The judgements clarified the 
following points: 
x The fact that a dominant company’s tariffs are subject to price caps approved 
by a national regulatory authority is not an exemption from competition law;  
x The vertically integrated company’s own costs are the correct benchmark to 
assess whether a reasonable margin is possible for competitors; and  
x A comparison of the prices of the upstream input with a weighted average of 
the prices of the bundle of downstream services for which the upstream input is 
needed can provide evidence of a margin squeeze. 
x A company can still be guilty of operating a margin squeeze despite 
compliance with national regulatory decisions 
x Margin squeezes are determined by reference to the ability and the incentive of 
equally efficient competitors to remain on the market. 
In Wanadoo, the Commission decided that France Telecom's internet access 
subsidiary, Wanadoo, had charged predatory prices for its consumer broadband 
internet access services881. The case was treated as one of predation, but it could have 
also been treated as one of margin squeeze.  
The Commission found that for the period from March 2001 to October 2002, 
Wanadoo had charged its customers prices well below average variable costs and, at a 
later stage, charged prices equivalent to variable costs but significantly below total 
                                            
877 Par. 140 of the decision. 
878 Croscioni, A., ibid., 569, questions the correct implementation of the imputation test in DT: With 
ULL charges set at cost by the RegTP, downstream rivals could always re-enter if DT later attempted to 
raise its downstream rates. Further, DT’s charges for digital and ISDN narrowband network access were 
also regulated as being part of a basket of services subject to a retail cap. 
879 Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, Judgment of 10 April 2008. 
880 Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission [2010] ECR I-9555. 
881 Wanadoo Interactive (COMP/38.233 Wanadoo Interactive, Commission decision of 16 July 2003). 
Commission Press Release IP/01/1899, December 21, 2001. 
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costs. Whilst found to have suffered substantial losses, Wanadoo's market share was 
found to have increased dramatically from 46% to 72% from January ‘01 to September 
‘02.  Significantly, that increase took place on a market that had grown five-fold in the 
same period. 
More specifically the Commission’ s findings had as follows: 
(a) the losses that would have to be incurred by an undertaking wishing to compete 
with Wanadoo would have been prohibitively high, thereby deterring entry in the first 
place 
(b) the growth of competitors already in the market was hampered - none of 
Wanadoo's competitors held more than 10% of the market at the end of the abuse 
period 
(c) one competitor, Mangoosta (an ADSL service provider) went out of business; and 
(d) Wanadoo's main competitor also suffered as a result of Wanadoo's pricing 
practices.  According to the European Commission, the French high speed internet 
access market grew more in the seven months after the predatory behaviour stopped 
than it did during the 17 month infringement period during which time Wanadoo 
sought to secure its position882. 
 
In this case also, the Commission findings were upheld by the GC and the CJEU883, 
which confirmed that France Telecom cannot rely on any absolute right to align its 
prices on those of its competitors in order to justify its conduct where such conduct 
constitutes an abuse of its dominant position. The GC upheld the AKZO test and held 
that, as the choice of the method to calculate the rate of recovery of costs entails a 
complex economic assessment on the part of the Commission, the Commission must 
be afforded a broad discretion884. 
 
In Telefonica, the Commission in its 2007 investigation and decision found that 
Telefonica had inflated the price it sold wholesale broadband access to its competitors 
                                            
882 Refer also to http://www.ffw.com/publications/competition/july2003.aspx. To prevent future abuse, 
Wanadoo has had its accounts on ADSL services placed under European Commission surveillance until 
the end of 2006. The decision was upheld both by the GC in its Judgement of January 30, 2007, Case T-
340/03 and the CJEU in its Judgement of April 2, 2009, France Telecom v. Commission, Case C-
202/07. 
883 Case C-202/07 P, France Télécom SA v Commission. 
884 Case T-340/03 France Télécom v Commission [2007] ECR II-107, par. 129 of the judgement. 
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to a level where they could not effectively compete with Telefonica’s own prices to its 
retail customers. The Commission held this was in breach of Article 102 TFEU as 
Telefonica was held to be in a dominant position on the Spanish wholesale broadband 
market, since it was the only operator in Spain with a nation-wide fixed telephone 
network. By charging this high wholesale price, competitors were forced to price their 
own retail customer prices at such a level they could not effectively compete or gain 
market share from Telefonica. The GC upheld the Commission’s findings885. 
 
In TeliaSonera886, the Commission established at a preliminary stage abuse by the 
Swedish operator, when the latter was found to have predatorily priced a contract for 
the creation of alternative infrastructure for the provision of broadband services with 
the aim of preventing alternative providers to enter the network market887. The CJEU 
explained that in ADSL broadband services a margin squeeze may occur, inter alia, 
where  
‘the spread between the wholesale prices for ADSL input services and the retail 
prices for broadband connection services to end users were either negative or 
insufficient to cover the specific costs of the ADSL input services which 
TeliaSonera has to incur in order to supply its own retail services to end users, 
so that that spread does not allow a competitor which is as efficient as that 
undertaking to compete for the supply of those services to end users’888,  
but required evidence of effect on the competitive situation of competitors, in order to 
classify a margin squeeze as an exclusionary practice, i.e. evidence that the penetration 
of competitors in the market concerned is made more difficult by that practice889. 
 
All the cases referred in the present and the previous sub-section on margin squeezes 
involved abuses of single dominance. In fact, the theoretical connection of the 
conditions precedent to the application of a price squeeze to essential facilities 
indicates that the concept of price squeeze is linked to single dominance890. 
                                            
885 Case T-336/07, Telefónica, SA and Telefónica de España, SA v Commission [2012] 
886 Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB [2011] ECR I-527. 
887 IP/03/1797, December 17, 2003. 
888 Par. 32 of the judgement. 
889 Par. 66 of the judgement. 
890 Refer for details to section 4.3.3, where it was explained that the essential facilities doctrine is 
unsuitable for oligopolistic markets. 
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Commentators have also argued that for a price squeeze to occur, the undertaking 
concerned must hold a position more akin to super dominance891.  
 
There is a higher degree of uncertainty in carrying out an imputation test in 
oligopolistic markets due to the additional number of undertakings under scrutiny; this 
adds also practical difficulties to the prospective application of the test on oligopolistic 
markets. The relevant difficulties were recognised in the Discussion Paper:  
“Companies that are collectively dominant are less likely to be able to predate 
because it may be difficult for the dominant companies to distinguish predation 
against an outside competitor from price competition between the collective 
dominant companies and because they usually lack a (legal) mechanism to 
share the financial burden of the predatory Action”892. 
 
Indeed, the potential abuses investigated under the notifications to the Commission 
pursuant to Article 7 of the Framework Directive involving collective dominance did 
not refer to price squeezes or predatory pricing, which reiterates that this is an issue 
concerning mainly single dominance. Hence, price controls may be relevant in the 
context of regulation in oligopolistic markets to the extent that excessive pricing is 
required to be addressed.  
 
6.3.3 Excessive Pricing 
 
The approach of Article 13 par. 1 of the Access Directive to price controls and in 
particular the distinction between price squeezes and excessive prices reflects the 
corresponding difference between exclusionary and exploitative abusive conduct in 
competition law. Albeit the literal reading of Article 102 and particularly par. (a) 
covers exploitative abuses893, there have been increasing trends in antitrust theory that 
competition law should focus on the exploitative conduct and generally leave it to the 
marketplace to remedy the exclusions. The same views support that 
                                            
891 Whish, R., Competition Law, 4th edition, OUP, 2001, 652. 
892 Par. 98 of the Discussion Paper. 
893 “Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: (a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or 
selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;”. 
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‘competition enforcers should not be minded to help individual competitors, 
and should not see themselves as horse race handicappers whose notion of 
perfect competition is a robustly contended race whose winner is uncertain’894.  
 
The European Commission and the CJEU have been very reluctant in establishing anti-
competitive practices on the basis of excessive pricing, as the latter contains in itself an 
element of subjectivity, thus rendering pricing decisions unstable. Past experience of 
the application of Article 102 has shown that it is not easy to decide whether a price is 
excessive in relation to the economic value of the service provided895. The Guidance 
Paper covers only exclusionary abuses896. It does not discuss exploitative abuses, such 
as excessive pricing or discriminatory conduct, making it clear that such abuses, 
including excessive pricing, do not constitute enforcement priorities of the 
Commission. However, the Competition Committee of the Directorate for Financial 
and Enterprise Affairs explained in a subsequent paper that there are reasons for 
intervening against exploitative conduct, including the need to intervene in cases 
where intervention against exclusionary conduct may legally not be possible897. 
 
The CJEU refused to condemn high levels of prices as such, but decided to pursue 
excessive pricing, if the prices were excessive in relation to the economic value of the 
services provided and if it has the effect of either curbing parallel trade or of unfairly 
exploiting customers, thus launching an element of objectivity in an essentially 
subjective assessment898.  For these reasons there has been relatively little examination 
of excessive prices on the part of the Commission and the case law of the European 
Courts is not particularly helpful in this regard either899. According to economic 
analysis, prices can be considered excessive if they allow the undertaking to sustain 
profits higher it could expect to earn in a competitive market (super-normal profits)900. 
 
                                            
894 Forrester, I., Sector-specific Price Regulation or Antitrust Regulation A Plague on Both Your 
Houses?, [2007] European University Institute Papers, 6. 
895 Refer, e.g. to Case 26/75 General Motors Continental NV v. Commission [1975] ECR 1367. 
896 Paragraph 7 of the Guidance Paper. 
897 Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Competition Committee, Excessive Prices, [2011] 
DAF/COMP/WP2/WD(2011)54, par. 2-8, albeit the Committee recognized the need to apply resources 
mainly in cases of exclusionary conduct. 
898 Kon, S., Turnbull, S., ibid., 82. The scholar’ s remark is based on the CJEU’ s approach to General 
Motors. 
899 Garzaniti, L., ibid., 2nd edition, 2003, 86. 
900 The ERG Common Position on SMP remedies, 37. 
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In United Brands, the Court established that the following conditions should be met 
cumulatively for a price to be excessive901: 
 the difference between the costs and the price charged should be excessive; and 
 the price should be unfair in itself or when compared to competing products902. 
 
In British Leyland903 the CJEU upheld the Commission’s findings that the 
discriminatory fee charged to car dealers for the issue of certificates of conformity for 
vehicles, entailing simple administrative costs was disproportionate to the economic 
value of the service provided, hence constituted a monopoly abuse. In SACEM904, the 
Court held that Article 102 must be interpreted as meaning that a dominant 
undertaking imposes unfair conditions where the royalties charged for the same service 
are appreciably higher than those charged in other Member States and where the rates 
are compared on a consistent basis, unless there is sufficient justification. 
 
 In Scandlines905 the Commission applied the test of United Brands as well as the 
Commission’s findings on the difficulties to establish the excessiveness of a price-cost 
margin, since there is little guidance as to whether a price is unfair when comparisons 
are drawn, if it is possible to make such comparisons at all906. In fact, if the high profit 
margin results from the dominant company being very efficient, it cannot be said that 
the prices are unfair in themselves; hence a comparison of the prices of the dominant 
company with the costs of other companies, for instance with the costs of the next 
most profitable competitor907.  
 
                                            
901 Case 27/76 United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, par. 252. 
902 The element of subjectivity is inherent in the concept of excessive pricing with respect to both the 
definition of “excessive” and of “unfairness”. The uncertainty created by such subjectivity is the reason 
for the traditional refusal of the US Courts to establish anti-competitive behaviour in excessive pricing, 
US v. DuPont de Nemours & Co, [1953] 118 F.Supp. 41, 208. 
903 Case 226/84, Judgment of the Court of 11 November 1986, British Leyland Public Limited Company 
v Commission of the European Communities. 
904 Joint Cases 110/88, 241/88 & 242/88, F. Lucazeau v Societé des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs 
de Musique. 
905 Case COMP/A.36.568/D3 – Scandlines Sverige AB v Port of Helsingborg.  
906 Lamalle, M., Lindstrom-Rossi, L., Teixteir, A., Two important rejection decisions on excessive 
pricing in the port sector, [2004] 3 Competition Policy Newsletter, 40-43. Refer also to Akman, P., 
Garrod, L., When are excessive prices unfair?, CCP Working Paper 10-4, 
http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107587/1.150484!ccp10-04.pdf , who suggest the 
principle of dual entitlement as the basis for defining a price as unfair relative to other comparable 
prices is in line with the goal of an effective probition of excessive prices.  
907 Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Competition Committee, ibid, par. 47.  
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In oligopolies Professor Whish and Sufrin have proposed holding abusive excessive 
prices charged by tacitly collusive oligopolists908. The abuse targets the unfairly high 
price levels imposed by oligopolists on their customers and is based on the wording of 
Article 102(a) TFEU. It thus seems acceptable under the existing legal framework, but, 
according to Petit, 
‘Forbidding excessive price levels in collusive oligopolies has little interest. As 
long as the conditions of tacit collusion subsist, oligopolists will grope for the 
next lower (and lawful) supra-competitive level. Under the socalled “folk 
theorem”, there are indeed rafts of anticompetitive equilibria in tacitly collusive 
oligopolies. Professors Whish and Sufrin proposal is thus only likely to achieve 
distributional transfers from producers to customers, by slightly reclining the 
tacitly collusive equilibrium. Surely, this mitigates the magnitude of the 
anticompetitive effects caused in the market place. But, it will not dispel the 
remaining allocative (price), productive (costs) and dynamic (innovation, 
investments, products) inefficiencies inflicted by tacit collusion’909.  
 
In telecoms, excessive pricing may occur both at retail and at wholesale level. In fact, 
the Commission has launched proceedings in several cases, like international leased 
lines and termination rates910. Unlike predation, excessive pricing may be found occur 
in collective dominance cases911. The twelve cases notified under Article 7 of the 
Framework Directive on wholesale international roaming were initiated from concerns 
following complaints for excessive rates at retail level. If it is accepted that the history 
behind roaming regulation supports the assumption that the SMP regulation has 
possibly failed to address issues of collective dominance in wholesale roaming 
markets, according to the discussion in chapter 4, international roaming is also 
                                            
908 R. Whish and B. Sufrin, Oligopolistic Markets and Competition Law, [1992] 12 Yearbook of 
European Law, 75. 
909 Petit, N., ibid., 67. In support of this submission it is reminded form the analysis of chapter 4 on 
international roaming that by expiry of the extended term of Roaming Regulation which imposed price 
caps on wholesale and retail international roaming services, rates dropped below, but close to regulated 
price caps. Such rates were estimated that they were still on average at least 118% higher than their 
underlying costs. 
910 Following complaints by other operators, the Commission had opened sector inquiries into the prices 
charged by incumbents in various member states for the provision of international leased lines. and for 
termination rates from fixed to mobile networks and vice-versa. Both cases were closed, as in most 
cases under investigation, prices declined significantly in the course of the inquiry IP/99/786, October 
22,1999, IP/99/298, May 4, 1999. 
911 It is reminded from the analysis of section 1.1.1 that under the Bertrand model, firms chose their 
price level, which may be excessive. 
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demonstration of excessive pricing in oligopolistic electronic communications 
markets, which was dealt with through the imposition of price caps on wholesale and 
retail international roaming services. 
 
6.4. Main pricing elements of the telecommunications industry 
6.4.1. General concepts of cost 
 
This last section will discuss elementary cost issues of the electronic communications 
industry and their approach through SMP regulation. The principles applied are the 
same for single and joint SMP. 
 
The telecommunications industry, like most network industries, displays particular 
economic characteristics. These include its multi-product nature; the non-storability of 
its services, time-varying demands and capacity constraints, high fixed and sunk costs, 
the existence of externalities between users, natural monopoly elements and its 
complex vertical structure912. These characteristics affect the cost structure of 
telecommunication networks and services. 
 
The appropriate definition of costs is crucial in any regulated industry, because there 
are different kinds of costs that interact and potentially affect competition in the market 
and also influence regulatory choices. 
 
In general, costs are either fixed or variable with respect to the quantity of output. The 
degree of variability depends on the units of output and the time length of operation. In 
the long term, whose length varies from one process to another, all costs are variable. 
Thus, all production costs exhibit both some fixity and some variability over certain 
levels of output and during certain lengths of time913.  
 
Costs are also distinguished into sunk and avoidable costs. A cost is avoidable if it 
does not have to be incurred once the operation terminates. Normally, variable costs 
                                            
912 Correa, L., The Economics of Telecommunications Regulation, in Walden, I. (ed.), 
Telecommunications Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2002, 31. 
913 Nicolaides, Ph., Polmans, R., Competition in EC Telecommunications: Cross-Subsidisation, Access 
and Predatory Pricing, [1999]4 World Competition, 23-24. 
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are avoidable, but this is not always the case. Costs, which are not avoidable, are sunk. 
These are defined in the US merger guidelines as  
“the acquisition costs of tangible or intangible assets that cannot be 
recovered through redeployment of these assets outside the relevant market”.  
Namely, a sunk cost has to be incurred for the operation to begin, but its termination 
results in no reimbursement or recovery of the initial outlay914.  
 
The addition to total cost from one extra unit of output is the “marginal” cost.  The 
calculation of the marginal cost is used as the basis for the application of various 
pricing systems (marginal pricing). Economists have favoured marginal pricing, 
because it is said to result in efficient allocation of resources and, in addition, in the 
long term, it induces firms to produce at the point at which average cost is 
minimised. A profit-maximising firm, whether operating in competitive conditions 
or not, would set the price at the level where its marginal revenue is equal to its 
marginal cost. If the firm also incurs fixed costs, then, under competitive conditions, 
its marginal revenue (and its marginal cost) would be equal to the average of fixed 
and average variable costs (unit costs)915. 
 
The significance of marginal pricing is also depicted in the implications of prices 
that are not equal to marginal cost:  
“If the price is less than marginal cost, consumers are thereby encouraged to 
purchase that product even if their personal valuation of the good is less than 
the cost of supplying it – this will lead to inefficient over-consumption. 
If the price is above marginal cost, some consumers will be put off from 
buying it by the high price even though they valued the product higher than 
its cost of supply – this leads to inefficient under-consumption of the 
good”916. 
 
of data services, all cause the costs of voice per minute to fall and the decrease of the 
absolute difference in cost per minute between fixed and mobile917.  
                                            
914 Ibid., 24. 
915 Ibid., 26. 
916 Ridyard, D., Exclusionary Pricing and Price Discrimination Abuses under Article 82 – An economic 
Analysis, [2002] ECLR 286. 




Second, for networks which normally enjoy significant economies of scale the 
marginal cost would lay below average cost, hence it would not lead to full cost 
recovery. And, third, incumbents need to make out some profit so as to be encouraged 
to invest in upgrading the network918.  
 
The fixed costs of telecom services result primarily from providing customer access 
(i.e. connection) to the networks. Variable costs depend on the volume of traffic on the 
network. These costs include expenditures to operate switches and carry signals, as 
well as a small portion of billing and collection expenses.  
 
The difference in the level of expenditure involved in both fixed and sunk costs and in 
variable costs incurred mainly by network operators is noticeable. The telecom sector 
is comparatively capital intensive as far as networks are concerned, and particularly the 
access network, which is estimated to cover between one third and one half the 
investment costs. This is despite the fact that investment goals, such as electronic 
equipment, cables and wires, whose costs plays a diminishing role compared with the 
cost of the work needed for their installation, have become cheaper over the past 
years919. 
 
Hence, one of the major problems in the economics of the telecom industry is the 
allocation of fixed costs to the user (end-user or other operator) for providing access to 
the network. Marginal cost pricing retains some desirable properties, but in a dynamic 
context, it has been criticised for failing to remunerate the firm’s fixed costs for several 
reasons. First, the marginal cost is not easy to determine because of the multi-product 
nature of the industry. In such multi-product industries, it may not be always possible 
to attribute precise costs to specific products, because the main reason of existence of 
multi-product firms is precisely to achieve cost-savings, cost-sharing etc.920. It is also 
noted that Next Generation Networks entail changes in cost structure towards a higher 
                                            
918 Nicolaides, Ph., Polmans, R., ibid. 
919 Falch, M., Cost and Demand Characteristics of Telecom Networks in Melody, M. (ed.), Telecom 
Reform: Principles, Policies and Regulatory Practices, DTU, Lyngby, 1997, 108-112. In its 2005 
Communications Review, Ofcom also underlined the decrease in hardware prices, attributed to their 
import from the Far East (par. 1.2.5 of the Review). 
920 Nicolaides, Ph., Polmans, R., ibid., 27. When accounting obligations were imposed on BT in the 
frame of the former regulatory framework, it was shown that half of BT’s costs were whether joint or 
common (refer to Ryan, M., BT’ s Separate Accounts, [1996] 4 CTLR, 147). 
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proportion of common costs of a multi-service network which increase the complexity 
of cost allocation. A higher percentage of common costs to be distributed between 
regulated and unregulated products increases the risk of anti-competitive cross-
subsidisation921.  
 
The fixed costs of telecom services result primarily from providing customer access 
(i.e. connection) to the networks. Variable costs depend on the volume of traffic on the 
network. These costs include expenditures to operate switches and carry signals, as 
well as a small portion of billing and collection expenses.  
 
The difference in the level of expenditure involved in both fixed and sunk costs and in 
variable costs incurred mainly by network operators is noticeable. The telecom sector 
is comparatively capital intensive as far as networks are concerned, and particularly the 
access network, which is estimated to cover between one third and one half the 
investment costs. This is despite the fact that investment goals, such as electronic 
equipment, cables and wires, whose costs plays a diminishing role compared with the 
cost of the work needed for their installation, have become cheaper over the past 
years922. 
 
Hence, one of the major problems in the economics of the telecom industry is the 
allocation of fixed costs to the user (end-user or other operator) for providing access to 
the network. Marginal cost pricing retains some desirable properties, but in a dynamic 
context, it has been criticised for failing to remunerate the firm’s fixed costs for several 
reasons. First, the marginal cost is not easy to determine because of the multi-product 
nature of the industry. In such multi-product industries, it may not be always possible 
to attribute precise costs to specific products, because the main reason of existence of 
multi-product firms is precisely to achieve cost-savings, cost-sharing etc.923. It is also 
noted that Next Generation Networks entail changes in cost structure towards a higher 
                                            
921 BEREC Common Statement on Next Generation Networks Future Charging Mechanisms/ Long 
Term Termination Issues, BoR(10) 24 Rev 1, 26. 
922 Falch, M., Cost and Demand Characteristics of Telecom Networks in Melody, M. (ed.), Telecom 
Reform: Principles, Policies and Regulatory Practices, DTU, Lyngby, 1997, 108-112. In its 2005 
Communications Review, Ofcom also underlined the decrease in hardware prices, attributed to their 
import from the Far East (par. 1.2.5 of the Review). 
923 Nicolaides, Ph., Polmans, R., ibid., 27. When accounting obligations were imposed on BT in the 
frame of the former regulatory framework, it was shown that half of BT’s costs were whether joint or 
common (refer to Ryan, M., BT’ s Separate Accounts, [1996] 4 CTLR, 147). 
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proportion of common costs of a multi-service network which increase the complexity 
of cost allocation. A higher percentage of common costs to be distributed between 
regulated and unregulated products increases the risk of anti-competitive cross-
subsidisation924. The practical result is that the transition to NGN networks, the 
technological convergence of fixed and mobile networks and the growth of data 
services, all cause the costs of voice per minute to fall and the decrease of the absolute 
difference in cost per minute between fixed and mobile925.  
 
As an alternative to pure marginal pricing in telecoms, incremental pricing provides a 
measure of the costs per unit of producing a larger increase in service output926. The 
practical difference between incremental pricing and marginal cost pricing lies in the 
time period that is taken into account for the calculation of cost. Marginal cost pricing 
is more static in the sense that it calculates historic investment cost, whereas 
incremental pricing is more dynamic, i.e. it is a forward – looking assessment of value. 
This feature makes incremental pricing more complicated than marginal pricing, as the 
measurement of incremental cost depends crucially upon the time horizon used. 
Shorter time frames increase average costs, because of the short period of allocation of 
sunk investments. 
 
Second, for networks which normally enjoy significant economies of scale the 
marginal cost would lay below average cost, hence it would not lead to full cost 
recovery. And, third, incumbents need to make out some profit so as to be encouraged 
to invest in upgrading the network927.  
 
6.4.2. Cost-orientation principles 
 
The liberalisation of the telecommunications market which required the development 
of wholesale products, have lead economists in turning to costs as a tool for price 
regulation.  
 
                                            
924 BEREC Common Statement on Next Generation Networks Future Charging Mechanisms/ Long 
Term Termination Issues, BoR(10) 24 Rev 1, 26. 
925 Ibid., 48. 
926 Correa, L., ibid., 53. 
927 Nicolaides, Ph., Polmans, R., ibid. 
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Pricing on the basis of cost is mainly done with the use of one of the following 
methods: 
1) Cost – plus, which calculates tariffs on the basis of historic costs of the 
operator, i.e. the costs the undertakings have faced in order to build and 
maintain infrastructure.  
2) Cost – orientation, which calculates the provision of services at tariffs based on 
current costs, i.e. the value that assets have at the time the evaluation is made. 
This does not imply that tariffs must be equal to current costs, but tariffs are not 
allowed to include excessive prices928. Cost – orientation has been frequently 
discussed as the optimal policy of pricing telecommunication services 
especially interconnection and/or access fees929.  
 
The European Commission has endorsed the principle of cost-orientation in the 
Directives of the 2002 framework, as well as in their revisions of 2009. This is shown 
in the first paragraph of Article 13 of the Access Directive, where cost orientation of 
prices (and only cost orientation) is specifically indicated as falling within the 
authority of the NRAs in relation to pricing obligations. Cost-priced methods are 
considered more favourable to new entrants and, thus, more likely to stimulate 
competition930. The Commission takes the view that cost-orientation can provide full 
justification in markets where competition is not sufficiently strong to prevent 
excessive pricing931.  
 
As pointed out by Nicolaides and Polmans932,  
“cost orientation is a principle that at first glance appears to be so reasonable that it 
cannot be faulted. It aims to force dominant firms to charge prices that reflect their 
current (not historic) costs and to prevent them from earning super-normal profits. 
However, this principle suffers from three significant weaknesses”. 
                                            
928 Sometimes the cost-plus and the cost-orientation method are considered as one and the same method, 
which may be applied on the basis of historic or of current costs, e.g. refer to House of Commons, Trade 
and Industry Committee, UK Broadband Market, 2nd report of session 2003-2004, 
http://www.broadbanduk.org/news/news_pdfs/TISC%20Report%20Feb%2004.pdf. 
929 For example, Lapuerta, C., Tye, W., Lapuerta, C., Tye, W., Promoting effective competitive through 
interconnection policy, [1999] 23 Telecommunications Policy, 139. 
930 Geradin, D., Kerf, M., ibid., 311. 
931 Recital 20 of the Access Directive. The Commission Recommendation on interconnection in a 
liberalised telecommunications market (Part 1 – Interconnection Pricing), [1998] OJ L73/42 clarifies the 
use of models based on LRIC for the purposes of interconnection price regulation. 





a) The arbitrary nature of any method of full-cost allocation in any multiproduct firm; 
in telecoms, additional regard should be taken to the fact that many of the dominant 
operators in the EU have been operated as government departments under public 
budget rules. Appropriate cost allocation is therefore currently extremely difficult, if 
not impossible933.  
b) The inflexibility caused by the obligation on the operator to charge all relevant cost 
items, irrespective of whether they are recoverable, sunk, variable or common. As a 
consequence of such inflexibility, incumbents may try to exaggerate their costs or be 
prevented from lowering their costs when they can, as they deem fit from time to time. 
And last but not least,  
c) Cost–orientation imposes a heavy information burden on regulators. 
 
And, Nicolaides and Polmans continue: 
“[C]ost orientation has been adopted as the pricing tenet of the EC telecoms 
policy because there was concern about the potential for abuse of market 
power by incumbent operators (most of which were legal monopolies) and 
because costs and cost structure were hazy under the old regime of state 
monopolies. Perhaps, at the beginning of any deregulation and liberalisation, 
it is inevitable that rules must be cost based in order to introduce 
transparency and some kind of uniformity of rules across Member States so 
as to encourage greater cross-border market entry. However, as competition 
intensifies and as costs become more visible, it is probably more efficient to 
shift to price based rules and relax the constraints imposed on incumbent 
operators by the requirement for cost orientation”934. 
 
In the same line of thinking, Cave and Crowther consider that cost-oriented pricing for 
interconnection or access to customers should only be considered when dealing with 
                                            
933 Haag, M., Klotz, R., Commission Practice concerning Excessive Pricing in Telecommunications, 
[1998] 2 Competition Policy Newsletter, 36. 
934 Nicolaides, Ph., Polmans, R., ibid., 39. 
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an operator with SMP which is both persistent and incapable of being dealt with by 
other remedies, including structural remedies935.  
 
Wholesale or access pricing is a difficult exercise, because in vertically integrated 
companies it is difficult to isolate the costs of providing retail services and pure access 
costs, notably the fixed costs of the network, which may also contain the overall fixed 
or common costs of the firm as a whole936. Cost-based pricing rules are commonly 
determined with the use of the FDC and LRIC models. 
 
The Fully Distributed Cost (FDC) pricing is one of the oldest pricing models for the 
calculation of marginal cost and requires that each output generate enough revenue to 
cover its attributed and allocated costs937. The joint and common costs for which no 
causal relationship can be found are allocated either in proportion or arbitrarily in full 
to each service. The FDC method was supported by the European Commission in its 
Guidelines on the application of EEC Competition rules in the Telecommunications 
sector, for the detection of cross-subsidisation938. The Commission also recommended 
FDC as a regulatory norm under the former regulatory framework939. FDC is a 
relatively easy to implement cost model, but has been criticised, among other, for the 
arbitrariness entailed in the allocation of joint and common costs and for inefficient 
allocation of resources based on average rather than incremental costs940.  
 
The concept of long-run incremental cost (LRIC)  
“should be used to indicate the addition to total cost over a certain range of 
output, especially when output can expand in non-divisible chunks”941. 
 
                                            
935 Cave, M., Crowther, P., Pre-emptive Competition Policy meets Regulatory Anti-trust, [2005] ECLR,, 
485. 
936 Ibid., 29-30. 
937 The origins of FDC are found in the theory of economics and Ramsey pricing, which marks-up 
services where demand is not responsive to price, i.e. the mark-up varies the price to incremental cost 
ratio in inverse proportion to the elasticity of demand. In practice Ramsey pricing has not been used, 
because it implies a very detailed knowledge of each service demand function and would also lead to 
unfair income distribution, Correa, L., ibid. 
938 [1991] OJ C233/2, par. 106-108. 
939 E.g. in the leased lines and voice telephony Directives, 92/44/EEC and 95/62/EC respectively. 
940 Confraria, J., Noronha, J., Vala, R., Amante, A., On the use of LRIC models in price regulation, at 
http://userpage.fu.berlin.de/¬jmueller/its/conf/dub01/papers/confraria.pdf., 4-10.  
941 Nicolaides, Ph., Polmans, R., ibid., 27. 
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The usual type of LRIC applied in telecom networks is the Long Run Average 
Incremental Cost pricing (LRAIC) which measures the difference in costs between 
producing a service and not producing it942. LRIC is the usual practice set by 
regulators for access pricing943. It is said to take the form of the addition of average 
variable cost of providing network facilities, incorporating a certain amount of profit, 
and of the appropriate share of fixed costs associated with the network and which are 
to be borne by the user944.  
 
Both FDC and the LRAIC may be calculated on the basis of historic or current costs. 
The key difference between LRAIC and FDC lies in the treatment of common costs945. 
On the basis of current costs, FDC is transformed into the so-called CCA (Current 
Cost Allocation) model and LRAIC into the so-called FL-LRAIC. Both models may 
be adjusted with the use of various mark-ups to minimise –to any possible extent- at 
least some of the inefficiencies that are inherent in such models946. In its 
Communication on Interconnection Pricing947, the Commission recommended the use 
of FLLRAIC for interconnection pricing, plus a share of joint costs. 
 
LRIC (but also FDC) can be calculated upwards or downwards. The first, known as 
‘top-down’ cost modelling starts from the operator’ s management accounts of fully 
allocated costs. The first step involves re-valuing the assets on the basis of their 
replacement costs. The non-incremental costs such as non-attributive ‘common costs’ 
are then removed from the accounts and the resulting costs are used to calculate the 
                                            
942 Confraria, J., Noronha, J., Vala, R., Amante, A., ibid., 16. 
943 BEREC (ibid., 51-52) recommends the strict application of cost orientation in the current Calling 
Party Pay (CPP) environment in the short/medium term for mobile and fixed networks claiming that 
bringing down mobile termination rates to efficient cost levels is a major step towards Bill and Keep 
(BaK). 
944 Nicolaides, Ph., Polmans, R., ibid., 29-30. 
945 FDC attributes to the service under scrutiny only the costs directly determined or caused by that 
service. In its Communication on Interconnection Pricing in a Liberalised Telecommunications Market, 
[1998] OJ C-84/1, the Commission established that the accounting systems used by most of the ex-
monopolists operators, were based on fully distributed historic costs, which were insufficient to support 
cost-orientation obligations. It also directed the development of new accounting systems and the setting 
of deadlines for their implementation, where the common costs should be attributed to the fullest extent 
possible, taking into account the relevant direct and indirect cost drivers. 
946 There are also other financial models that have been used for the pricing of electronic communication 
services, like the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) approach that looks at whether the profitability over a 
product life is sufficient to remunerate the capital invested given the underlying risk, Crocioni, A., ibid., 
567. In Freeserve, Oftel had concluded that the DCF approach was appropriate for ‘immature’ services, 
like consumer broadband access (par. 6.149 of the decision). 
947 European Commission, Communication on Interconnection Pricing in a Liberalised 
Telecommunications Market, [1998] OJ C/84. 
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incremental costs of a service on a per unit basis. The second approach is known as 
‘bottom-up’ cost modelling and it involves the construction of an 
engineering/economic model of an optimal telecommunications network. By changing 
certain demand parameters for individual services, it is then possible to calculate the 
incremental costs of that service. The bottom-up model in designing an optimal 
telecommunications network rather than using the actual network in place is argued to 
remove the margin of inefficiency implicit in most incumbent’ s network, thereby 
allowing only efficient costs to be recovered through the interconnect charges948. 
 
In the Access Notice, the European Commission has placed particular consideration on 
the time frame to be taken into account for the necessary cost analysis, which should 
be neither a very short nor a very long run949. The Commission argued that a test 
different from the simple variable cost standard is required in industries such as 
telecoms, because the existence of high fixed costs creates excessive room for 
incumbent firm pricing responses. Since its Recommendation on interconnection 
pricing, the Commission suggested the use of an FL-LRAIC cost standard for 
interconnection pricing950. The rationale behind the suggestion for an LRIC test is that 
such pricing method includes an appropriate amount to remunerate capital costs of 
investing in the network, thus amounting to a requirement to cover something akin to 
the “average total costs” of manufacture951. In the Termination Rates 
Recommendation952, the Commission imposed the application of the BU-LRAIC+ 
model and has strictly requested compliance with such model in the market 
notifications concerning termination markets953.  
 
In its 2nd Recommendation on NGA, the Commission provides the adoption of a BU 
LRIC + costing methodology that estimates the current cost that a hypothetical 
efficient operator would incur to build a modern efficient network, which is an NGA 
network, without prejudice to whether an NGA network in the relevant geographic 
                                            
948 Correa, L., ibid., 53. 
949 Par. 114 of the Access Notice. 
950 Commission Recommendation of 8 January 1998 on interconnection in a liberalised 
telecommunications market (Part 1 – Interconnection Pricing), [1998] OJ L73/42, par. 3. 
951 Ridyard, D., Exclusionary Pricing and Price Discrimination Abuses under Article 82 – An economic 
Analysis, [2002] ECLR, 301. 
952 Commission Recommendation of 7 May 2009 on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile 
Termination Rates in the EU, [2009] L124/67, par. 2. 
953 For example, Cases DE/2013/1460, EE/2012/1352, LV/2012/1356.  
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market is subject to an obligation of regulated wholesale access pricing, pursuant to the 
provisions of the 1st Recommendation on NGA954. 
  
As a condition precedent to the application of cost-orientation principles, article 13 
par. 4 of the Access Directive provides that a description of the cost-accounting system 
“showing at least the main categories under which costs are grouped and the rules used 
for the allocation of costs” should be made publicly available, where its 
implementation “is mandated in order to support price controls”. Without a proper cost 
attribution model, the FDC and LRIC standards make no sense. In a study completed 
by Anderson Business Consulting in 2002 on behalf of the Commission, it was stated 
that the failure by most of the then Member-States to identify transfer charges internal 
to the SMP operator, made detection of discrimination impossible955. The Framework 
Directive, the Universal Service Directive and the Access Directive have all 
recognised the significance of the application of proper accounting systems for 
regulatory controls956. 
 
The cost attribution model (cost accounting system) should determine how costs are to 
be allocated between the various services, including wholesale and retail and also 
determine how costs are allocated between product markets where the undertaking has 
SMP and “non-SMP products”. In the words of Andrew Tarrant957,  
“the boundaries of the allocation model must migrate so that they serve as a 
tool for policing the boundary between the SMP area and the non-SMP 
areas”. 
 
The current regulatory framework does not impose the use of a particular cost 
accounting system and allows NRAs to impose transparency requirements with respect 
                                            
954 Commission Recommendaiton 2013/466/EU of 11 September 2013 on consistent non-discrimination 
obligations and costing methodologies to promote competition and enhance the broadband investment 
environment [2013] OJ L251/13, par. 31. 
955 Andersen Business Consulting, Study on the implementation of cost accounting methodologies and 
accounting separation by telecommunications operators with significant market power, July 2002, 29. 
956 Article 17 par. 4 of the Universal Service Directive, Annex VII of the Framework Directive, Article 
13 par. 4 of the Access Directive. 
957 Tarrant, A., ibid., 279. 
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to the applied cost-accounting systems but refrains from setting explicit obligations in 
relation to the structure of the attribution model958.  
 
Without prejudice to the limited knowledge of economics, the present research has not 
identified specific references to the need to treat oligopolies different from monopolies 
in case NRAs hold that pricing measures are warranted. However, from the 
combination of the following  
a) that in oligopolistic markets concerns are more likely to arise as a result of 
excessive rather than predatory rates or margin squeezes; 
b) that the increased transparency that may be caused by the publication of a 
detailed cost attribution model may increase transparency, which is a factor 
enhancing rather than combatting collusion and 
c) that there are voices, like the abovementioned Nicolaides and Polman, 
considering more efficient the shift to price-based rules if costs become more 
visible (which may be the case in transparent oligopolies), 
one may validly consider that the application of price-based rules to oligopolistic 
electronic communications markets is worth exploring959.  
6.5. Conclusions 
 
This chapter has completed the review of the applicable SMP framework in electronic 
communications with the examination of pricing measures applied in the context of 
                                            
958 Article 13 par. 4 of the Access Directive requires an annual statement of compliance to accompany 
cost-accounting obligations. The audit may be performed by the NRA, provided that it has the necessary 
qualified staff, or by an independent auditor (recital 21 of the Framework Directive). 
959 The most usual price-base rule is retail-minus that has been applied for the regulation of wholesale 
access prices and calculates the price charged to the competitor by reference to the retail price of the 
standard service and deducting therefrom the avoided costs for the production of the part of the service 
that is not being ordered by the competitor. The retail minus approach is a simplified form of the 
“efficient – component pricing” (ECP) or “parity principle”, compensating the operator for the costs of 
access provision, namely the foregone income from the downstream service minus the direct cost saved 
by not providing own service. The retail minus adds to the benefit of the operator opportunity cost (the 
cost of capital) is said to compensate the incumbent for lost opportunity, because it includes part of the 
incumbent’s foregone profit Caune, R., Downstream Access in the UK Postal Market: Postcomm’ s 
Proposal, [2003] Util. Law Rev., 47. Geradin, D., Kerf, M., ibid., 313. The arguments in favour of such 
approach are that the ECP rule offers a strong incentive to network operators not to oppose the entry of 
efficient downstream service providers; that predatory behaviour by the incumbent is avoided, because 
if the rates to the final user are lowered, then access rates should be reduced also. In addition, the ECP 
rule is favoured as easier to apply, because information on retail prices is easier to obtain than its 
breakdown into access rates. Finally, it is argued that the ECP rule does not operate to the detriment of 
competitors, because the latter will contribute to a more efficient allocation of resources if they are at 
least as cost-efficient as the incumbent, or even more efficient than the incumbent, Nicolaides, Ph., 
Polmans, R., ibid., 30-31. 
243 
 
Article 13 par. 1 of the Access Directive. The relevance of Article 13 of the Access 
Directive for the regulation of collective dominance lays mainly in the event of 
detection of excessive prices, since it is unlikely that margin squeezes or predation 
occur in oligopolistic markets. Suggesting the optimum method of calculation of the 
regulated rate is out of the scope and potential of this work; however, given the lack of 
specific research on the subject, one may validly consider that the application of price-
based rules to oligopolistic electronic communications markets is worth exploring. 
244 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusions of the thesis 
 
The present work has examined the thesis that, under the SMP framework for 
electronic communications, joint dominance is considered a very rare occasion that 
may arise in symmetrical duopolies; there are strong doubts on whether the existing 
framework is capable of addressing more complex issues associated with oligopolies 
in electronic communication markets.  
 
The starting point of the current research was the remark that there is an increasing 
number of telecommunications markets with oligopoly characteristics. Wholesale 
network markets in electronic communications may exhibit oligopoly characteristics 
and there may be concern that these markets are conducive to tacit collusion. However: 
 
A. The focus of ex ante SMP regulation in electronic communications has been on the 
monopolies of the former incumbents and builds on traditional single dominance 
principles, that may be difficult to adapt to the more complex assessment of 
oligopolistic behavior. The decision to regulate joint dominance in electronic 
communications ex ante, through the application of the dominance test, rests on the 
paradox that there is not a single Article 102 case precedent, where collective 
dominance was found to exist. The analysis of section 1.1.2 has shown that the concept 
of collective dominance was developed mainly in the context of merger cases, which 
suggests a lower evidence threshold due to ex ante speculation as opposed to the ex 
post proof, which seems more robust than ex ante speculation. The application of the 
stronger dominance test of Article 102 may not tally with the relaxation of the 
evidentiary burden after the Impala judgment. 
 
The analysis has demonstrated that, despite the intent of the Commission to regulate 
oligopolistic market structures next to monopoly situations, which is expressed in the 
definition of SMP in electronic communications of Article 14 par. 2 of the Framework 
Directive, the Commission’s thinking has been too much dominated by the concept of 
single dominance, which is found at the core of ex ante regulation in electronic 
communications markets. The history of telecommunications regulation has shown 
that, as a result of the former monopolistic nature of the sector, the focus of EU 
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regulators has always been on the regulation of the former incumbent. Each of the 
three steps of SMP regulation (market definition, assessment of market power and 
choice of remedies) indicates that the regulation of oligopolistic markets is placed at 
the lower end of the Commission’s priorities, as opposed to regulation of market 
power exercised by incumbents. 
 
Given the inevitable complexities inherent in the assessment of joint dominance 
coupled with the need to review factors that may lead to conflicting credible 
conclusions, i.e. they may support credibly either the existence or the absence of 
collective dominance on the same market, and the high level of proof required for the 
establishment of joint dominance cases, creates doubts on whether there may be 
findings by NRAs on collective dominance in the long run under the SMP framework 
for electronic communications. The review of market notifications made by NRAs 
under Article 7 of the Framework Directive involving collective dominance shows a 
general trend for pleas on the absence of one condition discrediting in their entirety 
tacit collusion theories of harm.  
 
In a dynamic and forward-looking market analysis as in the case of the analysis 
requested by the Commission in the Guidelines, it is doubted whether any economic 
analysis would be able to provide the degree of certainty requested under Article 102. 
Despite original ‘enthusiasm’ in the very first years of application of the framework on 
the concept of collective dominance, the number of cases that have examined 
prospective issues of collective dominance remains extremely low if compared with 
the total number of notifications in the period 2003-2013 (47 cases on a total 1300+ 
notifications) and is practically non-existent since 2008. What is ‘bizarre’ is not that 
there are no markets in electronic communications with established collective 
dominance today, but that –with the exception of assessments made by the Maltese 
NRA in the former duopolistic markets of mobile access and wholesale broadband 
access- NRAs in the 28 member-States do not examine oligopolistic markets at all. 
The impression gained from the review of NRA notifications is that joint dominance is 
considered a very rare occasion that may arise in symmetrical duopolies, a position 
that may be possibly in compliance with the approach to light-handed regulation and 




B. International wholesale roaming has been examined as a case study of the failure of 
the existing framework to address the complex interrelationships between collectively 
dominant players. The case study proves that once an oligopolistic market is identified, 
the burden of proving that it breaches Article 102 is very onerous. Despite prima facie 
concerns of collective dominance, the subsequent analysis of NRAs resembles to a 
search for market characteristics that can negate this preliminary conclusion by 
proving the absence of one condition.  
 
The NRAs that conducted their market research on the international roaming market 
acknowledged the existence of excessive international roaming charges compared with 
national calls, as well as the existence of factors inducing the market to a co-ordinated 
outcome, but they placed emphasis on the existence of the pan-European alliances for 
the provision of roaming services, which they considered inhibiting transparency and 
retaliation. However, the prospect of retaliatory mechanisms at retail level through 
‘price wars’ consisting in the deviation from the principles of the common commercial 
strategy, was not examined, albeit the ERG had found low elasticity of demand in the 
direction of international roaming traffic towards alliance or group partners and the 
findings of the Impala judgments with respect to transparency and retaliation have not 
been taken into account. It is reasonable to assume that NRAs have refrained from 
regulating wholesale international roaming tariffs at a national level, in order to avoid 
limiting the profit margins of national operators set in favor of international roaming 
customers and foreign mobile network operators.   
 
It is noted further that the process for the identification of trans-border roaming 
markets susceptible to ex ante regulation was not adhered to, despite the acknowledged 
cross-border nature of the services and the possibility of collusion between the biggest 
international alliances operating in the European roaming market. It is supportable to 
assume that, in recognizing the failure of SMP regulation to address collective 
dominance in wholesale roaming markets, the Commission decided to depart from the 
SMP framework in electronic communications and passed the Roaming Regulations. 
According to the Commission, the volume of the roaming market has increased and 




If the Commission decides to place more weight to the prospective regulation of 
oligopolistic markets in electronic communications (and this is primarily a policy 
decision), Annex II of the Framework Directive and/or the Guidelines should be 
revised. It must be made clear that NRAs should take into account the following 
factors when analyzing markets with concerns of collective dominance:  
i) market concentration and particularly the number of players in the market 
as opposed to market shares, although the existence of symmetries between 
market players in terms of shares and of cost structures must be taken into 
account;  
ii) transparency, which may be presumed in the absence of credible 
explanation for the justification of alignment of prices in the frame of the 
Impala  judgement; 
iii) the existence of retaliation mechanisms, which may be also determined 
indirectly after the Impala judgement; 
iv) the exercise of competitive constraints by the competitive fringe and 
potential competitors; 
v) the countervailing power of buyers. 
 
The NRAs should collect market data suggestive of tacit collusion and, on this basis 
build a theory of harm. They should then verify the foregoing factors and establish if 
they comply with the theory of harm.  
 
C. The Commission has defined narrow product markets and through such narrow pre-
definition, it limits considerably the assessment of prospective collective dominance 
issues. These policy decisions place the regulation of oligopolistic markets at the lower 
end of regulatory priorities, as opposed to regulation of market power exercised by 
monopolists. It is noted that in the first ten years of application of the SMP framework, 
none of the notifications on markets different from the list of the Recommendation 
involved a market with oligopolistic characteristic or concerns of collective 
dominance.  
 
Through the definition of a separate market for the termination of calls on individual 
networks, the Commission has pre-established single dominance on the markets for 
call termination on both mobile and fixed networks. One possible explanation is that 
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the Commission, in recognising the complexities involved in the assessment of factors 
capable of establishing collective dominance, did not want to leave lea-way to NRAs 
to refuse the regulation of termination charges unregulated. It may also be the case, 
that the narrow market definition of the termination markets is the result of cellophane 
fallacy effects, notably of the failure to capture the oligopolistic nature (and 
interactions) of the relevant market, hence defining network operators as monopolists 
rather than oligopolists.  
 
The delineation of a separate market for terminating segments of leased lines also 
points to the designation of the former incumbent as monopolist in the relevant market. 
The two markets defined for broadband access are the only markets where, 
theoretically, joint dominance can be established between operators providing 
broadband through different platforms, particularly as the Commission does not 
preclude the merging of the two markets into one.  
 
The Commission has excluded mobile services, which is the classic example of 
oligopolistic structure in telecoms, from the list of regulated markets, with the 
exception of call termination which applies on calls made on both fixed and mobile 
platforms, despite indications that the market may not be sufficiently competitive in 
some member-states. This reflects the Commission’s political decision to leave mobile 
services out of regulation. 
 
Finally, the lack of definition of any transnational market provides further 
demonstration of the fact that, through SMP regulation, the Commission’s focus is still 
on incumbents’ operation at national level. For the purposes of the review of oligopoly 
regulation in the telecommunications sector, such decision would be of particular 
interest, given the limited number of undertakings that operate trans-nationally. It is 
expected that, in this process and in view of the increasingly global character of 
network markets, the Commission examines the structure of existing European 
networks, whether applied for voice, Internet or other applications, to identify potential 
‘top-level’ or key networks for the connectivity of trans-national network markets. 
 
If the Commission decides to place more weight on the prospective regulation of 
oligopolistic markets in the future, the European framework on SMP regulation should 
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be revised in order to encompass wider market definitions. Wider market definitions 
will allow the assessment of prospective joint SMP held by operators present in the 
market. In that respect, the Commission should consider the definition of wider 
markets for the origination and termination of calls, encompassing multiple networks 
and possibly multiple platforms. Alternatively, the Commission may opt for the 
definition of a market for the termination of all off-net calls with a possible further 
segmentation by reference to the platform where the call is terminated (mobile, fixed 
etc.). Further, there should be one market for broadband access, encompassing all 
types of access. 
 
D. In the context of remedies, the existing framework does not differentiate between 
single and collective SMP and does not give any guidance on the application of the 
separate categories of remedies in oligopolistic markets. 
 
Yet, transparency, non-discrimination and accounting separation obligations, which are 
essentially one and the same measure, may create additional distortions in oligopolistic 
environments, if they are not applied with caution. Transparency obligations create the 
risk of causing the opposite result of their intended purpose, since they are likely to 
further collusion rather than prevent it by allowing the operators to observe each 
other’s charges and making cooperation easier; hence, they should focus on issues that 
may bring factors capable of preventing collusion into light.  
 
The indispensability of transparency for the application of non-discrimination 
obligations also impairs the efficiency of the latter on oligopolistic markets. In 
addition, non discrimination obligations enhance stability and similarity in cost 
structures, which is considered a further factor inductive to tacit collusion. Non-
discrimination obligations should be treated with caution in the context of regulation of 
oligopolistic markets also because excuses supporting a transaction-specific efficiency 
defence under general competition law principles, are easier to find in a complex 
oligopolistic environment with no monopoly equilibrium. The collusive access price 
may already be non discriminatory, whereas discriminatory pricing or selective price-
cutting by one of the undertakings may mean that price competition is in fact operating 




The direct association of accounting separation with the obligations on transparency 
and non-discrimination suggests that problems similar to that identified in relation to 
transparency and non-discrimination also apply in this area regarding co-ordinated 
effects and the possible promotion or facilitation of tacit collusion through the 
imposition of obligations on accounting separation; the exchange of business 
information may be facilitated and, consequently, the sustainability of a common 
position towards competitors and consumers. However, the downsides of the measure 
may be mitigated if the information is not disclosed by NRAs to third parties. 
 
Finally, functional separation is not considered appropriate for the regulation of 
oligopolistic network markets. On top of the generally known risks entailed in 
structural separation (risk of welfare losses and particularly of the concern that the 
remaining set of functions will not operate as incentive to innovate), the efficiency of 
structural separation for the purposes of regulating oligopolistic markets is disputed 
further, because of the increased transparency created through the separation of 
operations. Also, economists have challenged the effectiveness of structural remedies 
in oligopolistic environments on the grounds that inappropriate divestments may 
actually facilitate collusion by restructuring an industry in a more symmetric way.  
 
Access obligations are inevitable for the regulation of SMP in electronic 
communications. However, they enhance co-operation between the undertakings 
involved and, as such, facilitate the exchange of information between competitors and, 
thus, collusion, which may eventually reduce the efficiency of their several application 
in oligopolistic environments. Economic analysis has shown that entry through access 
obligations, if they are not complemented by some form of price regulation, may also 
lead to higher prices, particularly in markets with more than two players or where there 
is already collusion between the oligopolistic players.  
 
Also, unlike single SMP, there should be no absolute approach against intervention at 
retail level in oligopolistic situations, because measures taken at retail may be capable 
of remedying anti-competitive practices at wholesale level, in oligopolies where the 
same players are active both at wholesale and retail level and the effects of collusion at 
wholesale are passed on to retail customers directly. It is, therefore, suggested that the 
revised framework allows the taking of measures at retail level directly, since the 
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absolute position taken in SMP regulation against intervention at retail level is 
incorrect for oligopolistic markets. 
 
The foregoing remarks should be made clear in a future revision of the Access 
Directive or of the Guidelines. 
 
As an alternative to access obligations, it is worthy of exploring with further economic 
analysis the option of imposing penalties on collectively dominant undertakings and 
applying the receivables of such penalties for the financing of network roll-out by new 
entrants. On condition that such scheme could obtain the required prior consent under 
Article 107(3) TFEU, the suggested option may exercise competitive pressure on the 
oligopolists, since there is general consensus that the most credible pressure in anti-
competitive oligopolies may be exercised by new entry. 
 
Finally, the relevance of Article 13 of the Access Directive for the regulation of 
collective dominance lays mainly in the event of detection of excessive prices, since it 
is unlikely that margin squeezes or predation occur in oligopolistic markets. 
Suggesting the optimum method of calculation of the regulated rate is out of the scope 
and potential of this work; however, given the lack of specific research on the subject, 
one may validly consider that the application of price-based rules to oligopolistic 
electronic communications markets is worth exploring. 
 
In closing, it must be emphasised that the effectiveness and correct application of any 
SMP framework depends on administrative skills, notably the training and skills of the 
staff involved. Market assessment and the choice of applicable remedies for the 
regulation of market power particularly in oligopolistic markets is not a mechanical or 
abstract process but requires an analysis of any available evidence of market behaviour 
and an overall understanding of the mechanics of the electronic communications 
sector. Accurate market identification, the assessment of market power and application 
of the correct pricing measures which are all essential for the proper regulation of 
oligopolistic electronic communications markets depend to a great extent on the proper 
gathering of all necessary information, findings and studies commissioned or relied 
upon by NRAs in exercising their regulatory tasks and on the education, skills and 




The thesis has not examined the practical query of adequacy or competence of 
personnel employed by NRAs for the application of the SMP framework in so far as 
the implementation of the suggestions for the revision of the framework to allow the 
more efficient regulation of telecommunications markets. It is acknowledged, though, 
that the positive reply to this query is a condition precedent to the success of any 
revision of the framework and additional input will be required on the necessary 
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